Nodal Pricing Basics. Drew Phillips Market Evolution Program
|
|
- Austen Lang
- 7 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 Nodal Pricing Basics Drew Phillips Market Evolution Program 1
2 Agenda What is Nodal Pricing? Impedance, Power Flows Losses and Limits Nodal Price Examples No Losses or Congestion Congestion Only Impact of Transmission Rights Losses Only How DSO Calculates Nodal Prices 2
3 What is Nodal Pricing? Nodal Pricing = Locational Marginal Pricing (LMP) = Locational Based Marginal Pricing (LBMP) Nodal Pricing is a method of determining prices in which market clearing prices are calculated for a number of locations on the transmission grid called nodes Each node represents the physical location on the transmission system where energy is injected by generators or withdrawn by loads Price at each node represents the locational value of energy, which includes the cost of the energy and the cost of delivering it, i.e., losses and congestion IMO publishes nodal prices for information purposes; they are referred to as shadow prices 3
4 What causes locational differences? Losses Due to the physical characteristics of the transmission system, energy is lost as it is transmitted from generators to loads Additional generation must be dispatched to provide energy in excess of that consumed by load Transmission congestion Prevents lower cost generation from meeting the load; higher cost generation must be dispatched in its place In both cases, the associated costs are allocated to each node in a manner that recognizes their individual contribution to/impact on these extra costs 4
5 Impedance, Power Flows, Losses and Limits 5
6 Impedance and its effect on power flows Impedance Is a characteristic of all transmission system elements Signifies opposition to power flow A higher impedance path indicates more opposition to power flow and greater losses Impedance between two points on the grid is related to: Line length Number of parallel paths Voltage level Number of series elements such as transformers Impedance will be lower where there are: Shorter transmission lines More parallel paths Higher voltage Fewer series transformers 6
7 Relative Impedance and Power Flow Gen Load Transformer 230 kv 115 kv Energy will flow preferentially on the 230 kv path: Higher voltage More lines in parallel Fewer transformers 7
8 Power Flows Power will take all available paths to get from supply point to consumption point Power flow distribution on a transmission system is a function of: Location and magnitude of generation Location and magnitude of load Relative impedance of the various paths between generation and load The following examples ignore the effect of losses 8
9 Power Flows N Load 75 % N W Gen W E E Gen S 25 % All lines have equal impedance Path W-S-E-N has three times the impedance of path W-N Flow divides inversely to impedance If W Gen supplies N Load, flow W-S-E-N is one third flow W-N If N Load is 100 MW, 75 MW flows on path W-N, 25 MW flows on path W-S-E-N 9
10 What if E Gen supplies N Load? N Load N 75 % W 25 % E E Gen S Path E-S-W-N has three times the impedance of path W-N Flow divides inversely to impedance If E Gen supplies N Load, flow E-S-W-N is one third flow E-N If N Load is 100 MW, 75 MW flows on path E-N, 25 MW flows on path E-S-W-N 10
11 Superposition N Load 100 MW N ( ) MW 45 MW ( ) 30 MW 60 MW W Gen W 10 MW E E Gen 40 MW (15 10) 5 MW 5 MW 15 MW (15 10) S What if W Gen supplies 60 MW and E Gen supplies 40 MW to N Load? Both W Gen and E Gen s output will flow in proportion to the impedance of the paths to N Load Resulting line flows represent the net impact of their flow distribution 11
12 Loss Comparison for 100 km Lines 90 MW 180 A 89.9 MW 500 kv 90 MW 390 A 88.5 MW A 230 kv 90 MW 780 A 115 kv 79.5 MW Current (Amps) Losses are: proportional to Current 2 x Resistance (I 2 R) lower on higher voltage lines because resistance is lower and current flow is lower for a given MW flow 12
13 Loss Comparison Losses (M W) Current (I) Losses are higher on a line that is heavily loaded for the same increase in current = 13
14 Security Limits Security limits are the reliability envelope in which the market operates Power will take all available paths to get from supply point to consumption point Transmission lines do not control or limit the amount of power they convey Power flows are managed by dispatching the system (normally via dispatch instructions and interchange scheduling) Must respect current conditions and recognized contingencies 14
15 Nodal Price Examples 15
16 How are nodal prices derived? Marginal cost is the cost of the next MW; the marginal generator is the generator that would be dispatched to serve the next MW This is the basis of our current unconstrained market clearing price A nodal price is the cost of serving the next MW of load at a given location (node) Nodal prices are formulated using a security constrained dispatch and the costs of supply are based upon participant offers and bids Nodal prices consist of three components: Nodal Price Marginal Cost of Generation Marginal Cost of Losses = + + Marginal Cost of Transmission Congestion 16
17 Current Pricing Scheme $ Uniform Price Market Participants Bids/ s IMO Bids/ s Unconstrained Calculation ignores physical limitations Constrained Calculation considers physical limitations Market Schedule Schedule CMSC able resources produce or consume MWs Nodal Prices Currently calculated for information purposes only 17
18 Nodal Price Calculations No Congestion or Losses With Congestion With Losses Process: Determine least cost dispatch to serve load Determine resulting power flows to ensure security limits are respected Calculate prices by determining the dispatch for one additional MW at each node (while still respecting all limits) 18
19 No Congestion or Losses 19
20 No Congestion or Losses: Transmission Limit = 85 MW N Load N 100 MW 75 MW 25 MW $30 W Gen W E E Gen $ MW 25 MW S 25 MW 0 MW Least cost solution would have W Gen supply all 100 MW to N Load, based on W Gen s offer price Resultant flow is within limits Nodal price is the cost of serving the next MW What are the prices at each node? 20
