Ethics and Agency: Conceptualizing Moral Community

Transcription

1 Wesleyan University The Honors College Ethics and Agency: Conceptualizing Moral Community by Lauren Kuhlik Class of 2011 A thesis submitted to the faculty of Wesleyan University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts with Departmental Honors in Philosophy Middletown, Connecticut April 12, 2011

2 2 Acknowledgements I would like to express my deep gratitude to my advisor, Professor Elise Springer. This project would not have been possible without her encouragement, support, questions, and guidance. She has helped me not only create this thesis, but become a more critical and more inquisitive thinker and writer. I would also like to thank Professor Joe Rouse, who introduced me to the complex and fascinating ideas of Karen Barad. I greatly appreciate the time he spent working through the most difficult facets of her philosophy with me. Without this help, my project could not have come as far as it has. I would like to thank my friends, for their encouragement and, when necessary, their sympathy. I owe a great deal of gratitude to my parents, for encouraging and putting up with my curiosity from a young age, and for all the support they have given me in my endeavors, academic and non-academic alike. 2

3 3 Table of Contents Introduction...4 Chapter 1: Two Major Concerns: Non-Exclusivity and Relationality Chapter 2: Kantianism: Kant, Korsgaard, and Shoemaker...17 Chapter 3: Consequentialism: Mill, Singer, and Railton...32 Chapter 4: Care Ethics: Noddings, Luo, and Kittay..48 Chapter 5: Redefining Agency: Barad, Haraway, and Meyers.66 Conclusion

4 4 Introduction David Shoemaker begins his article "Responsibility and Disability" with the phrase [m]oral community is a term of art in philosophy. 1 He goes on to argue that the moral community is the community of agents with whom we can engage in moral address. Shoemaker takes it for granted that there is some line though perhaps not an obvious one at which the scope of morality ends. But is this the right way to conceptualize moral community? My thesis will explore the issue of how to give an account of moral community. The issue at hand is not primarily an ontological one; I am not deeply concerned with defining the phrase as such. Instead, I am interested in the ethical implications of conceptualizing moral community. Who or what should be included in our understanding of moral community? Our moral obligations are directly related to our understanding of moral community; we cannot be morally obligated to those who fall outside the scope of our moral community, though we can have general obligations: for example, not to cause harm intentionally. Shoemaker is primarily concerned with a community that encompasses reason-givers. His conception of moral community is one that focuses explicitly on norms of moral address. The boundary drawn, then, demarcates a line between those who are capable of engaging in some level of moral address, and those who are not. In addition to some sorts of people such as psychopaths and the severely cognitively disabled this conception of community must exclude non-adults and non-humans. 1 David Shoemaker, Responsibility, Agency, and Cognitive Disability, in Eva Feder Kittay and Licia Carlson, eds., Cognitive Disability and its Challenge to Moral Philosophy (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010),

5 5 This sort of boundary drawing intrigued me, and pushed me to ask what a conception of moral community ought to look like, and what it ought to do. If it is reasonable to say that one person falls inside the boundary of our moral community while another one does not, then I want to make it clear what the consequences of that separation are. I am questioning whether the line that Shoemaker is interested in is drawn too tightly. In giving us an account of moral community, did Shoemaker pick the right norms? Should the scope of morality the boundaries of the moral community be seen as being confined to those who can engage in moral address, and if so, can that boundary be clearly demarcated? Throughout my thesis, I will explore a number of different ethical theories to determine which ones best provide the tools necessary to constructing a robust account of moral community. Out of all the philosophers whose theories I will explore, only Shoemaker explicitly mentions moral community, but his concern is indirect, as he uses the idea of moral community to get at issues of responsibility and moral address. These philosophers do not share all of my concerns, and do not themselves come up with accounts of moral community. However, I can use the implications of their ethical theories in order to determine whether or not that theory provides the tools necessary to conceptualize moral community. My thesis will be divided into five parts. The first part is a framework chapter, which is an explanation on the concerns I have that any account of moral community must answer to satisfactorily. The second chapter will explore Kantianism, specifically that of Kant and then Shoemaker, and will look to answer the question of whether these philosophers can provide the tools to respond to the two 5

