AMERICAN PUBLIC UNIVERSITY SYSTEM. Charles Town, West Virginia COUNTERTERRORISM: A NETWORK TO DEFEAT A NETWORK

Transcription

1 AMERICAN PUBLIC UNIVERSITY SYSTEM Charles Town, West Virginia COUNTERTERRORISM: A NETWORK TO DEFEAT A NETWORK A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS in INTELLIGENCE STUDIES by Jason Christopher Beaford Department Approval Date: July 22, 2010 The author hereby grants the American Public University System the right to display these contents for educational purposes. The author assumes total responsibility for meeting the requirements set by United States Copyright Law for the inclusion of any materials that are not the author s creation or in the public domain.

2 Copyright 2010 by Jason Christopher Beaford All rights reserved. 2

3 3 DEDICATION To my wonderful wife, Meghan, who has supported me throughout my pursuit of my degree and who has spent countless hours proofreading and discussing papers about this very topic. Thank you for your support!

4 4 ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS COUNTERTERRORISM: A NETWORK TO DEFEAT A NETWORK by Jason Christopher Beaford American Public University System, July 22, 2010 Charles Town, West Virginia Dr. Joseph DiRenzo III, Thesis Professor The global war on terrorism has been ongoing since the events of September 11, The major enemy of the United States is Al Qaeda s global terrorist network. With the war raging for nine years, this paper addresses the question of how can the US Government defeat Al Qaeda? Through an examination of counterterrorism case studies and the current situation in Afghanistan, this thesis will explore how the United States Government should conduct counterterrorism in order to defeat Al Qaeda s global terrorist network.

5 5 TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE I. INTRODUCTION...6 II. LITERATURE REVIEW...8 Understanding Terror Networks...8 COMISAF Initial Assessment...9 First In. 10 Al Qaeda: The Terror Network that Threatens the World..10 Leaderless Jihad...12 III. CASE STUDIES IN COUNTERTERRORISM...14 Russian Operations against Chechen Terrorists...14 United States Operations against Al Qaeda...20 IV. WAYS TO DEFEAT AL QAEDA...20 Intelligence Disciplines and Fused Intelligence.20 Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze...30 The New Strategy for Afghanistan.31 Prevent the Radicalization of Terrorists...32 Target the Facilitator...33 Summary...34 LIST OF REFERENCES...35

6 6 INTRODUCTION Terrorism is a strategy that has been used in warfare for centuries. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Americans often associated terrorism with hijackers aboard commercial airliners and the suicide truck bombing of the US Marine barracks in Beirut. Throughout the 1990s, terrorism began to transition from hijackings and truck bombings in openly hostile locations to attacks against civilian targets throughout the world. As attacks against US personnel overseas continued to rise in the late 1990s, Al Qaeda was identified as having planned many of these attacks. The bombing of the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania brought Al Qaeda and its leader Usama Bin Laden onto the radar of the United States Intelligence Community. The attacks on September 11, 2001 brought Al Qaeda to the forefront of national security policy and the attention of the United States Government. The events of September 11, 2001 lead the United States into a global war on terrorism. This global war on terrorism is really a war against Al Qaeda s global terrorist network. This war on terrorism is unlike previous wars where there was a conventional enemy that could be defeated by destroying key equipment or by forcing the surrender of a leader; instead enemy forces consist of loosely affiliated networks that exist within a nebulous structure. The problem with the nebulous structure of terrorist networks is that it is difficult to focus a deterrent force on one single node of that network that can affect the rest of the network, thereby preventing future acts. A node within a network can consist of an individual, location, or organization that is connected to other individuals, locations, or organizations that comprise the network. If one of these nodes does not have a position of leadership over another node (such is often the case with individuals in the network) then a deterrent effort would be ineffective.

7 7 Since the United States is involved in a global war on terrorism, and there is always a way to win a war, then there must be a way to win the war on terror. The classic way to win a war is to defeat the enemy. Defeat in the conventional term was used to represent the destruction of the majority of the enemy s combat power whether that was infantry, tanks, ships, or other pieces of military material. Today, the definition of defeat must be modified when dealing with terrorism due to its decentralized network structure. This paper will treat the word defeat, when applied to terrorism, as the disruption of recruiting, the capture or killing of key nodes, the disruption of financial and material facilitation, and the denial of safe haven to terrorists. Therefore, the best way to defeat terrorism is to use a counterterrorism based strategy. The United States Department of Defense defines counterterrorism as: actions taken directly against terrorist networks and indirectly to influence and render global and regional environments inhospitable to terrorist networks (JP 1-02, pg 113). If counterterrorism is treated as the responsibility of the military or a single agency within the United States Government, then a counterterrorism strategy based around offensive actions will be unsuccessful. Instead, counterterrorism must use a network of agencies, organizations, and partner nations in order to effectively apply the principles of counterterrorism to global terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda. Therefore, this paper will examine a counterterrorism strategy of using a network to defeat a network, thereby using a network of US agencies and organizations as well as partner nations to effectively apply offensive actions against the global terrorist network, Al Qaeda.