21 No Congestion or Losses: Node N Price $30 Transmission Limit = 85 MW N Load 100 MW + 1 MW N ( ) MW $ MW ( ) W Gen 100 MW +1 MW W MW MW ( ) S ( ) E E Gen $35 0 MW Price at Node N is the cost of supplying next 1 MW to N Least cost solution would have W Gen supply the next MW to N, based on W Gen s offer price Resultant flow would be within limits (net of existing flow and increment to serve additional 1 MW at Node N) W Gen is the marginal generator and Node N price = $30 21
22 No Congestion or Losses: Node W Price Transmission Limit = 85 MW N Load N 100 MW 75 MW 25 MW $ MW W Gen W $30 E E Gen $ MW +1 MW 25 MW S 25 MW 0 MW Price at Node W is the cost of supplying next 1 MW at W Least cost solution would have W Gen supply the next MW to W, based on W Gen s offer price Resultant flow would be within limits (net flow change is zero) W Gen is the marginal generator and Node W price = $30 22
23 No Congestion or Losses: Node E Price Transmission Limit = 85 MW N Load N 100 MW (75 +.5) 75.5 MW 24.5 MW (25 -.5) $30 W Gen W + 1 MW $30 E E Gen $ MW +1 MW 25.5 MW 25.5 MW (25 +.5) S (25 +.5) 0 MW Price at Node E is the cost of supplying next 1 MW to E Least cost solution would have W Gen supply the next MW to N, based on W Gen s offer price Resultant flow would be within limits (net of existing flow and increment to serve additional 1 MW at Node E) W Gen is the marginal generator and Node E price = $30 23
24 No Congestion or Losses: Node S Price Transmission Limit = 85 MW N Load N 100 MW ( ) MW MW ( ) $30 W Gen W E E Gen $ MW +1 MW MW $ MW ( ) S ( ) + 1 MW 0 MW Price at Node S is the cost of supplying next 1 MW at S Least cost solution would have W Gen supply the next MW to S, based on W Gen s offer price Resultant flow would be within limits (net of existing flow and increment to serve additional 1 MW at Node S) W Gen is the marginal generator and Node S price = $30 24
25 Summary The previous examples demonstrate the method used to derive nodal prices As we would expect, the nodal prices at all nodes on a transmission system will be the same in the absence of losses and congestion Unfortunately, no such transmission system exists The following examples will apply the same method to illustrate the calculation under conditions of congestion and then losses Examples: are not representative of how the IMO-controlled grid is dispatched and therefore the impact on nodal prices is entirely fictitious; these scenarios were designed to illustrate a concept while keeping the calculation as simple as possible are for illustrative purposes only and do not imply a settlement basis for a nodal pricing methodology for Ontario 25
26 Congestion, No Losses 26
27 Congestion (No Losses): Transmission Limit = 75.2 MW N Load N 100 MW 75 MW 25 MW $30 W Gen W E E Gen $ MW 25 MW S 25 MW 0 MW Assume the transmission limit is reduced; dispatch can be solved as in the no congestion case, but what is the effect on nodal prices? 27
28 Congestion (No Losses): Node N Price Transmission Limit = 75.2 MW N Load 100 MW + 1 MW N 75.2 MW $ MW $30 W Gen W E 100 MW 24.7 MW 24.7 MW -.1 MW S E Gen $35 0 MW +1.1 MW An increase in output of 1 MW by either W Gen or E Gen alone will increase the W-N line flow over the limit; we must redispatch the system using both generators If we reduce W Gen output by 0.1 MW (75% of the reduction will appear on W to N flow) and increase E Gen output by 1.1 MW (25% flows from N to W), net effect is on line W-N is a flow increase of.2 MW This is the lowest cost way to meet an additional 1 MW at N Node N price = $35.50 (1.1 X $ X $30) 28
29 Congestion (No Losses): Node E Price Transmission Limit = 75.2 MW N Load N 100 MW $30 W Gen 100 MW +.4 MW W 75.2 MW 24.8 MW 25.2 MW S $ MW + 1 MW E E Gen $35 0 MW +.6 MW An increase in output of 1 MW by either W Gen or E Gen alone will increase the W-N line flow over the limit; we must redispatch the system using both generators If we increase W Gen output by 0.4 MW (50% flows from W to N) and increase E Gen output by.6 MW (0% flows from N to W), net effect is on line W-N is a flow increase of.2 MW This is the lowest cost way to meet an additional 1 MW at E Node E price = $33 (0.6 X $ X $30) 29
30 Congestion (No Losses): Node S Price Transmission Limit = 75.2 MW N Load N 100 MW 75.2 MW 24.8 MW $30 W Gen W E E Gen $ MW +.9 MW 25.7 MW $30.50 S + 1 MW 24.7 MW 0 MW +.1 MW An increase in output of 1 MW by either W Gen or E Gen alone will increase the W-N line flow over the limit; we must redispatch the system using both generators If we increase W Gen output by 0.8 MW (25% flows from W to N) and increase E Gen output by.2 MW (25% flows from N to W), net effect is on line W-N is a flow increase of.2 MW This is the lowest cost way to meet an additional 1 MW at E Node S price = $30.50 (0.1 X $ X $30) 30
31 Congestion (No Losses): Node W Price Transmission Limit = 75.2 MW N Load N 100 MW 75 MW 25 MW $ MW W Gen W $30 E E Gen $ MW +1 MW 25 MW S 25 MW 0 MW Least cost solution would have W Gen supply the next MW to W, based on W Gen s offer price W Gen can meet the additional MW at Node W without affecting the transmission system (net flow change is zero) W Gen is the marginal generator and Node W price = $30 31
32 Congestion (No Losses): Summary Transmission Limit = 75.2 MW N Load 100 MW N 75 MW $ MW $30 W Gen W $30 $33 E E Gen $ MW 25 MW $30.50 S 25 MW 0 MW System is congested on line W-N Combination of W Gen and E Gen redispatch is necessary to meet incremental loads at Node N,E and S If W Gen and N Load are settled at their respective nodal prices, the difference will result in a settlement surplus Surplus due to the congestion component of different nodal prices is used to fund transmission rights 32
33 Transmission Rights Provide a hedge against congestion charges between two locations Transmission rights holders receive the difference in congestion charges between the two locations defined by the transmission right Using our example: Price at N - Price at W = Congestion Charge $ $30 = $5.50/MW If N load holds 100 MW of transmission rights, they will receive 100 x $5.50 = $550 N Load: Pays 100 x $35.50 = $3550 for energy Receives 100 x $5.50 = $550 for transmission rights Net = $3000 W Gen is paid 100 x $30 = $
34 Exercise One N Load N 100 MW 75 MW 25 MW $30 W Gen W E E Gen $ MW 25 MW S 25 MW 0 MW Transmission Limit = 25 MW Assume the transmission limit is on line S-E (for simplicity we ll allow flow to equal the limit, although in reality flow must be less than the limit) The load at N is being served by W Gen with flows on the transmission system as shown What are the nodal prices at N and S? 34
