Applying Crashworthiness Principles to Trucking Litigation

Transcription

1 Applying Crashworthiness Principles to Trucking Litigation Details & Dynamics of Trucking Accidents University of Arkansas Sam Walton College of Business Fayetteville, Arkansas E. Todd Tracy 1944 Are heavy trucks safer today? 2014 The Law Firm rm.com Dallas, Texas

2 Applying Crashworthiness Principles to Trucking Litigation Introduction There are currently 30 million heavy trucks traveling on our nation s highways and roads. Sadly, these heavy trucks contain deadly safety flaws that render them defectively designed and unreasonably dangerous because they are treated differently than passenger vehicles when it comes to safety performance. Since the late 1960 s, vehicle manufacturers for passenger cars have been mandated by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to furnish vehicles that are crashworthy as regulated by various Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS). However, most of these FMVSS crashworthiness provisions do not apply to heavy trucks. Crashworthiness is the science of preventing or minimizing serious injuries or death following an accident through the use of various vehicle safety systems. There are five basic crashworthiness principles: Each of these crashworthiness principles must work together like links in a chain. If one or more safety system fails, the other safety systems can be rendered ineffective. Crashworthiness principles were originally developed by the military to ensure protection of airmen who had crashed. Colonels John Paul Stapp and Hugh DeHaven applied principles of packaging cargo to protecting downed airmen. A television was used as an example. The box crate was sturdy. The television then had an internal protective crate around it to prevent movement and to absorb energy in the event the crate was dropped. Straps were then applied to the crate for restraint. Padding was then placed inside the crate to help distribute energy. Colonels Stapp and Dehaven then developed bladders, metal braided lines and quick disconnect lines for the fuel system to protect against post crash fires. The crashworthiness advancements created by the military were then adopted by the aeronautics industry, the racing industry and finally by the vehicle industry through what is known as technology transfer. This paper does not focus on production model passenger vehicles. Instead, this paper addresses the need to apply crashworthiness principles to heavy duty trucks, Class 8 tractors, dump trucks, garbage trucks, cement trucks, log trucks, and water trucks because this segment of the transportation industry has been long overlooked. As a result, truck drivers and members of the motoring public are being needlessly and senselessly killed and

3 maimed in accidents that should be walkaway events. Crashworthiness principles should be applicable to both the heavy truck driver and his occupants as well as to members of the motoring public that collide with heavy trucks because serious injuries and deaths can happen to each group. Thousands of Serious Injuries and Deaths Could Be Avoided Each Year with NHTSA Involvement and Improved Heavy Truck Safety Designs Each year thousands of heavy truck drivers and members of the motoring public are killed each year because heavy trucks contain defects that render heavy trucks defective and unreasonably dangerous. Many of these deaths and catastrophic injuries could be avoided if vehicle crashworthiness principles were applied to heavy trucks. The NHTSA should immediately undertake a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Making to ensure that heavy trucks must pass a 40mph, 25% narrow offset impact in the front and rear; dynamic rollover test while fully loaded; ejection mitigation through the use of side curtains or laminated glass; side underride guard protection and fuel system performance requirements that mandate fuel tanks be located inside the frame rails. However, there are no NHTSA standards that apply to heavy trucks that pertain to rollover, frontal, side underride guard protection or fuel system protection. For this reason, most heavy truck manufacturers fail to take any design steps to ensure safer protection for drivers and the motoring public. Because there is no one forcing the heavy truck industry to provide safer trucks, it is incumbent on lawyers to be the safety watchdogs over the trucking industry who have run without proper checks and balances for the last 60 years. American Trucking Associations and the Owner Operator Independent Drivers Association together called on the federal government to begin researching standards for crashworthiness for heavy trucks. "NHTSA has continuously developed crashworthiness standards for automobiles and light trucks, but to date has generally not applied crashworthiness standards to commercial trucks," the two groups wrote in a June 6 letter to David Strickland, head of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. "We believe there may be opportunities to enhance the survivability of professional truck drivers if appropriate, research-based, uniform standards are developed."

