ANPR. Independent Investigation into the use of ANPR in Durham, Cleveland and North Yorkshire from October 2009.

Transcription

1 Independent Investigation into the use of in Durham, Cleveland and North Yorkshire from October CTMS: 2010/004924

2 Contents Contents... 2 Introduction... 3 Circumstance of Referral... 5 Investigation Team... 5 Terms of Reference... 6 Complaints... 7 Officers under investigation... 7 Chronological summary of events... 7 PNC ACTion Report... 7 "Hits"... 8 Back Office Facility... 8 Databases... 9 Arrest... 9 Custody Information Obtained North Yorkshire Police Hits Monitoring Response to hits Staffing National Policy Local Policy Cleveland Police Hits Monitoring Response to hits Staff National Policy Local Policy Durham Constabulary Hits Monitoring Response to hits Staffing National Policy Local Policy Version 1.0 2

3 National Policies NPIA: The Practice Advice on the Management and use of NPIA: National ACPO Standards (NAAS), version NPIA: PNC ACTion and REAction Police Reports NPIA: ACTion and REAction Police Reports, March 2009, V ACPO: Strategy for the Police Service 2007/ ACPO: Back Office Facility 2, enabling PNC connectivity ACPO Data Protection Guidelines NPIA Policy Template Version Discussion of evidence Conclusions Learning report Independent investigation into the use of in Durham, Cleveland and North Yorkshire from October Overview of incident Type of investigation Contact details Good practice Findings and recommendations Finding National recommendation Finding National recommendation Finding National recommendation Finding National recommendation Finding National recommendation Introduction Version 1.0 3

4 1. On the 08 March 2010, Peter Chapman pleaded guilty at Teesside Crown Court to the kidnap, rape and murder of Ashleigh Hall on 25 October 2009, whom he had met via a social network site on the internet. On the 23 October 2009 Peter Chapman s vehicle was circulated on the Police National Computer (PNC). Peter Chapman was wanted for arson, breach of his sex offender registration (failing to notify a change of address) and theft. At 5.27pm on 26 October 2009 Peter Chapman was stopped by a motor patrol. After checks confirmed he was wanted for outstanding offences, he was arrested and taken to Middlesbrough police station. 2. Between the 23 October 2009 and the 26 October 2009 there were the following hits by the use of Automatic Number Plate Recognition () over the Force areas of Durham, Cleveland and North Yorkshire: 23 October hits in Cleveland Police Force area at 9.30pm and 9.46pm. 24 October hits in Cleveland Police Force area 6.42pm, 7.30pm and 7.42pm. 25 October hits in Cleveland Police Force area at 10.26am, 11.31am, 11.59am and 11.58pm. 2 hits in Durham Constabulary Force area at 7.48pm and 8.25pm. Version 1.0 4

5 26 October hits in North Yorkshire Police Force area at 12.18am and 12.49am. 3 hits in Cleveland Police Force area at 1.38pm, 2.02pm and 5.07pm. 3. It is evident that not all of the hits in relation to Mr Chapman were acted upon by the Forces involved. This relates to an issue of national interest that would impact on forces nationwide, namely the procedures for responding to activations. These concerns, in relation to national implications, have also been highlighted by the Forces to Her Majesty s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) and Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO). Circumstance of Referral 4. On 12 March 2010 a telephone referral was made by Durham Constabulary, which was followed up with a paper referral on 17 March This referral was made on behalf of Durham Constabulary, Cleveland Police and North Yorkshire Police. 5. IPCC Commissioner, Nicholas Long, subsequently determined that an independent investigation should be conducted by IPCC investigators. 6. It is acknowledged that this investigation is connected to a separate independent IPCC investigation in relation to Merseyside Police involvement with Peter Chapman. Investigation Team 7. An investigation team was established comprising Deputy Senior Version 1.0 5

6 Investigator, Ernest Brentnall, Investigators Heather Beck and Louise Hancock and Casework Manager Anita Adams. 8. Members of the investigation team can be contacted at the IPCC, Evergreen House, Cedar Court Office Park, Denby Dale Road, Wakefield, WF4 3DB, Terms of Reference 9. The terms of reference are set as: 1. To investigate the use, deployment and tactical options of together with the use of PNC within Durham, Cleveland and North Yorkshire Police Forces. 2. To consider the protocols in relation to the police response to an activation. 3. To consider the implications of the use of and PNC in connection with the murder of Ashleigh Hall on 25 October 2009 by Peter Chapman. 4. To review the use of in relation to public interest, confidence and the police service nationally. 5. Where it appears at any stage during the investigation that any person whose conduct is in question and may have committed a disciplinary offence, to make a submission setting out the details to the Commissioner. 6. To consider and report on whether any disciplinary offence may have been committed by any police officer or member of police staff involved in the incident, and whether relevant local and national policies/guidelines were complied with. Version 1.0 6