8 8 LITERATURE REVIEW Sageman (2004) offers a journalistic-informative view of terrorism and terrorist networks. Sageman gives the reader an overview of the origins of the jihad, the evolution of the jihad, the Mujahedin, joining the jihad, and social networks and the jihad. Sageman takes the reader through the key points of the origins and evolution of the jihad to give the reader a better understanding of the Mujahedin. In addition, Sageman explains how the Mujahedin changed from Afghan freedom fighters to terrorists linked to Al Qaeda. In addition to the historical overview presented in Understanding Terror Networks, Sageman discusses the background of known terrorists and attempts to determine if there is a single factor that contributes to the creation of a terrorist (Sageman 2004, 103). Sageman s analysis shows that there is no single reason why a person decides to become a terrorist. Instead, there are multiple factors that may contribute to making a person much more vulnerable to radicalization by a terrorist recruiter. Finally, in Understanding Terror Networks, Sageman explains the network characteristics of Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda consists of the Al Qaeda central staff made up of Usama Bin Laden, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, and many others. This central staff is separate from the other groups such as the Maghreb Arabs, the Southeast Asians, and the core Arabs. In addition, the Al Qaeda network is non-hierarchical, which allows an individual to perform several functions and allows individuals within the network to be easily replaced. This recouperability factor makes the Al-Qaeda network difficult to target. Sageman s book gives the reader a great introduction to terrorist networks, but does not go in-depth on ways in which the United States Government can disrupt or defeat the Al Qaeda network. Sageman mentions the need to penetrate terrorist networks, but does not go into detail

9 9 on the problem that recruitment of terrorists poses (Sagemen 2004, 180). Sageman offers the idea of having a captured terrorist go back to his original location and provide the US Government with information, but the legal ramifications as well as the ability to track these individuals would be extremely difficult for the US to handle. McChrystal (2009) offers an assessment on the situation in Afghanistan conducted by General Stanley McChrystal and his staff in General McChrystal s assessment informs the reader about the problems as seen through the eyes of the Commander of the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF). The main premise of the assessment is that ISAF is failing to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people due to soldiers being inexperienced in local languages and cultures as well as focusing mainly on kinetic actions instead of a counterinsurgency strategy. In addition to the need for a counterinsurgency strategy, General McChrystal also assessed that ISAF required more intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets as well as increased Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) control throughout the entire country of Afghanistan (McChrystal 2009, 2-3). Finally, General McChrystal assesses that Pakistan is supporting the insurgency and states that senior leaders of the major Afghan insurgent groups are based out of Pakistan as well as groups linked to Al Qaeda. McChyrstal (2009) offers a current view of the situation in Afghanistan directly from the point of view of the commander of ISAF. The assessment alone however, does not answer the question: how can the United States Government defeat Al Qaeda? The assessment and current counterinsurgency strategy is contrary to President Obama s strategy in Afghanistan which is to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al Qaeda and prevent their return to Afghanistan

10 10 (McChrystal 2009, 2-2). This struggle between strategies within Afghanistan is important because it demonstrates what the US has done wrong so far in the war on terrorism. In addition, an analysis of how to defeat terrorism would be incomplete without examining the current situation in Afghanistan which is the frontline in the war against Al Qaeda. Schroen (2005) offers a senior level prospective on Operation JAWBREAKER, the reestablishment of relations between the Northern Alliance and the United States Government. Schroen, a veteran of the CIA s activities in Afghanistan, established a team that was tasked with going into Afghanistan and establishing relationships with the Northern Alliance, in order to allow military operations to occur within Afghanistan. Schroen provides an in-depth prospective on Northern Alliance leadership personalities and their feelings toward the United States. Schroen paints the picture of the battlefield as he found it and leads the reader to the start of the campaign. Schroen uses a journalistic approach to his writing in order to convey his information in a chronological manner. Schroen s work leaves several unexplored gaps. Schroen describes the operation as he saw it; this single point of view on the operation fails to show the relationships between the Department of Defense and CIA headquarters and many other interagency partners. In addition, at the start of the conflict, Schroen was forced to return to Washington when Gary 2, Gary Berntsen, took over the JAWBREAKER team. In addition to lacking information on interagency problems that plagued JAWBREAKER, Schroen also fails to point out the need for other collection disciplines besides HUMINT. Schroen s bias in favoring HUMINT is due to his role with the CIA and the type of team that he led. Therefore, Schroen s work cannot stand alone in order to demonstrate what kind of collection is needed for a successful counterterrorism strategy.