4 Heavy Truck Rollover Foreseeability In 1986, the NHTSA conducted a study that concluded that approximately 1,000 heavy truck occupants were killed each year. They identified rollovers as one of the key accident modes that caused the fatalities. The NHTSA also concluded there was a need to improve cab structures to control and minimize the extent of cab intrusion so that the occupant survival space is maintained. In 1988, The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) concluded after evaluating 189 heavy truck tow away accidents that the structural design of the cab did not provide adequate protection for the driver. In 1991, researchers from the University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute (UMTRI) concluded that approximately 60% of all heavy truck driver fatalities were associated with rollover accidents. They also concluded that existing cab structures were not strong enough to resist the forces produced during rollovers and that truck drivers had a 50% chance of being seriously injured in a rollover even if they were restrained. The same study revealed that if no rollover occurred, the risk of injury dropped by a factor of 10. In 2001, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) investigated firefighter deaths from water tank truck rollovers and found that 20% of firefighter deaths each year were from water tank truck rollovers. Roof Crush and the Vehicle Industry Every engineer involved in the design of vehicle components located in the vicinity of the occupant compartment must consider the importance of maintaining survival space. The Japanese Automobile Manufacturers Association (JAMA) wrote in 1968 that when evaluating the requirements for intrusion, it would be necessary to take into consideration the substantial space around passengers to protect them from the intrusion dangers of component parts and the collapse of the passenger compartment. In 1969, Franchini of Fiat wrote his Crash Survival Space paper where he concluded that a post crash survival space of 29.5 inches above the H point must be maintained. He also noted that heavy truck survival space was covered in the SAE Recommended Practice J320. In 1970, Chrysler developed its Research Safety Vehicle and one of the goals of the vehicle was to minimize intrusions in side impacts and rollovers so that the restraint systems could perform their function. Chrysler concluded that prudent engineering design required that roof crush be held within tolerable limits. In the 1970 s, Mercedes Benz reported that preservation of the survival space was their top priority. Mercedes also concluded that if occupant space

5 was not maintained, other safety systems cannot execute their protective function. Volvo concluded in its Crashworthiness Guidelines for the XC90, that roof crush must be kept to a minimum, roof contact with the head must be prevented and no glass should break out in rollovers. Heavy Truck and Rollover Protection Systems Testing Capabilities The Swedish Impact Test, a scientifically heavy truck test method, has been used by Volvo since 1959 to test their heavy truck cabs ability to withstand rollovers. This methodology is comprised of three tests. The first test subjects the truck cab roof to a distributed, static vertical load of up to 33,075lb. After this, a cylindrical pendulum weighing more than one ton strikes one of the cab s front A pillars from a height of approximately 10 feet. In the third test, another square pendulum weighing one ton strikes the rear wall of the cab with the same amount of energy. To pass all three tests, the cab must maintain its survival space. Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) Regulation 29 which was implemented in 1974, sets forth that the roof must withstand a static, distributed weight of 22,046 lbs. which is determined when a 50 th percentile male occupant is placed inside the cab to verify the cab space is maintained. In 1978, SAE J2422 was developed in a 180 degree rollover. There are two types of roof strength testing a dynamic and static test. The dynamic test involves a sled test where the truck cab s roof is affixed to the sled at a roll angle of 20 degrees. The sled must weigh between 5,000 15,000 and should impact the cab with a kinetic energy of at least 13,000 ft lb. The static test involves loading the roof through its vertical axis until it reaches a load equal to the maximum capacity of the front axle up to 22,046 lbs. Other Industries Were Concerned About Roof Strength In 1967, the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) published SAE J320 Recommended Practice which established the minimum performance criteria for rollover protective systems for rubber tire selfpropelled scrapers. After sustaining a load equal to the weight of the vehicle, the critical zone around the driver must extend up 42 inches off the seat.

6 In 1967, the Army Corps of Engineers recognized construction machine rollover issues when they drafted Manual EM The ROPS system had to comply with SAE J320. In 1972, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) established standard which mandated that ROPS on material handling equipment must comply with the Army Corps of Engineer s Manual EM In 1988, SAE J1040 was created for construction, water trucks, earthmoving, forestry and mining machines. This recommended practice required a side load of 32,147 lb. absorbing 270,992 in lb and then subsequently withstand 62,000 lb. vertically and 25,717 lb. longitudinally without intruding into the survival space. This standard is now the ISO Dangerous Roof Structures The heavy truck industry formed a Heavy Truck Task Force Committee decades ago. The committee hired an outside engineering firm to study real world rollover events. The engineering firm recommended that roof strength be increased by over 200% to reduce roof crush to six inches. The Task Force not only failed to follow the recommendation, they criticized the recommendation. The engineering firm also recommended using a roll cage which they created using Finite Element Analysis. They also used a computer simulation to demonstrate how much stronger the roof would be with a roll cage. The Task force rejected the recommendation and requested that the engineering firm destroy its file on the roll cage.