35 Exercise Answer: Node N Price ( ) N Load 100 MW + 1 MW N 75.5 MW $ MW ( ) $30 W Gen W E E Gen $ MW +.5 MW 25 MW 25 MW ( ) S ( ) Transmission Limit = 25 MW 0 MW +.5 MW W Gen cannot be used as sole supply as any increase in output will increase the S-E line flow; must redispatch the system Must increase W Gen output by 0.5 MW (25% flows from S to E) and increase E Gen output by 0.5 MW (25% flows from E to S) Resultant flow would be within limits Node N price = $32.50 (0.5 X $ X $30) 35
36 Exercise Answer: Node S Price ( ) N Load 100 MW N MW MW ( ) $30 W Gen W E E Gen $ MW +1 MW MW $ MW ( ) S ( ) + 1 MW 0 MW Transmission Limit = 25 MW W Gen can be used as sole supply; the increase in output to serve Node S will decrease the S-E line flow Increase W Gen output by 1.0 (75% flows from E to S) Resultant flow would be within limits Node S price = $30 36
37 Losses, No Congestion 37
38 Losses (No Congestion): 75 MW N Load N 100 MW 25 MW $30 W Gen W 78 MW 26 MW E E Gen $ MW S 0 MW Least cost solution would have W Gen supply all 100 MW to N Load due to its lower offer price, but due to losses must generate 104 MW Resultant flow is within limits Nodal price is the cost of serving the next MW What are the prices at Node N? 38
39 Losses (No Congestion): Node N Price MW N Load N $ MW MW + 1 MW $30 W Gen 104 MW MW 78.9 MW W 26.3 MW Price at node N is the cost of supplying next 1 MW W Gen must generate an additional 1.04 MW to N to deliver 1 MW at Node N Resultant flow would be within limits Node N price = $31.20 (1.04 X $30) Prices at Nodes E and S would be similarly calculated Price at Node W = $30 as an increment of load can be supplied from W Gen with no impact to transmission flows S E E Gen 0 MW $35 39
40 Summary When more than one generator is on the margin, prices may be: higher than any offer lower than any offer (and could even be negative) For additional examples see the Market Evolution Day Ahead Market web page and in particular: Even when there is no congestion on the transmission system directly connecting them, prices may be different between two nodes due to: losses and/or their differing impact on congested paths elsewhere in the system If a generator is partially dispatched: nodal price = offer price If a generator is fully dispatched: nodal price > than offer price If a generator is not dispatched: nodal price < than offer price 40
41 How the Scheduling Algorithm (DSO) Calculates Nodal Prices 41
42 Scheduling Optimizer (DSO) Two methods are available to calculate nodal prices: 1) calculate nodal prices at each node directly (as in previous examples) 2) calculate a reference node price then derive prices at all other nodes The DSO uses method 2 as it requires less computing power and is faster: It yields the same results as method 1 It does not matter which node is chosen as the reference bus 42
43 Calculate Nodal Prices Nodal Price Cost of losses incurred for the next MW of load at the node LMP Marginal Cost? of s Generation (DF n - 1)*? s Marginal Cost of Losses? n = + + Marginal Cost of Transmission S a nk* µ k Congestion System Marginal Cost at Reference Node Cost of transmission limits incurred for the next MW of load at the node 43
44 Inputs s and bids Forecast demand for the next interval based upon a snapshot of current demand modified by the expected +/- in the next interval Load profile based upon the current system snapshot Physical model of the transmission system Security limits Penalty Factors (losses) represent losses between nodes and the reference bus IMO uses fixed losses for each node based on historical power flows 44
45 Penalty Factors PF = 1.3 = 23% losses Gen D Load Z Non-dispatchable PF =.97 = - 3.1% losses Richview Gen C PF =.95 = - 5.3% losses Gen B PF = 1.01 = 1% losses Gen A PF =.9 = % losses Represent incremental impact on losses for generation or load at each node based on a representative power flow distribution on the grid If PF > 1: losses are incurred for each MW delivered to Richview If PF < 1: losses are reduced for each MW delivered to Richview 45
46 Nodal Price Calculation in DSO Penalty Factors Bids and s Forecast Load System Limits Transmission Model Load Profile Penalty Factors Richview Nodal Price Congestion Impact DSO Calculation 1 DSO Calculation 2 Richview Nodal Price Congestion Impact Instructions All Other Nodal Prices 46
47 Reference Bus Merit Order Delivery Point /Bid Stack Gen A 100 $75 Gen B 100 $70 Gen C 100 $60 Gen D 100 $50 Penalty Factors Richview Equivalent /Bid Stack Gen B 100 $70.7 Gen A 100 $67.5 Gen D 100 $65 Gen C 100 $57 Subsequent calculation addresses quantity differences due to the effect of losses 47
48 Effective Price Delivery Point /Bid Stack Penalty Factors Richview Equivalent /Bid Stack Gen D 100 $ Gen D 100 $65 If we generate 100 MW at Gen D, only 100/1.3 or 76.9 MW shows up at Richview due to losses 100 MW at Gen D costs 100 x $50 = $5,000, which only yields 76.9 MW at Richview, resulting in an effective price of $5000/76.9 MW = $65 /MW 48
49 Determine Unconstrained Economic Solution Richview Equivalent /Bid Stack Current system demand +/- forecast change in next interval Gen B 100 $70.7 Gen A 100 $67.5 Gen D 100 $65 Gen C 100 $57 Forecast Demand 49
50 Introduce Physical Network Load Z Gen D 4% 4% 3% 1% Richview 5% 3% 2% Gen C 4% 5% Gen B 6% 10% 2% Gen A Allocate forecast demand to nodes based on load profile of current system Run load flow to solve power balance using offers and bids at appropriate nodes, physical characteristics of transmission system and system limits Determine System Marginal Cost at Richview 50
51 System Marginal Cost: No Congestion Gen B 100 $70.7 Gen A 100 $67.5 Gen D 100 $65 Gen C 100 $57 Forecast Demand If power balance is solved without any need to redispatch to respect limits; there is no congestion and the system marginal cost will equal that determined in the purely economic merit order i.e., Gen D will set the system marginal cost System Marginal Cost (? s ) = $65 51
52 Nodal Prices: No Congestion Price Penalty Factor Losses Cost Congestion Cost Nodal Price Gen A $ $ $72.22 Gen B $ $ $64.36 Gen C $ $ $68.42 Gen D $ $ $50.00 Load Z N/A 0.97 $ $67.01 Richview =? s $
53 Nodal Prices and : No Congestion $50.00 Gen D Partially dispatched $65.00 Richview $68.42 Gen C Fully dispatched Gen B $64.36 Gen A $72.22 prices: Gen A $75 Gen B $70 Gen C $60 Gen D $50 Which generators should be dispatched? 53
