Iraq After the December 2005 Election

Transcription

1 Social Education 70(2), pg National Council for the Social Studies Iraq After the December 2005 Election Social Education staff In an article in 2004 on Islamist movements in Iraq, Social Education pointed out that Iraq might be headed toward a juncture from which one road leads to sectarian and ethnic strife and the other to the establishment of a new Islamic republic in the Middle East. 1 The events of 2005 propelled Iraq further in that direction. Elections for a national assembly in January and December confirmed that the Iraqi political scene in the era following Saddam Hussein has fragmented on a sectarian and ethnic basis. The dominant parties of the new Iraq Arab Shia, Arab Sunni and Kurdish each represent their own communities and have little appeal to Iraqis of different communities. The December 2005 election offered a snapshot of the new political order that has evolved in Iraq after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein s Baathist regime. Among the Arab population (almost four of five Iraqis) Islamic fundamentalism has become the major political force in both the Shia and Sunni communities. Among Kurds, two leading secular nationalist parties remain dominant. The results of the December election, in which about 78% of registered voters went to the polls, showed that: The largest Iraqi political movement is the United Iraqi Alliance, a coalition of Arab Shia groups led by Islamists. While it held the Iraqi Shiite demonstrators gather by an election campaign poster for the Shia United Iraqi Alliance in December (AP Photo/Karim Kadim) majority of seats in the parliament elected in January to write an Iraqi constitution, the December elections left it short of a majority in the new Iraqi parliament. The secular Iraqi and Arab nationalism represented by the Baath Party has been replaced in the Arab Sunni community by Islamic fundamentalism. Most of the Sunni community voted for a coalition of Islamist groups, the Iraqi Accord Front. A secular nationalist group with an ideology close to that of the Baath Party got less than 20% of the Arab Sunni votes. Almost all Kurdish voters supported one or other of the two Kurdish nationalist parties that have gained ascendancy in the Kurdish community, and are close allies of the U.S. in Iraq. The National Iraqi List led by former prime minister Iyad Alawi, a secular Shia Muslim and a close ally of the U.S., fared badly. Its share of seats in parliament has been reduced from 40 to 25. Alawi s movement includes members from the different religious communities of Iraq and it is the least sectarian of the major Iraqi parties. Its sup- 104

2 Results of the Iraqi Elections of December 2005 United Iraqi Alliance: A Shia alliance led by three Shia Islamist parties: the Dawa Party of Prime Minister Ibrahim Jaafari; the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, led by Abdul-Aziz al-hakim; and the Sadr Movement led by Muqtada al-sadr. The alliance includes some secular Shias and a scattering of Sunnis, but Islamist groups control the alliance s organization and the selection of candidates for election. Kurdistan Alliance: The alliance of the two major Kurdish nationalist parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, led by Iraq President Jalal Talabani, and the Kurdistan Democratic Party, led by Massoud Barzani. Iraqi Accord Front: A Sunni Islamist alliance led by Tariq Hashimi and Muhsin Abdul-Hamid of the Iraqi Islamic Party and Adnan al-dulaimi, a leading Sunni cleric. National Iraqi List: A secular, pro-u.s. grouping of parties committed to a unified, nonsectarian Iraq, led by former interim Prime Minister Iyad Alawi. Iraqi National Dialogue Front: An alliance of secular Arab nationalist groups led by Salah al- Mutlak whose ideology is the closest of current Iraqi political groups to the Baath Party. Islamic Union of Kurdistan: A Kurdish Islamist grouping that has distanced itself from the secular nationalism of the Kurdistan Alliance. Other Groups: These include smaller secular and religious parties as well a representative of the Iraqi Turkmen Front, representing Iraqis of Turkish ancestry and one of the Assyrian (Christian) community. Source of voting results: the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq, at Movement Number of Representatives United Iraqi Alliance 128 Kurdistan Alliance 53 Iraqi Accord Front 44 National Iraqi List 25 Iraqi National Dialogue Front Islamic Union of Kurdistan Other Groups TOTAL 275 port has, however, dwindled over the last year as the U.S. has become increasingly unpopular in Iraq and corruption scandals involving some of Alawi s appointees when he was prime minister have become public. Ahmad Chalabi, head of the Iraqi National Congress and the Iraqi exile most associated