6 6 concerns I give. My third chapter looks at consequentialism, focusing on the utilitarianism of Mill and Singer, and then examining the theory of the consequentialist Peter Railton. My fourth chapter looks at care ethics, to determine whether that theory can provide the basis for a robust conception of moral community. The fifth and final body chapter looks to Karen Barad s philosophical insights and sees whether they can answer adequately to the two concerns. I will end with a conclusion that states more precisely how we ought to conceptualize our moral community, and what the ethical implications of that conceptualization are. The framework chapter goes over the two major concerns that any conception of moral community must answer to: non-exclusivity and relationality. Although I do not define precisely what a conception ought not to be exclusive of, I will argue that any account of moral community that is exclusive rather than non-exclusive is lacking in some way. A theory may be too exclusive in two ways, both of which involve drawing too sharp a line around some population. First, it may be exclusive in the interests that it considers, if it allows its followers to ignore the interests of some beings but not others. Second, it may be exclusive in its conception of agency, if it allows for a dichotomy between complete moral agents, and completely passive nonagents. A serious account of moral community must also answer to the concern of relationality. Relationships must be of fundamental importance not merely as valuable things, but as locations of agency itself. For a theory to answer fully to this concern, it must define agency in a way that views relationships as indispensable to the process of agency. 6

7 7 I focus on Kant and Mill in my second and third chapters because these thinkers have had a huge amount of influence on our ethical sensibilities. Because they and their followers have been so influential in crafting our understanding of what it means to be moral or ethical, I want to determine whether their theories can answer to my two major concerns. I will argue that neither Kant nor Mill can adequately respond to my concerns. However, modern followers of their theories Shoemaker and Peter Railton are able to give some suggestion of how to respond to those concerns, though they are still not able to answer all of them under the Kantian or utilitarian framework. The fourth chapter focuses on care ethics that of Nel Noddings and Eva Feder Kittay. I explore the philosophy of Shirong Luo as well, to illuminate and complement Noddings theory. Care ethics takes the concern of relationality very seriously, though care theorists generally, and Noddings specifically, are not centrally concerned with non-exclusivity. Kittay does give a suggestion as to how a theory can answer to the concern of non-exclusivity, both in showing how we are involved in complex networks of nestled dependencies and showing that agency exists on a continuum, rather than being a single characteristic that a being either does or does not possess. I will argue that while Noddings insights about the nature of relationships are extremely helpful in conceptualizing moral community, she does not redefine agency in a way that answers satisfactorily either to the concern of nonexclusivity or to that of relationality. My final body chapter looks to Karen Barad, a physicist who is also concerned with matters of ethics. In this chapter, I will show the importance of 7

8 8 undermining certain metaphysical assumptions that are prevalent in our culture such as that of individualism and representationalism and how we need to alter our understanding of metaphysics in order to conceptualize moral community in a meaningful way. I will show that Barad s concerns overlap with mine to a great degree, although in the writings that I am exploring, she does always answer to those concerns fully because she is primarily a theoretical physicist, not a philosopher. I will argue that her theory goes a long way in showing us that our metaphysical assumptions have important consequences for our ethical beliefs and actions, as well as our understanding of who and what should be included in our conception of moral community. My conclusion will revisit how complex an idea moral community is, and how important it is that we understand the ethical consequences of choosing to see someone as being either a member or not a member of the moral community explicitly or implicitly. I will also argue that moral community is not and cannot be a fixed concept. Instead, we should recognize the ways that we include and exclude a variety of beings and concepts in our understanding of our world metaphysically and ethically. We must take responsibility for those exclusions and inclusions, and recognize whether we ought to change the way that we make them, now or in the future. My thesis considers several philosophers, separated by difference of emphasis and tradition. I am not aiming to discredit or undermine the work of any particular philosopher, but merely to determine whether those philosophers can account for the concerns I have. Philosophers have rarely taken moral community as a primary 8

9 9 consideration, and when they have, they have not focused on making their account of moral community relevant to a wide range of moral concerns. The tradition that emphasizes moral community focuses instead on Kantian-style moral address. I hope that my thesis will push us to consider how we (at least implicitly) make assumptions about what it means to participate in a moral community, and the ethical implications that follow those assumptions. 9

10 10 Chapter 1 Two Major Concerns: Non-Exclusivity and Relationality In this chapter, I will examine two major concerns to which any robust conception of moral community must answer. The two concerns can be summed up as non-exclusivity and relationality. Non-exclusivity refers a refusal to leave beings out of an ethical theory. Some theories attempt to respond to this concern by showing that we must be non-exclusive in recognizing those beings whose interests ought to matter. Still, these theories might be exclusive in terms of how they define agency leaving out a number of beings from this definition. The relationality concern has to do with the fact that many philosophical theories do not truly take relationships seriously they are treated (if they are valued at all) either as instrumental goods, or as intrinsic goods that are still not constitutive of moral agency. These two concerns will motivate my work, and a robust account of moral community must be able to satisfy them in some way. For each concern, the full conception of what is lost in theories that do not take the concern seriously will come out in later chapters. I am seeking, in this chapter, to give the reader a sense of why each concern interests me, and what the ethical consequences are that attach to any theory that takes one of the concerns seriously. Most of what I refer to in this chapter will be brought out more fully in later chapters, and so I am not seeking to give the reader a full account of any one of these concerns, or to explore precisely and completely what is at stake when each goes unfulfilled. I am interested primarily in describing the outline of each concern, allowing that my interest may shift based on the philosophic explorations I undertake 10