7 7. To consider and report on whether there is any: (a) learning for any individual police officer or member of police staff; or (b) organisational learning for the police service (see Annex), including: 1) Whether any change in police policy or practice would help to prevent a recurrence of the event, incident or conduct investigated. 2) Whether the incident highlights any good practice that should be disseminated. Complaints 10. To date, no complaint has been made. Officers under investigation 11. No regulation 14A notices have been served. Chronological summary of events PNC ACTion Report 12. On 23 October 2009, Merseyside Police created an ACTion report on the PNC database and graded this as medium. The report stated a blue Ford Mondeo, registration S148JNK, was being used by Peter Chapman who was wanted for arson, breach of sex off [offender] registration, theft. 13. An ACTion report highlights a vehicle, of sufficient interest, to be immediately stopped and further action taken. It is given a high, medium or low priority. The action required should be specified as Stop Version 1.0 7

8 or Monitor. Monitor can only be used in exceptional circumstances and only for HIGH priority cases, where it is necessary to keep vehicle under observation pending further advice or requests from the owner of the ACT report. The National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) guidance on ACTion reports gives clear structure on the specification required to create an ACTion report. "Hits" 14. The vehicle registration mark, believed to be that associated with Peter Chapman, was captured numerous times as a hit by systems in North Yorkshire, Cleveland and Durham Force areas between 23 October 2009 up to and including 26 October The camera takes an image of a vehicle registration mark, widely known as a number plate. The image can be captured by static cameras at fixed site locations, at mobile sites or using in police vehicles. The relevant images captured between 23 October 2009 up to and including 26 October 2009 were taken by static cameras. 16. The image that has been captured is read and converted into an electronic file. This electronic file is then checked against local and national databases, referred to as hotlists. When the takes the image, this data is referred to as read data. When the image is matched to a database loaded onto the system this is referred to as a hit. Back Office Facility 17. The hit and read data of every number plate captured by, is saved on a centralised computer database referred to as a back office Version 1.0 8

9 facility (BOF). Each Force has its own BOF. The BOF stores the time, date, location, the number plate as read by the system, along with an image of the number plate and an image of the vehicle. Dependent on the camera that captured the number plate, the direction of travel of the vehicle may also be stored. 18. Once saved in the BOF, the hit and read data is transmitted to a central source called the National Data Centre (NADC). The NADC allows investigators to search for matching data on a national basis. Each Force BOF can also be searched. 19. The information stored on BOF can be analysed and used as an investigative tool. Databases 20. There are a number of databases. These include: PNC, local Force databases, foreign Force databases (local Force databases circulated to a neighbouring Force), Motor Insurance database and Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency (DVLA) database. These databases are loaded onto the BOF. Arrest 21. On Sunday 25 October 2009 at 7.10pm, Ashleigh Hall informed her mother that she was intending to stay at a friends overnight. 22. On Monday 26 October 2009 at 5.27pm, Cleveland motor patrols responded to a hit on and stopped a Blue Ford Mondeo. The occupant of the vehicle was confirmed as Peter Chapman. Peter Chapman was arrested on suspicion of arson, a breach of his sex offender registration and theft. Version 1.0 9

10 Custody 23. Whilst in custody Peter Chapman confessed that he had killed someone last night. 24. Peter Chapman directed officers to where a body was. Ashleigh Hall s body was recovered from the Sedgefield area in County Durham. Peter Chapman was arrested for murder. 25. Peter Chapman subsequently pleaded guilty at Teesside Crown Court on 08 March 2010 and received life imprisonment. Information Obtained North Yorkshire Police Hits 26. In North Yorkshire Police Force area, there were hits recorded in the BOF during the period from 23 October 2009 up to and including 26 October These hits are from all the databases monitored by North Yorkshire Police s BOF. Two of these hits were in relation to Peter Chapman s vehicle. 27. The two hits were on 26 October at 12.18am and 12.49am, at two separate locations. The hits were in relation to PNC which shows at the time there was an ACTion report on the vehicle [paragraph 12]. The ACTion report was graded as a medium priority. 28. At the time of each hit, an image of the vehicle was taken and stored on North Yorkshire Police s BOF. The images do not identify who was in the vehicle at the time. Version

11 Monitoring 29. North Yorkshire Police do not monitor their systems 24 hours, 7days a week (24/7). Communications staff can log onto the system but not be monitoring the systems. The monitoring of the system is not part of their duties. The systems are only monitored in relation to specific observations. 30. North Yorkshire Police have an intercept team, who have systems fitted within their vehicles. This team was not working at the relevant times of the two hits. 31. As the system is not monitored 24/7, the hits would not appear on any of the Communications staff computer systems in order for them to carry out an assessment, including whether resources are available to respond or carry out observations. Response to hits 32. None. Staffing 33. At 12.15am there were seven police officers within a ten mile radius of the location of the camera that read Peter Chapman s number plate. Five of the officers were unavailable due to dealing with incidents. Two officers, who were working together, were available to be deployed. 34. At 12.49am there was one police officer within a ten mile radius of the location of the camera that read Peter Chapman s number plate. This police officer was unavailable due to dealing with an incident. Version

