TA trades at a severe discount to publicly traded comparable companies as the charts below indicate. 35.0x 30.0x 25.0x 20.0x 15.0x 10.0x 5.0x 0.

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1 TravelCenters of America Board of Directors c/o Mr. Thomas O Brien Chief Executive Officer Center Ridge Road - Suite 200 Westlake, OH February 23, 2015 To the Board of Directors of TravelCenters of America: RDG Capital Fund Management ( RDG ) is a shareholder of TravelCenters of America LLC ( TA or the Company ). We believe TA is an attractive business and commend management for its continuing improvements to the operating performance of the Company. Notwithstanding its recent share price appreciation, however, in our view TA remains a significantly undervalued company which is underfollowed and misunderstood by the public markets. To enhance shareholder value, RDG recommends the Board consider a sale leaseback of the Company s significant real estate assets and the spinoff of its growing truck repair services segment. RDG believes these actions will help unlock the fair market value of the Company which RDG estimates at $24 $27 per share. TRAVELCENTERS OF AMERICA IS SIGNIFICANTLY UNDERVALUED TA trades at a severe discount to publicly traded comparable companies as the charts below indicate. Enterprise Value / 2015E EBITDA Price / 2015E EPS 16.0x 14.0x 12.0x 10.0x 8.0x 6.0x 4.0x 2.0x 0.0x 4.8x TravelCenters of America 14.0x Repair Service Peers 11.9x QSR & Restaurant Peers 8.7x Fuel & C-Store Peers 35.0x 30.0x 25.0x 20.0x 15.0x 10.0x 5.0x 0.0x 14.4x TravelCenters of America 28.9x Repair Service Peers 25.3x QSR & Restaurant Peers 21.1x Fuel & C-Store Peers Note: Fuel / C-Store peers include Alimentation Couche-Tard, Inc., Casey s General Stores, Inc., CrossAmerica Partners, LP, CST Brands, Inc., Energy Transfer Partners, LP, Marathon Petroleum Corp., Murphy USA, Inc., Phillips 66 and The Pantry, Inc. QSR/Restaurant peers include Brinker International, Inc., Carrols Restaurant Group, Inc., Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., Darden Restaurants, Inc., Denny s Corp., Jack in the Box, Inc., The Wendy s Co. and Yum! Brands, Inc. Repair service peer is Monro Muffler Brake, Inc. Competitors Love s Travel Stops & Country Stores and Pilot Flying J are excluded because they are privately owned. Much like TA, the public companies in these peer groups derive revenue primarily from fuel, repair services, restaurants or convenience store retail operations. Yet, despite a similar revenue mix, TA trades at more than a 50% EBITDA multiple discount relative to these publicly traded comparable companies. 1

2 TA also trades at a significant discount to the valuation multiples paid for comparable companies in recently announced acquisitions as the chart below indicates. Given their favorable MLP tax structure and acquisitive growth strategy, fuel distributors such as Energy Transfer Partners/Sunoco LP and CST Brands/CrossAmerica Partners LP are willing to pay high EBITDA multiples for retail fuel networks. Recent Precedent M&A Transactions (LTM EBITDA Multiples) 12.0x 11.2x 10.0x 8.0x 6.0x 6.3x 4.0x 2.0x 0.0x TravelCenters of America Peer Group M&A Median Note: Recently announced M&A transactions include Alimentation Couche-Tard, Inc. / The Pantry Inc., Energy Transfer Partners LP / Susser Holdings Corp., Marathon Petroleum Corp. / Hess Retail Holdings LLC and Susser Petroleum Partners LP / Aloha Petroleum, Ltd. Given its premier nationwide network of interstate highway locations, its embedded customer relationships with the leading truck fleet operators, its steadily improving margins and its double-digit EBITDA growth rate, we believe TA deserves a higher valuation multiple. TA IS MISPERCEIVED AS A LOW-MARGIN FUEL BUSINESS RATHER THAN THE HIGHER MARGIN GROWING CHAIN OF RESTAURANTS, CONVENIENCE STORES & TRUCK REPAIR FACILITIES IT IS Although TA operates the #3 travel center chain and the #1 truck repair services business nationwide, we believe TA is undervalued in part because it is not properly credited for its valuable real estate assets and is misperceived as a slow growth, low-margin, commodity-oriented fuel company rather than the higher margin, growing chain of 359 quick service restaurants (QSRs), 218 full service restaurants, 34 convenience stores, and 240 truck repair facilities which contribute the majority of TA s profits as the graphs below illustrate. Nonfuel 18% Revenue by Segment Gross Profit by Segment Fuel 30% Fuel 82% Nonfuel 70% 2

