JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

Transcription

1 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE May 2008 MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue, Miami, FL (S) Personal Information: JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Yousef Abkir Salih al- Qarani Current/True Name and Aliases: Muhammad Hamid Ali al- Qarani, Abu Ali, Ali Hassan Muhammad Hamid, Abu Dujana, Fadel, Khourbali, Yusuf Abkar Salih, Yusuf al- Chadi, Place of Birth: Medina, Saudi Arabia (SA) Date of Birth: 1981 Citizenship: Chad (CD) Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9CD DP 2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in overall good health. 3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment: a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) on 22 May b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is an admitted member of al-qaida and is assessed to be affiliated with the Global Jihad Support Network (GJSN) through his CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES REASON: E.O , AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C) DECLASSIFY ON:

2 membership in a London, United Kingdom (UK)-based al-qaida cell. 1 Detainee is identified as an al-qaida suicide operative and is associated to two Saudi nationals captured during a suicide mission targeting Saudi Arabia. Detainee is assessed to be an al-qaida courier with connections to senior al-qaida leadership including Usama Bin Laden s (UBL) and deceased al-qaida military commander Muhammad Atif, aka (Abu Hafs al-masri). Detainee participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces in UBL s Tora Bora Mountain Complex, and received training at the al-qaida al-faruq Training Camp in Afghanistan (AF). Detainee is listed in al-qaida affiliated documents. Detainee stayed in al-qaida facilities in Afghanistan and was captured with the group of fighters led out of Tora Bora by Ali Muhammad Abdul Aziz al-fakhri aka (Ibn al-shaykh al-libi), ISN US9LY DP (LY- 212). JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be: A HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies A HIGH threat from a detention perspective Of MEDIUM intelligence value c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee s assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by next to the footnote.) Updated detainee s account of events Updated detainee s capture statement Additional reporting regarding London based al-qaida cell Updated reporting of detainee and his associates 4. (U) Detainee s Account of Events: The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee s own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability. a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee was born and raised in Saudi Arabia, but has Chadian citizenship as his parents are Chadian citizens and Saudi Arabia does not grant citizenship based solely on birthplace. Detainee has stated both Mecca and Medina as his place of birth, 2 and he completed two years of high school. 3 1 Analyst Note: The Global Jihad Support Network (GJSN) is a National Intelligence Priority Framework (NIPF) Priority 1 counterterrorism target. Priority 1 targets are defined as issues, opportunities, or threats that rise to, or are expected to rise to, the level of interest of the President, Vice President, DNI, and NSC/HSC Principals and Deputies. This includes terrorist groups, countries that sponsor terrorism or countries that have state organizations involved in terrorism that pose a clear and immediate danger to U.S. persons or interests. This includes those preparing to employ Weapons of Mass Destruction. 2 TD-314/ , section F, number 5, IIR

3 b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: Detainee wanted to travel to Karachi, Pakistan (PK) to seek education and employment opportunities. Detainee paid for the trip with funds from his family and money earned selling various items during the annual hajj (Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca). Detainee also received donations from Emir (shaykh, leader) Sultan, the brother of King Fahd. Detainee paid 500 Saudi riyals for a fake passport from the Chadian Embassy and obtained a six-month student visa from the Pakistani Embassy in Jeddah, SA. In June 2001, detainee flew from Medina to Karachi via Jeddah, SA and Dubai, United Arab Emirates (AE). 4 Approximately August 2001, detainee met individuals named Abu Muath and al-harbi in a mosque in Karachi. Abu Muath offered to help detainee enroll in school. 5 c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Detainee stated he missed the school application deadline and decided to conduct missionary work. 6 Detainee met a Pakistani named Abdallah Husayn who convinced him to travel to Khowst, AF. Detainee and Husayn bought and distributed food with a group of Pakistanis associated with the Islamic proselytizing group, Jamaat al-tablighi (JT). 7 Detainee and his associates were trapped in Afghanistan when the Northern Alliance began to take control of Afghan cities. Approximately 10 December 2001, detainee hired an Afghan guide to take him to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border (U) Capture Information: a. (S//NF) Detainee claimed he was praying in a mosque in Karachi when Pakistani authorities raided the mosque and arrested all non-pakistanis. 9 However, detainee was identified in the Tora Bora Mountain complex and escaping Afghanistan with a group of al- 3 TD-314/ IIR , FEB-2003, MAR-2003, Analyst Note: During initial interrogations detainee continued to identify himself by the name on his fake passport to prevent an accurate identification. Detainee has also claimed he went to Pakistan in April 2001 to study English for two months (see TD-314/ and TD-314/ , paragraph T). 5 IIR , MAR-2003, Analyst Note: Detainee also stated it was Abdullah Husayn whom he met (see TD-314/ , paragraph T) JUN Analyst Note: JT is an NIPF CT Priority 3 Terrorist Support Entity (TSE). Priority 3 TSEs have demonstrated intent and willingness to provide financial support to terrorist organizations willing to attack US persons or interests, or provide witting operational support to Priority 1-2 terrorist groups. Affiliation with the JT, a proselytizing organization, has been identified as an al-qaida cover story. Al-Qaida used the JT to facilitate and fund the international travels of its members. (For additional information see IIR , Jamaat Tabligh Provides Cover 28-DEC-2005, JITF-CT Special Analysis US Jamaat Tabligh, AFOSI Report on Jamaat Tabligh 27-OCT- 2004, and Jamaat al-tabligh (JT) Members - TRRS MAR-2004). 8 TD-314/ , paragraph T SIR 23-JAN