12 National Policy 35. North Yorkshire Police provided the IPCC with the National Policy they refer to: The Practice Advice on the Management and use of ACPO Standards, version 4.0. PNC ACTion and REAction Police Reports. ACPO and Back Office Facility 2, enabling PNC connectivity. Local Policy 36. North Yorkshire Police do not have any local policies in relation to. 37. The NPIA carried out an review of North Yorkshire Police. The findings were detailed to the Force in a letter dated 28 November It was acknowledged as good practice that the Force had set up an project team supported by a monthly project board. The review identified that a draft local policy had been prepared. However it was recommended that monitoring the prioritisation of response to hits on a 24/7 basis was included in the draft policy. Cleveland Police Hits Version

13 38. In Cleveland Police Force area, there are approximately 2652 hits per day. These hits are from all the databases monitored by Cleveland Police s BOF. Twelve of these hits were in relation to Peter Chapman s vehicle. 39. The BOF generates an average of 284 hits per day for the databases the Force Control Room (FCR) staff monitor. These hits appear on the alarm stack of the FCR staff who monitor. 40. The twelve hits in the Cleveland Police Force area were captured by a total of seven different cameras. The hits were in relation to PNC which shows at the time there was an ACTion report on the vehicle [paragraph 12]. The ACTion report was graded as a medium priority. 41. At the time of each hit, an image of the vehicle was taken and stored on Cleveland Police s BOF. The images do not identify who was in the vehicle at the time. Monitoring 42. Cleveland Police monitor the systems 24/7. Cleveland Police has a dedicated intercept team, including a dispatch operator. When the team is on duty the majority of the databases will be monitored by the dispatch operator. 43. When the team is not operating, the FCR take primacy in monitoring. To match this with management of risk and availability of resources the number of databases monitored is reduced. 44. The monitoring is undertaken by FCR supervisors. The FCR supervisors can filter the information in order to only see hits from a limited number of databases. This ensures they do not receive an unmanageable amount of hits. The hits appear on the FCR Version

14 supervisors computer screen on an alarm stack. This alarm stack is then monitored by the FCR supervisors. The FCR supervisors carry out a resource and risk assessment based upon the perceived risk to persons and the Force. The availability of and proximity of units, in relation to the location of the hit are also considered. 45. When units are dispatched or observations passed for a vehicle, an event is created on the Force command and control system. Although any suitable vehicle can be dispatched to a hit consideration will always be given to ensure a suitable resource is capable of bringing a pursuit to a safe conclusion should one develop. 46. At the time in question, if officers were not dispatched and observations were not requested, there was no requirement for any record to be made for the reasoning behind the dismissing of the hit. Cleveland Police has since implemented changes so records are now made within the user notes on the BOF when officers are not dispatched and observations are not requested. Response to hits 47. The two hits on 23 October were assessed by the FCR Inspector and an assessment was made not to dispatch officers to respond to the hits. However, at the time no records were made on the system as to why hits were dismissed. 48. The three hits on 24 October and the hits on 25 October at 10.26am, 11.31am and 11.59am did result in officers being dispatched or observations passed within the Cleveland Force area. 49. The hit at 11.58pm on 25 October, although recorded within the system, was not monitored. The FCR Inspector stated the hit did not appear on his alarm stack. The FCR Inspector also made reference to Version

15 the hits on the 23 and 24 October. He stated he was on day shifts on 23 and 24 October and that these hits were not activated on the system being monitored by myself and my sergeant during our tour of duty. There is some confusion around the activation of the hits on the 23 and 24 October. It appears these hits were activated on the system. This is because the hits on the 23 October were monitored by a different Inspector and the hits on 24 October were responded to and corresponding incident logs were created. 50. The hits at 1.38pm and 2.02pm on 26 October resulted in officers being dispatched or observations passed within the Cleveland Police Force area. The hit at 5.07pm resulted in the arrest of Peter Chapman. Staff 51. Cleveland Police provided an interpretation of the resources [police officers] available at the time of the hits within a ten mile radius of the location of the hits. Resources have been referred to as units by Cleveland Police. 52. Cleveland Police acknowledged this information request was a difficult one to answer with any degree of accuracy so the figures offered are in very basic form. The information provided includes units where there was a possibility of the radius covering an additional district. This does not give a completely true representation as it is impossible to say where within the district the unit was. 53. Cleveland Police has stated similar information should be easier to provide in future, as Global Positioning System (GPS) data is now being stored and a search can be carried out to pin point units. This information can then be exported and overlaid onto a map. 54. On 23 October at 9.30pm and 9.46pm there were approximately 18 Version