54 Congestion Binding Transmission Limit Load Z Gen D Line 1 Richview Gen C Gen B Gen A If a transmission limit on the line from Gen D prevents its economic dispatch another more expensive resource must be dispatched to meet demand This congestion will raise the system marginal cost and affect nodal prices throughout the system 54
55 System Marginal Cost: Congestion Gen B 100 $70.7 Gen A 100 $67.5 Gen D 90 $65 Gen C 100 $57 Forecast Demand Congestion on Line 1 from Gen D: redispatch from economic merit order to respect limit System marginal cost is now set by Gen A System Marginal Cost (? s ) = $67.5 There is a cost associated with the Line 1 transmission limit 55
56 Line 1 Transmission Limit Cost Binding Transmission Limit Load Z Gen D Line 1 Richview Gen C Gen B Gen A Determine transmission limit cost by relaxing constraint by 1 MW and measuring impact on total system costs Note: results are rounded on the following diagrams 56
57 Line 1 Transmission Limit Cost Load Z +1 MW 23% losses Gen D Gen C Gen B Richview +.77 MW % losses Gen A -.69 MW Increase Gen D by 1 MW results in MW at Richview due to losses To maintain the generation/load balance we must reduce Gen A by.6923 MW Net cost is $50 x 1 MW - $75 x.6923 MW = -$
58 Nodal Prices: Congestion Price Penalty Factor Losses Cost Congestion Cost Nodal Price Gen A $ $ $75.00 Gen B $ $ $66.83 Gen C $ $ $71.05 Gen D $ $ $50.00 Load Z N/A 0.97 $ $69.59 Richview =? s $
59 Nodal Prices and : Congestion Binding Transmission Limit $50.00 Gen D Partially dispatched Line 1 $67.50 Richview $71.05 Gen C Fully dispatched Gen B $66.83 Gen A $75.00 Partially dispatched prices: Gen A $75 Gen B $70 Gen C $60 Gen D $50 Which generators should be dispatched? 59
60 Nodal Price Comparison Gen A Gen B Gen C Gen D Nodal Price (No Congestion) $72.22 $64.36 $68.42 $50.00 Nodal Price (Congestion) $75.00 $66.83 $71.05 $50.00 Load Z $67.01 $69.59 Richview =? s $65.00 $
61 Getting Nodal Price Information Nodal prices available on IMO FTP site only (in.csv format) Go to Market Data page: Scroll down to hyperlink: ftp://aftp.theimo.com/pub/reports/pub/ Select DispConsShadowPrice folder Choose report date and hour i.e., Sept 20 for Hour 1: PUB_DispConsShadowPrice_ csv 1 6 RICHVIEW-230.G_SLACKA DSO-RD; Hour Interval Node Energy Operating Reserve 10S/10NS/30 61
Congestion Management Settlement Credits Dispatch Technical Working Group February 13, 2012
Congestion Management Settlement Credits Dispatch Technical Working Group February 13, 2012 Agenda Dispatch Design Principles Review constraints Review the purpose of Congestion Management Settlement Credits
More informationIntroduction to Ontario's Physical Markets
Introduction to Ontario's Physical Markets Introduction to Ontario s Physical Markets AN IESO MARKETPLACE TRAINING PUBLICATION This document has been prepared to assist in the IESO training of market
More informationAn Overview of the Midwest ISO Market Design. Michael Robinson 31 March 2009
An Overview of the Midwest ISO Market Design Michael Robinson 31 March 2009 The Role of RTOs Monitor flow of power over the grid Schedule transmission service Perform transmission security analysis for
More information2013 Ventyx, an ABB company
Co-optimization of Congestion Revenue Rights in ERCOT Day-Ahead Market Chien-Ning Yu, Vladimir Brandwajn, Show Chang ABB/Ventyx Sainath M. Moorty ERCOT FERC Conference on increasing real-time and day-ahead
More informationInterjurisdictional Energy Trading. IESO Training
Interjurisdictional Energy Trading IESO Training Revised: January, 2014 Introduction to Interjurisdictional Energy Trading AN IESO TRAINING PUBLICATION This document has been prepared to assist in the
More informationThe Locational Based Marginal Prices ( LBMPs or prices ) for Suppliers and Loads in
17.1 LBMP Calculation Method The Locational Based Marginal Prices ( LBMPs or prices ) for Suppliers and Loads in the Real-Time Market will be based on the system marginal costs produced by either the Real-
More informationConvergence Bidding Tutorial & Panel Discussion
Convergence Bidding Tutorial & Panel Discussion CAISO June 13, 2006 Joe Bowring PJM Market Monitor www.pjm.com Convergence Basics Day-Ahead Market basics Day-Ahead and Real-Time Market interactions Increment
More informationNatural Gas Pipeline Penalty Recovery Issue Paper
Natural Gas Pipeline Penalty Recovery Issue Paper September 16, 2014 Table of Contents I. Introduction and Background... 3 II. Scope of Initiative and Plan for Stakeholder Engagement... 4 III. The Approved
More informationPricing Transmission
1 / 37 Pricing Transmission Quantitative Energy Economics Anthony Papavasiliou 2 / 37 Pricing Transmission 1 Equilibrium Model of Power Flow Locational Marginal Pricing Congestion Rent and Congestion Cost
More informationIntroduction to the Integrated Marketplace
The information, practices, processes and procedures outlined and contained in this publication are the intellectual property of Southwest Power Pool, Inc. and are protected by law. This publication or
More informationTwo Settlement - Virtual Bidding and Transactions
Two Settlement - Virtual Bidding and Transactions (Fall 2009) PJM 2009 2009 PJM 1 Agenda Two-Settlement Overview Two-Settlement Features & System Two-Settlement Business Rules Two-Settlement Data Requirements
More informationPower System review W I L L I A M V. T O R R E A P R I L 1 0, 2 0 1 3
Power System review W I L L I A M V. T O R R E A P R I L 1 0, 2 0 1 3 Basics of Power systems Network topology Transmission and Distribution Load and Resource Balance Economic Dispatch Steady State System
More informationPJM Overview of Markets. Georgian Delegation PUCO Office April 11, 2013
PJM Overview of Markets Georgian Delegation PUCO Office April 11, 2013 1 Agenda Introduction Energy Markets Locational Marginal Pricing - LMP Two Settlement - Day Ahead / Real time Ancillary Services Capacity
More informationDispatch Software Parameters
PUBLIC IMO_REQ_0023 Dispatch Software Parameters Issue 1.0 This document defines the values basic parameters that are utilized within the dispatch algorithm Public Disclaimer The posting of documents on
More informationThe Materials Contained Are Property of GP Renewables & Trading, LLC and are considered proprietary. This is not for distribution.