11 11 Corbin (2002) offers a journalistic-historical view of Al Qaeda. Corbin (2002) asserts that Al-Qaeda is a terror network that threatens the world as shown by the title of the book. Throughout the discussion about Al Qaeda, Corbin explains that while Usama Bin Laden was enrolled at the King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, he attended lectures by Mohamed Qutb. Mohamed Qutb was a radical Islamist from Egypt who lectured students on the tenants of Jihad as created by his brother Sayyid Qutb (Corbin, 10). At the time Bin Laden was attending King Abdul Aziz University, Saudi Arabia was undergoing an economic boom due to high oil prices. This economic boom filled Saudi pockets with money and many of these Saudis began to flaunt their money (Corbin, 8). This flaunting of money caused a group of Saudis to reject the modernization and westernization of Saudi Arabia and created a desire to return to classic Muslim thinking and behavior. It is likely that Qutb s teachings and the environment in Saudi Arabia helped to radicalize the young Usama Bin Laden. Corbin s historical prospective on a young Usama helps to build the picture of Usama s background and what drove Bin Laden to become the notorious man he is today. The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan became an outlet for Saudi dissidents who longed for classic Muslim living and who believed in the armed struggle of jihad. In the early 1980s, Usama Bin Laden came to the town of Peshawar in the tribal areas of western Pakistan. Peshawar sits along a main round leading into Afghanistan through the Khyber pass (Corbin, 16). It is in Peshawar where Bin Laden began donating money to the jihad as well as eventually setting up his own jihadist training camp within Afghanistan. Corbin (2002) also examines the legend of Usama Bin Laden in battle as well as the creation of Al Qaeda. Both of these points are very important because without the legend of Bin Laden fighting in battle or the creation of Al Qaeda, there would likely be no war on

12 12 terrorism. Corbin (2002) gives the reader an in-depth look at Al Qaeda and some of the key members within the organization. Corbin presents the information on Al Qaeda in a manner that allows the reader to understand the history of the organization. The only pieces that Corbin (2002) lacks is that the book does not attempt to predict the future of the Al Qaeda organization. In addition, the age of the work leaves a lot of information that is relevant to counterterrorism out of discussion which hinders any strategy based on Corbin (2002). Therefore, a further study of other resources along with Corbin (2002) is required to better understand Al Qaeda and how to defeat the global terrorist network. Sageman (2008) focuses on several important aspects of terrorism networks. One such aspect is the path to radicalism. Sageman uses the backgrounds of some infamous terrorists such as Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh, the man who was convicted of kidnapping Daniel Pearl. Sageman shows Omar s background as similar to any other child of immigrants. Omar himself was born in London to Pakistani parents. Omar s friends and family could not believe that Omar was a terrorist and many believed he was a model Englishman (Sageman 2008, 4). Others however described Omar as aggressive. Sageman paints the picture of Omar s childhood as one of aggression and a desire to prove his strength over others. This desire to show his strength is likely one reason why Omar became a terrorist, but the problem with this assessment is that aggression is shown by many other individuals who do not become terrorists. This psychological explanation of the path to radicalization is still unproven and leaves the reader with many questions. In addition to radicalization, Sageman (2008) focuses on Al Qaeda as an organization and a social moment with other organizations who desire to fall underneath the Al Qaeda umbrella. Sageman explains that Al Qaeda as a social movement is composed of informal networks that

13 13 mobilize people to resort to terrorism (Sageman 2008, 31). The idea that Sageman presents of Al Qaeda as a social network is important because it must be factored into any counterterrorism strategy. The defeat of Al Qaeda s operational units themselves may not put an end to the Al Qaeda social movement of inspired terrorism world-wide. Sageman (2008) also focuses on the use of the internet in terrorism planning, propaganda, and recruiting as well as the idea of leaderless jihad. Sageman (2008) explains how the internet is used as a tool for jihadist recruiting focusing on the radicalization of teenagers who have grown up with the internet. In addition to radicalization through the internet, the internet itself has been used as a tool to train distant would-be terrorists. Instructions on how to conduct attacks or use certain weapons have been placed online to facilitate attacks by individuals throughout the world (Sageman 2008, 113). With the use of the internet, terrorism can be conducted through leaderless jihad. Leaderless jihad, as presented in Sageman (2008), is the idea of smaller groups taking on the Al Qaeda name and conducting their own operations without the direction of a central leadership structure. This lack of leadership for the global network allows operations to be conducted in several countries without the need for communication or face-to-face contact between individuals thereby making them harder to target. In addition to the use of the internet, the idea of leaderless jihad allows for a more wide spread use of homegrown terrorism (Sageman 2008, 134). This homegrown threat inspired by Al Qaeda is yet another problem requiring an enhanced counterterrorism strategy. Sageman(2008) offers a vast amount of knowledge in the realm of terrorist radicalization as well as technology and leaderless jihad. These ideas all help paint the picture of possible future Al Qaeda operational objectives throughout the world. Sageman s work is a vital piece to