3 TA trades at the lowest valuation multiple in the entire fuel & convenience store peer group, notwithstanding the 70% contribution to TA s profits from its higher margin nonfuel segments which generate $1.6 billion in revenue. While low-margin, pure play fuel businesses on a standalone basis may deserve to be valued at a relatively modest 5.0x 6.0x EBITDA multiple, we believe the Company s higher margin nonfuel segments should be valued closer to 7.0x 8.0x EBITDA to be more in line with QSRs, full service restaurants and automotive repair service providers which trade at 11.9x 14.0x EBITDA. Furthermore, unlike some competitors, TA owns the real estate underlying many of its properties. Separated, RDG believes the Company s real estate assets and nonfuel segments would be more appropriately valued. In fact, we believe TA s real estate and truck repair segment alone are worth more than the entire market cap of the Company, implying the market currently ascribes virtually no value to TA s other business segments which collectively generate over $7 billion in annual revenue. Therefore, to address the undervaluation of the Company, RDG would like to encourage the Board to consider the following actions RDG believes would significantly increase shareholder value. MONETIZE REAL ESTATE ASSETS TA owns a substantial portfolio of premier real estate assets, including properties underlying 36 of its travel center sites and 27 of its convenience store sites which are not encumbered by mortgage or other secured indebtedness. In addition, the Company owns 8 sites with 348 acres of valuable undeveloped land. Based on an assessment of rental rates and fixed charge coverage ratios, RDG believes this real estate portfolio is worth approximately $400 million net of estimated taxes. Travel Center Composition Franchised 25 Convenience Store Composition Leased 7 Leased 189 Owned 36 Owned 27 This real estate appraisal is based on the Company s average $8 $10 million investment per travel center and $2.2 million investment per convenience store using an approximate 8.0% 8.5% rent cap rate and minimum 1.5x rent coverage ratio. We believe these figures are consistent with the treatment of capital improvements made under the Company s existing sale leaseback agreements and may, in fact, be conservative. Although we are assuming rent at the same 8.0% 8.5% rate used under the Company s existing lease agreement which was entered into in January 2007, revised in August 2008 and last amended in January 2011, since then interest rates and realty cap rates have declined. Furthermore, the Company s credit worthiness has improved considerably as its operating income has nearly doubled in the past several years. Assuming approximately $33 million in rent associated with a future sale leaseback, the estimated value of the Company s owned real estate increases by approximately $50 million for each 100 basis point reduction in cap rate. 3

4 We recognize some of the Company s owned travel center properties are undergoing renovation and a prospective buyer may prefer to wait until these properties are fully stabilized. However, with cap rates on commercial real estate at historically low levels, RDG believes now is an auspicious time for the Company to commence the sale leaseback process in stages, beginning with the 27 Company-owned convenience store locations which are fully stabilized and do not require further renovation. Based on the preceding estimates, the accompanying analysis highlights the Company s undervaluation relative to its real estate assets. Adjusting TA s enterprise value for the estimated after tax proceeds from a sale leaseback and adjusting EBITDA for the estimated additional rent associated with a sale leaseback, TA trades at only 3x pro forma 2015E EBITDA. Real Estate Sale Leaseback Analysis Low High 2015E EBITDA $145.0 $145.0 Rent Expense Associated with Sale Leaseback Transaction (29.8) (36.1) Pro Forma 2015E EBITDA $115.2 $108.9 Current Capitalization Recent Share Price $12.68 $12.68 Shares Outstanding Equity Value $477.6 $477.6 Cash (241.5) (241.5) Debt & Deferred Rent Obligations Aggregate Value $701.3 $701.3 Estimated After-Tax Real Estate Value (360.2) (416.8) Pro Forma Aggregate Value Adj. for Sale Leaseback $341.1 $284.5 Implied PF Aggregate Value / PF 2015E EBITDA 3.0x 2.6x By engaging in a sale leaseback transaction, we believe the Company can reduce its cost of capital related to approximately $400 million in real estate assets by exchanging approximately $33 million in EBITDA currently trading at an implied 21% cap rate or 4.8x EBITDA for $400 million in after tax proceeds and annual rental payments at an 8.0% 8.5% cost of capital or the effective equivalent of approximately 12.0x EBITDA. As a result, the EBITDA multiple improvement and cap rate arbitrage creates more than $215 million in value. Real Estate Sale Leaseback Analysis Low High Estimated After-Tax Real Estate Value $360.2 $416.8 Capitalized Rent Associated with Sale Leaseback (144.0) (174.8) Incremental Value Created from Sale Leaseback $216.1 $242.1 Incremental Value Created from Sale Leaseback per Share $5.74 $6.43 As the analysis above indicates, adjusting for the incremental capitalized rent associated with a sale leaseback, RDG believes such a sale leaseback transaction could increase shareholder value by $5.70 to $6.40 per share or approximately +45% upside. 4

