New conceptions in the understanding of man at Warsaw School of Consequential Thomism

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1 CONGRESSO TOMISTA INTERNAZIONALE L UMANESIMO CRISTIANO NEL III MILLENNIO: PROSPETTIVA DI TOMMASO D AQUINO ROMA, settembre 2003 Pontificia Accademia di San Tommaso Società Internazionale Tommaso d Aquino New conceptions in the understanding of man at Warsaw School of Consequential Thomism Rev. Dr. Tomasz Stepien University of Cardinal Stephan Wyszynski, Warsaw (Poland) One of the new propositions of interpreting the texts of St. Thomas and of developing his philosophy is the School of Consequential Thomism in Warsaw. The founder of that school, M. Gogacz, believes that the texts of Aquinas contains complete philosophical system and he proposes to study the texts of Aquinas without the support of modern philosophical schools. The most important feature of the metaphysics of St. Thomas is the discovery of the act of existence (ipsum esse) as a principle of the individual being. The scholars of the Warsaw school consequently place an emphasis on the role of the act of existence in the field of metaphysics and other philosophical disciplines, including philosophical anthropology. Two most important results of the studies on the act of existence in understanding the human being are: a new theory of person, and the modification of the theory of creation. The new understanding of the person is related to the new approach to the essence of man which can be described as subsistence (subsistentia). This is made possible to formulate the new definition of person which is an individual being of intellectual subsistence (intellectualis subsistentia individuum ens). The second presented issue concerns a new approach to the understanding of creation. God as the subsistent act of existence creates the act of existence of an individual being but does not create form, which is made into a real and individual being by a created act of existence in cooperation with other external principles. Those principles are called end principles, and are related to the essence of man. Introduction In Poland there are some Thomistic schools which try to study philosophical anthropology in the spirit of St. Thomas. One of them is a school in Warsaw called Consequential Thomism. M. Gogacz, founder of that school, has proposed a specific approach to the writings of St. Thomas. 1 This new approach is an attempt to understand the texts of St. Thomas more precisely, but it also develops certain problems, which had only been alluded to 1 Differences between Thomistic schools are well shown in: K. Bankowski, Tomizm konsekwentny na tle odmian tomizmu, Studia Philosophiae Christianae, XXXII/1996 nr 2, pp ; and also:, M. Gogacz, Wspólczesne interpretacje tomizmu, in: Znak 113, (1963), pp Copyright 2003 INSTITUTO UNIVERSITARIO VIRTUAL SANTO TOMÁS Fundación Balmesiana Universitat Abat Oliba CEU

2 T. STEPIEN, New conceptions in the understanding of man at the Warsaw School of Consequential Thomism by St. Thomas. A very accurate reading of the texts goes hand in hand with an effort to develop the pure thought of St. Thomas without the support of phenomenology or other modern philosophies. In the writings of Aquinas we can find a complete theory of being that is the basis of all parts of the philosophical system, including philosophical anthropology. Therefore there is the conviction at our school that attempts to better understand human nature can be fruitful only in the light of the metaphysics of St. Thomas. The metaphysics of St. Thomas is revolutionary because it is not a metaphysics of essence but of existence. That is why following the path shown by Aquinas means underlining the role of the act of existence (ipsum esse) in individual beings. Scholars of our school consequently place an emphasis on the role of the act of existence which leads to new conceptions in the field of philosophical anthropology. Orders of matters in a metaphysics of man. In the introduction to the treatise about man in the Summa Theologica, St. Thomas explains the proper order of problems in the metaphysics of man. The distinction must be made between the problem of how man exists, the nature of man and how man comes into being, and the production of man. 2 M. Gogacz called these two aspects of understanding of man a structural approach and a hereditary approach. 3 To understand human nature is to show the metaphysical principles of the man. These principles are set in a metaphysical structure and therefore this first aspect of the understanding of the human being was called structural approach. The term nature used by St. Thomas means essence of man with all accidents which are needed to operate, that is, an essence in operation. To understand being is of course to understand its essence, but essence itself is not a full metaphysical structure. The term proposed by M. Gogacz structural approach is also a proposition to take a broader look at the human being. Human is not only an essence or nature, but an individual being. Men do not differ in nature and when one comprehends nature, one comprehends the common essence of all men. The act of existence (ipsum esse) is the principle which makes man a concrete and real individual being. The act of existence, the first act of individual being, is for M. Gogacz the most important principle of man. This is a full identification of the principles (principia) of man, which are: act of existence (ipsum esse), form (forma) which is the soul (anima) and matter, which is the body (corpus). It is worth noticing that this development of St. Thomas thought is made in his spirit because probably one of the most important features of Thomistic philosophy is that it is realistic. This means that 2 S.Th. I, q. 75, intr.: Et primo de natura ipsius hominis et de eius productione. 3 M. Gogacz, Elementarz metafizyki (Warszawa 1987), pp p. 2