The Materials Contained Are Property of GP Renewables & Trading, LLC and are considered proprietary. This is not for distribution. 1 Wholesale Power 101 Maximizing Asset Value & Minimizing Risk 2 Facts
More informationPROCEDURE. Part 4.3: Real-Time Scheduling of the Physical Markets PUBLIC. Market Manual 4: Market Operations. Issue 44.
PUBLIC IMP_PRO_0034 PROCEDURE Market Manual 4: Market Operations Part 4.3: Real-Time Scheduling of the Physical Markets Issue 44.0 This procedure provides guidance to Market Participants on the Real-time
More informationECCO International, Inc. 268 Bush Street, Suite 3633 San Francisco, CA 94104
PROMAX SHORT-TERM ENERGY & TRANSMISSION MARKET SIMULATION SOFTWARE PACKAGE ECCO International, Inc. 268 Bush Street, Suite 3633 San Francisco, CA 94104 ECCO International, Inc. Copyright 2009 EXECUTIVE
More informationsink asset load power pool ISO pool participant bids operating constraints ancillary service declarations
G1 DEFINITIONS In the ISO rules: acceptable operational reason means with respect to a source asset, any one or more of the following: i) a circumstance related to the operation of the generating asset
More informationGenerator Optional. Timeline including the next steps. A practical example. Potential benefits of OFA? Key implications. How might OFA work?
Generator Optional Firm Access Rights Australian Energy Market Commission announces terms of reference for detailed design work On the 6 March 2014, the Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC) released
More informationPJM Overview and Wholesale Power Markets. John Gdowik PJM Member Relations
PJM Overview and Wholesale Power Markets John Gdowik PJM Member Relations PJM s Role Ensures the reliability of the high-voltage electric power system Coordinates and directs the operation of the region
More informationBogdan Vesovic Siemens Smart Grid Solutions, Minneapolis, USA bogdan.vesovic@siemens.com
Evolution of Restructured Power Systems with Regulated Electricity Markets Panel D 2 Evolution of Solution Domains in Implementation of Market Design Bogdan Vesovic Siemens Smart Grid Solutions, Minneapolis,
More informationAGCS Gas Clearing and Settlement AG
Annex to the General Terms and Conditions of the Balance Group Coordinator (GTC BGC) Balancing energy management in the Eastern distribution area V 5.0 Annex Balancing energy management Version 5.0 Page
More informationThe Importance of Marginal Loss Pricing in an RTO Environment
The Importance of Marginal Loss Pricing in an RTO Environment Leslie Liu, Tabors Caramanis & Associates Assef Zobian, Cambridge Energy Solutions 50 Church Street Cambridge, MA 02138 Abstract This paper
More informationThe Power Market: E-Commerce for All Electricity Products By Edward G. Cazalet, Ph.D., and Ralph D. Samuelson, Ph.D.
The Power Market: E-Commerce for All Electricity Products By Edward G. Cazalet, Ph.D., and Ralph D. Samuelson, Ph.D. Why not use the Web to buy and sell transmission rights at prices derived from bids
More informationThe Role of the ISO in U.S. Electricity Markets: A Review of Restructuring in California and PJM
The Role of the ISO in U.S. Electricity Markets: A Review of Restructuring in California and PJM Lisa Cameron and Peter Cramton Electricity Journal, April 1999, 71-81 Several regions of the U.S. have sought
More informationHow To Settle Day Ahead Energy, Loss, And Loss For A Day Ahead Market
Settling the Day-Ahead Market Charge Codes included in this training: 6011, 6800, 6700, 6301. EXTERNAL Customer Services Page 1 of 45 Disclaimer All information contained in this document is provided for
More informationPower Supplier Statement - Billing Date. Energy(MWh) 300 Forward Energy 303 Balancing Energy
Power Supplier Statement - Billing Date Energy(MWh) 3 Forward Energy 33 Balancing Energy Energy Settlement ($) 31 Forward Energy 34 Balancing Energy 314 ELR DAM Contract Balancing Payment $ 32 DAM Bid
More informationIssue for the ERCOT Board of Directors
Date: December 4, 2012 To: Board of Directors From: Kenan Ogelman, Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) Chair Subject: ERCOT Business Practice, Setting the Shadow Price Caps and Power Balance Penalties in
More informationERCOT Monthly Operational Overview (March 2014) ERCOT Public April 15, 2014
ERCOT Monthly Operational Overview (March 2014) ERCOT Public April 15, 2014 Grid Operations & Planning Summary March 2014 Operations The peak demand of 54,549 MW on March 3 rd was greater than the mid-term
More informationBUSINESS RULES FOR CHAPTER VII DAILY IMBALANCE CHARGES
BUSINESS RULES FOR CHAPTER VII DAILY IMBALANCE CHARGES 1. General 1.1. The TSO shall publish its imbalance charge methodology and update it accordingly as any changes are made. This methodology must contain:
More informationPriority Dispatch in Real Time Operation. Marie Hayden
Priority Dispatch in Real Time Operation Marie Hayden Presentation Reasons for dispatching units with Priority Dispatch Changes in approach with SEM-62 Who has Priority Dispatch Today? Unit Type MW Interconnector
More informationPJM LMP Market Overview
PJM LMP Market Overview Andrew Ott Senior Vice President, Markets June 10, 2010 PJM as Part of the Eastern Interconnection 6,038 substations KEY STATISTICS PJM member companies 600+ millions of people
More informationNV Energy ISO Energy Imbalance Market Economic Assessment
March 25, 2014 NV Energy ISO Energy Imbalance Market Economic Assessment NV Energy ISO Energy Imbalance Market Economic Assessment 2014 Copyright. All Rights Reserved. Energy and Environmental Economics,
More informationStandard conditions of the Electricity Distribution Licence
Gas and Electricity Markets Authority ELECTRICITY ACT 1989 Standard conditions of the Electricity Distribution Licence Statutory Consultation: 29 April 2008 SECTION A: STANDARD CONDITIONS FOR ALL ELECTRICITY
More informationPreliminary Results of Analysis of the Broader Regional Markets Initiatives