14 14 this overall study in how to defeat the Al Qaeda terrorist network, but by itself, Sageman (2008) does not go far enough in the recommendations to the US Government. CASE STUDIES IN COUNTERTERRORISM Russian Operations against Chechen Terrorists Russian operations against Chechen terrorists have been plagued with problems, since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Chechnya has historically been a separatist region from Russia and the Soviet Union mainly due to the differences in socio-religious makeup of Chechens as compared to Russians in Moscow. In 1834, Imam Shamil, a Muslim guerrilla commander, commanded a force of Caucasian guerrillas in Chechnya for a period spanning twenty-five years (Bodansky 2007, 7). While Shamil s attacks were limited in scope, the presence of his forces in the Caucasus held many of Russia s forces in place during the Crimean War due to the fear of Shamil s forces mounting a major attack. Due to Shamil s increasing influence in the region, the Russian military decided to contain and eventually defeat Shamil (Bodansky 2007, 9). The Russian military launched a series of assaults on Chechen villages, in order to destroy the economic base and sever Shamil s ties with the population. In addition to forcing the population into compliance, the Russian military also resettled the area to restrict Shamil s influence only to the mountains that border Chechnya. Shamil is not only a historic figure in relation to Chechnya, but he is also of note due to his use of a black standard or flag and his proclamation of holy war against the Russian government. This tying of holy war to the Chechen struggle for independence did not stop with the resettlement of Chechnya, instead it only delayed attacks.

15 15 After the fall of the Soviet Union, the situation in Chechnya flared up once again. The citizens of Chechnya desired to create their own country and spilt away from Russia instead of being a state within the Russian Federation. This struggle for independence was a continuation of the same struggle that Imam Shamil fought against the Russian government. Eventually, the conflict between the Chechens and the Russian government turned into a war known as the First Chechen War. A key figure in the First Chechen War was Dzhokhar Dudayev. Dudayev was a former Soviet bomber pilot and a native Chechen. In 1991, Chechnya declared its independence and Dudayev was elected president (Bodansky 2007, 21). The relationship between Moscow and Chechnya was fragile due to the existence of an oil pipeline in Chechnya. The relationship continued until a series of skirmishes in 1994 forced the Russian government to put forth and ultimatum to the Chechen government. The ultimatum was for the Chechens to lay down their arms or face war (Bodansky 2007, 24). It was at this point in the conflict, that Dudayev changed his approach and began to use Islam as a justification for his actions. Dudayev appealed for greater support from the Muslim world by describing the Chechen war against Russia as a jihad (Bodansky 2007, 25). Dudayev s use of the word Jihad was intended to be used as a rallying cry for Muslims all over the world. Dudayev, who was a Soviet War in Afghanistan veteran, likely intended to gain both financial as well as military support for his government. Prior to 1994, Dudayev seldom used religious undertones, he likely felt over powered and needed support to defeat the Russian offensive. While Dudayev and the citizens of Chechnya likely did not fully believe they were in a religious war against Russia, the call for jihad had been sounded and Muslim fighters from the Middle East were ready to respond.

16 16 From the fall of the Soviet Union to the 1994 call for Jihad in Chechnya, Mujahideen veterans from Afghanistan had moved onto conflicts in Tajikistan and Azerbaijan. These veterans continued to hone their combat skills and eventually arrived in Chechnya to support Dudayev s government. In addition to the arrival of Muslim fighters, the Pakistani ISI began to develop a relationship with the Chechen government. The relationship was established through the use of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and his group Hizb-i-Islami, which was in direct contact with a representative of the Chechen government, Shamil Basayev (Bodansky 2007, 35). Also as 1994 came to an end, Al-Qaeda began to focus more on the activities of Central Asia and the Caucuses. Al Qaeda previously had focused on Central Asia and the Caucuses as a means to gain weapons of mass destruction, but as the conflict in Chechnya grew, Al Qaeda began to see the Chechen War as a way of obtaining its goal of creating a global Islamic government (Scheuer 2006, 7). Dudayev s call to jihad was likely more than he bargained for. Not only did he have support for the Pakistani ISI, but he also had the assistance of Al Qaeda and other Muslim fighters. With an influx of individuals from different organizations, Dudayev could not have unity of command within his own country and therefore was unable to control the forces within his country. In the spring of 1995, the Chechen War was spurred on by the arrival of Al Qaeda s Ibn al-khattab aka Emir Khattab. Emir Khattab served in the Afghan jihad and became associated with many future members of Al Qaeda to include Usama Bin Laden (UBL) (Bodansky 2007, 40). After the Afghan jihad, Khattab spent commanding a small Arab elite force in support of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) in the Fergana Valley of Tajikistan. Khattab remained commanding Arab forces in Tajikistan, until UBL sent him to Chechnya to lead an Al