with the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, failed to win any seats and is no longer a member of parliament. This election marked the first occasion on which his movement stood for election on its own; it had previously been part of the United Iraqi Alliance. The December election was the first parliamentary election in which the Sunni Arab community participated. The community boycotted the previous January elections, when insurgents threatened to attack polling places, but Order a set today for only $100 and make the Bill of Rights relevant to all your students! The Bill of Rights for Real Life, written at an 8.5 reading level, emphasizes civic engagement. The Bill of Rights and You, 2nd Edition, written at both 10.5 and 12.0 reading levels, helps students understand the historical and continuing importance of the Bill of Rights. Both guides are tied to national standards. Each curriculum features a 10-unit teacher s guide and DVD set designed to help your students understand the importance of the Bill of Rights and lead them towards a stronger engagement in civil society. Visit or call toll-free , ext. 22 for more information. M a r c h

3 the insurgents changed their strategy at the time of the October referendum on the new Iraqi constitution which most Sunnis opposed and Sunnis voted both in the October referendum and the December elections for a four-year national assembly. Involving the Sunni Arab community in Iraqi politics has been a long-term goal of the United States. It has also, however, introduced into the Iraqi parliament Sunni movements that are closer to Iraq s Sunni insurgents than to Iraq s other political movements on issues such as setting a clear timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. forces, and control over Iraq s internal security forces. The Sunni movements also differ significantly from the leading Kurdish and Shia parties on issues such as de-baathification measures, and on a provision in the constitution passed in October that would allow the formation of separate Kurdish and Shia regions in a loose federal system of government. Many of the divisive issues in Iraq are especially difficult because they revolve around differences in the senses of identity, interests and aspirations of the different communities. Arab Shias. The Shia community has welcomed the democratic principle of majority rule in Iraq because Shias represent 60% of the Iraqi population. The Shias view themselves as an underprivileged group that was deprived of its rights by previous governments dominated by Sunni Arabs and was ruthlessly repressed by Saddam Hussein s regime. Iraq is the home of many Shia holy places, and was the site of the division of Islam into Sunni and Shia branches during the seventh century, and many Shias seek to restore Iraq to a pre-eminent place in the Shia world. Because of the common religious bonds between Iraqi and Iranian Shias, many Iraqi Shias view Iran favorably. Arab Sunnis. The Arab Sunni community has been used to charting Iraq s political course. It has provided the economic and political elite of Iraq, and was the ethnic group that formed the social and political base of Saddam Hussein s Baathist rule. The community has traditionally been sympathetic to a strong Iraqi Arab nationalism that has confronted Western powers, Kurdish nationalism and Iran. Within the community, the U.S. invasion is widely seen as marking the resumption of Western imperialism against Iraq, justifying Iraqi resistance for patriotic reasons. Most Arab Sunnis believe in a strong Iraqi central government and reject the idea that Shia Arabs should be able to form a separate self-governing region of Iraq. Kurds. Most Iraqi Kurds overwhelmingly favor an independent Kurdish state. Recognizing that this is impractical because of the opposition of Iraqi Arabs and neighboring countries with Kurdish populations (Turkey, Iran and Syria), the two Kurdish parties have accepted a role in the new Iraqi political system, but have insisted on autonomy for the Kurdish areas of The A-B-C s of Infusing Economics into Your History Curriculum FREE SHIPPING use code SE2006 Explore the crucial role that economics plays in U.S. History with fun, mystery-based activities. The ideal supplement to any history textbook, your students will leave your classroom with a new appreciation and understanding of both History and Economics. 39 activity-based lesson plans. Correlated to National Content Standards in Economics. Lessons arranged in chronological order. Students solve mysteries using group activities. History Matters background reader for teachers. Order online at or call Focus: Understanding Economics in U.S. History $49.95 For FREE shipping use code SE