11 11 in the rest of my thesis. I will be using these concerns in order to explore why various moral theories do not provide the correct tools for constructing an account of moral community. Moral theories often address one or the other of these concerns, though they often cannot fully satisfy either. Currently, utilitarianism is most concerned with issues of non-exclusivity and care ethics is deeply concerned with issues of relationality. However, neither of these philosophies redefines agency in a way that shows either that agency is a non-exclusive process, or that agency is interactive and that relationships are constitutive of both morality and moral agency. Non-Exclusivity I first want to address the concern of non-exclusivity more in-depth. This issue is deeply important to many philosophers, including those who espouse the two major modern philosophical trains of thought: utilitarianism and Kantianism. Both are concerned with including all of the relevant beings in their moral theories. Kantian philosophy is focused on including all moral agents within the bounds of its theory. Utilitarian philosophy focuses on including all sentient beings, whose needs we must take into consideration when making moral decisions. Kantian philosophy can claim to be non-exclusive because it does not exclude any rational beings from the scope of its philosophy. It does not exclude any being that we can hold accountable and that can hold us accountable. Kantian philosophy focuses on both the absolute moral duties that we have to other agents, and the 11

12 12 absolute respect that we ought to have for them. However, it does not fully satisfy the concern of non-exclusivity for two reasons. First, it excludes a number of beings from its morality, and so we are only obligated to take the interests of non-rational beings into consideration either because they display a proto-rationality, or because our own maxims show that we already value those interests. Second, the Kantian definition of agency is extremely exclusive, in that it is limited solely to rational beings. A wide range of beings are considered morally passive, and are not shown as participating in the process of moral agency. The utilitarian response to the concern of non-exclusivity is focused not on moral agents (or agency), but on sentience and suffering. In attempting to provide the greatest happiness for the greatest number, we must take into account the happiness (or suffering) that would be accrued by all sentient beings. Since the basis of this morality is about minimizing suffering and maximizing happiness, it is imperative that we do not exclude beings whose happiness (or suffering) should matter to us. Still, the most prominent utilitarian theorists do not provide an account of agency that is non-exclusive. There is still a divide between those beings who are agents, and those beings whose interests matter but who are morally passive. I want to emphasize the point that there is no simple answer to the question exclusive (or inclusive) of what? There is no simple way to say that, for example, utilitarian philosophy is non-exclusive while Kantian philosophy is exclusive without explaining what those theories ought not to be exclusive of. Instead, I will let this concern to come up throughout my thesis. It will allow me to say that something is 12

13 13 missing from a given theory that something is excluded even while acknowledging that a theory is in some way responsive to this concern. Consequentialism responds to the concern of non-exclusivity by refusing to exclude any sentient beings from the realm of its theory. Theories such as Kantianism, even while it insists on its own version of non-exclusivity, marginalize a number of beings who ought to matter. However, consequentialism s way of dealing with this concern is not fully satisfying. Sentient beings are seen as valuable things (or receptacles for the ultimately valuable thing that is happiness or pleasure). This sort of understanding of non-exclusivity does not take into consideration the importance of relationships, which leads me to my next concern of relationality. Relationality Relationality is a somewhat more complex concern than that of nonexclusivity. What is at stake in the non-satisfaction of this concern is a theory that does not take seriously the constitutive nature of relationships in constructing what it is to be human. As in the concern of non-exclusivity, a number of different theories take seriously the concern of relationality, and attempt to address and satisfy it in two major ways. The first treats relationships as only instrumentally valuable as a way to accomplish some further end, and the second treats relationships as intrinsically valuable but as intrinsically valuable objects that are not constitutive of our selves and of agency. 13

14 14 Many utilitarian theorists, including Mill, treat relationships as valuable only insofar as they tend to increase the happiness of the sentient world. What is intrinsically valuable is the state of affairs in which the happiness of all sentient beings is maximized. Relationships can contribute to this state of affairs by making those involved in them happier, or by encouraging us to seek out the happiness of others as well as ourselves. However, in these theories, they are never themselves valuable. They are always subject to appraisal in reference to the ultimate end that of the state of affairs in which happiness is maximized. It is obvious that we can become estranged from our own relationships in these situations that we can feel alienated from those to whom we are close or committed. However, even theories that do not treat relationships as merely instrumental goods can still fail to treat them as constitutive of value and agency. Just as a utilitarian concerned with non-exclusivity would take sentient beings to be points (or receptacles) of value, a consequentialist concerned with relationality might take relationships themselves to be intrinsically valuable things. Care ethics, likewise, sees relationships as valuable (indeed the source of what is valuable), but does not necessarily go far enough to answer fully to this concern. A theory that allows relationships their full due will not treat relationships merely as things (instrumentally valuable, intrinsically valuable, or otherwise). Instead, a theory that takes relationality seriously will allow that relationships are constitutive of selves, and that relationships are locations of agency. It is possible that certain theories (such as care ethics) would not object to this classification of agency but the concern of relationality for these theorists does not extend to the point of redefining agency so 14