17 17 Qaeda force within the country (Bodansky 2007, 41). Khattab s arrival in Chechnya gave the Chechens a seasoned commander as well as strong ties to the Arab world and the growing terrorist organization Al Qaeda. The presence of Arab volunteers likely helped the Chechen rebels to beat back the Russians. The problem with the Russian strategy is that the Russians attempted to win by showing an overwhelming force due to the number of Russian troops as well as armored vehicles that crossed into Chechnya. The problem with the Russian strategy is that while they were able to win conventional battles with their forces in Chechnya, the situation quickly changed into guerrilla warfare. This bloody conflict continued even after the death of Dudayev (Abdullaev 2004, 332). Dudayev s death spilt the forces within Chechnya which became a series of networks under various leaders. This splintering of the force made the groups in Chechnya even harder to target. After the first Chechen War, Khattab was responsible for establishing terrorist training camps within Chechnya (Abdullaev 2004, 333). Chechnya not only served as a battleground to produce combat hardened veterans, but it also became a terrorist safe haven were would-beterrorists could learn how to build and use explosive devices as well as conduct guerilla warfare. Finally, these new terrorists were also indoctrinated in Al Qaeda s brand of Wahhabi Islam. These trained terrorists were not satisfied with a peaceful Chechnya, instead they desired to use their skills to conduct attacks on other parts of Russia. In August 1999, Basayev and Khattab led a force of 1,200 trained mujahideen into the Russian republic of Dagestan. In Dagestan, the mujahideen seized several mountainous districts and declared them the Islamic state of Dagestan (Abdullaev 2004, 334). In addition to the seizure of border towns, Khattab s terrorists attacked several Moscow apartment buildings with

18 18 explosives planted in the basements of each building. The campaign of terror within Moscow forced the Russian government back into Chechnya for the second Chechen War. During the second Chechen War, the campaign of terror within Russia and the Russian republics only increased. The campaign of terror spread into the heart of Russia, when Chechen terrorists stormed a Moscow theater and took 850 people hostage (McGeary 2002, 2). The hostage situation began when Chechen terrorists raided the theater firing into the air, while racing on stage shouting we are Chechens! and We are at war here! (McGeary 2002, 2). Besides the fact that the hostage situation occurred in Moscow, it is also interesting to note that over a third of the terrorists were women. While terrorists in the Middle East have been slow to effectively use women in terrorism, the difference in social norms between the Middle East and Chechnya allowed the Chechens to increase their numbers. In addition to using female attackers, the terrorists almost immediately started attaching plastic explosives to pillars and planting bombs, some as large as 50 kilograms, throughout the theater (McGeary 2002, 2). The Chechen terrorists involved with the Moscow theater siege were also equipped with suicide vests, in order to punish any attempted assault by Russian security forces. In the end, Russian security forces used a sleeping gas to slow the reaction of the terrorists and to put some to sleep. The actions of the Russian security forces were successful. They were able to save the hostages and prevent the bombs from detonating. The negative side to the successful operations is that it did not prevent future attacks and the Russian government remained reactionary. The next major attack by Chechen terrorists was the Beslan school siege. The hostage situation began on September 1, 2004 with Chechen and Arab terrorists seizing the North Ossetia

19 19 town of Beslan at Beslan school number one which gave the terrorists 1,200 hostages (Galeotti 2004, 1). Yet again, terrorists rigged explosives to pillars and throughout the crowd of hostages to react to any assault by Russian security forces. This time the Russian government was not successful in recovering the hostages before they could be harmed. As emergency workers approached the school to remove dead bodies, the terrorists believed they were under siege and detonated their explosives killing many of the hostages either from the blast or from the collapse of the school s roof. Overall, 326 people died and over 700 were injured (Galeotti 2004, 1). There are several lessons to be learned from both Beslan and the Moscow theater siege. First, the Chechen terrorists learned that they had to increase the terror inflicted on Russia in order to get their point across. Previous campaigns of violence against Russian troops did not effectively influence the Russian population. The symbols of Russia (the school and theater) that the Chechens attacked in the terror campaign sent a message to Russian society that no one was safe as long as Chechnya was occupied by Russian forces. The lesson for Russian security services is that Chechen terrorists will employ men and women to conduct their attacks. In addition, they will likely have suicide vests and large amounts of explosives rigged throughout the building in any hostage situation. Finally, the fact that Arabs were present in the Beslan school hostage situation continues to show that Chechens are receiving outside assistance for their campaign of terror. Overall, the key takeaways from Russia s operations against Chechen terrorists are: that a nationalist insurgency quickly changed to terrorism mainly due to foreign influence, Chechnya in between the first and second war became a safe haven for terrorists, and jihad was used as a religious justification for fighting against the Russian government. These key takeaways are

20 20 significant as they are often repeated in conflicts such as in the United States Government s operations against Al Qaeda. United States Operations against Al Qaeda United States operations against Al Qaeda are not merely a product of the attacks on September 11, 2001, instead there are multiple underlying issues that have brought the US and Al Qaeda into conflict. Some of the underlying issues that have brought the US and Al Qaeda into conflict are: Al Qaeda s role as a terrorist umbrella organization, Al Qaeda s funding and planning of attacks against the US, and Al Qaeda s radicalization of Muslims worldwide. The key to understanding US operations against Al Qaeda is to understand the history, goals, and structure of Al Qaeda and how the US has attempted to counter Al Qaeda in the past. United States operations against Al Qaeda did not start with the war in Afghanistan; instead Al Qaeda made the first strike against the United States, when Al Qaeda planned the attack on the World Trade Center in On February 26, 1993, the World Trade Center was attacked via a vehicle borne improvised explosive device. The perpetrator of the attack was Razmi Yousef, a Kuwaiti born citizen, who trained at an Al Qaeda training camp and who is the nephew of Khalid Sheik Mohammed (Gathehouse 2006, 37). The World Trade Center bombing was the first attack on the United States by Al Qaeda but it would not be the last. In addition, the tactics were analyzed and reused in other attacks perpetrated against the US by Al Qaeda. Finally, the US did not link the 1993 World Trade Center bombing directly to Al Qaeda for a few years and there was therefore, no response to the attack. The next major attack that Al Qaeda conducted against US citizens was the attack on the US Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya. The attack was conducted by members of Al Qaeda who drove a truck loaded with explosives toward the embassy. This truck bomb was supposed to be placed in