16 units available. 55. On 24 October at 6.42pm, 7.30pm and 7.42pm there were approximately 13 units available. 56. On 25 October at 10.26am, 11.31am and 11.59am there were approximately 9 units available. On the same day at 11.58pm there were approximately 3 units available. 57. On 26 October at 1.38pm and 2.02pm there were approximately 15 units available. National Policy 58. Cleveland Police provided the IPCC with the National Policy they refer to: Practice Advice on the Management and use of 2009 ACPO Data Protection Guidelines NPIA ACTion and REAction Police Reports, March 2009, V2.0 Local Policy policy Version The aim of the policy is to provide guidance and direction regarding the use of within Cleveland Police from a monitoring, reactive and intelligence basis. The level of training required before someone can be granted administration rights to the BOF is specified. It is detailed in the policy when audit and system conformity checks are to be carried out. 60. It is stated the monitoring of will be 24/7. The monitoring will be Version

17 carried out predominantly within the FCR. Other Force resources may monitor the BOF subject to operational commitments. A limited number of databases that will be monitored 24/7 are specified. It is stated that the capacity to increase the databases is under the direction of the FCR Inspector and controlled by individual user alarm filters. The Intercept team also have facility to monitor databases. In addition the policy highlights working with local authorities. 61. It is specified all suitably trained officers can react and be dispatched to hits. It is important the rational, justification, relevance and proportionality of responding to an activation is considered before dispatching and reacting to an activation. Guidance is given on when relevant authorities under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 are required. 62. It is stated who is able to research information contained in the BOF. Also included are the requirements and authorisations required to carry this out. Disclosure of information in Criminal Proceedings and retention of the material is also considered within the policy. Cleveland Police Strategy 2007/ Cleveland Police s commitment to the use of is stated within the strategy. The strategy is intended to Target Criminals through their Use of the Roads by exploiting the full potential of, at local, Regional and national levels 64. It is specified in the strategy that the Programme Board will assume the overall lead for the direction of. It stated Cleveland Police will work in support of the ACPO NPIA strategy and will draw on the support of NPIA in relation to: Continued development and maintenance of local infrastructure and gain maximum benefit from NADC and inter force BOF Version

18 capabilities. Identify good practice in use as an Intelligence, Operational and Investigative resource and share our experience with the larger police family. Adopt the assisted implementation plan and support the implementation of to agreed national standards. 65. It is also stated Cleveland Police will continue to develop and related technology, identify additional resources to support activity and initiate work to evaluate the benefits of activity. Act/React reports on PNC Version The policy supports the national policy. It is stated in the policy how ACTion reports will be managed by Cleveland Police. The circumstance when Cleveland Police will create ACTion reports on PNC is specified. Any ACTion report placed on PNC by Cleveland Police will require prior authorisation from an officer of at least the rank of Superintendent. It is highlighted that information placed on PNC must comply with the current guidelines issues by the NPIA. Durham Constabulary Hits 67. In Durham Constabulary Force area, there are approximately 6000 hits recorded in the BOF per day. These hits are from all the databases monitored by Durham Constabulary s BOF. Two of these hits were in relation to Peter Chapman s vehicle. 68. The BOF generates an average of 350 hits per day for the databases the Control Room staff monitor. These hits appear on an alarm stack Version

19 on the Control Room staffs monitors. 69. The two hits were on 25 October at 7.48pm and 8.25pm, at two separate locations. The hits were in relation to PNC which shows at the time there was an ACTion report on the vehicle [paragraph 12]. The ACTion report was graded as a medium priority. 70. At the time of each hit, an image of the vehicle was taken and stored on Durham Constabulary s BOF. The images do not identify who was in the vehicle at the time. Monitoring 71. Durham Constabulary monitor the systems 24/7. The system is currently configured to allow a specific number of databases to be monitored by Control Room staff. This is to minimise the number of hit alarm activations being sent to staff and ensures quality intelligence is dealt with as a priority. 72. There are two Control Rooms within Durham Constabulary, each are responsible for particular geographical areas. 73. Area dispatchers have responsibility for the monitoring of all activations within their geographical area. In order to reduce the number of hits, specific databases are selected. To provide accountability, staff are required to submit an entry on the BOF hit alarm activation user notes screen to document what action had been taken. Response to hits 74. The hit on 25 October at 7.48pm created an alarm activation in the Control Room as the vehicle was entering Durham Constabulary Force Version