15 15 that relationships are shown as being not merely valuable things, but what constitutes our reality. Any moral theory that takes my concern of relationality seriously will see relationships as not only expressing agency, or as allowing an agent to develop and sustain her agency, but as constitutive of agency. If this concern is properly understood, then it demands that we see agency as a process of engagement, not as a characteristic of an individual. This concern may require us to rethink some of our most basically held beliefs (acknowledged or not) about what agency is, and even what individual selves are. A satisfactory answer to this concern will show that moral agency and action are tied up in relationships. Agency, in this view, must be interactive rather than individual, something intertwined rather than clearly meted out to some beings but not others. A conception of moral community that takes seriously both of these concerns is not one that will merely capture our experience as moral and social beings. This conception, once developed, will have certain ethical consequences. Rethinking agency, for example, is not merely a metaphysical issue; instead, different conceptions of agency require that we treat other beings in certain ways, and that we seek to create certain circumstances in order to realize agency as far as possible in any of these conceptions. As members of a moral community, we are responsible for other members either merely responsible for their welfare, or responsible (to some extent) for their development, or responsible for creating the conditions necessary to fostering their membership (and the membership of others) as much as possible. 15

16 16 Throughout my thesis, I will be using these concerns to formulate a conception of moral community that answers to the concerns while showing what we ought to value morally and the ethical consequences of taking these concerns seriously. I will look to a variety of different moral theories, and ascertain whether they provide the proper tools to allow me to conceptualize moral community. I will do so by exploring in what ways these theorists (or someone sympathetic to these theorists) could respond to these concerns. I want to make it clear that I do not believe that all moral theorists focus on conceptualizing moral community many would not share my concerns, or would understand them differently. With this in mind, I will not treat these theories as attempts to conceptualize moral community that succeed or fail to various degrees. Rather, I will treat the theories as providing tools that either help to satisfy my concerns, or provide a basis for better articulating the concerns themselves, and the consequences that result in their (non)fulfillment. 16

17 17 Chapter 2 Kantianism: Kant, Korsgaard, and Shoemaker In this chapter, I will explore Kantianism, one of the major strands of modern western philosophy, with respect to my two major concerns of non-exclusivity and relationality. First, I will explain the basics of Kant s philosophy, and determine whether his system of ethics can answer to my two concerns of non-exclusivity and relationality. In this section, I will briefly discuss Christine Korsgaard s Kantian argument for humane treatment of animals. I will argue that Kant s philosophy cannot make room for a fully non-exclusive or relational conception of moral community. Next, I will explore the philosophy of David Shoemaker a modern philosopher who uses a Kantian framework and determine whether his philosophy better satisfies the concerns. I will argue that Shoemaker gestures toward an understanding of relationships and agency that better addresses the relationality concern than Kantianism, but that his philosophy does not fully satisfy either of the two major concerns. Kant s Philosophy: Rationality, Autonomy, and the Kingdom of Ends Kantian ethics makes two basic assumptions about humans and morality: first, that if we are rational, then we are also autonomous; and second, that rational beings have access to a single enduring moral code, by virtue of their rationality, regardless of their background. Kant argues that if one is a rational agent, then one is automatically required, by reason, to obey the dictates of reason absolutely. As for 17

18 18 what an agent should morally do, Kant argues that ordinary reason is well able to distinguish, in every case that occurs, what is good or evil, in accord with duty or contrary to duty. 2 Reason, without any special education or experience, should be able to determine what is correct and incorrect in every possible situation without the need to confer with other agents or use empirical data. In fact, Kant says that everything empirical is even highly detrimental to the purity of morals 3. Our rationality leads us to find the nature of duty, which we must obey as rational agents. Kant sums up duty as obedience to the categorical imperative. Reason compels us to use this law as the basis for all of our maxims, which affect how we act and what we intend. One of the formulations of the categorical imperative is, I should never act expect in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law 4. Although Kantian agency seems to be completely solitary, duty relates purely to the way that we treat other people specifically, other rational agents. We must respect others, not as individuals with diverse interests and goals, but as fellow rational beings capable of obeying universal law. One of Kant s many formulations of the categorical imperative is that of respecting others as ends in themselves: Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means 5. 2 Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. James W. Ellington (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993), Kant, 34 4 Kant, 14 5 Kant, 36 18