3 Congresso Tomista Internazionale man as an individual being exists first before our cognition of human nature and structural approach is an attempt to understand man as it is in the real world which differs from an existence of man in our cognition. The second aspect, called by St. Thomas a production of man, was recalled to a hereditary approach. This change is not only a change of words but also an attempt to show that coming into being is something more than a production. In the modern world the term production can be understood as the composition of a structure from previously existing elements. The metaphysical structure of man cannot be made in this way because it is not only a physical structure. The structure of man is a metaphysical structure of being. It must be created, not only composed. The term hereditary approach excludes an understanding of man only as composition of bodily organs. There is also another linguistic problem which comes with this terminology. In Polish M. Gogacz uses term ujecie genetyczne which can be simply translated in English as genetic approach but this term can be taken as referring to genetics which is part of biology, so we decided to translate it as hereditary approach. It is worth mentioning that the sequence of these two aspects of understanding man, structural and hereditary approach, seems to be natural. Firstly we must understand the structure of existing man, and only then we can ask how this structure came into being. Now I would like to highlight the two most profound new conceptions in the understanding of man developed at the Warsaw School of Consequential Thomism, which are the consequences of the importance of underlining the role of the act of existence in the individual being. These new conceptions are: conception of man as a person in the structural approach and a new understanding of creation in the hereditary approach. The new understanding of man as a person. To better understand the new conception of man as a person we must start with a more specific identification of the principles of man. The first act of man is an act of existence (ipsum esse), which is an act to essence (essentia). This is the first composition of act and potency in human being. Essence is composed of form (forma) which is the soul (anima) and of matter, which is the body (corpus), and this is a second composition of act and potency in the human being. However we must broaden the commonly held opinion that the human body consist only of matter. When St. Thomas talks about matter, he understands it in the metaphysical sense, which is material potentiality. The key to this problem is in the distinction between primary and secondary matter. The p. 3

