ELECTROMAGNETIC OPERATING ENVIRONMENT (EME) & UK JOINT ELECTRONIC WARFARE (EW)

Transcription

1 ELECTROMAGNETIC OPERATING ENVIRONMENT (EME) & UK JOINT ELECTRONIC WARFARE (EW) Commander Dave Hewitt OC JOINT EW OPERATIONAL SUPPORT CENTRE (JEWOSC)

2 Electronic Warfare Military action to Exploit the Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS) which encompasses the interception and identification of EM emissions, the employment of EM energy, including directed energy, to Reduce or Prevent hostile use of the EMS and actions to ensure its effective use by own/friendly forces. EW enables EM Situational Awareness (SA) which critically informs decision making and the execution of Joint Effects/Action. Note this statement should also include elements of Cyber

3 EM Operating Environment Complex, Congested and Contested - EME Situational Awareness critically Informs and/or enables: Planning, C2, manoeuvre, exploitation, denial, Battlespace Management, CID, Targeting, BDA, Threat Warning, Platform Protection and future capability development

4 EME & UK Defence EW Period EME Defence EW Analogue, emerging digital caps, limited proliferation and commercial exploitation Digitisation and non-traditional emitter technology development, proliferation, EMS Commercial exploitation, Cyber, Asymmetric applications Above + Complex, Congested & Contested Traditional War Fighting - EW focus maintained across ES, EA, ED and SIGINT DLoDs. EW Governance, C2, Doctrine, training established and enabled. COIN EW shift to protection aspects of ES, EA, ED. ELINT and Collect caps reduced. Limited EW Governance, C2, Doctrine and training focus. Capability Development failed to integrate and enable all aspects of the EW Defence Lines of Development, particularly Training and Information (data). Post Libya/Syria lessons increased EME and EW awareness. 5th+ Generation capability data requirements, recognition of non-equipment DLoD aspects (especially Governance, C2, training, people, information), ELINT.

5 UK Defence Review of EW (Jan 2013) Identify the risk to Defence outputs caused by deinvestment Develop a coherent model for exploitation of the EME Recognise synergies between EW and Cyber Build on existing National and International EW relations Update National EW policy Produce a National EW Operating directive

6 Review Scope Background - Relevance of EME and EW interfaces EME Framework - Policy, Command, Spectrum Management, MOUs Capability Stocktake - Evidence based against Risks, Scenarios Organisation - Joint and single service elements engaged in EW activities Governance & Tasking - Collection & Analysis tasking mechanisms & Governance models Manpower & Training - Skills & training. Manpower Review & Cyber career stream work Future of EME - Evidenced view of future EM environment & challenges

7 Review Outcomes Key Points Risks, weaknesses, capability gaps & incoherency across ES, EA, ED and EM components of EW Recommendations Some quick wins Governance, Tasking Some longer term Equipment, People and training Improved coherency (Included DEWC move to JEWOSC) Summary Lacked EW champion for years No Joint oversight of pan-dlod issues; ES, EA, ED, EM activities Equip often Urgent Operational Requirement derived, single service specific and not sustained Establish operating coherence with Cyber, IO and ISR EW effects not considered in the round lack of whole EM spectrum Management, Planning & Operational C2 Various Governance, Tasking, Project lines The need to reinvigorate collaborative working with Allies and partners

8 EW ESM ECM EPM EW Management Search Intercept Identify Locate Record (ES) = EME SA Prevent, Reduce (EA) = Deceive Deny Protect, Ensure (ED) = Counter ES & EA Command, Direct Integrate, sustain, Develop Policy & Governance Jt Battlespace Management & Integration Operational Command, Control, Coordinate EWCC End-to-End EME Operating Process SIGINT, MASINT, Cyber Threat Warning, Targeting, CID Info, Comms, Cyber, Jt Fires across networks and sensors Physical and Procedural Spectrum Management, EWOS, EOB, Training, trials, CNO

9 Initial Actions Establish UK Defence Authority for EW Comd JFC EW Policy set & issued under CDI leadership, consistent with NATO (29 May 14) Delegate specific EW responsibilities for Develop, Plan, Manage, Deliver, Generate and Operate functions EW Delivery Programme (equip & enablers) established ES,EA,ED and EM Establish Joint EW operational planning team (EM Battlestaff) Develop Joint EW Operating Directive Develop a 1 Star Joint Force EW Group EW Capability assessment in advance of SDSR 15

10 UK Joint EW Command Structure CDS/VCDS Commander Jt Forces (4 Star) Chief Defence Intelligence (3 Star) Director Cyber, Intelligence & Information Integration (2 Star) Joint Force EW Group Commander (1 Star) Single Service Headquarters EW Staff

11 UK Joint Operational EW Command Structure Director Joint Warfare (2 Star) Director Cyber, Intelligence & Information Integration (2 Star) UK Govt Depts Allies MoUs Joint Spectrum Authority PJHQ, EWCC, NATO Research & Development Joint Force Group EW Commander (1 Star) EWOS SIGINT EMBM Embeds Spectrum, Cyber, IO, Joint Intelligence Operations Centre EWCC DE&S Joint Force Intelligence Group Cyber and Info Ops NAVY LAND AIR Allies Industry Others

12 Summary Work is progressing much more to do EW has become more complex Art of the possible vs risk It must be carried out with less resource Efficiencies, collaboration, partnerships Equipment is only part of the solution Other Defence Lines of EW Development are equally as important Sustainability is key Must have Governance, resilience and through-life support solutions Collaboration and Integration is Key

13 Questions