20 area. The BOF is configured to only receive an alarm activation for a vehicle entering the Force area. 75. System checks have been carried out to ascertain those members of staff who were logged on to the system at the time of the activation (19.48hrs) and who would have received the hit alarm activation. It transpired that the relevant member(s) of staff were not logged onto the system. 76. Statements have been obtained from the two members of staff who should have been logged onto the system. Neither member of staff can state why this was the case. It is acknowledged that a substantial period of time has passed since the incident. Both statements raised issues of the reliability of the system and the fact that the system has been down for days at a time and the system regularly did not work 77. Inspector Robson has provided a minute in relation to reliability and stated All the issues identified have been resolved the number of problems brought to my attention have greatly reduced. 78. The hit on 25 October at 8.25pm was of the vehicle leaving the Force area. This data would be captured on the BOF but would not appear on the Control Room staffs system due to the way the system is configured. Staffing 79. At 7.48pm there were no police officers available in the vicinity of the camera that read Peter Chapman s number plate. 80. The hit at 8.25pm was of the vehicle leaving the Durham Constabulary Force area. This data is captured on the BOF but does not appear on Version

21 the Control Room staffs system. National Policy 81. Durham Constabulary provided the IPCC with the National Policy they refer to: NPIA Policy Template Version 1.0 ACPO Strategy for the Police Service 2007/2010 Practice Advice on the Management and use of 2009 Local Policy Graded Response and Resource Deployment Protocol Third Edition 82. This policy sets out Durham Constabulary s graded response protocol. It also sets out the protocols/procedures which will be applied by both Communications Department and Areas in respect of resource deployment. 83. Specific guidance in relation to is given. It is stated activations from fixed cameras are monitored in the Communications Centres and certain activations will require a response. It is acknowledged these are vehicles of interest which would not usually come to the attention of the police and are only discovered when the vehicle is identified by an camera. With this in mind Communications Supervisors will make the final decision on whether to deploy a police resource 84. The policy stated consideration will be given to: Positive identification of the vehicle the supervisor will confirm Version

22 that the image shown on the screen matches the information held. Location of appropriate resource using the Command & Control system to identify the closest, most appropriate officer(s) & vehicle to attend. Location & speed of vehicle it may be that the vehicle is travelling at speed towards a neighbouring area or police force. In these circumstances the information may need to be circulated to other areas for attention and allocation. 85. activations will be graded as immediate. Communications will deploy resources when a dispatcher is confident that the vehicle captured by the camera matches the information stored within the system. The Communications Centre can circulate an observation message or dispatch resources. Strategy October Durham Constabulary s commitment to making the best use of technology with a vision to expand the present infrastructure is stated in this document. 87. The aim of the strategy is to disrupt and combat the use of roads by criminals through: proactive enforcement and disruption, expansion of fixed sites and increased analytical capability. The importance of also targeting regional and cross border criminality is recognised. 88. It is stated in the strategy that Durham Constabulary will have a Steering Board to oversee the operation and development of. The Board will also manage and control the expansion of infrastructure and work closely with the Information Systems and Technology Department to ensure equipment is suitable for purpose. Version

23 89. Short term and long term ways to achieve pro-active disruption of criminality are considered. 90. It is also stated there will be a dedicated intercept team (this has now been disbanded). The system administrators will ensure infrastructure is supplied with all relevant intelligence ensuring it is current and accurate. Policy on use and disclosure in criminal investigations 91. This policy seeks to ensure that Durham Constabulary maximise the potential benefits that can provide whilst ensuring that the system is not compromised, that the provisions of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2002 (RIPA) are complied with and that the needless disclosure of intelligence and site locations is avoided. Draft Policy 92. This policy defines the key protocols and pressures associated with the development and utilisation of Automatic Number Plate Recognition (). The Human Rights Act 1998, data protection and disclosure issues are considered. Action Plan 93. This template has been prepared by the NPIA Assisted Implementation Team to facilitate the implementation of the Implementation Support Plan in Forces. The Action Plan is designed as a self assessment process and should be owned and managed by the Force Implementation Lead for. National Policies Version

24 NPIA: The Practice Advice on the Management and use of This document is produced on behalf of ACPO by the NPIA. An explanation of and guidance to Forces on utilising and the associated issues are provided in this document. It is stated Forces should develop local Force protocols for the creation and management of local Force databases. Managers should ensure that local databases contain timely and accurate intelligence. Local databases created to support are required to conform to a national template. Items included within a database are determined by local force policy. 95. Local force policy should define the standards for monitoring active databases and for controlling the response of hits including: The definition of the requirements for monitoring all databases, taking account of force strategic and tactical processes; The definition for the prioritisation of responses to hits twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, including the identification of resources that should be available for a response. 96. It is important that forces develop local force policy and procedures for the effective management and deployment of assets. NPIA: National ACPO Standards (NAAS), version The performance requirements of systems and the BOF are specified in this document. This is to ensure a minimum standard and compatibility with systems nationally. The minimum levels of performance required in capturing and reading number plates are specified. Detailed in this document are the BOF system requirements, Version