4 T. STEPIEN, New conceptions in the understanding of man at the Warsaw School of Consequential Thomism terms primary matter and secondary matter are used by Aristotle. St. Thomas does not use these terms because they were wrongly understood by other medieval Aristotelians (eg. David of Dinant said that God is primary matter). St. Thomas always uses the term matter in a metaphysical sense. In the school of Consequent Thomism matter in the metaphysical sense is called material potency. Secondary matter (matter in the physical sense) is described with many terms, like proper matter (materia propria), matter as dimension (materia sub dimensione), matter as quantity (materia sub quantitate) etc. The human body can therefore be described as physical matter with a certain dimension and quantity, which is in material potency. I mentioned the problem of understanding the human body, because it is also an issue developed by P. Milcarek, a scholar of our school in Warsaw. 4 P. Milcarek in his book about understanding the human body in the texts of Aquinas also gives a good introduction to the problem of person. He proposes that a human body in a philosophical anthropology should be described in relation with a specific approach to an essence of human being. 5 The new understanding of human as a person is also linked with an approach to human essence. There are three basic aspects in which we can understand human essence. Human essence can be taken as quidditas, which is the essence described in the definition of man. And to define a man it is sufficient to show the matter only, from which genus can be taken, and form, from which species difference (differentia specifica) can be taken. If the quidditas is a basis of the definition so there can only be the one quidditas of all man. 6 But even in a common sense human essence is not only pure essence, because every human being has accidents which are not included in the definition of the man. Therefore there is a second approach to man s essence which is nature. Nature as we mentioned above is an essence with all accidents taken in a common sense as the powers of human soul. St. Thomas says that there are several definition of nature, but all of them underline form as the principle of motion and form can be a principle of motion through its powers. 7 As we know, there is also only one nature of man, which we can call humanity. We are not different in our humanity but each of us is an individual being, so finally there is a third approach to human essence, which is subsistence (subsistence). Subsistence is an essence understood with transcendental qualities like realness, difference and unity. 8 Subsistence therefore is an approach to 4 P. Milcarek, Teoria ciala ludzkiego w tekstach sw. Tomasza z Akwinu, (Warszawa 1994). 5 Ibid De ente et essentia, II. 7 S.Th. III, q. 2, a. 1, corp. 8 The term subsistence has many meanings in the text of Aquinas. A definition of subsistence as an approach to essence was worked out in our school. M. Gogacz, Próba heurezy subzystencji i osoby, Studia Philosophorum Medii Aevi, t. 8, Subzystencja i osoba wedlug sw., Tomasza z Akwinu, (Warszawa 1987) pp p. 4

5 Congresso Tomista Internazionale essence as it is in the individual human being. Individualization is the most important feature in understanding the human being as a person. The word individual is always present in the definition of person, because the concept of person always refers to an individual human being. St. Thomas accepts the classical definition of person as proposed by Boethius (rationalis naturae individua substantia), and when he discusses the problem of Divine Persons in Summa Theologica, he makes a great analysis of it. 9 This analysis is based on the problem of individualization, because he would like to show how one God can be three Divine Persons. In my opinion this article shows not only that a person is an individual being of a certain substance. It seems that Aquinas wants to tell us more, namely that a being which has a rational nature is more individual than non intellectual beings. So in the personal being there must be a specific reason of individualization and the matter cannot be the only source of that individualization. The person differs from other individuals of the same species not only in body but also in intellect so this reason of individualization must be related to the intellect, which has an immaterial nature. As I mentioned above the principle which makes the essence a real and individual being is the act of existence. One of the transcendental qualities which are the effect of the act of existence in the essence of being is difference (aliquid). Therefore this principium which is a reason of special individualization of the intellectual being is the act of existence related to intellect. That is why the proper understanding of the person must be related not only to the essence of man but also to the act of existence, and the definition of Boethius seems to be insufficient. We can see more clearly the unique role of the act of existence in understanding the person with a closer look at another aspect of personal being proposed by St. Thomas in the Summa Theologica. In the 3 rd article of the 29 th question he asks if the term person can be applied to God. Answering that question, Aquinas says something very important, that person means some kind of perfection in creatures so God, who is not only perfect but is perfection, must be a person. 10 In another place in the Summa Theologica St. Thomas tells us that to be perfect means to be in an act. 11 He refers to God who is the subsisting act of existence so, to say it more precisely, to be more perfect means to exist in a more perfect way. The first act of being is not the form which is the act in essence but the act of existence (ipsum esse), which is an act of being. Perfection of being is not only perfection of form, but also perfection of existence. The well-known 4 th way of proving God s existence taken from the degrees of 9 S.Th. I, q. 27, a S.Th. I, q. 29, a. 3, corp. 11 S.Th. I, q. 4, a. 1, corp. p. 5

