Who do we Trust? A Critique of the Significance of Trust in the Social Construction of Regional Leadership in Two Norwegian City-Regions

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1 Who do we Trust? A Critique of the Significance of Trust in the Social Construction of Regional Leadership in Two Norwegian City-Regions KNUT HIDLE and ROGER NORMANN Agderforskning, Gimlemoen 19, 4630 Kristinansand, Norway. Knut.Hidle@agderforskning.no and Roger.Normann@agderforskning.no o O o HIDLE, K. and NORMANN, R. What determines if leadership of regional governance processes is anchored in market, hierarchy, or network forms of systems? In this paper we discuss the origin of city-region governance leadership anchored in representative structures. We argue that where this type of leadership is anchored can have important implications for local economic practices as well as for the quality of local democracy. Based on empirical analysis of two Norwegian city-regions we argue that variations in terms of leadership practices not necessarily can be fully explained in terms of levels of trust, social capital, and institutional set-up, issues related to the systemic dispersion of power needs also to be explored and explained in order to improve our understanding of processes associated with the social construction of regional political leadership. City region governance Social capital Systemic power Regional leadership JEL classifications: H11, R50, R59, H70 1

2 INTRODUCTION 1 In what sense have trust and the social construction of politician role importance for choice of regional development strategies? Can choice of regional development strategies be seen as a relation between trust and the social construction of politician role, or is it a question of power? This article follows Markku Sotarauta and others that have argued that the increased significance of regional governance networks also has given issues related to regional leadership a more prominent position in regional discourses, and we also follow Sotarauta in the sense that the we see discourses related to the concept of power as central for our understanding of regional leadership (SOTARAUTA et al. 2002). Our starting point is that trust plays a significant role in many contemporary development theories and that it is to anticipate that variation in trust may influence or determine choice of regional strategies. For instance is it common to anticipate that high level of trust reduces transactions costs in the regional economy between different sorts of agents. PUTNAM et al., (1993) maintains that social capital gives better conditions for coordination between agents as a consequence of mutual trust, common norms and network. He refers to some regions in Italy that are blessed with vibrant networks and norms of civic engagement, while others are cursed with vertically structured politics, a social life of fragmentation and isolation, and a culture of distrust. It seems that the argument of trust is vital in many of contemporary models and theories of regional development and governance too. Concerning regional development are cluster theories and industrial districts, for example PORTER (1990, 1998, 2003) and ASHEIM (2000), and theories related to regional innovation systems, for example COOKE (1992) and ASHEIM and ISAKSEN (1997), in addition to theories related to triple-helix systems of university-industry-government relations, for example ETZKOWITZ and LEYDESDORFF (1997), some of the most prominent theories and sources for inspiration in strategies for regional development at present, see for example PIKE 2

3 et al. (2006) for a discussion. Development theories such as these involve a certain portion of norm steered collaboration between different agents. That may be between companies (cluster) and between companies and different agents in public sector, including universities (regional innovation and triple helix systems). Similar preconditions is often associated with theories related to governance and the steering (often informal leadership) of regional governance networks, for example KOOIMAN (1993), SCHARPF (1994), and MARCH and OLSEN (1995), where trust and institutional configurations is anticipated to play an significant role in mediating actor relations and coordinated network action, see SØRENSEN and TORFING (2007) for an extended discussion. However, what we argue in this article is that much of theory and development strategies are too heavily based on ideas of trust similar to what is meant in Putnam s concept of social capital without take into assessment that trust also is a matter of social construction of both politician role and local/regional public discourse. Ideas of trust related to concepts like social capital is also part of social discourses that define who that is trusted, or has to be trusted, and who is not. It does not deal much with difference and diversity in the same manner as it deals with sameness, similarity and agreement as success criteria for development (HARRISS 2001). Difference and diversity is at least potentially problematic, while sameness, similarity and agreement are to prefer if regional development is to be achieved. As a consequence may level of trust reflect and structure different strategic models for regional development depending on whom that is trusted. In our case where we look upon regional leadership, does this mean that trust may reflect a social construction of a politician role that effect the choice of strategies for regional development. Our empirical body contains two city-regions in south-western part of Norway, namely Kristiansand and Stavanger. On the surface the two city regions Kristiansand and Stavanger shares many similarities, but are also noteworthy different on central governance dimensions, 3