19 19 Kant s moral ideal is that of the kingdom of ends. In this kingdom, everyone is a rational being who is capable of grasping the universal law (the categorical imperative) independently. There is no need of laws imposed from the outside on a person in order to correct her or his behavior. Instead, each person is motivated only by duty, and so is able both to legislate and to obey that legislation, since the dignity of humanity consists just in its capacity to legislate universal law, though with the condition of humanity s being at the same time itself subject to this very same legislation 6. Everyone will legislate the exact same rules, in this scenario, because each is bound to the categorical imperative. The kingdom of ends is not possible so long as we rational beings do not universally obey duty. However, we must always act as though we are in this kingdom, respecting the dignity of others though they might not respect our dignity, and might not act out of or even in accordance with duty, as all rational beings must in all his actions be regarded at the same time as an end 7 and never merely as a means, regardless of what their ends are. The members of this kingdom of ends would be bound by respect for one another. What each rational agent respects in each other rational agent is her ability to grasp and obey universal principles. Although people are likely to have close personal relationships, what is morally important is every being s ability to follow maxims based on absolute duty. [D]uty does not rest at all on feelings, impulses, and inclinations, but only on the relation of rational beings to one another 8. Nothing 6 Kant, 44 7 Kant, 35 8 Kant, 40 19

20 20 more than mutual respect for the rationality at the foundation of the humanity of every other member binds the members to one another. Nobody would treat any other member (merely) as a means, but rather as an end as well. Respect here is a formal, cognitive act, and emotional caring or love has little importance. Major Concerns: Can Kant Respond to Them? I will now explore whether Kantianism is amenable to my two concerns for creating a robust conception of moral community. First, I will ask whether Kantianism is non-exclusive; then, whether it provides the tools for constructing an account of moral community that takes seriously the concern of relationality. My concern of non-exclusivity has not been completely and clearly spelled out. I have not yet indicated what a conception of moral community ought to be inclusive of. Kant is clear that he does not want to exclude any rational beings the only beings, on his theory, who have dignity and are capable of acting morally from his ethical philosophy. Only our rational nature is inherently valuable, and so Kant is not concerned that his theory might exclude non-rational beings. As beings capable of moral thinking and action, we ought not intentionally to mistreat any being rational or not. There are two reasons for this. First, we are undermining our moral selves by getting pleasure from doing harm, even if that harm is not directed toward beings with dignity. As rational beings, we ought not to value the infliction of harm and if we do so, then we open the possibility for not taking seriously the infliction of harm on rational beings, those beings who alone are capable 20

21 21 of dignity. The second reason that we cannot harm animals is more complex. As Korsgaard argues, the fact that animals cannot legislate universal laws does not inherently exempt them from their protection a universal law can extend its protection to someone who did not participate, and could not have participated, in its legislation 9. When we value taking seriously our desires, then we are we are in a sense valuing our animal nature, for we are still conferring normative value on the kind of natural good characteristic of creatures who experience and pursue their own good 10. As we value our animal nature not just our rational one we also confer value onto animals themselves. Therefore, we do not have a duty only to ourselves to treat animals humanely. Instead, we have a duty to animals because we confer value onto them by valuing not just our rationality but our desires and satisfactions as well, and disvaluing pain. However, it is still the case that we get to this place by beginning from the idea that only rationality is inherently valuable. There will always be a divide between those that legislate universal laws, and are obligated to formulate maxims that are in line with those laws, and those that are subject merely to natural law and inclinations. If we take Kant s theory seriously, we cannot create a conception of moral community that is truly non-exclusive, because there is a clear divide between a small set of beings that is included in the moral theory rational beings and those who are not. The second major concern that I posed that any conception of moral community must satisfy is that of relationality. Kantian philosophy holds a high 9 Christine Korsgaard, Fellow Creatures: Kantian Ethics and Our Duties to Animals: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Delivered at University of Michigan February 6, 2004 pg Korsgaard,

22 22 degree of respect for human respect and relations, but ultimately does not see relationships as being fundamentally valuable. Kant s morality is that based entirely on the categorical imperative every rational being has the ability to comprehend and implement universal, permanent moral law. Kant would certainly admit that circumstances, in reality, affect an individual s likelihood of obeying moral law. For example, someone who was abused as a child might take a hypocritical stance toward morality, recognizing its normative force while giving up on the possibility of realizing it as an ideal altogether. Such a person would likely justify immoral actions defensively, indicating that he or she could recognize moral duties without self-legislating them. However, every rational being is required to abide by the imperatives of duty, regardless of background or education. I want to use the example of a psychopath here something that will come up when I discuss Shoemaker. A psychopath is someone who is capable of using reasons, and recognizing their normative force, but who has no emotional incentive to obey moral duties such as the incentive of empathy or love. For Kant, a psychopath is subject to moral law. A psychopath who does obey moral law, in fact, would be an example of a moral being, as he would likely have no motivation other than duty to follow the categorical imperative. Our duty is concerned entirely with our interactions with one another, but the particular nature of the relationship is morally unimportant. Whether I am interacting with someone to whom I am very close, or a stranger, I must make sure that my actions accord with the categorical imperative and I am only truly acting morally when my moral actions are done out of a sense of duty, rather than love or sympathy. 22