4 Qaida and Taliban fighters led by UBL-appointed military commander in Tora Bora LY-212. The group crossed the Afghani-Pakistani border in the Nangarhar region in mid-december Their Pakistani contact convinced them to surrender their weapons and gathered the group in a mosque where Pakistani forces immediately arrested them. 10 Al-Qaida senior commander LY-212 reported he and detainee were in a Pakistani prison in Kohat together until sometime in Pakistani officials transferred detainee from Kohat, PK, to US custody on 3 January b. (S) Property Held: 27,130 Pakistani rupees (PKR) 13 Miscellaneous items including a watch, prayer beads, and scraps of papers: Two letters to senior al-qaida military commander Abu Hafs al-masri Small piece of paper containing a message between Abu Jaffar and Abu Turab al- Maghrebi Piece of paper with phone numbers. 14 A letter to Abu Yed Kabir decorated with a bleeding heart used to spell out the word Battle c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 9 February 2002 d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the following: Arab training in computers and the English language Typical participation by Muslims in the dawa (missionary work) 6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee s Account: Detainee s account is only partially truthful. The period leading up to and including his capture contains numerous contradictions. Contradictions include how detainee obtained funds for his travels, the length of time he expected to stay in Pakistan, omission of time in Afghanistan, individuals captured with him, and omission of UK associations. Detainee provides conflicting information when discrepancies are addressed by the debriefing teams and are used to prevent association of detainee with other individuals. Although detainee claims to have only participated in missionary work for JT, reporting from other sources and detainee s pocket litter indicate his association to al-qaida in 10 TD-314/ , Withdrawal From Tora Bora Analysis 11 TD-314/ TD-314/ , section F, number 5; DAB Association of Names to 195 Detainees 29-Dec SIR 20-APR-2006, Analyst Note: YM-252 stated that Abdallah Abd al-muin Mualla al-wafi, ISN US9SA DP (SA-262, transferred), gave the detainee the 27,000 PKR detainee was captured with. 14 IIR , IIR