25 including security levels, audit trials and delivering data NADC. 98. It is specified that all databases must conform to the national hotlist template. Data retention and access control must be detailed within Force policy taking account of the requirements of legislation. NPIA: PNC ACTion and REAction Police Reports 99. The reason for the creation of ACTion and REAction reports are highlighted in this document. It is stated this will be effective from 01 June It is stated ACTion reports should be used where, as part of an investigation; a vehicle is of sufficient interest to be immediately stopped and further action taken The REA report is to enable cancellation of an ACT report following completion of the required action Specific rules are specified on using ACTion and REAction reports. NPIA: ACTion and REAction Police Reports, March 2009, V ACTion reports were intended to be applied only to vehicles that should be stopped should a hit occur. This would allow the FCR to be more effective in directing resources in response to hits within systems. This document now sets out further guidance to assist Forces in constructing the ACT report and for dealing with REAct reports the ACT report is to be used where it is reasonable and proportionate to cause a vehicle to be stopped and action taken throughout the United Kingdom. Consideration should be given to the use of a force hotlist for the circulation of vehicles of local interest only Version

26 103. The REAction report cancels an ACTion report. REAction reports are to be used where there has been an intervention that has been positively dealt with The rules that apply to the creation and use of ACTion and REAction reports are specified in this document. The time limit for the ACTion report to be automatically weeded by PNC, and the opportunity for extending this are also stated. The creation of a REAction report will generate a notification print to the owner of the ACTion report The mandatory and optional fields which must be completed when creating an ACTion report are detailed. The action required should be specified as Stop or monitor. The priority should be specified as High, Medium and Low. This is the responsibility of the person requesting the report against a vehicle on the PNC High is to be used where life is at risk e.g. child abduction, murder and terrorism and should be with the authority of a Superintendent but may be authorised by senior control staff pending the authority of the Superintendent Medium is to be used taking into account priorities determined within the National Intelligence Model (Intelligence led business model). May be linked to major or serious and complex investigations as defined within the Force investigation policy Low is to be used in cases such as particular Road Traffic Act offences where a vehicle and/ or occupants need to be traced It is essential that forces establish business processes to ensure that all ACT reports entered onto PNC are in accordance with the standards detailed within this document. Version

27 ACPO: Strategy for the Police Service 2007/ The strategic intent to Target criminals through their use of the roads is identified in this document. Also specified is the strategy for the Police Service to achieve the strategic intent. The Police Service working with partner agencies, maintaining national support and momentum for, developing and promoting awareness of and good practice in relation to activities are included in the strategy This strategy will be delivered with the support of the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA). Key milestones were identified including by March 2010 embedded into core police business. ACPO: Back Office Facility 2, enabling PNC connectivity 112. Guidance is provided to Forces looking to take and install the BOF. The document serves as an implementation guide and checklist for Force IT engineers and project leads. ACPO Data Protection Guidelines 113. This document was created to ensure Forces gather and retain information appropriately and in accordance with the Data Protection Act The guidelines are intended to provide Police system operators with an understanding of the requirements and considerations necessary for compliance with the Data Protection Act. In addition the document also highlights Human Rights issues likely to impact on the police use of many intrusive surveillance techniques including. Version

28 NPIA Policy Template Version The purpose of this document is to identify specific aspects of policy development that should be included within policy and also to provide an indication of possible links with other force policy and strategy documents. Discussion of evidence 115. Durham Constabulary, Cleveland Police and North Yorkshire Police each use and monitor differently Durham Constabulary and Cleveland Police monitor systems 24/7, whereas North Yorkshire Police do not. North Yorkshire Police and Cleveland Police have intercept teams, who monitor databases and can respond immediately to activations. Durham Police no longer has an intercept team It is clear if too many databases are monitored by FCR staff then this leads to an overload of information and a greater possibility of vital information been missed. This in turn would make it impossible to action or respond to hits. This then filters down the importance of hits Durham Constabulary and Cleveland Police, who monitor 24/7 have both recognised this. To ensure high level hits are responded to, Forces should monitor the most important databases. This includes the PNC database, with priority given to the monitoring of ACTion reports In Durham Constabulary, FCR staff monitor cameras in the area they are responsible for. A selected number of databases are monitored. Version