23 23 A close relationship might even be detrimental, since I might do something that is opposed to my moral duty (such as lie or steal) in order to better the situation of a person or animal I care deeply for. It is clear that Kant s moral theory precludes the intrinsic moral importance of relationships, and that relationships cannot be constitutive of morality. Kant s philosophy also cannot account for a conception of agency as inherently relational, and relationships as entirely constitutive of agency. The idea that agency is a continuum, that is not only expressed by relationships, but created by them, would undermine his notion of autonomous beings as ones who could obey the absolute moral law regardless of circumstances. Kantian philosophy demands that we see ourselves and others primarily as rational and therefore autonomous beings capable of comprehending and implementing the categorical imperative. As Kantian philosophy is concerned with autonomy and freedom, it cannot answer fully to the concern of relationality. Shoemaker s Philosophy: Accountability and Agency in the Moral Community I will now explore the philosophical theory of David Shoemaker, in order to determine whether it is possible for a theory to satisfy my two concerns in a Kantian framework. Shoemaker is not obviously a Kantian he is not concerned with issues of autonomy and freedom. He comes from the Strawsonian tradition, which is focused primarily on issues of accountability and responsibility. However, he does use a Kantian framework that is, he does understand that we can view each other 23

24 24 either as agents capable of acting on principles and reasons, or as beings acting on inclinations, but not as both in the same moment. Shoemaker is the only philosopher I am studying who has a conception of moral community. He begins his piece Responsibility, Agency, and Cognitive Disability with the claim that [m]oral community is a term of art in philosophy 11. He also asserts that philosophers use moral community primarily to understand who is responsible and why 12. I am interested in moral community itself, and the conceptualization thereof, and so I am coming at the issue from a different angle than is Shoemaker. In order to figure out exactly where the moral community ends, Shoemaker uses two examples: that of mild mental retardation (MMR), and that of psychopathy. He argues that adults with MMR are members of the moral community the population of which is made up of only those who are capable of meeting the accountability face of responsibility, those capable of holding, and being held, accountable to one another 13 though not paradigmatically so, and that psychopaths are non-members, but are closer to membership than some other beings are. The implication is that we can treat as accountable and be held accountable to adults with MMR, even if those adults cannot be treated as accountable to all people at all times. In contrast, we are incapable of reciprocal responsibility to and from psychopaths. It is unclear whether Shoemaker believes that psychopaths can hold us accountable to them, or whether their exclusion from Shoemaker s conception of the 11 Shoemaker, Shoemaker, Shoemaker,

25 25 moral community implies that we are not morally accountable to them either. Shoemaker does not see this sort of accountability as lining up with a legal accountability. He certainly believes that psychopaths are legally accountable for their actions, even if we cannot hold them morally accountable to us. This placement can be contrasted with Kant, who would certainly take a psychopath to be an accountable, autonomous moral agent, as psychopaths do understand and use reasons, even if they do not have the emotional powers necessary to make following duty easy or natural. Although Shoemaker has an individual conception of agency in much the same way that Kant does, his idea of agency is related to and expanded by our relations with others, rather than to a separate and absolutely commanding reason. We can take a stance toward someone as an agent, who acts by reasons, or as a nonagent whose actions are explained by instinct or inclination, but not by deliberately chosen reasons or principles. We use the concept of agency in order to decide whether to treat someone as accountable, and this decision is based partly on the fact of whether that person has the preconditions of agency, and partly on our taking a sort of accountability-holding attitude toward that person. Shoemaker focuses on emotional powers in explaining whom we should and should not treat as accountable, as [t]he capacity for certain sorts of emotional responses is necessary for the development of the intellectual capacity for sensitivity to, appreciation of, and responsiveness to moral reasons 14. However, some level of cognitive ability is required, as we must be able to recognize when others are in 14 Shoemaker,