5 Europe, Saudi Arabia, and Afghanistan. Detainee is not forthcoming with interviewers, and only provides relatively accurate information when confronted with known intelligence. 7. (U) Detainee Threat: a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies. b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is an admitted member of al- Qaida. Detainee is listed in al-qaida affiliated documents, is identified as an al-qaida suicide operative, and has links to a London-based al-qaida cell. Detainee is assessed to be an al- Qaida courier with connections to the senior leadership of al-qaida and other members including two Saudi nationals captured during a suicide mission targeting Saudi Arabia. Detainee possibly participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces, received militant training at the al-qaida al-faruq Training Camp, and resided at al-qaida sponsored guesthouses. Detainee was captured with a group of individuals, including senior al-qaida member LY-212. (S//NF) Detainee is an admitted member of al-qaida. Detainee is listed in al-qaida affiliated documents, is identified as an al-qaida suicide operative, and has links to a London-based al-qaida cell. (S//NF) Detainee admitted being a member of al-qaida. 15 (Analyst Note: Detainee has since retracted his claim, but his original admission is assessed to be truthful. Detainee s retraction is an attempt to disassociate himself from al-qaida.) (S//NF) Detainee s name is included on al-qaida affiliated documents. (S//NF) Detainee s name was found on a list of captured fighters recovered from a hard drive associated with al-qaida senior facilitator Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, aka (KSM), ISN US9KU DP (KU-10024). KU s hard drive was seized during joint raids with the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID) on 1 March 2003 in Pakistan. 16 (S//NF) The al-qaida website al-neda listed the name Muhammad Bin Hamid al-qarani aka (Abu Dajanah) from Medina, as captured, and stated he carried a counterfeit passport in the name of Yusuf Abkar Salih. 17 (S//NF) SA-493 reported detainee would sing about what he was going to do to the Americans with his AK-47 and his pika (PK) rifle and identified him as a suicide operative who would die for al-qaida and UBL FM40 26-MAY TD-314/ , page 7; IIR , number 6; TD-314/ , number AA 17 IIR , FBIS GMP JAN-2002, number 30; TD-314/ , paragraph W 5

6 (S//NF) Muhammad Abd al-rahman Awn al-shamrani, ISN US9SA DP (SA-195), stated detainee and two others were next in line to commit suicide at JTF-GTMO. 19 (S//NF) Shakir Abd al-rahim Muhammad Aamer, ISN US9SA DP (SA- 239) informed Abd al-hakim Abd al-karim Amin Bukhari, ISN US9SA DP (SA-493, transferred) that detainee was a member of a London al-qaida cell in (S//NF) The other members of the cell were identified as Abd al-razzaq Abdallah Ibrahim al-sharikh, ISN US9SA DP (SA-067, transferred), Abd al-hadi Abdallah Ibrahim al-sharikh, ISN US9SA DP (SA-231, transferred), Fouzi Khalid Abdullah al-awda, ISN US9KU DP (KU-232), Bisher Amin Khalil al-rawi, ISN US9IZ DP (IZ-906, transferred), Ghassan Abdallah Ghazi al-sharbi, ISN US9SA DP (SA-682), and al- Qaida facilitator Abdullah Muhammad Khan, aka (Abdul Latif al-turki), ISN US9AF DP (AF-556). 21 Additional information from the discussion indicates SA-239 was one of the cell leaders. 22 (S//NF) Detainee has additional connections to London cell members, Fahd Umar Abd al-majid al-umari al-sharif, aka (Abu Shahad Fahd), ISN US9SA DP (SA-215) and SA-231. SA-215 s pocket litter contained a piece of paper listing detainee s name and number ( ) along with similar information for other JTF-GTMO detainees. 23 SA-231 s pocket litter contained a torn piece of notebook paper with names and home phone numbers for detainee and SA (S//NF) Abu Qatada was the leader of the London al-qaida cell, and Shaykh Abu Hamza al-masri was his second in command. 25 Abu Qatada was regarded as al-qaida s spiritual liaison in Europe, facilitating recruitment of young Muslims 18 RFI RESPONSE R-GTMO ISN 493, Analyst Note: Variants for Pika are Bika, Beka, Beaker, which is another name for an RPK. An RPK is a Russian made 7.62mm machine gun SIR 03-NOV IIR , SIR 01-JUN-2005(b), SIR 26-MAY IIR , SIR 01-JUN-2005(b), SIR 26-MAY IIR , SIR 12-OCT-2005 (B), SIR 26-MAY-2005, Analyst Note: In SIR 26- MAY-2005, SA-493 identified Abdul Hadi al-sharahk as SA-231, and Ghassan al-utaybi al-sherbi as SA-682. SA- 682 told SA-493 directly that he (SA-682) was a member of the London cell. 23 IIR , Analyst Note: Detainee is listed as Abu Dajana/Muhammad. The title of this piece of paper was incorrectly translated in the report as the Bahrain Defense Organization and is actually the name of a town, Rifa, Bahrain. The detainees listed are: KU-232; SA-231; Khalid Bin Abdullah Mishal Thamer al- Hameydani, ISN US9KU DP (KU-213); Fayiz Ahmad Yahia Suleiman, ISN US9YM DP (YM-153); Humud Dakhil Humud Said al-jadani, ISN US9SA DP (SA-230, transferred); and Muhammad Suleimani Laalami, ISN US9MO DP (MO-237, transferred) PERSDOC GUAN-2006-P MAY IIR , IIR , IIR (Item 4D) IIR , IIR