29 120. Individual FCR staff can set their own filters. There is a possibility that staff may not set their filters correctly In Cleveland Police, monitoring is undertaken by FCR supervisors. If a critical incident happens the FCR supervisors would be responsible for the management of this. There is a possibility hits would not be responded to. It is acknowledged Cleveland Police are looking to train more FCR staff on the use of the system It is emphasised by the NPIA that an ACTion Report should only be used for vehicles a Force requires stopping anywhere in England and Wales when read by an system. Otherwise the use of a local force hotlist may be appropriate Through discussion with the Forces and observation of use in the control room, it would appear the quality of ACTion reports vary from Force to Force. They should not be used for minor issues. This filters down the importance of ACTion Reports that require immediate response It is acknowledged the NPIA are looking at Force variations in relation to ACTion reports and that NPIA audit all ACTion reports. On the first of the month NPIA print out every ACTion report for auditing purposes Cleveland Police do have a policy stating how ACTion reports will be managed. It is stated in this policy that to place an ACTion report on the PNC system the authorisation from an officer of at least the rank of Superintendent is required There is a potential risk that this requirement could be too restrictive. It is recognised that Forces do require a policy specifying how they will control the quality of ACTion reports on PNC. The guidance on ACTion reports issued by NPIA specifies that it is only the high priority ACTion Version

30 reports that require the authorisation of the rank of Superintendent ACTion Reports are given high, medium and low priority as defined in NPIA ACTion and REAction Police Reports, March 2009, V2.0. The priority levels of the ACTion reports cannot be prioritised on the alarm stack If the priority levels could be filtered on the alarm stack, this would highlight the most important hits to FCR staff is reliant on the accuracy of the databases that are loaded onto the BOF. It is important the information contained within the databases is accurate and up to date. If information is continually reliable then this instils confidence in the system. There is also a risk of officers responding to out of date information It is stated in the Practice Advice on the Management and use of that Forces should develop local Force protocols for the creation and management of local Force databases. Managers should ensure that local databases contain timely and accurate intelligence. Local databases created to support are required to conform to a national template. Items included within a database are determined by local force policy In order for the system to be effective, it is essential Forces have protocols in place to ensure information contained within the database is accurate and up to date. The information within the database should be of use to other Forces. Processes should be in place for removing out of date information and information that cannot be actioned It is also stated in the Practice Advice on the Management and use of that It is important that forces develop local force policy and procedures for the effective management and deployment of Version

31 assets North Yorkshire Police do not have any policies in place. North Yorkshire Police do have a draft policy but this has not yet been finalised and implemented Cleveland Police have an policy stating monitoring will be 24 hour real time monitoring. It is also stated that the rational, justification, relevance and proportionality of responding to an activation is considered before dispatching and reacting to an activation Cleveland Police responded to 9 of the12 hits that occurred in the Force area. Incident logs were created in relation to these hits. Units were not dispatched in relation to the 2 hits on 23 October. There was no requirement, at the time, to record the rationale for this. Units were not dispatched in relation to the hit at 11.58pm on 25 October. The FCR Inspector stated this hit did not appear on his alarm stack. It is unclear as to why this hit did not appear on the FCR Inspector s alarm stack Durham Constabulary has a Draft policy which considers the implications of the Human Rights Act 1998, data protection and disclosure issues. Durham Constabulary has an policy in place in relation to the response and deployment of officers. It is stated in the policy that Communications Supervisors will make the final decision on whether to deploy a police resource. A positive identification of the vehicle must be made, the closest appropriate resource must be located and the location and speed of the vehicle must be considered Durham Constabulary s BOF is configured to receive an alarm activation for a vehicle entering the Force area. The relevant hit was on 25 October at 7.48pm. The Policy above could not be adhered to as Version

32 the relevant members of staff were not logged onto the system. The systems were therefore not monitored 24/ The ACTion report created in relation to Peter Chapman was graded as medium. The report stated the vehicle was being used by Peter Chapman who was wanted for arson, breach of sex off [offender] registration, theft. There was no intelligence on the marker to grade the Action Report as high. A high marker would be used where there was intelligence to indicate there was a threat to life Officers were dispatched or observations circulated in response to 9 of the hits in the Cleveland Force area. North Yorkshire Police and Durham Constabulary did not respond to any hits As a result of the hit at 5.07pm on an camera in the Cleveland Police Force area, a unit was dispatched. This led to the arrest of Peter Chapman. Conclusions 141. It is impossible to say, from reviewing the evidence, whether the use of and PNC may have prevented the murder of Ashleigh Hall There is no evidence to suggest that any disciplinary offences have been committed by any police officer of member of police staff is a valuable asset for any Force. Optimum use of can only be made where the system is managed well and the databases uploaded on the BOF are accurate and up to date can be used as part of pre-planned operations or for surveillance purposes. It can be used as an investigative tool to place vehicles, plot routes and analyse data. Version

33 145. It must be noted that has its limitations. It would appear impossible for to be utilised to its full potential. This is because it is not feasible to monitor and respond to every hit from all databases. It would be unmanageable for a Force to do this as resources and budgets are not unlimited To manage these limitations it is important that priority databases are identified. These databases should then be monitored as a matter of routine on a 24/7 basis. This includes the PNC database with priority given to the monitoring of ACTion reports The quality and accuracy of the databases is of significance. The information should be accurate and be capable of action. If the information contained within the databases is constantly found to be inaccurate or no specific action is required in response to a hit, then this does not instil confidence in the system Force inconsistencies, differing priorities and differing levels of importance placed on the system by each Force, impacts significantly on the effectiveness of within each Force area. Version