26 26 pain, when what we are doing is causing others pain, and how to avoid causing such pain in order to be reasonably held morally accountable. What provides the conditions for accountability to us are sensitivity and arousal to the distress of others, emotional maturity and empathy 15. There does not need to be abstract reasoning, or an understanding of what universal principles are and how and when to apply them. Unlike Kant, Shoemaker argues that we need a sort of motivation in order to behave like good members of the moral community. Some people, such as psychopaths, are able to understand and use complex, abstract reasoning. However, they are not appropriate targets of moral address in part because they are not able to have an emotional reaction to another s suffering, and so are not motivated to prevent or stop harm. On psychopaths, Shoemaker argues that someone for whom the plight of others makes no emotional dent surely lacks the capacity to be appropriately sensitive to the moral reasons deriving from their plight 16. Shoemaker does not think of people as agents (or potential agents) who can work through difficult moral problems on their own. Instead, his vision of agency is merely a vehicle by which we are able to interact with others in complex ways. Only when we hold someone accountable to us morally are we able to engage with him in moral address. We hold someone accountable by viewing her as an appropriate target of moral address. When someone someone whom we hold accountable wrongs us, we respond by engaging that person in moral address. We can let her know that we feel angry or hurt by chastising, ignoring or censuring her. Shoemaker does not 15 Shoemaker, Shoemaker,

27 27 go into detail about non-concrete interactions. However, drawing from the Strawsonain tradition and consistent with Shoemaker s philosophy we see that we hold someone accountable when we imagine that we at least theoretically could engage that person in moral address. For example, we feel outraged when we hear of a murderer who has since died, even though we cannot for obvious reasons engage that person in moral address. However, if we hear that a dead lion has killed a person, we might feel angry that a person died, or outraged that someone (an agent) did not take proper precautions, but we do not feel the same complex emotion toward the lion. We cannot even imagine ourselves engaging morally with the lion. Although Shoemaker does not go into detail about our moral interactions with animals, we can imagine having a limited moral address with an animal. For example, we might have an emotional reaction if a pet dog bites someone, and in chastising the dog, might expect it to feel some level of shame. This sort of interaction does not imply that we think that the dog is a rational moral agent, but that the dog might be able to have some sort of response to a moral demand, such as not to bite people. This fact strengthens a point I made earlier. Although Shoemaker focuses on emotional maturity, or the ability to have complex emotions about other people, as the central aspect of his agency, a certain level of cognitive ability is also required. We attribute many complex emotions to non-human animals, but we almost always take the objective attitude towards them, and rarely do we attempt to engage them in any sort of moral address. Although there is no perfect way to figure out who has, or does not have, the requisite cognitive and emotional skills to be held accountable, we 27

28 28 tend to hold accountable to us who distribute a certain level of emotional and cognitive maturity, and seem to be motivated to interact with others in a way that is susceptible to moral address. Even if we imagine that the other would not necessarily be very affected by our attitudes, we still hold responsible those to whom it seems sensible to display those attitudes. For Shoemaker, we can treat someone as accountable to an increasing number of people 17. For example, a parent might hold her child accountable before a stranger does, and a mentally disabled person s caretaker might hold him accountable to herself, and treat him as though he is accountable to other people in order to expand the circle of people to whom he sees himself as accountable, and who hold him accountable. At first, however, the mentally disabled person is eligible for accountability, [is] held to be so primarily just by those with whom [he] already find[s] [himself] emotionally engaged family, friends, caregivers 18. There is interplay between agency and relationships that does not exist in the Kantian view of agency. However, agency is still individual, to some extent, and while the relationships that we have are important, they may not be morally significant they are merely a way of expressing and refining our agency. Major Concerns: Can Shoemaker Respond to Them? I will now explore whether Shoemaker s philosophy can respond to my two concerns of non-exclusivity and relationality. The first concern is that of non- 17 Shoemaker, Shoemaker,

29 29 exclusivity. Unlike Kant, Shoemaker does not focus on our status as rational beings. His moral theory focuses not just on those rational beings, but on those with whom we do or could engage in moral address. Still, Shoemaker s focus is on bringing more beings into the folds of agency and the community of those capable of engaging one another in moral address. He is straightforward in saying that many beings are not part of our moral community only those agents eligible for assessments of moral responsibility 19 are. I want to emphasize that he uses the phrase moral community to indicate that group of beings whom we hold accountable, and with whom we are capable of engaging in moral dialogue. As I am using the phrase in a different way, I want to point out that his conception of moral community does not focus on the concern of non-exclusivity. It is not important to Shoemaker that a variety of beings such as psychopaths and the very severely mentally disabled are excluded from what he calls our moral community. Shoemaker s focus on responsibility and moral address is similar to Kant s focus on moral agency, though the two groups the morally responsible and the Kantian agents are not completely coextensive. In both cases, a number of beings are excluded from the bounds of the moral theory. Neither Kant himself nor the Kantian Shoemaker is able to respond satisfactorily to the concern of non-exclusivity. My second concern is that of relationality. Shoemaker s philosophy depends more on concrete relationships than does Kant, and so gives a suggestion for how a robust conception of moral community might cope with the demand for satisfaction of the concern of relationality. For Shoemaker, morality is intertwined with 19 Shoemaker,