5 SPIN OFF TRUCK REPAIR SEGMENT In addition to its valuable real estate holdings, TA has also built a valuable nationwide network of 240 truck repair facilities which RDG believes is another underappreciated hidden asset of the Company. We believe a spinoff of TA s truck repair services segment would allow this business with attractive margins and solid growth to trade at a valuation multiple significantly higher than the valuation multiple ascribed to the Company on a consolidated basis. As the charts below indicate, TA s truck repair segment has grown steadily during the past several years to become a leading national provider of truck repair services. TA has more truck repair locations than its largest independent competitors, Love s Travel Stops, Speedco and Bosselman Boss Shops, combined. The Company s RoadSquad fleet of 450 heavy duty vehicles also positions TA as one of the largest nationwide emergency roadside service networks TravelCenters of America Number of Truck Repair & Maintenance Facilities Competitor Comparison Number of Truck Repair & Maintenance Facilities E 0 TravelCenters of America Love's Travel Stops Speedco Bosselman Boss Shops Notwithstanding the market leadership position and consistent growth of its truck repair division, we believe TA s stock price does not properly reflect the value of this attractive business segment. As the charts below indicate, publicly traded automotive repair chain Monro Muffler Brake ( Monro ) trades at approximately 14.0x 2015E EBITDA, yet TA trades at only 4.8x 2015E EBITDA. Both companies provide similar repair services, including basic services such as oil changes and tire repair to specialty services such as repair of air conditioning, brakes and electrical systems, although Monro focuses on passenger cars, light trucks and vans while TA focuses on trucks. Also, both Monro and TA operate similarly large company-operated networks with 953 and 240 locations, respectively, and both companies have similar scale in terms of revenue. TA s truck repair segment with approximately $750 million in revenue is nearly equal in size to Monro with approximately $880 million in revenue. While Monro has high margins and consumer brand awareness, TA s truck repair segment also has several key competitive advantages, including the largest nationwide emergency roadside service network operating in 43 states, 240 prime interstate highway locations, 2,500 skilled technicians, customer relationships with most of the 100 largest truck fleet operators, and substantially larger scale than its competitors in a highly fragmented industry. 5

6 These attributes should justify a higher valuation multiple for TA s truck repair segment in comparison to its automotive repair service peer. Yet, as the chart below indicates, Monro trades at approximately 2.4x 2015E revenue compared to only 0.1x 2015E revenue for TA on a consolidated basis. 16.0x 14.0x 12.0x Enterprise Value / 2015E EBITDA 14.0x 2.5x 2.0x Enterprise Value / 2015E Revenue 2.4x 10.0x 8.0x 6.0x 4.8x 1.5x 1.0x 4.0x 2.0x 0.0x TravelCenters of America Monro Muffler Brake 0.5x 0.0x 0.1x TravelCenters of America Monro Muffler Brake If TA s truck repair segment were to be spun off and trade at just 0.5x estimated revenue of $750 million, it alone would be worth $375 million and account for the majority of TA s equity market value today, thereby ascribing modest value to TA s other business segments which collectively generate in excess of $7 billion in revenue. Even assuming TA s truck repair segment were to trade at an EBITDA multiple discount of approximately 50% relative to its comparable publicly traded automotive repair chain, or just 7.3x 2015E EBITDA, we believe this business segment alone would be worth at least $300 million. Although it may require the restructuring of existing real estate leases, truck fleet contracts and credit agreements, RDG believes a spinoff of the Company s truck repair segment would be feasible to implement. TA could sublease its service bay facilities to the newly independent truck repair segment. Such a sublease arrangement would be similar to the Company s current arrangement to sublease to franchisees several of the travel center sites it leases from Hospitality Properties Trust. Furthermore, similar to its existing outsourcing arrangement with Reit Management & Research, TA could continue to provide the newly independent truck repair segment with business management and shared services, fuel card & loyalty programs, and general & administrative functions. In fact, TA could form an alliance with its newly independent truck repair segment similar to the network alliance travel center rival Pilot Flying J has with truck repair competitor Bosselman Boss Shops. Finally, TA could implement the spinoff of its truck repair segment either by distributing 19.9% ownership of its shares on a pro rata, tax free basis to existing TA shareholders or through an initial public offering (IPO). Assuming a post spinoff enterprise value of approximately $325 million, including $50 million of net debt, the newly independent truck repair segment would have an equity market cap of $275 million. Therefore an IPO of 19.9% of the new truck repair company could generate $50 million in proceeds for TA that can be used for further acquisitions and expansion. 6