4 Iraq, which they already administer. They also demand recognition by the other movements of the multiethnic city of Kirkuk, which plays an central role in Kurdish history, as a Kurdish city. The following are among the contentious issues that divide the political movements of the different communities. 1.The U.S. military presence in Iraq. The Kurdish parties have been strong supporters of the U.S. military presence in Iraq, as is the National Iraqi List of former Prime Minister Iyad Alawi. In contrast, the Arab Sunni parties elected in December 2005 have demanded a clear schedule for a U.S. withdrawal, have condemned the behavior of U.S. forces, and have refused to condemn insurgent attacks on U.S. troops (though they have criticized insurgent attacks on Iraqi civilians). The Arab Shia parties have supported the U.S. presence, but this presence has become increasingly unpopular in some segments of the Shia community, and has been vehemently opposed by the movement of Muqtada al-sadr, the young cleric whose militia fought against U.S. troops in 2004 and who has joined the United Iraqi Alliance as one of its major components. 2. Control of the Iraqi police and security forces. Because of the active insurgency (see box on page 108) and a breakdown in law and order in key parts of Iraq, strengthening Iraqi police and security forces is a primary goal of the Iraqi government. The government elected in January, 2005, was a coalition of Shia and Kurdish political movements, whose leading groups have their own militias. Members of these parties and militias have joined the Iraqi police and internal security forces. The Ministry of the Interior, which has been controlled by the United Iraqi Alliance, has deployed special units of security forces who are members of the Badr Brigades, the Iranian-trained militia of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. Sunnis accuse these units of being anti-sunni death squads, and demand that they no longer police Sunni areas. (The government is opposed to leaving the policing of Sunni areas in the hands of Sunnis themselves for fear that they are sympathetic to the insurgency.) Sunnis demand that the Ministry of the Interior should no longer be controlled by Shia political movements and accuse its forces of torturing and abusing Sunni prisoners. 3. Federalism. Under the new Iraqi constitution, any set of provinces can federate to form a distinct region that would have powers not subject to the control of the central government, including the right to revenues from new discoveries of oil (revenues from existing oil wells would go to the central government s Treasury). There are two major centers of oil wealth in Iraq in the Shia south, and in the north, near Kirkuk, an area currently claimed by the Kurdish parties (though Iraq s Sunni Arabs and Turkmen reject the claim). The provision for a loose federalism is rejected by the Arab Sunni parties, who view it as seeking to concentrate much of the country s oil wealth in Kurdish and Shia hands. The Sunni parties reject any division of the Arab part of Iraq into different regions, though they have indicated that they would allow the creation of an autonomous Kurdish region that would coexist with a separate Arab region, both subject to the central government. The Sunni view of the Kurdish region would allow it to cover much less territory than the Kurds claim and would exclude the town of Kirkuk, viewed by Kurds as an integral part of their region. Yale Center for International & Area Studies I N T E N S I V E S U M M E R I N S T I T U T E S f o r E d u c a t o r s J U L Y Spend time at Yale University learning about: The Teaching of Africa Transforming Japan: Global Connections, Domestic Developments* Putin s Russia: Problems and Prospects* International Development: Focus on South Africa* Central America* Black Gold: The Geopolitics of Oil in the Middle East* *Programs include an optional travel component at an additional cost Tuition $300-$400 per program including materials; housing & transportation are extra. Some tuition/travel scholarships may be available. For information and registration, visit Programs in International Educational Resources (PIER) PO Box New Haven, CT July 6-15 July July July 6-12 July 6-14 July Yale University M a r c h