Preliminary Results of Analysis of the Broader Regional Markets Initiatives Presented to: NYISO Management Committee David B. Patton, Ph.D. Potomac Economics April 21, 2010 1 Introduction This presentation
More informationBorder flow rights and Contracts for differences of differences: Models for Electric Transmission Property Rights
1 Border flow rights and Contracts for differences of differences: Models for Electric Transmission Property Rights Ross Baldick Abstract In this paper a property rights model for electric transmission
More informationChapter 9 Settlements and Billing
MDP_RUL_0002_09 Market Rules Chapter 9 Settlements and Billing Public Issue Date: December 2, 2015 Library Record No. MDP_RUL_0002_09 Document Name Market Rules for the Ontario Electricity Market Issue
More informationEstimation of electrical losses in Network Rail Electrification Systems
Estimation of electrical losses in Network Rail Electrification Systems Page 1 of 16 Contents 1. BACKGROUND...3 2. PURPOSE...3 3. SCOPE...3 4. DEFINITIONS & ABBREVIATIONS...4 5. NETWORK RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE
More informationChapter 7 System Operations and Physical Markets
MDP_RUL_0002_07 Market Rules Chapter 7 System Operations and Physical Markets Public Issue Date: June 3, 2015 Library Record No. MDP_RUL_0002_07 Document Name Market Rules for the Ontario Electricity Market
More informationATE-A1 Testing Without Relays - Using Inductors to Compensate for Parasitic Capacitance
Introduction (Why Get Rid of Relays?) Due to their size, cost and relatively slow (millisecond) operating speeds, minimizing the number of mechanical relays is a significant goal of any ATE design. This
More informationOPTIMAL DISPATCH OF POWER GENERATION SOFTWARE PACKAGE USING MATLAB
OPTIMAL DISPATCH OF POWER GENERATION SOFTWARE PACKAGE USING MATLAB MUHAMAD FIRDAUS BIN RAMLI UNIVERSITI MALAYSIA PAHANG v ABSTRACT In the reality practical power system, power plants are not at the same
More informationN-1-1 Contingency Analysis using PowerWorld Simulator
N-1-1 Contingency nalysis using PowerWorld Simulator uthor: PowerWorld Corporation Scott R. Dahman, P.E. Date: March 24, 2010 October 25, 2012 (revised) Table of Contents Background and Objective... 2
More informationSAMPLE OF THE STUDY MATERIAL PART OF CHAPTER 3. Symmetrical Components & Faults Calculations
SAMPLE OF THE STUDY MATERIAL PART OF CHAPTER 3 3.0 Introduction Fortescue's work proves that an unbalanced system of 'n' related phasors can be resolved into 'n' systems of balanced phasors called the
More informationCALIFORNIA ISO. Pre-dispatch and Scheduling of RMR Energy in the Day Ahead Market
CALIFORNIA ISO Pre-dispatch and Scheduling of RMR Energy in the Day Ahead Market Prepared by the Department of Market Analysis California Independent System Operator September 1999 Table of Contents Executive
More informationSection 4: Scheduling Philosophy & Tools
Welcome to the Scheduling Philosophy & Tools section of the PJM Manual for Scheduling Operations. In this section you will find the following information: A description of the PJM OI s scheduling philosophy
More informationDifferent types of electricity markets modelled using PLEXOS Integrated Energy Model The UK Balancing Market example
Different types of electricity markets modelled using PLEXOS Integrated Energy Model The UK Balancing Market example Peny Panagiotakopoulou, Senior Power Systems Consultant, Energy Exemplar Europe Overview
More informationESB NATIONAL GRID RESPONSE TO CER/03/266 INTERCONNECTOR TRADING PRINCIPLES IN THE MAE
ESB NATIONAL GRID RESPONSE TO CER/03/266 INTERCONNECTOR TRADING PRINCIPLES IN THE MAE ESB NATIONAL GRID PAGE 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY There are a number of considerations to be made in relation to interconnector
More informationOperational Security Network Code
Amstelveenseweg 998 1081 JS Amsterdam Phone: + 31 20 520 7970 Fax: + 31 346 283 258 Email: secretariat@efet.org Website: www.efet.org Operational Security Network Code Public consultation 3 November 2012
More informationPower System Operation Procedure: Short Term Projected Assessment of System Adequacy (ST PASA)
ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY ACT ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY (WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKET) REGULATIONS 2004 WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKET RULES Power System Operation Procedure: Short Term Projected Assessment of System
More informationGenerator Interconnection and Deliverability Study Methodology Technical Paper
Generator Interconnection and Deliverability Study Methodology Technical Paper July 2, 2013 Generator Interconnection and Deliverability Study Methodology Table of Contents Introduction... 1 Section One:
More informationMulti-Faceted Solution for Managing Flexibility with High Penetration of Renewable Resources
Multi-Faceted Solution for Managing Flexibility with High Penetration of Renewable Resources FERC Technical Conference Increasing RT & DA Market Efficiency Through Improved Software June 24 26, 2013 Nivad
More informationCourse notes for EE394V Restructured Electricity Markets: Locational Marginal Pricing
Course notes for EE394V Restructured Electricity Markets: Locational Marginal Pricing Ross Baldick Copyright c 2015 Ross Baldick www.ece.utexas.edu/ baldick/classes/394v/ee394v.html Title Page 1 of 29
More informationA market design to support climate policy
A market design to support climate policy Karsten Neuhoff, karsten.neuhoff@cpiberlin.org David Newbery, Christian von Hirschhausen, Benjamin Hobbs, Christoph Weber, Janusz Bialek, Frieder Borggrefe, Julian
More informationMarket Solutions to Loop Flow
Market Solutions to Loop Flow Robert Pike Director, Market Design New York Independent System Operator Business Issues Committee September 9, 2009 1 Agenda Background Recommendation Next Steps Solution
More informationBalance Settlement. The following also applies to balance settlement: a) There must be a Balance Administrator for each trade in Dragör.