7 Based on the Company s significant book value relative to its market value we presume there would be little tax leakage from such an IPO. Selling stock of the truck repair segment via an IPO at 7.0x 8.0x 2015E EBITDA would clearly be more beneficial and less dilutive to TA shareholders than issuing TA common stock at the Company s current 4.8x 2015E EBITDA multiple to raise capital. Under this IPO scenario, TA could also continue to consolidate its truck repair segment financials with the Company s other operations assuming TA continues to own at least 80.1% of the new entity and maintains effective management control. Truck Repair Spinoff Analysis Low High 2015E Truck Repair Services Segment EBITDA $42.1 $42.1 Current 2015E EBITDA Trading Multiple 4.8x 4.8x Current Truck Repair Services Implied Value $203.4 $ E Truck Repair Services Segment EBITDA $42.1 $42.1 Assumed Truck Repair Services Multiple Post Spinoff 7.3x 7.8x Implied Truck Repair Services Value Post Spinoff $305.0 $330.0 Incremental Value Created Post Spinoff $101.6 $126.6 Incremental Value Created Post Spinoff per Share $2.70 $3.36 As the table above indicates, we estimate that applying a reasonable 7.0x 8.0x 2015E EBITDA multiple to TA s market leading truck repair services segment rather than the 4.8x 2015E EBITDA multiple ascribed to it as part of TA on a consolidated basis, TA s spinoff of its truck repair services segment could increase shareholder value by $2.70 to $3.35 per share or approximately +20% upside. RESTAURANT SEGMENT Following the sale leaseback of its owned real estate and a spinoff of its truck repair segment, we believe TA would trade at a higher valuation more appropriately reflecting its extensive QSR and full service restaurant operations. Currently TA trades at a significant discount to publicly traded QSR and full service restaurant chains notwithstanding the fact that TA operates 218 full service restaurants under the Iron Skillet and Country Pride brands as well as 359 diversified, brand-name QSRs nationwide, including Burger King, Dunkin Donuts, Pizza Hut, Popeye s Chicken, Starbuck s Coffee, Subway, Arby s and Taco Bell franchise restaurants. With 577 QSR franchises and full service restaurants nationwide TA trades at only 4.8x 2015E EBITDA yet, by comparison, publicly traded Carrols Restaurant Group ( Carrols ), operator of 581 Burger King franchises, Cracker Barrel Old Country Store Inc., operator of 633 full service restaurants, and Denny s Corporation, operator of 1,700 full service restaurants, trade at approximately 8.2x 13.2x 2015E EBITDA. 7