5 Iraq At A Glance Population 27 million Nationalities Arab=78 percent Kurd=18 percent Other=(Turkomen, Assyrians Armenians) 4 percent Religious Beliefs Shia Muslim=60 percent, almost all Arabs Sunnis=38 percent, divided fairly evenly between Kurds and Arabs Christians=2 percent Major Challenges Facing Iraq 4. The status of Kirkuk. Kirkuk is a town in north Iraq with a mixed population of Kurds (the largest single group), Arabs and Turkmen. It is of great historic importance to Kurds, and the Kurdish parties have demanded that it should be part of the Kurdish region they have formed. The Arab Sunnis and Turkmen reject this claim. The government headed by the United Iraqi Alliance promised to hold a referendum of inhabitants of Kirkuk on the issue, but has been accused by the Kurdish parties of stalling on the issue. 5. The elimination of Baathist influence on Iraq. Since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein s regime, the government has attempted to remove the influence of the Baath Party from Iraqi public life. De-Baathification is a divisive issue, because a significant number of members of the Baath Party had to join as a condition for holding good positions in Insurgency The insurgency in Sunni Arab areas continued unabated in During the year, more than 840 U.S. troops were killed about the same as in The number of Iraqi civilians killed in 2005 was between 12,600 and 14,000, a number greater than in Despite the publicity given to foreign jihadists fighting in Iraq, the vast majority of insurgents are Iraqi. Different insurgent groups have emerged in different parts of Iraq. Many of the skills, tactical knowledge and military experience that power the insurgency are provided by groups of former Iraqi army officers, soldiers, and other officials of Saddam Hussein s regime. Despite the links of many organizers to the pre-war secular Baathist regime, however, the insurgency has a strong Islamic character, and the insurgents present their struggle as a jihad by Iraqi Sunni Muslims against a Western invader and local collaborators. Local, mosque-based units play an important role in this decentralized insurgent network, which has managed to obtain the recruits, funds and arms needed to sustain the insurgency. The groups active in the insurgency have names like the Islamic Army in Iraq, the Islamic Front of the Iraqi Resistance, Defenders of Sunni Islam, the Army of Muhammad, the Islamic Resistance Movement in Iraq, the Army of the Mujahideen and the Army of the First Caliphs. The rising Islamism among the Sunni population has also been reflected in the voting for parliament, in which the Sunni community voted overwhelmingly for an Islamist movement. The insurgents have not announced a central leadership or declared specific objectives other than forcing U.S. troops to leave Iraq. A recent study by the International Crisis Group identified four major insurgent groups that have an extensive nationwide network: Al Qaeda in Iraq (a movement founded by the Jordanian Abu Musab al-zarqawi that originated as a foreign jihadist movement but now has a majority of Iraqi members and regards Shia Muslims as apostates); Ansar al-sunna (Defenders of Sunni Islam); Al Jaysh al- Islami fi al Iraq (The Islamic Army in Iraq); and Al Jabha al-islami fi al- Iraq (The Islamic Front of the Iraqi Resistance). 2 The precise number of fighters in each is unknown, but the International Crisis Group records claims by Al Qaeda in Iraq to have 15 brigades, by Ansar al-sunna to have 16 brigades, and by Al Jaysh al-islami to have 13 brigades; a brigade in Arab armies is usually men. Formation of an Iraqi Army One of the key aims of the Bush administration is to build up a new Iraqi army. Originally conceived as a relatively small army, the demands of the insurgency have resulted in the U.S. expanding the planned number of Iraqi soldiers to 135,000. Efforts so far have been behind schedule, and as of February 2006, no Iraqi battalion was capable of taking independent action against insurgents without support from U.S. forces, though Iraqi forces supported by the U.S. have engaged in action against insurgents in a number of areas of Iraq, and the number of Iraqi battalions able to do so has increased. Arab Sunnis are underrepresented in the new army. A number of the Arab Sunni officers who dominated Saddam Hussein s army are playing a key role in the insurgency and many more sympathize with it. The U.S.-sponsored army is composed mainly of former Kurdish and Shia officers and men of the old Iraqi army, with new 108

6 the work force, and a policy of removing Baathists from official positions has far-reaching effects because the government is the dominant force in the economy as well as in public administration. There have been disputes over how many Baathists should be removed from their positions. Because the Baath Party was rooted in the Sunni community, anti-baathist measures are viewed by Sunnis as discriminating against their future. On the other hand, the Kurdish and Shia parties, which were mercilessly repressed by the Baath, are in favor of a thorough uprooting of Baathist influence. 