7 There are several effective design techniques that can be used to strengthen heavy truck roof structures including: 1. Steel instead of aluminum. 2. High strength steel instead of low strength mild steel. 3. Thicker stampings. 4. Gussets at the roof rails and pillar intersections. 5. Closed box sections rather than open C or L sections. 6. Reduction in the area of cutouts used to lighten stampings and/or to provide access for wiring and components. 7. Structural foam in void space to increase buckling strength. 8. Door frames that lock securely to the roof rails. If there were ever an industry that could benefit from better designs and more testing, it would be the trucking industry. Due to the fact that there are tens of thousands of new heavy trucks added yearly to the national fleet, it is imperative that testing and safety regulations be implemented. The number of foreign heavy trucks coming into the United States has dramatically increased as well.

8 The roll cage that was proposed by the engineering firm hired by the Task Force is the least expensive structural fix. A rollover demonstration on a 1997 Kenworth T800 truck equipped with a roll cage was conducted. The modified truck rolled 44 down a sandy hillside with a 33 degree slope. The vehicle made a complete roll and suffered no cab damage because of the roll cage. Dangerous Cab Guards Many types of heavy trucks have cab guards that appear at first blush to be an extremely viable design to improve roof crush protection. Cab guards or headache racks prevent shifting cargo from contacting the cab of the heavy truck. Cab guards are designed out of welded, heat treated aluminum which weakens over time. This weakening is not obvious to the driver. Also, many welding requirements are not followed by the cab guard manufacturers. There are some effective cab guards that are produced by ATM Enterprises, QMW Industries, ROPS Pty. Ltd, and ROPS Engineering are just a few of the companies that currently provide production Cab Guards that are safe and effective. Inadequate Front Structure If the front survival space is not maintained, none of the other safety systems can perform their safety function. Heavy truck manufacturers must conduct real world barrier crash test at speeds up to 40mph, at various offset positions from 25% up to 50%. This testing will enable design engineers to evaluate the total occupant protection systems including the structure, interior, restraint and fuel system.

9 Testing done by the NHTSA has shown that heavy trucks do not perform well in barrier impact testing. This fact alone is sufficient grounds to halt all truck fleets as these heavy trucks are coffins on wheels. Unsafe Restraint System Performance The same problems that plague passenger vehicles are even more prevalent in heavy truck cases because there are so few component part suppliers. The following restraint system defects are routinely seen in heavy truck litigation: 1. Buckle false latches 2. Buckles unlatching under load 3. Retractors not properly locking up which allow for excessive vertical and lateral excursion Many heavy trucks do not contain pretensioners, side curtain airbags, front airbags, knee airbags, or torso airbags. Also, heavy trucks do not use All Belt To Seat (ABTS). This lack of restraint protection renders these heavy trucks incapable of providing adequate safety. Preventing Ejection When an occupant is ejected from a vehicle, there is a 34 times greater chance of fatality according to the NHTSA. However, there are no ejection mitigation systems used on most heavy trucks except for the lap belt. However, in rollover accidents, the head, torso and arms of a fully restrained occupant can be ejected. That is why laminated glass and side curtain airbags are utilized in passenger vehicles. Inadequate Rear Underride Guards Because of the incompatibility in height between the passenger vehicles and heavy trucks, the bumper of the smaller vehicle does not contact any of the heavy truck s components in a rear impact collision which renders the passenger vehicle s safety systems useless. Instead, the passenger vehicle passes under the heavy truck in what is called an underride accident. When an underride occurs, the roof, steering wheel and seats of the under riding vehicle are ripped from the vehicle. The occupants in the under riding vehicle are often decapitated or suffer torso transection.

10 The rear underride guard was designed to prevent small passenger vehicles from going underneath the rear structure of a heavy truck. However, the rear underride guard must be capable of absorbing considerable crash forces. A weak or damaged rear underride guard is tantamount to having no guard at all. Guards are damaged daily as they contact loading docks which produce cracks in the metal. In the United States, there are 3,675 fatalities and 80,000 serious injuries each year due to inadequate rear underride guard protection. The first underride guard proposal was proposed back in 1967 by the NHTSA. It took 30 years for the NHTSA to finally adopt any rear underride guard provisions. Since 1998, vehicles with a GVWR of 10,000lbs must be equipped with underride guards. FMVSS 223 mandates the load testing, strengths and energy absorbing requirements for rear underride guards and FMVSS 224 mandates their size requirements. The purpose of these two FMVSS provisions is to reduce the number of fatalities when a light vehicle collides with the rear or a trailer. The FMVSS does not require a dynamic test to verify the safety of rear underride guards. Instead, a ram fixed in one direction of motion is utilized at various point on the guard. The Canadian counterpart to the NHTSA concluded in 2004 that FMVSS 223 and 224 were inadequate because the force limits were simply too low. Canada requires its rear underride guards to withstand a force of 75,000lbs whereas the United States requires only 25,000lbs. The Canadian standard is based on the original 1967 FMVSS proposal that could not get approved due to industry lobbying. A recent series of tests conducted by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) revealed that rear underride guards provide a safety benefit when the impact involves the full face of the guard. But, when the crash involves only a small portion of the guar, only 1 out of 8 guards passed the 30% offset test. The IIHS testing also revealed that under the current FMVSS requirements, the trailer, underride guard, bolts and welding do not have to be tested as a whole system which creates a huge problem since accidents are dynamic and involve each of these components simultaneously. Another problem with the existing rear underride guard provisions is that the guards are too high. The standard allows the guards to be 22 inches above the ground, but because of the design of newer vehicles, the guard height needs to be 16 inches above the ground. The standard does not cover single unit trucks, dump trucks, pole trailers, low chassis trailers, wheels back trailers. It only covers semi trailers.