Balance Settlement 1 GENERAL 1.1 Basic rules Swedegas balance settlement is based on measured figures reported by the Network Owner and other information submitted by the Balance Administrator in accordance
More informationERCOT Analysis of the Impacts of the Clean Power Plan Final Rule Update
ERCOT Analysis of the Impacts of the Clean Power Plan Final Rule Update ERCOT Public October 16, 2015 ERCOT Analysis of the Impacts of the Clean Power Plan Final Rule Update In August 2015, the U.S. Environmental
More informationTutorial 12 Solutions
PHYS000 Tutorial 2 solutions Tutorial 2 Solutions. Two resistors, of 00 Ω and 200 Ω, are connected in series to a 6.0 V DC power supply. (a) Draw a circuit diagram. 6 V 00 Ω 200 Ω (b) What is the total
More informationLinear Programming Notes V Problem Transformations
Linear Programming Notes V Problem Transformations 1 Introduction Any linear programming problem can be rewritten in either of two standard forms. In the first form, the objective is to maximize, the material
More informationOperating Hydroelectric and Pumped Storage Units In A Competitive Environment
Operating electric and Pumped Storage Units In A Competitive Environment By Rajat Deb, PhD 1 LCG Consulting In recent years as restructuring has gained momentum, both new generation investment and efficient
More informationOperator Initiated Commitments in RTO and ISO Markets
Price Formation in Organized Wholesale Electricity Markets Docket No. AD14-14-000 Staff Analysis of Operator Initiated Commitments in RTO and ISO Markets December 2014 For further information, please contact:
More informationWind Power and Electricity Markets
PO Box 2787 Reston, VA 20195 Phone: 703-860-5160 Fax: 703-860-3089 E-mail: info@uwig.org Web: www.uwig.org Wind Power and Electricity Markets A living summary of markets and market rules for wind energy
More informationSeries and Parallel Circuits
Direct Current (DC) Direct current (DC) is the unidirectional flow of electric charge. The term DC is used to refer to power systems that use refer to the constant (not changing with time), mean (average)
More informationVirtual Transactions in the PJM Energy Markets
PJM Interconnection October 12, 2015 This page is intentionally left blank. PJM 2015 www.pjm.com i P age Table of Contents Executive Summary... 1 Background... 3 Synopsis of the Virtual Transactions...
More informationCredit Management and the ERCOT Nodal Market
Credit Management and the ERCOT Nodal Market Legal Disclaimers and Admonitions PROTOCOL DISCLAIMER This presentation provides a general overview of the Texas Nodal Market Implementation and is not intended
More informationDG Transmission Impact Analysis for Rate Determination GTMax Software Demonstration
DG Transmission Impact Analysis for Rate Determination GTMax Software Demonstration Thomas D. Veselka (U.S. DOE National Laboratory) Prepared for Distributed Generation Tariff Workshop Midwest CHP Initiative
More informationWinter Impacts of Energy Efficiency In New England
Winter Impacts of Energy Efficiency In New England April 2015 Investments in electric efficiency since 2000 reduced electric demand in New England by over 2 gigawatts. 1 These savings provide significant
More informationResistors in Series and Parallel
Resistors in Series and Parallel Bởi: OpenStaxCollege Most circuits have more than one component, called a resistor that limits the flow of charge in the circuit. A measure of this limit on charge flow
More informationCircuit Analysis using the Node and Mesh Methods
Circuit Analysis using the Node and Mesh Methods We have seen that using Kirchhoff s laws and Ohm s law we can analyze any circuit to determine the operating conditions (the currents and voltages). The
More informationOptimal Power Flow Analysis of Energy Storage for Congestion Relief, Emissions Reduction, and Cost Savings
1 Optimal Power Flow Analysis of Energy Storage for Congestion Relief, Emissions Reduction, and Cost Savings Zhouxing Hu, Student Member, IEEE, and Ward T. Jewell, Fellow, IEEE Abstract AC optimal power
More informationFault Analysis I13-1. 2008 PowerWorld Corporation
Fault Analysis Analysis of power system parameters resulting from a ground or line to line fault somewhere in the system Simulator contains a tool for analyzing faults in an automatic fashion Can perform
More informationElectricity Exchanges in South Asia The Indian Energy Exchange Model
Electricity Exchanges in South Asia The Indian Energy Exchange Model 18 Mar 14 Rajesh K Mediratta Director (BD) rajesh.mediratta@iexindia.com www.iexindia.com In this presentation Overview - Indian Market
More informationComments of Pacific Gas & Electric Company pertaining to ISO s Straw Proposal on Bid Cost Recovery Enhancements
Comments of Pacific Gas & Electric Company pertaining to ISO s Straw Proposal on Bid Cost Recovery Enhancements Submitted by Company Date Submitted Josh Arnold J2A2@pge.com 415-973-1273 CB Hall cbh7@pge.com
More informationOverview of the IESO-Administered Markets. IESO Training. Updated: January, 2014. Public
Overview of the IESO-Administered Markets IESO Training Updated: January, 2014 Public Overview of the IESO-Administered Markets AN IESO TRAINING PUBLICATION This guide has been prepared to assist in the
More informationSCHEDULE 1. Scheduling, System Control and Dispatch Service
Seventh Revised Volume No. 5 (MT) Original Sheet No. 71 SCHEDULE 1 Scheduling, System Control and Dispatch Service This service is required to schedule the movement of power through, out of, within, or
More informationCFD Auction Guidance 25 September 2014
CFD Auction Guidance 25 September 2014 This Guidance is intended for information only, it remains subject to change and is not legally binding. This Guidance does not constitute legal or investment advice
More informationMotor Efficiency and Power Factor ME 416/516
Motor Efficiency and Power Factor Motivation More than half of all electric energy generated goes to power electric motors. Electric motor converts electric power into shaft power. In thermodynamics terms,
More informationPower System Simulation for Engineers (PSS/E): Fault Analysis
Power System Simulation for Engineers (PSS/E): Fault Analysis Table of contents: A. GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 1 B. REQUIRED DATA 2 C. READING AN EXISTING CASE 2 D. SAVING A CASE 4 E. CREATING A NEW CASE 4 F.