6. The balance between religion and secularism. The Iraqi constitution makes Islam the official religion of the state and a fundamental source of legislation, forbids laws that contradict Islam, and establishes a Federal Supreme Court that continued on page 112 members drawn from Kurds and Shias who are often loyal to the leadership of their communities, and a number of whom have served in Kurdish and Shia party militias. The army will need to confront insurgency forces estimated at 25,000 or more in Sunni areas. The army s planned size of 135,000, however, means that it will be too small, even when trained, to impose control over rebellious Sunni regions, where it would be regarded as a force of armed Kurdish and Shia outsiders hostile to Sunni Muslims. As such, it would be likely to encounter resistance not only from insurgents but from other townspeople and villagers among the hundreds of thousands of Sunni Muslims who received military training from the old Iraqi army. The development of an Iraqi army has sometimes been seen as a way of giving the Iraqi government and political movements the security needed to usher in the new Iraqi order. The reality, however, is that the effectiveness of an Iraqi army of 135,000 is dependent on a prior political agreement between Sunni, Shia and Kurdish movements that would persuade Sunnis that the army is a legitimate force, incorporate Sunnis in it, and induce a significant number of insurgents to make peace. The Spread of Militias One problem in Iraq is that the estimated number of fighters in the militias of the various political movements exceeds the number of trained soldiers in the Iraqi armed forces. Apart from the insurgent forces, both major Kurdish movements operate their own party militias, and two groups in the Shia United Iraqi Alliance also have powerful militias; the Badr Brigades operated by the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, and the Mahdi Army of the Sadr Movement. As the Kurdish and Shia movements have increased their control of their regions of Iraq, many of the police and security forces have either incorporated members of militias or cooperate with them in an attempt to maintain order. The existence of sectarian and ethnic militias greatly complicates the task of the weak Iraqi central government. Economic Reconstruction The problems of poverty and widespread unemployment remain acute. Attacks on the Iraqi infrastructure by insurgents have kept the electricity supply short of Iraqi needs and the sabotage of oil pipelines has meant that Iraq is pumping less oil than during Saddam Hussein s time. However, because of the rise in oil prices, Iraqi revenues have risen compared to Saddam Hussein s time, and the government, which is Iraq s major employer and source of business contracts, has been able to keep the economy afloat. Some sectors of the economy trade across Iraq s borders, opened in 2003, or businesses that engage in contract work for the U.S. armed forces have also done well despite the overall insecurity. U.S reconstruction efforts have helped support a number of projects. They have aided old and new educational institutions, assisted vaccination programs and provided medical supplies. However, the insecurity has prevented the effectiveness of many programs, and a significant portion of the aid funds allocated to Iraq has been diverted to pay for security instead of development. There is widespread ignorance among the Iraqi population that the U.S. made a major commitment to Iraqi reconstruction. M a r c h

7 IRAQ CHRONOLOGY Violence was so widespread in Iraq in 2005 that it is impossible in a brief chronology to list the daily attacks and violent incidents. The following are key events and incidents that occurred during the year. January [ 12 ] The White House announces the official end of the search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, no such weapons having been found. [ 26 ] Thirty-seven U.S. troops are killed throughout Iraq, most of them in a helicopter crash in Anbar province. [ 30 ] More than 8 million Iraqis (58% of eligible voters) vote in an election for a national assembly whose responsibility will be to draft a new Iraqi constitution. Because of Sunni insurgent threats to attack polls, turnout is very low in Arab Sunni areas; it is, however, high in Arab Shia and Kurdish areas. The United Iraqi Alliance, led by Shia Islamist parties, wins 48% of the vote, and obtains 140 out of 275 seats; the Kurdistan Alliance, made up of the two main Kurdish parties, gets 26% (75 seats); the National Iraqi List led by U.S.