34 Learning report Independent investigation into the use of in Durham, Cleveland and North Yorkshire from October Use of Automatic Number Plate Recognition (), raising issues about: Force monitoring of Procedures for responding to activations Overview of incident 150. On the 08 March 2010, Peter Chapman pleaded guilty at Teesside Crown Court to the kidnap, rape and murder of Ashleigh Hall on 25 October 2009, whom he had met via a social network site on the internet. On the 23 October 2009 Peter Chapman s vehicle was circulated on the Police National Computer (PNC). Peter Chapman was wanted for arson, breach of his sex offender registration (failing to notify a change of address) and theft. At 5.27pm on 26 October 2009 Peter Chapman was stopped by a motor patrol. After checks confirmed that he was wanted for outstanding offences, he was arrested and taken to Middlesbrough police station Between the 23 October 2009 and the 26 October 2009 there were the following hits by the use of Automatic Number Plate Recognition () over the Force areas of Durham, Cleveland and North Yorkshire: Version

35 23 October hits in Cleveland Police Force area at 9.30pm and 9.46pm. 24 October hits in Cleveland Police Force area 6.42pm, 7.30pm and 7.42pm. 25 October hits in Cleveland Police Force area at 10.26am, 11.31am, 11.59am and 11.58pm. 2 hits in Durham Constabulary Force area at 7.48pm and 8.25pm. 26 October hits in North Yorkshire Police Force area at 12.18am and 12.49am. 3 hits in Cleveland Police Force area at 1.38pm, 2.02pm and 5.07pm It is evident that not all of the hits in relation to Mr Chapman were acted upon by the forces involved. This relates to an issue of national interest that would impact on forces nationwide, namely the procedures for responding to activations. These concerns, in relation to national implications, have also been highlighted by the forces to HMIC and ACPO. Type of investigation 153. Independent Contact details 154. Deputy Senior Investigator, Ernest Brentnall, IPCC, Evergreen House, Cedar Court Office Park, Denby Dale Road, Wakefield, WF4 3DB. Version

36 Good practice 155. Cleveland Police Force has arrangements in place to monitor the systems 24/7. They prioritise the number of databases they monitor. Cleveland Police Force responded to 9 hits and created corresponding incident logs. Findings and recommendations Finding The quality of ACTion reports vary from Police Force to Police Force. ACTion reports should not be used for minor issues. This filters down the importance of ACTion Reports that require immediate response. National recommendation 157. It is acknowledged that the NPIA are looking at Police Force variations in relation to ACTion reports and that the NPIA audit ACTion reports. On the first of the month the NPIA print out every ACTion report for auditing purposes Guidelines for the creation of ACTion reports are appropriate for national consistency. All Police Forces should establish internal procedures to review ACTion reports within 24 hours of creation. If ACTion reports do not meet the criteria as specified by NPIA Guidance on PNC ACTion and REAction Reports, they should be removed. Finding ACTion Reports are given high, medium and low priority as defined in NPIA ACTion and REAction Police Reports, March 2009, V2.0. The Version

37 priority levels of the ACTion reports cannot be prioritised on the alarm stack. National recommendation 160. The NPIA should create the ability to filter the priority level of ACTion reports on the alarm stack. It is acknowledged the NPIA are aware of this and are looking into ways to resolve this issue. Finding If too many databases are monitored by Control Room staff then this leads to an overload of information. There is a possibility of vital information being missed. It is then impossible to action or respond to hits. National recommendation 162. To ensure high level hits are responded to, Police Forces should monitor the most important databases. This includes the PNC database, with priority being given to ACTion reports Police Forces should have policies in place to specify the particular cameras and databases the Control Room staff are required to monitor. Police Forces should have appropriate resources to be able to respond to the hits and the outcome should be recorded within the Control Room system. Finding Individual Police Forces should have protocols in place for the creation and management of local Force databases, as identified by NPIA in the Version

38 Practice Management and use of. National recommendation 165. Local Force Policy should be in place to ensure information contained within the database is accurate and up to date. Processes should be in place for removing inaccurate and out of date information To minimise the impact on Police Force systems, local Force databases should not be circulated outside of the owning Force except in exceptional circumstances. For example, in support of prearranged operations. Finding North Yorkshire Police do not have any local policies in place in relation to. National recommendation 168. Every Police Force should ensure they have in place local policies as specified by NPIA, including: determining what to monitor, prioritisation of responses to hits 24 hours, 7 days a week, accountability and auditing of systems. Ernest Brentnall Deputy Senior Investigator, IPCC Louise Hancock Investigator, IPCC 30 July 2010 Version