11 Inadequate Side Underride Guards The large, unprotected gap between the rear axle and the kingpin of a trailer is a deadly hazard because vehicles can underride this portion of the vehicle. Sadly, there is no FMVSS provision that mandates the use of side underride guards on heavy trucks. There are no current statistics available to show how many deaths and serious injuries are caused each year when vehicles run under the side of a heavy truck. Back in 1977, UMTRI concluded there were 195 side underride fatalities each year. From 1994 to 2005, 932 deaths were caused from side underride collisions and there were 5,085 serious injuries. The IIHS concluded in a recent article that one fifth of all fatalities are side underride collisions which is the same as rear underride fatalities. Despite these staggering numbers, no attempt has been made to prevent side underride fatalities. The ECE, along with Australia have expressed interest in regulating side underride protection. This sentence doesn t make sense Testing by various agencies, universities and research outlets have found to provide significant occupant protection benefits. One such design tested was to fill the gap with a reinforced pallet box. The second design was a more conventional guard attached to the trailer. A third design incorporates a molded block placed under the trailer. In Europe, side underride guards have been used since the mid 1980 s and no side underride fatalities have been reported due to a failure of the side underride guards. These guards costs per trailer. Back in 2013, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) recommended that side underride guards be equipped on all new trailers.

12 Preventing Fuel Fed Fires If you survive the crash, you should not die because of fire. This is a seminal crashworthiness principle. However, the heavy truck industry has been killing its drivers at an alarming rate because they put mileage ahead of driver safety. So, to increase mileage, driver s sit above a large diameter, side saddle tank that is unguarded, unprotected and made out of thin walled aluminum. These side saddle tanks get ripped open, ripped off and spew hundreds of gallons of fuel onto hot surfaces. Fuel fed fires are 15 times more likely to kill truck drivers than passenger vehicles occupants because heavy trucks have no fuel system safety regulations. Sixteen percent of all accidents that involve a heavy truck result in the death of the driver by fire. This statistic is staggering since safer alternative designs have existed for 50 years to prevent most of these direct fuel tank breach impacts. Back in 1989, the NHTSA wrote that the following heavy truck tank modifications would virtually eliminate deaths by fuel tank failure: None of these proposals included moving the tank inside the frame rails which would mean decreasing the mileage capability of the heavy truck because the economics that drive the heavy truck industry is simple the vehicle should carry maximum fuel as far forward as possible. In 1995, Freightliner commissioned a study by UMTRI and they concluded that 9 persons a 1. Increase puncture resistance of fuel tanks. 2. Use bladders in the tank. 3. Protect the tank from nearby components that might strike or rupture the tank. month had died from fires in Freightliner trucks. The safest way to prevent fire is to simply move the fuel tank inside the rails away from the impact zone. Fuel tank configurations have existed since the 1970 s that would allow the same amount of fuel to be carried inside the rails as compared to the current side saddle tank design used by virtually every heavy truck manufacturer.

13 Another design that should be used if improved fuel system designs are not going to be utilized is an escape hatch that allows the driver to exit the vehicle before the fire engulfs the cab. This design has been used by Volvo, Freightliner and Mercedes. Conclusion Now that the NHTSA has been called on the carpet with its woefully inadequate response to the Toyota sudden acceleration and GM ignition defect issues, it is time for them to focus on protecting all members of the motoring public. Each year thousands of heavy truck drivers and other motorists are killed because heavy trucks are simply not safe. They are coffins on wheels. It is time for the heavy truck industry and the NHTSA to enact meaningful safety regulations that protect heavy truck drivers and motorists that impact the rear and sides of trailers. Complacency has lasted over 60 years while cemeteries were filling up and hospitals were overflowing with the carnage left behind when a heavy truck was involved in an accident. Crashworthiness safety principles were not and should not be limited to passenger vehicles. Rather, crashworthiness must be applied to any vehicle traveling in the United States.