21 21 the parking garage underneath the embassy, in order to knock the entire building down. The guard at the gate would not allow the truck through; therefore, the driver detonated the bomb at the gate (Corbin 2002, 80). The attack on the embassy in Nairobi followed the same tactic that was used in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Both bombings used truck-borne explosives and attempted to force the collapse of a building. Nine minutes after the Nairobi attack, Al Qaeda launched an attack against the US Embassy in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania. The coordinated attacks that targeted US officials in two countries almost simultaneously demonstrated the level of planning that was involved with these attacks. These attacks on US Embassies by Al Qaeda required a response from the US Government. The response from the US came in the form of a cruise missile strike, consisting of eighty missiles striking six Al Qaeda training camps (Corbin 2002, 87). The primary target of the attack was Usama Bin Laden, who was identified at one of the training camps prior to the missile attack, but Bin Laden left his camp prior to the missile strike. The cruise missile strike was effective at destroying some of Al Qaeda s assets as well as killing trainees, but Bin Laden was able to escape the strike. While the destruction of the training camps was a positive step, there were no follow up actions. Bin Laden was not killed or captured and the strike only added to his fame. Michael Scheuer, the intelligence analyst who led the CIA Bin Laden Group, said that the only way Bin Laden and his forces in Afghanistan could be destroyed would be through the direct intervention of some type of force on the ground (Berntsen 2005, 32). Scheuer s ideas where not acted upon during this time due to the political environment in the United States and the desire not to use ground forces within Afghanistan. The cruise missile attack did not slow down Al Qaeda s planning. Instead, Al Qaeda planned an

22 22 attack to occur on New Years of 2000 known as the millennium plot and was actually successful in conducting an attack against the USS Cole. On October 12, 2000, two Al Qaeda operatives steered a small boat laden with explosives into the side of the USS Cole within the Aden, Yemen harbor (Innes 2002, 78). The attack killed seventeen sailors and wounded dozens more. The investigation within Yemen was stalled due to diplomatic issues and while Al Qaeda was quickly suspected as the perpetrator, the US did not respond to this attack likely due to President Clinton leaving office with a few months of the incident and the November Presidential elections around the corner. The attacks on September 11, 2001 were planned long before the events of that day. Usama Bin Laden (UBL) and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) had worked together to plan what they called the planes operation (9/11 Commission Report, 148). UBL did not agree to plan when KSM first met with him and due to Afghan politics, KSM did not want to work with UBL and Al Qaeda because of their strong ties with the Taliban. Finally after failing to join Ibn al Khattab in Chechnya and after seeing the reports about attacks on the US Embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi, KSM attempted to renew his contact with UBL(9/11 Commission Report, 149). KSM joined UBL s organization because he felt that it was the only one capable of funding his operational plans to attack the United States, in this way KSM was taking the part of a businessman presenting a business proposal to a corporation. The fact that KSM s plan, which he acquired from his nephew Ramzi Yousef, was thought up in 1996, shows the span of time that a terrorist operation may require to move from the planning phase to the attack phase. Al Qaeda s role as a funding source and recruiter for the 9/11 operation is what really makes the organization dangerous.

23 23 The attacks of September 11, 2001, were almost immediately linked to Usama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda. By September 17, 2001 Pakistan delivered the message to the Taliban that they would either have to give up UBL to the United States Government, or they would face a US military attack (Frontline 2010). The Taliban decided to protect UBL and prepared to conduct jihad against the United States which led to post 9/11 operations in Afghanistan. The first post 9/11 US operation against Al Qaeda to take place was operation JAWBREAKER. Operation JAWBREAKER was the spearhead operation used by the United States Government to establish an American presence and reform relationships that would allow the US military to enter Afghanistan, in order to topple the Taliban regime, and to kill Usama Bin Laden (UBL). While the JAWBREAKER team was successful in establishing an American presence in Afghanistan, they failed in their mission to find UBL. The reason behind their mission failure was a lack of interagency cooperation. The Department of Defense was slow to act on sending in special operations forces, other CIA departments would not allow key personnel to deploy, and special operations forces were underutilized or misused in the hunt for Bin Laden. The first JAWBREAKER team led by Gary Schroen was tasked with taking the small team into Afghanistan, linking up with the Northern Alliance officers in the Panjshir Valley and convincing them to cooperate fully with the CIA and the U.S. Military (Schroen 2005, 16). From the planning stages, Gary Schroen believed in the need for special operations soldiers to accompany the JAWBREAKER team into the Panjshir Valley. The JAWBREAKER team requested that the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) send a contingent of special operations forces into Afghanistan with the JAWBREAKER team, but USSOCOM denied the request due to the lack of search and rescue aircraft.