6 T. STEPIEN, New conceptions in the understanding of man at the Warsaw School of Consequential Thomism perfection tells us more about the perfection of being. Aquinas says that: Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and the like. 12 Truth and good are transcendental qualities which are the effects of the act of existence present in the essence of being. Thanks to the act of existence we can recognize being as something true or good. Therefore to be more or less perfect means to present transcendental qualities in a more or less intensive way. Now we can come back to the problem of person. The person exists in a more perfect way, so its act of existence causes the transcendental qualities to be present in the essence of the person in a more intensive way. The person is simply more distinctive, more unified, more real, truer, more good and more beautiful than a non personal being. It can be illustrated using the example of transcendental truth. This transcendental quality means that being itself can be apprehended as it exists. Being is a condition for all apprehension. But a personal being which has an intellectual essence cannot only be apprehended, but can also inform us about itself, so that its openness to apprehension is more perfect. That is why at the school of Consequential Thomism there appeared the conviction that the definition of Boethius should be modified in the light of the new existential metaphysics of St. Thomas. Boethius associates his definition with the act of essence, which is form, but it should be associated to the first act of being act of existence, because persons exist in a more perfect way than non personal beings. M. Gogacz has proposed a new definition of person. The person is an individual being of intellectual subsistence (intellectualis subsistentia individuum ens). 13 As we can see, the term natura used by Boethius was replaced by subsistentia, which is another approach to the essence of being. Subsistence is an essence of the individual being understood as having transcendental qualities, which refers the definition of person to the act of existence. The term rationalis was replaced by intellectualis, which refers the definition to the power of the human soul rather than to operations made by the intellectual being. The term reason describes the intellectual powers in operation when reasoning and evaluating, so the definition of Boethius described the person in the aspect of operation. A being who can operate reasonably is a person. The new definition refers to the metaphysical structure of the person who is intellectual, so it describes a person more precisely and according to the metaphysical method of Aquinas. Operation is an accident, but accidents are always posterior to substance so the proposed definition says that a being can operate reasonably because it is a person. 12 S.Th. I, q. 2, a M. Gogacz, Próba heurezy subzystencji i osoby, Studia Philosophorum Medii Aevi, t. 8, Subzystencja i osoba wedlug sw., Tomasza z Akwinu (Warszawa 1987) p. 14. p. 6

7 Congresso Tomista Internazionale The new definition of person is certainly a very interesting attempt to understand human nature better. It is also very important as a basis for other problems of philosophical anthropology, like the dignity of the person, and specific relations between personal beings. New conception of creation. The second consequence of underlining the role of the act of existence in a human being, which I would like to present, is a new approach to the problem of creation. The structural approach does not indicate all the principles of man, because the principles in a man that exists are not sufficient to explain how that man came into being. Man cannot create himself and therefore there must exist an external principle or principles. The first and most important external principle is God who is the supreme act of existence and the causal principle. The most obvious description of the creation of man is that God as the subsisting act of existence (ipsum esse subsistens) creates the act of existence (ipsum esse) of man. However, in the texts of St. Thomas we cannot find such a description. In all places where the creation of man is discussed Aquinas makes a distinction between the creation of the human soul and the creation of the human body. 14 This does not help us understand this problem. In the questions about human nature, he is arguing that man is a substantial unity of body and soul. 15 These arguments are very strong because of a common opinion held in his age that the human soul is in itself a substance and is only linked to a body. 16 This unity of body and soul seems to be broken in the hereditary approach. It seems natural to say that the creation of man is a creation of his act of existence. To create is to give existence to something which did not exist. St. Thomas discusses the creation of body and soul in specific questions saying that the human soul is created by God but that the body comes from the parents. 17 So after placing the emphasis on the substantial unity of the human being in the structural approach we observe a very severe distinction between body and soul. This issue seems to be even more problematic when we add what Aquinas says, namely that only the human soul needs to be created directly by God, because only the human soul is subsistent. The human soul is subsistent so it has existence itself but non rational souls have existence as a composition of 14 St. Thomas describes creation of human in this way in: In Sent., II, 18, 2, 1; C.G., II, 87; S.Th. I, q S.Th. I, q E. Gilson, Historia filozofii chrzescijanskiej wieków srednich (Warszawa 1987) p There is a distinction between an origin of first and all other men. The body of Adam was made by God of the slime of the earth. S.Th. I, q. 91, a. 1. p. 7