More informationS-Parameters and Related Quantities Sam Wetterlin 10/20/09
S-Parameters and Related Quantities Sam Wetterlin 10/20/09 Basic Concept of S-Parameters S-Parameters are a type of network parameter, based on the concept of scattering. The more familiar network parameters
More informationAliso Canyon Gas-Electric Coordination. Straw Proposal
Aliso Canyon Gas-Electric Coordination Straw Proposal April 15, 2016 Table of Contents 1. Executive Summary... 3 2. Plan for Stakeholder Engagement... 4 3. Background... 5 3.1. Aliso Canyon Impact... 5
More informationOverview of Reliability Demand Response Resource
Overview of Reliability Demand Response Resource Radha Madrigal Customer Service Department May 8, 2014 Agenda Product overview and purpose Define Reliability Demand Response Resource Agreements & registration
More informationLinear Programming Supplement E
Linear Programming Supplement E Linear Programming Linear programming: A technique that is useful for allocating scarce resources among competing demands. Objective function: An expression in linear programming
More information4. Project management triangle The Project Management Triangle (called also Triple Constraint or the Iron Triangle) is a model of the constraints of
4. Project management triangle The Project Management Triangle (called also Triple Constraint or the Iron Triangle) is a model of the constraints of project management. It is a graphic aid where the three
More informationInternational Accounting Standard 36 Impairment of Assets
International Accounting Standard 36 Impairment of Assets Objective 1 The objective of this Standard is to prescribe the procedures that an entity applies to ensure that its assets are carried at no more
More informationWorkplace Giving Guide
Workplace Giving Guide 042612 2012 Blackbaud, Inc. This publication, or any part thereof, may not be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, or mechanical, including photocopying,
More informationFrom Forecast to Discovery: Applying Business Intelligence to Power Market Simulations
From Forecast to Discovery: Applying Business Intelligence to Power Market Simulations Presented at the Energy Central Webinar May 12, 2015 Copyright 2015 Newton Energy Group LLC Welcome and Introduction
More informationEnergy Imbalance Market
Energy Imbalance Market Tariff Framework September 10, 2013 CAIS[Type text] [Type text] [Type text] Table of Contents 1. Introduction... 1 2. Guiding Objectives for the Tariff Framework... 2 3. Tariff
More informationPower System Simulation for Engineers (PSS/E version 33)
Power System Simulation for Engineers (PSS/E version 33) Here are instructions for accessing and using the PSS/E-33 software. On-campus students should access this software at any of the computers in the
More informationTransmission Pricing. Donald Hertzmark July 2008
Transmission Pricing Donald Hertzmark July 2008 Topics 1. Key Issues in Transmission Pricing 2. Experiences in Other Systems 3. Pricing Alternatives 4. Electricity Market Structure and Transmission Services
More informationResource Monitoring and Deliverability Tool Paper
Resource Monitoring and Deliverability Tool Paper NWPP MC Phase 3 Operations Integration Work Group 11/30/2014 Page 1 of 16 Table of Contents Executive Summary... 3 1. Purpose... 5 2. Existent Methods
More informationJapan s Electricity Market Reform and Beyond
Japan s Electricity Market Reform and Beyond July 7, 2015 Takuya Yamazaki Director, Electricity Market Division Director for Electricity Market Reform Agency for Natural Resources and Energy (ANRE) 1
More informationComputing the Electricity Market Equilibrium: Uses of market equilibrium models
Computing the Electricity Market Equilibrium: Uses of market equilibrium models Ross Baldick Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering The University of Texas at Austin April 2007 Abstract We discuss
More informationJoint Con Edison LIPA Offshore Wind Power Integration Project Feasibility Assessment
Joint Con Edison LIPA Offshore Wind Power Integration Project Feasibility Assessment March 20, 2009 Joint Con Edison LIPA Offshore Wind Power Integration Project Feasibility Assessment Table of Contents:
More informationEnergy in the Wholesale Market December 5, 2012 1:30 p.m. to 3:30 p.m. Irving, Texas Robert Burke, Principal Analyst ISO New England
Business Models for Transactive Energy in the Wholesale Market December 5, 2012 1:30 p.m. to 3:30 p.m. Irving, Texas Robert Burke, Principal Analyst ISO New England About ISO New England (ISO) Not-for-profit
More informationConsistency of Energy-Related Opportunity Cost Calculations
Consistency of Energy-Related Opportunity Cost Calculations Bhavana Keshavamurthy Market Implementation Committee 03/14/2012 PJM 2012 www.pjm.com 1 P a g e This page is intentionally left blank. PJM 2012
More informationAn Agent-Based Computational Laboratory for Wholesale Power Market Design
An Agent-Based Computational Laboratory for Wholesale Power Market Design Project Director: Leigh Tesfatsion (Professor of Econ & Math, ISU) Research Associate: Junjie Sun (Fin. Econ, OCC, U.S. Treasury,
More informationCENTRAL ELECTRICITY REGULATORY COMMISSION NEW DELHI NOTIFICATION. No. L-1/(3)/2009-CERC Dated the 7 th August 2009
CENTRAL ELECTRICITY REGULATORY COMMISSION NEW DELHI NOTIFICATION No. L-1/(3)/2009-CERC Dated the 7 th August 2009 In exercise of powers conferred by section 178 of the Electricity Act, 2003 and all other
More informationRisk of Large Cascading Blackouts
Risk of Large Cascading Blackouts EUCI Transmission Reliability Conference Washington DC, October 2006 Ian Dobson ECE Department University of Wisconsin joint work with Ben Carreras, Oak Ridge National
More informationTexas transformed. Achieving significant savings through a new electricity market management system
Texas transformed Achieving significant savings through a new electricity market management system KHOSROW MOSLEHI The state of Texas has long been the center of energy activities in the United States,
More informationEvolution of Transmission Rights in the European Electricity Market
Evolution of Transmission Rights in the European Electricity Market Christof Duthaler, Matthias Finger Abstract In the European electricity market, transmission rights currently evolve from a physical
More informationTable of Contents. Real-Time Reliability Must Run Unit Commitment and Dispatch (Formerly G-203) Operating Procedure
No. 2310 Table of Contents Purpose... 2 1. Responsibilities... 2 2. Scope/Applicability... 2 2.1 Background... 2 2.2 Scope / Applicability... 2 3. Detail... 3 3.1 Energy Dispatching... 3 3.1.2 Real-Time
More information