8 14.0x 12.0x 10.0x 8.0x 6.0x 4.0x 2.0x 0.0x 4.8x TravelCenters of America Enterprise Value / 2015E EBITDA 13.2x 11.4x 8.2x Denny's Cracker Barrel Carrols Restaurant Group As a publicly traded operator of Burger King franchises in 13 states, we believe Carrols is a close comparable to TA s franchised QSR chain which operates in 43 states and includes Burger King franchises. Although it leases most of its 581 locations, Carrols trades at an enterprise value of approximately $400 million, which implies a market value of approximately $690,000 per restaurant unit. Applying a 30% discount or $480,000 per unit for TA s 359 QSRs and a 40% discount or $410,000 per unit for TA s 218 full service restaurants implies a fair market value greater than $250 million for TA s restaurant segment alone, which is equal to more than half the entire equity market cap of the Company. Restaurant Segment Analysis Low High 2015E Restaurant/QSR Segment EBITDA $26.7 $26.7 Current 2015E EBITDA Trading Multiple 4.8x 4.8x Current Restaurant/QSR Implied Value $129.3 $ E Restaurant/QSR Segment EBITDA $26.7 $26.7 Assumed Restaurant/QSR Multiple 7.5x 8.4x Implied Restaurant/QSR Value $200.0 $225.0 Incremental Value Created $70.7 $95.7 Incremental Value Created per Share $1.88 $2.54 Compared to the valuation metrics of full service restaurant chains such as Cracker Barrel and Denny s which trade at 11.4x and 13.2x 2015E EBITDA, respectively, TA trades at only 4.8x 2015E EBITDA on a consolidated basis. Even if the restaurant segment of TA were to be valued at a 40% discount to these peers, or only 7.5x 2015E EBITDA, we believe this segment alone would be worth at least $200 million. As the table above indicates, the difference between $200 million and the $129 million value implied by the 4.8x 2015E EBITDA valuation ascribed to this segment as part of TA on a consolidated basis enhances shareholder value by $1.85 to $2.50 per share. 8

9 FUEL & CONVENIENCE STORE SEGMENT We believe TA s fuel and convenience store operations would also be more appropriately valued following the sale leaseback of TA s owned real estate assets and a spinoff of its truck repair services segment. As the graph below indicates, TA currently trades at the lowest valuation multiple in the entire fuel & convenience store peer group, notwithstanding the fact that, in our opinion, TA has better locations than many of its higher-valued peers. Compared to its peers, TA has the largest number of premier travel center locations along the U.S. interstate highway system creating a national network that would be difficult if not impossible to replicate. Furthermore, approximately 50% of TA s travel center sites are located in the 10 states with the highest concentration of truck traffic, making these sites especially attractive locations. Enterprise Value / 2015E EBITDA 12.0x 10.0x 8.0x 11.1x 10.2x 9.9x 9.4x 8.7x 8.1x 7.3x 6.9x 6.8x 6.0x 4.0x 4.8x 2.0x 0.0x TravelCenters of America Alimentation Couche-Tard CST Brands Murphy USA Casey's General Stores CrossAmerica Partners Energy Transfer Partners Phillips 66 The Pantry Marathon Petroleum In addition to having superior locations compared to other fuel & convenience store operators, TA also focuses more than its peers on the attractive commercial trucking sector in which freight volume continues to grow steadily. In contrast to its retail gas station peers who rely on passenger vehicle traffic volume which is stagnant, the trucking industry volume on which TA relies is enjoying long term secular growth. In the past several years, while the estimated number of passenger vehicle miles driven has increased by only 2% according to the Department of Transportation, truck tonnage has increased by approximately 30% according to the American Trucking Association. TA is well-positioned within the growing commercial truck fleet sector. The Company has contractual relationships with most of the 100 leading truck fleet operators, which we believe provides TA with a more loyal, repeat customer base than retail gas stations operated by many of its peers. TA also has less commodity price risk than most retail gas station operators, in our view, because a large percentage of TA s fuel volume is contracted on a cost plus basis with truck fleet operators. Although having large truck fleet customers that buy in bulk based on negotiated terms may cause TA to have lower margins than retail gas station operators, TA has higher EBITDA growth compared to many of its peers. 9