8 T. STEPIEN, New conceptions in the understanding of man at the Warsaw School of Consequential Thomism form and matter. 18 It is clear that Aquinas, by saying that, is defending the immortality of the human soul, but this does not remove the difficulty of a division between body and soul in the creation of the human being. Those problems were the inspiration to develop the theory of the creation of man in the Warsaw School of Consequential Thomism in the light of the metaphysics of existence. God is pure act of existence and as existence he gives existence. The effect must be proportional to the cause and therefore to create means to give existence, not form. 19 The act of existence in the moment of creation gives realness to the essence, which is forming thanks to the other external principles which are effecting on the new being. 20 This process cannot be understood in a physical way like the moments in time but in a metaphysical way. The act of existence is firstly only metaphysical and we cannot say that there was a moment in time when the human being existed without the essence. However we can clearly see that the act of existence is no longer only the existence of essence in a passive way. It is rather active; it makes essence something real. The basic consequence of understanding creation in that way is that God can no longer be an exemplar cause. St. Thomas says that God as a creator of form must have the ideas, exemplar and ideal forms of all created forms. 21 Therefore M. Gogacz proposed a new understanding of other external principles in place of an exemplar cause. These external principles are related to the essence of man and are called end principles. The understanding of these principles is another subject developed in the Warsaw School of Consequential Thomism. According to M. Gogacz the end principle operates in a way that is different from that of the causal principle. The former operates by making being like itself. The essence of man is the composition of body and soul. 22 The chief end principle of the body is the DNA of the parents, and also food and everything else which is necessary to build the human body. 23 The human soul is different than that of an animal and therefore it needs a special end principle which is appropriate to the human soul. This principle is an immaterial substance which is traditionally called angel. The necessity of an angel as the end principle of the human soul is also proposed by M. Gogacz S.Th. I, q. 91, a M. Gogacz, Czlowiek i jego relacje (Warszawa 1985) p Ibid, S.Th. I, q. 15, a M. Gogacz, op. cit., p Ibid, M. Gogacz, Filozoficzna koniecznosc istnienia aniolów jako celowych przyczyn dusz ludzkich, Czlowiek we wspólnocie Kosciola (Warszawa 1979) pp p. 8

9 Congresso Tomista Internazionale Probably the most important difficulty which appears with this new understanding of the origins of man is how God, the causal principle, knows what he creates. If he is not the creator of form, how does he create man as a man? We must notice that this question can also be posed when we accept St. Thomas understanding of creation but then it concerns non intellectual beings, whose form is not created by God. The answer to that question is simple. God does not create the act of existence anywhere but in a certain place and in the environment of other end principles. Human beings cannot be created without cooperation of the parents, and in this new conception without the cooperation of a substance separated from matter. It is worth noticing that this approach to the genesis of the human being indicates that man becomes man at the very moment of conception, because at this moment man has all the principles which make him what he is, that is, a human being. This ends all theories that an intellectual soul can be created later and then joined to a body, as was suggested by many commentators of St. Thomas. This new theory of creation certainly needs more careful study, but it also an attempt to solve the above mentioned problems in the spirit of St. Thomas. Conclusion I believe that by presenting these two problems of philosophical anthropology I showed an example of the attempts to develop the thought of St. Thomas in the Warsaw School of Consequential Thomism. These attempts testify that the writings of Aquinas are not only worth studying but that they could be an inspiration to formulate new conclusions to the problems which had only been alluded to by St. Thomas, as I believe the doctrine of Aquinas is not a fully closed system, but rather it permits the intellect to search for new paths to the truth. p. 9