-backed interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, gets 14% (40 seats); and other smaller parties get the rest of the vote (20 seats). February [ 28 ] A massive suicide bombing at a clinic in Hilla, where police recruits are getting their physicals, kills 125 people and wounds more than 140. March [ 9 10 ] The bodies of about 70 Iraqis, mostly members of the security forces, are found in Qaim, Latifiyah, and Mosul. A suicide attack at a Shia funeral in Mosul kills 47 people and wounds more than 100. April [ 6 7 ] Jalal al-talabani is appointed by the national assembly as the first ever Kurdish president of Iraq. Ibrahim al-jaafari, the nominee of the United Iraqi Alliance, becomes prime minister. [ 20 ] The bodies of 19 Iraqi soldiers are found in Haditha; police find 58 bodies in the Tigris River in Madain, a town south of Baghdad. [ 28 ] A 30-person cabinet is approved by the national assembly; it includes 16 Shias, 9 Kurds, 4 Arab Sunnis and 1 Arab Christian. [ 29 ] At least 50 people die in bomb blasts in a number of Iraqi cities, notably Baghdad and Madain. May [ 4 ] A suicide bomber blows himself up in a line of police applicants in Irbil, in the Kurdish part of Iraq, killing more than 60 people. Ansar al-sunna, an Iraqi Islamist group with ties to Al Qaeda, claims responsibility. [ 6 ] A suicide car bomber strikes a vegetable market in Suwayra, killing at least 58 people and wounding 44. [ 7 ] U.S. Troops launch a major offensive against insurgents near Qaim on the Syrian border. [ 10 ] The U.S. Congress approves an $82 billion supplemental spending bill to cover the ongoing cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This brings to $208 billion the amount allocated by Congress to Iraq since the beginning of the war in March [ 11 ] At least 72 people are killed in car bomb attacks in different Iraqi towns. [ 23 ] More than 50 people are killed in bombings throughout Iraq. [ 25 ] U.S. troops launch an offensive against insurgents in the city of Haditha. June [ 17 ] U.S. troops launch another major anti-insurgent offensive near Qaim. [ 23 ] The Associated Press reports that 317 people have been killed since June 1 in 59 car bomb attacks. [ 30 ] The Associated Press reports that suicide bomb attacks in Iraq have increased in the first six months of the year and have numbered 213. July [ 17 ] A suicide bomber detonates a bomb under an oil tanker in Musayyib, south of Baghdad, while four suicide bombers attack targets in Baghdad. In all, more than 100 people are killed. August [ 28 ] Iraq s national assembly receives the text of a proposed constitution from the drafting committee. [ 31 ] Almost 1,000 Shia Muslims participating in a religious procession are killed in Baghdad when a rumor of a suicide bomber triggers a stampede on a bridge over the Tigris river. September [ ] A major offensive by U.S. forces assisted by Iraqi troops is launched in Tel Afar to oust insurgents from the city. [ 14 ] More than 160 people are killed in a series of attacks in Baghdad. [ ] Ninety-five people die following insurgent attacks throughout Iraq. October [ 15 ] The Iraqi people go to the polls to vote on the proposed constitution. It is approved by 79% of the voters, but most Arab Sunnis reject it. Only two Sunni provinces reject it by more than a two-thirds majority (if three had rejected it, the constitution would have failed), so the constitution is passed, though Sunni politicians assert their intention to have it amended. [ 19 ] The trial commences in Baghdad of Saddam Hussein, along with seven senior associates from his former regime. They are charged with ordering the killing of 143 Shia men from the village of Dujail in 1982, following a failed assassination plot against Hussein. November [ 15 ] More than 100 Sunni Arab prisoners showing signs of maltreatment are found in an Iraqi government bunker in Baghdad. Sunni political spokesmen accuse the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior of organizing Shia militiamen into death squads working for the ministry. [ 18 ] A series of suicide bombings kill 74 Shia worshippers at two mosques in Khanaqin, eastern Iraq. [ 30 ] U.S. forces commence a major operation against insurgents in western Iraq. December [ 15 ] Iraqis go to the polls to elect a four-year national assembly. Voter turnout is 78% of registered voters. Arab Sunni parties participate in the election. The main Shia movement, the United Iraqi Alliance, remains the strongest party, but no longer has an absolute majority in the assembly (130 seats, including two members of a smaller party). The Arab Sunni groupings and the Kurdish alliance win more than 50 seats each. The Iraqi National List of former Prime Minister Iyad Alawi, a close ally of the U.S., wins only 25 seats. [ 18 ] President Bush defends the Iraq War in a televised address to the American people, asserting that the U.S. can achieve eventual victory. [ 31 ] At the end of the year, more than 840 members of the U.S. Armed Forces have been killed in Iraq, about the same total as in More than 2,170 have been killed since the war began. The number of Iraqi civilian deaths during the year is estimated by the Washington Post as between 12,600 and 14,000. The total of all Iraqi civilian deaths since the start of the war in March 2003 is estimated as between 27,636 and 31,