7 for jihad through the Finsbury Park and Baker Street/Four Feathers Mosques in London. 26 Senior al-qaida lieutenant Zayn al-abidin Muhammad Husayn, aka (Abu Zubaydah), ISN US9GZ DP (GZ-10016) called Abu Qatada the most successful recruiter in Europe. 27 On 7 January 2006, British courts found al-masri guilty on 11 charges and sentenced him to seven years in prison. (S//NF) SA-067 confirmed detainee had a relationship with several London cell members. 28 (S//NF) Detainee is assessed to be an al-qaida courier with connections to the senior leadership of al-qaida and other members including two Saudi nationals captured during their suicide mission directed against Saudi Arabia. (S//NF) Detainee was captured with various paper items including a message between Abu Jaffar and Abu Turab al-maghrebi, and letters to Abu Hafs mentioning Abu Abdullah and Abu Faraj. (Analyst note: Detainee s possession of these documents indicates he served as a courier for al-qaida. Abu Abdullah is an alias for UBL. 29 Abu Hafs was identified as the commander in the letter. This is assessed to be Muhammad Atif, aka (Abu Hafs al-masri), aka (Abu Hafs the Commandant), the number 3 man in al-qaida until his death in Abu Faraj is assessed to be al-qaida commander Mustafa Faraj Muhammad Muhammad Masud al-jadid al- Uzaybi, aka (Abu Faraj al-libi), ISN US9LY DP.) (S//NF) GZ admitted he smuggled detainee across the border of Afghanistan in (S//NF) East Africa Embassy bomber Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, ISN US9TZ DP (TZ-10012), photo-identified detainee as a Chadian. TZ stated he never met the detainee, but noted he possibly had detainee s passport in his possession in Karachi in (S//NF) In June 2001, Bahraini authorities detained two Saudi Arabian citizens, Ashraf bin Ibrahim bin Abd al-rahman al-sayid and Abdallah bin Fahd bin Sulayman al-qadi. The men had detainee s phone number ( ) in their possession listed next to the name al-qarani. Both al-sayid and al-qadi attended extremist training in Afghanistan. The two admitted to Saudi officials they were part of a plot to commit UBL-sponsored suicide operations in Saudi Arabia DI DIA Assessment, IIR , IIR TD-314/ SIR 6-DEC IIR , IIR IIR , IIR , IIR , IIR , IIR , Analyst Note: Abu Hafs is inaccurately transliterated as Abu Hafsa in the reports 31 TD-314/ TD-314/ TD-314/ , section 8D number 12, OMA MEMO 14-NOV

8 (S//NF) Detainee provided his parents home phone number in Saudi Arabia as (Analyst Note: Due to detainee s connections to these individuals and his identification as a suicide operative, detainee s connections to additional suicide operatives, trainers, leadership, and potentially planned but unfulfilled missions require further investigation.) (S//NF) Detainee possibly participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces, received militant training at the al-qaida al-faruq Training Camp, and resided at al-qaida sponsored guesthouses. (S//NF) Yasin Muhammad Salih Mazeeb Basardah, ISN US9YM DP (YM-252), identified detainee as an extremist fighter who traveled with him from al- Faruq to Kabul. YM-252 added the next time he saw detainee was in UBL s Tora Bora Mountain Complex, where they stayed for two and a half months. YM-252 pointed out detainee was a fighter, who answered the call of Islamic militancy, and used the cover story that he was a humanitarian and relief worker. 35 YM-252 traveled to Tora Bora no later than November (S//NF) LY-212 identified detainee as an al-qaida fighter with basic training on the AK-47 assault rifle and who possibly fought at UBL s Tora Bora Mountain Complex. 37 (S//NF) SA-493 met detainee at the Nibras Guesthouse in Kandahar prior to both attending the al-faruq Training Camp. 38 (S//NF) Detainee was captured with a group of individuals including senior al-qaida member LY-212. (S//NF) LY-212 reported he and the detainee were in a Pakistani prison in Kohat together until sometime in LY-212 led the al-qaida forces in UBL s Tora Bora Mountain Complex during hostilities against US and coalition forces, after UBL placed in him command. 39 (C) Detainee s account of his capture is assessed to be false. Detainee s name is recorded on a document listing 84 captured Taliban and al-qaida fighters. Pakistani forces captured the fighters who had crossed the border from Nangarhar Province, AF, in December 2001, after they had gathered in a mosque and surrendered their weapons to their Pakistani host FM40 26-MAY FM40 10-MAR MAY TD-314/ SIR 20-DEC-2004, Analyst Note: The al-nibras Guesthouse aka al-ansar aka Hajji Habash aka Zubayr Guesthouse, was used primarily for Arabs awaiting training at the al-qaida affiliated al-faruq Training Camp. The guesthouse also served as a way-station for recruits traveling north to Kabul, AF. See: SIR 20-OCT-2004, IIR , Analyst Note: A variant of al Nebras is Anabras. 39 TD-314/ , TD-314/ , TD-314/ IIR , page 4; FBIS GMP