10 During the past few years, TA has grown EBITDA at a compound annual growth rate of approximately 17% compared to a CAGR of approximately 5% among its fuel & convenience store peers. According to analyst estimates, TA s future EBITDA growth is also projected to be higher than its industry peers. Yet, notwithstanding these significant competitive attributes and superior EBITDA growth, TA s fuel & convenience store segment trades at only 4.8x 2015E EBITDA as part of the Company on a consolidated basis compared to the 8.7x median 2015E EBITDA multiple of its peers. Even if TA s fuel & convenience store segment were to be valued at a 30% discount to the 8.7x median 2015E EBITDA multiple of its peers or only 6.0x 2015E EBITDA, the lowest valuation multiple in its peer group, we believe this segment alone would be worth approximately $450 million. Based on the following analysis we estimate TA s fuel segment is worth approximately $270 million and its convenience store segment is worth approximately $180 million. Fuel and Convenience Store Segment Analysis Low High 2015E Fuel Segment EBITDA $51.5 $51.5 Current 2015E EBITDA Trading Multiple 4.8x 4.8x Current Fuel Implied Value $249.3 $ E Fuel Segment EBITDA $51.5 $51.5 Assumed Fuel Multiple 5.0x 5.5x Implied Fuel Value $260.0 $285.0 Incremental Fuel Value Created $10.7 $ E Convenience Store Segment EBITDA $24.7 $24.7 Current 2015E EBITDA Trading Multiple 4.8x 4.8x Current Convenience Store Implied Value $119.3 $ E Convenience Store Segment EBITDA $24.7 $24.7 Assumed Convenience Store Multiple 6.9x 7.9x Implied Convenience Store Value $170.0 $195.0 Incremental Convenience Store Value Created $50.7 $75.7 Incremental Fuel & Convenience Store Value Created $61.4 $111.4 Incremental Value Created per Share $1.63 $2.96 As the table above indicates, the difference between the approximate $450 million estimated fair market value of TA s fuel & convenience store segment and the approximate $370 million combined value implied by the 4.8x 2015E EBITDA valuation ascribed to these segments as part of TA on a consolidated basis enhances shareholder value by $1.60 to $2.95 per share. 10

11 SUM OF THE PARTS VALUATION In summary, although the Company does not provide EBITDA by segment, based on the following estimates RDG believes TA could be worth $24 $27 per share on a sum of the parts basis assuming a sale leaseback of the Company s owned real estate assets and a spinoff of its truck repair services segment. ($ in M M, except per share amounts) 2015E Peer Assumed Estimated Value Segment EBITDA Multiple Multiple Low High Fuel $ x 5.0x $260.0 $285.0 QSR & Restaurant x 7.5x Convenience Store x 6.9x Truck Repair x 7.3x Real Estate, After-Tax (1) Capitalized Rent Associated with Sale Lease-back (2) (33.0) 6.5x (192.6) (233.6) Joint Venture (3) Estimated Enterprise Value $1,129.9 $1,254.4 Cash Debt & Deferred Rent Obligations (465.2) (465.2) Estimated Equity Value $906.3 $1,030.7 Estimated Equity Value Per Share $24.06 $27.36 Note: Assumes pro rata allocation of franchisee rent and royalties across operating segments. (1) Assumes rent capitalized at 8.25%. (2) Assumes weighted average EBITDA multiple of operating segments. (3) Assumes 10.0x 12.0x 2015E PE multiple. If TA were to trade up +90% to $24 per share based on the preceding sum of the parts analysis, it would still be valued at only a modest 6.6x pro forma 2015E EBITDA, net of the after tax proceeds and incremental rent associated with a sale leaseback. Even at 6.6x pro forma 2015E EBITDA, TA would still trade at the lowest EBITDA multiple among all its peers in each sector in which the Company operates. 11

12 $30.00 Recent Share Price vs Estimated Fair Market Value per Share $25.00 $ % $24.06 $2.90 $3.41 $15.00 $10.00 $12.68 $4.44 $5.20 $5.00 $0.00 Recent Share Price $8.11 Estimated Fair Market Value per Share Real Estate Truck Repair Fuel QSR & Restaurant Convenience Store Note: Assumes pro rata allocation of net debt and joint venture across all segments and pro rata allocation of capitalized rent across operating segments. As the chart above indicates, we believe TA s real estate and truck repair segment alone are worth more than the entire market cap of the Company, implying the market currently ascribes virtually no value to TA s other business segments which collectively generate over $7 billion in annual revenue. FAVORABLE MACRO ENVIRONMENT Given favorable macro economic and regulatory tailwinds which should continue to allow TA to grow EBITDA, RDG believes now is an auspicious time for the Company to unlock shareholder value through a real estate sale leaseback transaction and a spinoff of its truck repair services segment: (1) recent M&A consolidation in the truck stop industry has led to more stable and improved fuel margins which should increase cash flow and valuation multiples, (2) new driver regulations limiting hours of service and requiring more rest periods should be favorable to truck stop operators, (3) an improving economy should lead to continued increases in truck freight volume, and (4) lower gas prices should (i) increase fuel volume due to more vehicle miles driven, (ii) increase customer spending at restaurants and convenience stores, and (iii) provide a competitive advantage to trucking relative to rail transportation. 12

