The belligerent bear: Russia updates its military doctrine

Transcription

1 Jane's Defence Weekly [Content preview Subscribe to IHS Jane s Defence Weekly for full article] The belligerent bear: Russia updates its military doctrine Russia's new military doctrine differs from its 2010 predecessor mainly in tone and nuance but, highlighting growing security threats, it also suggests there will be no retreat from the country's military development programme. Dr Mark Galeotti reports While all national militaries are built on the basis of some sense of security priorities and threat assessment, Russian military planning is especially focused on its regularly updated doctrine. This document is typically updated when necessary to reflect a new political line, or else a reappraisal of the risks facing the country. The decision by the Kremlin to adopt a new doctrine at the end of 2014 is therefore a clear sign of the shifts in Moscow's thinking about its place in the world and the way it will respond to new challenges and opportunities. A column of Russian T-90 tanks roll through Red Square during the Victory Day military parade in Moscow, Russia, on 9 May 2014 (PA) The decision to revise the existing 2010 Military Doctrine was made at a meeting of Russia's Security Council (SB) on 5 July Speaking to IHS Jane's, General Staff sources said the original intention had Article 1 Page 1 of 6

2 been to submit a draft of the new document in mid-2015, but in September 2014, in the wake of NATO's Wales Summit, President Vladimir Putin instructed the SB to have a finished document ready by the end of the year. A draft was agreed by the SB on 19 December and then signed into law by Putin on 26 December. [Continued in full version ] Aggressive defence The 2014 document is fundamentally similar to the 2010 doctrine, not least in framing itself as intrinsically defensive. However, it embodies what could be considered 'aggressive defence': an explicit commitment to operating beyond Russia's borders to protect national interests that are, in turn, more broadly framed than those of many other countries. The doctrine talks primarily of "dangers" rather than outright "threats". Nonetheless, its list of 13 external military challenges to Russia ( see box ) is headed by efforts to increase the role and capacity of NATO to carry out global operations "in violation of international law", as well as the alliance's expansion to Russia's borders. The US Prompt Global Strike concept is also explicitly cited in the context of efforts to achieve military superiority over Russia. This is essentially a restatement, albeit in more dramatic terms, of challenges also cited in the 2010 document. However, one definite change is the statement that, "despite a decreased likelihood of a largescale war against Russia, some security threats continue to grow". These include: regional instability (such as in Afghanistan), the presence of "foreign private military companies" on Russia's borders, the overthrow of "legitimate public authorities" in adjacent countries and their replacement with regimes hostile to Moscow, and "subversion" by foreign intelligence agencies. In other words, the Kremlin believes that, while the risk of major war continues to decline, Russia is actually in a more dangerous position than in Instead, the challenge it faces comes both from environmental threats, such as localised terrorism and insurgency, as well as direct and deliberate hostile acts, through covert, proxy, and deniable means. [Continued in full version ] Information and political warfare One distinct shift in both tone and content reflects the Kremlin's new concerns about - and interest in - information operations, as well as wider worries about potential protest and disillusion at home. In a passage that bears the fingerprints of Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, the doctrine characterises modern military conflicts as "the comprehensive use of military force as well as political, economic, informational, and other non-military means, together with the extensive use of the population's potential for protest and special operations forces". This clearly reflects a developing theme in Russian military art, demonstrated in Ukraine, where a combination of direct military intervention - often covert or at least ambiguous and denied - as well as the operations of proxy forces and intelligence assets have been blended with political leverage, disinformation campaigns, and economic pressure. That this is not a one-off response to a specific situation Article 1 Page 2 of 6

3 has been demonstrated by the renewed authority granted to military intelligence and to the GRU (the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff) and the creation of a new Special Operations Command (KSO). Until 2013, after all, the GRU had been under pressure. The directive had formally lost operational control of the Spetsnaz special forces to regular territorial commands. During Dmitry Medvedev's interim presidency ( ), its establishment strength was cut sharply, with the loss of 80 of its 100 general-rank officers. There was even talk of demoting the GRU to a regular directorate, which would have lost it much of its prestige and autonomy. Now, however, it is restored to its old authority, is increasingly active overseas, and has regained control of the Spetsnaz. Those special forces have also experienced not just expansion - with two new brigades: the 100th and the 25th - but also development. Most of the 15,000-17,000 Spetsnaz are essentially very well trained light infantry and intervention forces. However, a growing awareness of the need for truly 'tier one' special forces able to operate in small teams and complex political environments led in 2010 to the decision to create the KSO. Becoming operational in 2013, the KSO first saw action in the seizure of Crimea in Numbering perhaps 500 operators, with integral airlift and close air support assets ( see box ), the KSO represents a genuine enhancement of Russian capabilities and one designed for precisely the kind of military-political operations described for the first time in the 2014 doctrine. However, there is also a strong defensive - even alarmist - tone to this document's discussion of such political and information operations. Moscow has long believed the Arab Spring risings as well as the Colour Revolutions that toppled authoritarian - and Moscow-friendly - regimes in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2005), and Kyrgyzstan (2005) were caused by Western subversion. The fall of the Yanukovych regime in 2014 has renewed and deepened these concerns and the belief the West is trying to engineer similar regime change in Russia. Russia's budget revisions (IHS) Dr Mark Galeotti is Professor of Global Affairs at New York University and director of the Initiative for the Study of Emerging Threats at the Center for Global Affairs. Article 1 Page 3 of 6