4 particularly related to the role of elected politicians in leading regional development processes. Both regions have what could be described as governance network systems for realizing regional development aims, for example industrial development, infrastructure, economical growth, etc. Leadership of regional governance systems in the Agder region was during the 1990s and early 2000s characterized as strong, and leadership was not the same as actors as those holding formal political positions in the region (NORMANN 2007). Later developments have indicated that influence exerted through this type of governance leadership has been reduced in significance, and the region has entered a phase that has been characterized by fragmentation, complexity and lack of clear leadership (TERÄS 2009). The Stavanger city region has on the other hand had reputation for having strong political leaders, leaders that over years have enjoyed positions as central figures in the regional development discourse, and that also have transcended party lines and institutional spheres (HANISCH 1992; KINDINGSTAD 1998). Network governance has during the last years become fashionable in Norwegian municipalities. One of the observable practical effects of this is that municipalities increasingly is participating in different forms of collaborative structures such as partnerships, projects, networks, temporarily organizations, development coalitions, foundations, limited companies etc. This means that a broader spectrum of local actors are invited to participate in the development and execution of local policies, something that can challenge the possibility for comprehensive and unified local steering (FIMREITE and MEDALEN 2005). One of the elements that must be assumed to increase the possibility for comprehensive and unified local political steering is that such governance networks have hands-on political leadership, via for example political representation, board participation, defined leadership roles, etc. The table below gives examples from some of the most important regional governance network institutions with political representation in the two city-regions. 4

5 Collaborative structure/ governance network CDFSN (Competence Development Fund of Southern Norway) Cultiva KNAS Universitetsfondet for Rogaland AS Forus Industrial Park Greater Stavanger Economic Development Table 1. Examples of important governance institutions 2 Description Stavanger Kristiansand Political representation. Regional competence development (Vest-Agder County) Culture foundation (Kristiansand) Property management/ industrial policy (Kristiansand) Regional competence development, property management Property management/ industrial policy. Industrial development. Disburses returns from Lyse Energi (approx 12,5 million annually) Locates ca 1000 firms/ property value unknown Collaboration between 17 municipalities on industrial development policies 90 million capital base 190 million capital base 75 million capital base/ property value Foundation with Manager /board. Politicians have 1/7 board rep. Kristiansand Mayor is member of the board. Foundation with Manager /board. Politicians have 2/5 board rep. No representation at Mayor level. Private limited company. Politicians have 3/7 board rep. No representation at Mayor level. Private limited company. Politicians have 7/9 board rep. Stavanger Mayor is chairman of the board. Private limited company. Politicians have 9/9 board rep. Stavanger Mayor is chairman of the board. Politicians have 9/11 board rep. Stavanger Mayor is chairman of the board. The above table does not represent a complete picture but incorporates some of the most important governance institutions in Kristiansand and Stavanger in terms of both value and influence. The table tells a story where direct political leadership seems to have a stronger position in the Stavanger city-region than it has in Kristiansand 3. Also Arild Farsund and Einar Leknes have noted the key role the Mayor s office in Stavanger plays in terms of being central in regional industrial development work: He [The Mayor in Stavanger] represents Stavanger municipality in a series of boards with relevance for industrial policy in the region, including: Universitetsfondet for Rogaland, Stiftelsen Rogaland kunnskapspark, Europakontoret i Brussel, Forus Næringspark A/S, Sola terminalbygg A/S, Kunnskapsparken Eiendom A/S, Arne-prosjektet, Stavanger interkommunale havnevesen, Risavika Eiendom og Næringsrådet i Rogaland (FARSUND and LEKNES 2005, pp. 65-6). 5