24 24 The need for search and rescue aircraft in case of an emergency is very important when placing soldiers in harm s way, but better interagency cooperation could have yielded an aircraft that would have been suitable for search and rescue. In addition, the embedding of special operations forces with the first team of American s on the ground would have better tied the Department of Defense into relationships with Northern Alliance commanders. The DOD run bombing campaign was yet another issue that confronted JAWBREAKER. The bombing campaign started off with the focus being on targets of strategic value (Schroen 2005, 163). These strategic targets scattered throughout Afghanistan did not help the situation the Northern Alliance faced. The idea to bomb strategic targets likely stems from the successes that the US enjoyed during Operation Desert Storm. Prior to Global War on Terrorism, the United States fought strategic campaigns that were large militaries fought against other large militaries. Even in Vietnam where large military battles were turned into smaller guerilla battles, the US still conducted a strategic air campaign focused on military infrastructure. Overall, this strategic bombing campaign may have given Al Qaeda breathing room to head toward Tora Bora and the Pakistani border. Finally, the main reason JAWBREAKER failed its mission is because special operations forces were underutilized or misused in the hunt for Bin Laden. One example of the misuse of special operations forces was an Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) that was operating near Tora Bora was not allowed to maneuver and was restricted to terminal guidance operations only (Fury, 100). Troops on the ground should never have such a restrictive mission as it does not allow them to move with the changing environment, but USSOCOM could not allow the ODA to maneuver freely for fear of capture or causing an international incident by crossing the Pakistani border. In addition, instead of using US Army Rangers as a blocking force on the Pakistani

25 25 border, the Pakistani border guards were used (Fury, 77). Pakistani border guards were known to have tribal relationships and historic friendships with many Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters. However an American presence on the Pakistani border would have put many soldiers at risk and would have also undermined the Pakistani Government s control on its territory. At the same time that operations were occurring against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Tora Bora, coalition ground forces were continuing to arrive in Afghanistan. While senior members of Al Qaeda were no longer in Afghanistan by the time that large numbers of coalition forces were on the ground, the coalition began to target the midlevel leaders that remained within Afghanistan. From the winter of 2001 to August 2009, operations in Afghanistan consisted mainly of small scale capture or kill missions. In August 2009, General Stanley McChrystal recommended changes to the overall Afghan strategy. GEN McChrystal decided to change the focus of the International Security Assistance Force from capture/kill missions to a counterinsurgency strategy. GEN McChrystal s guidance on counterinsurgency (COIN) is that the ISAF strategy cannot be focused on seizing terrain or destroying insurgent forces; but the objective must be the population (McChrystal 2009, 1-1). With GEN McChrystal s strategy still in place within ISAF, current operations cannot be measured as successful or unsuccessful as easily as other aspects of US operations against Al Qaeda. Instead, current operations within Afghanistan have switched from being operations against Al Qaeda to operations designed to strengthen the Afghan government and quality of life within Afghanistan. Therefore, current operations in Afghanistan no longer fall in line with President Obama s goal of disrupting, dismantling, and eventually defeating Al Qaeda (McChrystal 2009, 2-2). The US Government must look at new strategies in order to defeat terrorism; especially terrorism conducted or coordinated by Al Qaeda. Using

26 26 fused intelligence, the find, fix, finish, exploit, and analyze concept, as well interagency cooperation, the US can defeat Al Qaeda. WAYS TO DEFEAT TERRORISM In order to defeat terrorism, the US Government must properly use and resource each intelligence discipline. The major intelligence disciplines that this paper will cover are Human Intelligence, Imagery Intelligence, Signals Intelligence, Measurement and Signatures Intelligence, and Counterintelligence. In addition, these intelligence disciplines are best when combined within the All-Source discipline also known as fused intelligence. Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is the collection by a trained HUMINT Collector of foreign information from people and multimedia to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment, personnel, and capabilities. It uses human sources as a tool and a variety of collection methods, both passively and actively, to gather information to satisfy the commander s intelligence requirements and cross-cue other intelligence disciplines (HQDA 2009, 6-1). The problem with HUMINT in the fight against Al Qaeda is that US natives have a difficult time blending into Middle Eastern cultures. Often it is difficult to find Pashtu, Dari, or Arabic speakers within the intelligence community. Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) is the intelligence derived from the exploitation of imagery collected by visual photography, infrared, lasers, multi-spectral sensors, and radar. These sensors produce images of objects optically, electronically, or digitally on film, electronic display devices, or other media (HQDA 2009, 7-1).