4 MAIN EXTERNAL RISKS IN RUSSIA'S 2014 MILITARY DOCTRINE1. Increased power and expansion of NATO 2. Regional instability 3. Build-up of forces in neighbouring countries, including mercenaries 4. Ballistic missile defence systems and US Prompt Global Strike programme 5. Interference in the domestic politics of the Russian Federation and its allies and claims on their territory 6. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 7. A refusal by certain states to abide by international law and agreed treaty on controlling certain weapons 8. The illegal use of force in the territory of Russia or its allies 9. International terrorism 10. Ethnic and sectarian tensions and violent groups 11. The use of information warfare to undermine national sovereignty and stability 12. The establishment of hostile states on Russia's borders through the overthrow of legitimate governments 13. Subversion by foreign intelligence services SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (KSO)HQ: Senezh Training and Operations Centre (Solnechnogorsk) 346th Independent Spetsnaz Brigade (Prokhladny) Helicopter Attack and Transport Squadron (Torzhok) Aviation Transport Squadron (Tver-Migalovo) OUTLOOKIn the main, the 2014 Military Doctrine restates existing policy and formalises changes in force structure and operational art from recent years, albeit with an overlay of more extreme rhetoric. However, this does not mean it will have no impact. The centrality of doctrine in Russian military-political planning means that even changes in nuance and language are important. First of all, it is a statement of the Kremlin's commitment, regardless of its current economic crisis, to continue to modernise its military forces. Despite announcements of a potential 10% reduction to the approved RUB3.286 billion budget for National Defence in 2015, spending on the military will still increase by around 20% in nominal terms. Furthermore, the State Armament Program (SAP) - which encompasses the bulk of procurement, research and development, repair and upgrade activities for the Russian armed forces - has been protected from the proposed cuts to spending in In addition, while the depreciation of the ruble has cut the budget's value in dollar terms, the majority of the SAP's costs are ruble denominated, minimising the effect of this issue. Regardless, in 2015 the military expects to receive aircraft, 120 helicopters, and 30 surface ships and submarines, as well as some 600 armoured vehicles. Secondly, the doctrine demonstrates that a series of recent individual initiatives, from the establishment of the KSO and Arctic operational forces through to deployments to Abkhazia and Crimea ought not to be considered ad hoc moves or temporary fads, but part of a wider programme of military reorientation. Long-discussed plans to create joint Aerospace Forces (VKS) by merging the Air Forces and the Aerospace Defence Forces are also due to be implemented in 2015, given their doctrinal role in the new document as responses to what Moscow regards as US efforts to create a conventional 'first strike' capability. Most important, the doctrine reflects and consolidates the Kremlin's increasingly hostile position towards the West and its belief that, for Russia, the world has become an increasingly dangerous place. Whereas the 2010 document presented issues such as the enlargement of NATO's infrastructure and role and the destabilisation of friendly regimes as potential risks of the future, the new doctrine regards them as current, existing ones. It explicitly states that its fundamental goal is the prevention of war, but at the same time blurs the nature of 'war' to include political, economic, and sub-state military threats to Russian Article 1 Page 4 of 6

5 national interests. Thus, in the name of its own security, the Kremlin has developed a doctrine to use military means in pursuit of political objectives - as seen in Ukraine - and one that mandates the creation of modern, deployable forces to conduct high-tempo operations across the spectrum, from small-scale deniable missions all the way to devastating conventional offensives. It remains to be seen whether this in any way ends up enhancing Russian security. Copyright IHS Global Limited, 2015 For the full version and more content: IHS Jane's Defence Industry and Markets Intelligence Centre This analysis is taken from IHS Jane s Defence Industry & Markets Intelligence Centre, which provides world-leading analysis of commercial, industrial and technological defence developments, budget and programme forecasts, and insight into new and emerging defence markets around the world. IHS defence industry and markets news and analysis is also available within IHS Jane s Defence Weekly. To learn more and to subscribe to IHS Jane s Defence Weekly online, offline or print visit For advertising solutions contact the IHS Jane s Advertising team Article 1 Page 5 of 6