6 The explanations of the difference between these two city regions regarding regional leadership could be found in level of trust to politicians according to theories of trust. But as this article will show is the level of trust quite similar in the two regions. How then can we understand and explain the observed differences in terms of regional leadership practices? The answer to this question requires a conceptual and critical discussion of trust because trust seems to be so important in theory and analyses of regionalization and regional governance. This discussion is elaborated in the third section. The critical elaboration of trust is followed up by two different systemic explanations for why it is the case that there is important difference in politicians leadership in regional development processes. These explanations are related to how trust and power relates to regional leadership. The first, explanation addresses if there are significant differences between the two city regions on general trust levels and social capital indicators. Second, we discuss an explanation related to the question of power. We state here that regional leadership is a position of power, independent of it originates and is anchored in networks, markets, or political hierarchy, and that whether it is anchored in one systemic sphere or another has important implications for how we should interpret the quality of local democracy (LYNGSTAD 2003; NORMANN 2007; STONE 1980). Before we enter the theoretical discussion and the analyses we will explain the methodological approaches. METHODS, SAMPLING, AND OUTLINE The argument in this article is based on two empirical approaches. The first explanation regarding trust/social capital is based on a web-survey and telephone interviews among leaders in public and private sectors, and elected representatives in both regions. This was done because we view the level of leadership in both public and private sector is where we find core-agents in the regional leadership. A total of 1670 people were interviewed, of these 6

7 where 706 web-based. The survey is checked to be representative on a regional level. The target population was leaders in the industry (firms with more than 5 employees), public sector and politicians in Rogaland and Agder. The survey was conducted in October and November 2007, I the two city-regions Stavanger and Kristiansand which are located to the southwest and in the southernmost part of Norway. The task in this quantitative approach is to measure the level of social capital and trust in the two regions. The operationalisation of social capital and trust is based on PUTNAM and GOSS (2002) definition. They anticipate that dense social networks of social interaction appear to foster sturdy norms of generalized reciprocity (PUTNAM and GOSS 2002, p. 7), and further social interaction, in other words, helps to resolve dilemmas of collective action, encouraging people to act in trustworthy way when they might not otherwise do so (PUTNAM and GOSS 2002, p. 7). In our operationalisation of these dimension we have asked leaders questions regarding membership in different sorts of organizations and what role they play in these organizations and associations. It is further argued by PUTNAM and GOSS (2002) that social capital can be measured by the amount of trust in a community between different agents. We have therefore asked questions in what degree the three different bodies of leaders trust each other. In international studies of trust are questions from the American General Social Survey used. In the period between 1974 and 1994 did this survey ask the question: Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can t be too careful in dealing with people?, with the possibility to answer most people can be trusted, you can t be too careful in dealing with people or it depends (ALESINA and LA FERRARA 2002). The second explanation, regarding power, deals mainly with mapping of historical data that describes policy practice, outcomes and results in two selected cases in each region. The empirical sources are based on secondary literature. The two selected cases are: 7

8 1. Determining the location of the Norwegian oil-capital. The process of establishing a Norwegian oil-capital where public officials in Stavanger played a very significant role in the 1960 s and 1970 s. 2. Continued public ownership or sale? The transformation of a local and regional owned hydro electric power company in respectively Kristiansand and Stavanger in the 1990 s and early 2000 s. In the two set of cases we investigate what role politicians and other regional agents play in order to find similarities or differences between the two regions regarding role making and role taking, between the three different groups of agents in the regional governance network system. CONCEPTUAL DISCUSSION OF TRUST, GOVERNANCE NETWORK AND, REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT Why is trust important? First of all trust may have an existential significance. LUHMANN (2005) argues that trust is fundamental in all kinds of social life. It would be impossible to stand everyday life without any trust at all, trust is a way to reduce the complexity of a splintered world that contains an unlimited space of different actions. In principle can everyone select their own action, and trustworthiness will be impossible to achieve. In a context like that will chaos become the alternative to not trust at all, and total uncertainty will take possession. As a consequence will life become more effortless if you show trust to someone or something exactly to reduce the complexity of uncertainty. Therefore, argues LUHMANN (2005), trust is always related to a critical alternative. Fraud or deceit against trust may gain larger damage than the potential benefit of trust in given situations. The ones who trust also have a consciousness of the possibility of the damage in the selectivity in the action of others, and have to act according to that uncertainty and possibility. In GIDDENS (1990) 8