9 (S//NF) Anwar Hamdan Muhammad al-nur, ISN US9SA DP (SA-226, transferred), stated detainee was one of the Arabs who fled with him to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border around 1 November SA-226 was also on the list of 84 fighters captured with LY-212 after fleeing UBL s Tora Bora Mountain Complex. 42 c. (S//NF) Detainee s Conduct: Detainee is assessed as a HIGH threat from a detention perspective. His overall behavior has been non-compliant and hostile towards the guard force and staff. He currently has 385 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS with the most recent occurring on 1 April 2008, when he was in possession of two, one inch screws from the ceiling light. He has 60 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction for assault with the most recent occurring on 17 March 2008, when he threw feces on the guard force. Other incidents for which he has been disciplined include inciting and participating in mass disturbances, failure to follow guard instructions/camp rules, inappropriate use of bodily fluids, unauthorized communications, exposing his genitals, damage to government property, attempted assaults, assaults, provoking words and gestures, and possession of food and nonweapon type contraband. In 2007, he had a total of 192 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction and 71 so far in (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment: a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of MEDIUM intelligence value. Detainee s most recent interrogation session occurred on 19 February b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee was identified as a member of a Londonbased al-qaida cell led by Abu Qatada al-masri and Muhammad al-masri. However, detainee s exact role and duration with the group is unknown. Detainee attended training at al-qaida s al-faruq Training Camp in 2001, which provided him access to trainers, facilities, and other trainees. Detainee was probably in UBL s Tora Bora Mountain Complex for several weeks during the US and Coalition military campaign. Detainee belonged to a group led out of UBL s Tora Bora Mountain Complex by senior al-qaida commander LY-212. Detainee was associated with two Saudi nationals who were part of a plot to commit suicide missions in Saudi Arabia, and possessed letters to, from, or discussing other senior al-qaida members. c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee likely possesses valuable intelligence not yet exploited. Due to detainee s reported placement and access to a London-based al-qaida cell, 41 TD-314/ (Item 8D) 42 IIR , Analyst Note: ISN YM-252 reported if you were in Tora Bora, you were not innocent, you were there to fight. See: SIR 31-DEC

10 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee likely possesses valuable intelligence not yet exploited. Due to detainee's reported placement and access to a London-based al-qaida cell, detainee should be able to provide information regarding the group's operations and recruitment and facilitation efforts. Detainee's possible association with two Saudi Arabian al-qaida suicide operatives requires further investigation. Detainee's intelligence value remains difficult to accurately assess because of the limited details in detainee's account and single-source reporting that has not been corroborated. d. (S/ND Areas of Potential Exploitation: o Al-Qaida London cell members, leadership, facilitators, operations, funding, and recruitment e Al-Qaida leadership, operations, recruitment, and facilitation in Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Kuwait o Al-Qaida suicide training, trainers, trainees, and missions o Al-Faruq Training Camp cadre, courses, facilitators o Operations in UBL's Tora Bora Mountain Complex during Coalition campaign o Embassy of Chad support to extremist travels o Means of communications between terrorist individuals and organizations 9. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 9 November 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant. 4E- 7rr*z*(B^f7' MARK H. BUZBY Rear Admiral, US Navy Commanding - Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide Intelligence llarning Terminology. 10 S E C R E T //NOFORN / I