13 Furthermore, given management s proven ability to acquire and upgrade travel center locations, RDG believes EBITDA should increase more than 25%, or $35 million before rent, in just the next two years as the travel center sites acquired and renovated by the Company in recent years continue to mature. This substantial increase in EBITDA should provide ample cash flow from operations to adequately service incremental rent associated with a sale leaseback. Furthermore, in addition to its growing EBITDA, $400 million in cash proceeds from a real estate sale leaseback and $50 million in cash proceeds from the sale of a 19.9% stake in an IPO of its truck repair services segment would enable the Company to deleverage and continue to grow both organically via new site development as well as through further acquisitions. CONCLUSION In conclusion, RDG believes TA is a highly attractive yet deeply undervalued company. As the #3 travel center operator and the #1 truck repair services business nationwide, we think the Company should command a premium, not discounted, valuation. We believe TA is misperceived as a slow growth, low-margin, commodityoriented fuel company rather than the higher margin, growing chain of QSRs, full service restaurants, convenience stores and truck repair facilities which contribute the majority of TA s profits. Furthermore, unlike some competitors, TA owns valuable real estate underlying many of its properties. RDG believes a sale leaseback of the Company s real estate assets and a spinoff of its truck repair services segment would allow TA to close the valuation gap and realize its fair market value between $24 and $27 per share. We welcome the opportunity to discuss these recommendations to enhance shareholder value with you. Sincerely, Russell D. Glass Managing Partner 13

14 About RDG Capital Fund Management New York-based RDG Capital Fund Management ( RDG ) is a private investment firm founded by Russell Glass, the former President of Icahn Associates. RDG manages investment funds which primarily focus on undervalued companies with identifiable catalyst opportunities to enhance shareholder value. Important Disclosures Any views expressed herein represent the opinions of RDG, whose analysis is based solely on publicly available information. No representation or warranty, express or implied, is made with respect to the accuracy, timeliness or completeness of the information contained herein. RDG expressly disclaims any and all liability based, in whole or in part, on such information, any errors therein or omissions therefrom. Any opinions expressed herein are subject to change without notification. Forward looking statements involve certain risks and uncertainties and assumptions. Actual results may differ materially from those contained in forward looking statements. RDG does not assume any obligation to update, correct or revise the information contained herein. RDG intends to review its managed funds investment in the Company on a continuing basis and may from time to time and at any time in the future depending on various factors, including, without limitation, the outcome of any discussions referenced above, the Company s financial position and strategic direction, actions taken by the Board, price levels of the Company s shares, other investment opportunities available to RDG, conditions in the securities market and general economic and industry conditions, take such actions with respect to its managed funds investment in the Company as it deems appropriate, including, without limitation: (i) acquiring additional shares and/or other equity, debt, notes, other securities, or derivative or other instruments that are based upon or relate to the value of the shares or the Company in the open market or otherwise; (ii) disposing of any or all of such securities or instruments in the open market or otherwise; or (iii) engaging in any hedging or similar transactions with respect to such securities or instruments. Figures may represent estimates of RDG or third parties and may not be indicative of future results. There is no assurance or guarantee with respect to the prices at which any securities of the Company will trade, and such securities may not trade at prices that may be implied or stated herein. The estimates and pro forma information set forth herein are based on assumptions that RDG believes to be reasonable, but there can be no assurance or guarantee that actual results will not differ materially. The information contained herein does not recommend the purchase or sale of any security nor is it an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy any security. Furthermore, the information contained herein is not intended to be, nor should it be construed or used as, investment, tax or legal advice. No representation or warranty is made that RDG s investment process or investment objectives will or are likely to be achieved or successful or that RDG s managed funds investments will make any profit or will not sustain losses. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Nothing contained herein should be taken as any form of commitment on the part of RDG to take any action in connection with any particular security. RDG and its affiliates are in the business of buying and selling securities. They have, and may in the future, buy, sell or change the form of their position in the Company or any security for any or no reason whatsoever. RDG has neither sought nor obtained the consent from any third party to use any statements or information contained herein that have been obtained or derived from statements made or published by such third parties which RDG may not be able to independently verify. Any such statements or information should not be viewed as indicating the support of such third parties for the views expressed herein. Furthermore, RDG makes no representations or warranties as to the accuracy, timeliness or completeness of such information. 14