30 30 responsibility, and the ability to hold and be held responsible for our actions. When we are very young, for example, it is senseless for anyone to hold us morally accountable we do not have the emotional or rational capacities to understand what this accountability is, or to be moved by it to act in a certain way. However, with education and certain types of interactions, it gradually becomes more and more appropriate to hold us accountable for our actions first, our parents might act in ways that imitate holding accountable even before doing so makes sense, but eventually we are able to participate in moral address and to hold ourselves and others accountable. Here, interactions and relationships clearly have a pivotal point in Shoemaker s philosophy. Relationships are also centrally important in agency which is seen not as an attribute that divides one set of people from another, but as a complex set of characteristics that makes it reasonable for others to treat us as accountable. However, relationships still appear to play an instrumental role. Concrete and not so concrete interactions, including moral address, are useful in expanding our circle of accountability. Relationships are not inherently valuable, nor are they necessarily the location in which agency takes place. They merely play an important role in agency s development, and in expressing agency. The actual relationship and interaction is less important than the question of whether or not it helps to expand one or both of the participants circle of accountability. Shoemaker s philosophy cannot fully answer to the concern of relationality. However, Shoemaker still draws to our attention an extremely important feature of relationships that they are fundamental in developing and expression agency and responsibility. Our 30

31 31 relationships help to define our responsibilities, and caring relations are capable of pushing us to hold ourselves responsible to a wider circle of beings, and to engage or be capable of engaging in moral address with a greater array of beings. Shoemaker is only concerned with those relationships between agents or potential agents and those who might engage them in moral address or help them to expand their circle of accountability. What is most helpful here is the intimation that agency is neither something that is an attribute of a specific individual, nor something that can be attributed however we see fit. When we recognize someone as an agent, we are treating her as accountable, and presuming that she has certain attributes such as a level of both cognitive and emotional maturity that make it appropriate to treat her that way. It is not the case that she just is an agent, and just is morally accountable for her actions, regardless of how others treat her. It is also not the case that she suddenly becomes accountable when someone treats her as such, and will go back to being non-accountable when we cease to treat her so. We can attribute agency to a range of beings, but only if they have the appropriate characteristics for Shoemaker, there is a limit beyond which attributions of agency are inappropriate. Shoemaker gives us a good sense of what an account of moral community that takes at my concern of relationality seriously would look like. His account does connect relationships with agency, and does show that agency is not either something that someone either has or does not have, or something that we can appropriately attribute anywhere we see fit. Instead, agency is complex, and requires both certain skills and a certain attitude toward the agent. However, this account does not fully 31

32 32 satisfy either of the two concerns, and so in conceptualizing moral community, I must explore other theories that answer even more fully to these concerns. 32

33 33 Chapter 3 Consequentialism: Mill, Singer, and Railton In this chapter, I want to explore consequentialism, the second major strand of modern philosophical thought, with an eye on whether it some of its major proponents provide the necessary tools to conceptualize moral community in a way that takes seriously my two major concerns. First, I will explore the ethics of two of the biggest utilitarian thinkers: John Stuart Mill and Peter Singer, one of the most influential modern utilitarians. I will then look at each concern, determining whether their utilitarianism is able to address the concern adequately. I will argue that their utilitarianism responds to the concern of non-exclusivity, but does not fully satisfy either concern. Next, I will look at Peter Railton, a consequentialist who is concerned with alienation and relationships. I will see if his theory better speaks to my concerns than do Mill s and Singer s. I will argue that Railton gives an account of the value of relationships that comes closer to fulfilling the relationality concern, but ultimately does not satisfy either concern. Mill s Philosophy: Happiness and Sentience Mill argues that all that is of value in this world is happiness which he defines as pleasure (broadly construed, so as to include the pleasures of the intellect, 33

34 34 which he argues are are more desirable and valuable than others 20 ) and freedom from suffering. For Mill, everything we do can be good or right only so far as it increases the general happiness of the sentient world, or alleviates suffering actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to promote the reverse of happiness. 21 Good utilitarians do not have to have the goal of the alleviation of suffering in mind. [T]he motive has nothing to do with the morality of the action, 22 so our motives can be almost anything, as long as this goal is somehow accomplished. We can take our relationships to be genuinely and inherently meaningful, and as long as they lead us to increase the sentient world s overall happiness (for example, by encouraging us to forego some amount of pain or inconvenience in order greatly to increase our loved ones happiness), then Mill would consider those relationships to be morally positive. Even if the motive were something such as greed, if it does lead to the alleviation of suffering or an increase in overall happiness, then Mill would be satisfied. Mill believes that we ought to promote conditions in such a way that people no longer see any distinction between their own happiness and that of others. Utilitarianism would enjoin [that] the interest, of every individual [would be] in harmony with the interest of the whole John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, The Basic Writings of John Stuart Mill: On Liberty, The Subjection of Women, and Utilitarianism (New York: The Modern Library, 2002), Mill, Mill, Mill,