27 27 The problem with IMINT is that the operator of the IMINT collection device must know where to shot the image. IMINT must be driven by another intelligence discipline, in order to gain the most value from the product. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) is a category of intelligence comprising either individually or in combination all Communications Intelligence (COMINT), Electronic Intelligence (ELINT), and Foreign instrumentation Intelligence (FISINT), however transmitted; intelligence derived from communications, electronics, and foreign instrumentation signals (HQDA 2009, 8-1). Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT) is technically derived intelligence that detects, locates, tracks, identifies, and/or describes the specific characteristics of fixed and dynamic target objects and sources. It also includes the additional advanced processing and exploitation of data derived from IMINT and SIGINT collection (HQDA 2009, 9-1). Counterintelligence (CI) counters or neutralizes intelligence collection efforts through collection, CI investigations, operations, analysis and production, and functional and technical services. CI includes all actions taken to detect identify, exploit, and neutralize the multidiscipline intelligence activities of friends, competitors, opponents, adversaries, and enemies (HQDA 2009, 11-1). All Source Intelligence is defined as the intelligence products, organizations, and activities that incorporate all sources of information and intelligence, including open-source information, in the production of intelligence (HQDA 2009, 5-1). The problem with All Source Intelligence is that an analyst must be an expert on a region or a topic in order to put the puzzle together. In addition, the all source analyst must be able to tell collectors what type of indications to look for, in order to determine what is actually occurring within the analyst s area of responsibility.

28 28 Every intelligence discipline serves a specific role in determining a certain aspect of the enemy s current and/or future plans. Fusing that intelligence under the intelligence discipline of All Source intelligence is vital for a commander or policymaker to understand what is occurring and to make a decision as to how the US Government will respond. Prior to 9/11, intelligence was so compartmented that HUMINT analysts did not always know the same information that their SIGINT analyst counterparts knew about an enemy (9/11 Commission Report, 258). The problem of information sharing was not only one at the lower levels; it was also a problem at the national level within the Intelligence Community. The Intelligence Community is made up of seventeen intelligence member agencies, they are: Air Force Intelligence, Army Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Coast Guard Intelligence, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Energy, Department of Homeland Security, Department of State, Department of the Treasury, Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Marine Corps Intelligence, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, National Security Agency, Navy Intelligence and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI 2010). Of these seventeen intelligence member organizations, this paper will focus on just a few in regards to defeating terrorism. Because terrorist network structures are vast and contain several nodes or cells that perform certain functions in order to accomplish an overall goal, so too must the US Intelligence Community work in harmony toward the accomplishment of a goal. Currently, the CIA focuses its efforts mainly toward HUMINT collection, the NSA focuses mainly on SIGINT collection, and the FBI focuses mainly on crimes within the United States; each organization has a role in the counterterrorism fight. The problem with these organizations is that while each as a piece of the counterterrorism fight, the only overarching organization that can attempt to manage these

29 29 agencies is the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). The problem with the position of DNI is that an individual and his or her staff must manage all intelligence activities for the United States. This very broad look at intelligence does not allow the DNI to focus specifically on counterterrorism. Therefore, the US Government should create the position of Director of National Intelligence for Terrorism (DNI-T). The DNI-T would fall underneath the DNI and would have authority over all agencies in matters pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism. The DNI-T would not only be the point of contact for all source intelligence analysis on terrorism, which is currently done by the national counterterrorism center, but the DNI-T would also be the point of contact for counterterrorism actions conducted by the CIA or the USSOCOM. Currently, the CIA is capable of conducting counterterrorism operations and intelligence collection as apparent in the books JAWBREAKER and First In. In addition USSOCOM provides the US Government with special operations forces capable of conducting operations against terrorist organizations. In addition, there are multiple intelligence organizations that provide all source intelligence analysis on terrorism related issues to include DIA s Joint Interagency Task Force for Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT), the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and many others (DIA 2010). The difference between the current IC model and the proposed creation of the position DNI-T is that one organization would be the repository for all intelligence information related to terrorism. In addition, that same organization would have the authority to task manpower to both collect and act upon terrorism related intelligence. In order for the DNI-T to be successful, the office of the Director of National Intelligence for Terrorism (ODNI-T) will need to utilize both intelligence agencies and intelligence disciplines within the find, fix, finish, exploit, and analyze (F3EA) cycle.

30 30 Find, fix, finish, exploit, and analyze (F3EA) is a great tool for man haunting, which is the systematic leveling of national assets against an individual in order to kill or capture him or her (Flynn 2008, 57). F3EA is a cyclical process (as depicted below) in which a target is found by intelligence collectors or through operations and continues until the individual is captured or killed in the finish phase. (Flynn 2008, 57) During the find phase of the operation, HUMINT or SIGINT is usually the key that allows counterterrorism forces to gain a general location on the enemy. Using Usama Bin Laden as an example, during the find phase, a HUMINT source might report to a HUMINT collector that UBL is in vicinity of location X. Next, the operation would move into the fix phase. The fix phase is where intelligence gathers a precise location on a target. The location itself can be gained by having eyes on the target possibly through the use of scouts conducting surveillance. After the fix phase, the finish phase is usually the capture or killing of the targeted individual. Once that individual is detained or killed, examination of documents on his or her person or detainee debriefs will produce intelligence that needs to be analyzed in the analyze phase of the