9 interpretation of Luhmann is the argument as follows: an individual who does not consider alternatives is in a situation of confidence, whereas someone who does recognize those alternatives and tries to counter the risks thus acknowledged, engages in trust (GIDDENS 1990, p. 31). The dimensions of trust described above are also regarded as fundamental in modernity in general, as argued by for instance GIDDENS (1990, 1991). But instead of making a distinction between risk and confidence, and risk and danger as Luhmann did, does GIDDENS (1990) see trust as a type of confidence, and not as different from it. Concerning risk and danger does Giddens see that danger exist in circumstances of risk and relevant for defining what risk is, but risk and danger is not the same. Thus, he defines trust as confidence in the reliability of a person or system, regarding a given set of outcomes or events, where that confidence express a faith in the probity or love of another, or in the correctness of abstract principles (technical knowledge) (GIDDENS 1990, p. 34). According to this definition is trust the link between faith and confidence, and bound up to contingency. Risk and trust intertwine, and trust is normally serving to reduce or minimize the dangers to which particular types of activity are subject (GIDDENS 1990, p. 35). All definitions of trust are contested, and it is difficult to make a division between trust, and for instance faith, familiarity and confidence (GRIMEN 2008). It is also difficult to make a division between actions that are based on trust and actions that are based on constraint (GRIMEN 2008). What is of particular interest for us is nevertheless the dimension and importance that trust has in modernity, and especially in expert systems GIDDENS (1990, 1991) that is a hallmark for a modernity that consist of disembedding and faceless social relations and mechanisms. By expert systems Giddens means systems of expert knowledge, of any type, depending on rules of procedure transferable from individual to individual (GIDDENS 1991, p. 243). This is a kind of abstract system that we put trust in. As individuals 9

10 and as societies do we have to trust expert knowledge. Such knowledge is basic in all that we undertake, like for instance driving our car, in taking an airplane, eat prepared food, take an elevator, be treated by a doctor and so on. In short, expert knowledge is profession knowledge, and to a heavy degree we trust it. GIDDENS (1991) calls this for trust in systems that is not dependent on persons that we know or to face-to-face relations. BECK (1992) places trust as part of what he called risk society. Policy is also heavily based on statements and observations made by experts in their decision making. Trust is in itself amongst the central elements in political agency because what happens to a human society does depend both on the intelligence and practical skill of at least some of its members and on the use they elect to make of their freedom of action. Fundamentally, trust is a device for coping with the freedom of other persons [ ]. It is because of the phenomenological plausibility of this conception of trust that it plays such a prominent role in shaping collective life (DUNN 1988, p. 80). No matter how we define trust is it important to understand what trust and agency of trust does. We have already mentioned the reduction of transaction costs as a consequence of high level of trust, and we have mentioned the transfer of knowledge in regional innovation systems and cooperation in general. To this add GRIMEN (2008), similar to LUHMANN (2005) above, that high level of trust also shapes an action space that makes it possible for those who show or give trust to carry out action that would have been impossible without trust. We shall not go further into dept in our discussion of trust, but continue this discussion by moving it in direction of action, or social space, as discussed by GRIMEN (2008). So far we have argued that trust has a function in social cohesion and an essential part of modernity. But to this more or less functionalistic inspired perspective upon trust may we add a component of social construction of roles and power relations. That is because we select who we are trusting and in what circumstances we put trust into relations. This dimension is of particular interest when we deal with governance systems. If governance involves expert systems we 10

11 may argue, as GADAMER (1991) did, that an expert has its own limits. Gadamer is critical to the positions that experts undertake and are given in contemporary society. The growing importance and role the expert plays is a symptom of a growing ignorance among politicians and public authorities. While Gadamer take a critical position to trust to experts, take Giddens another position while claiming that expert systems are a consequence of modernity and disembedding mechanisms. Gadamer also place the growing importance of expert systems in a context of increasing complexity, but he stands for a critical attitude to this development. What we put trust in has to do with the role different actors have or play in certain contexts, according to Gadamer. In questions related to regional governance is the context of trust in other words important for the social construction of the politician role. It is to anticipate that less trust to politicians produce a certain politician role, and vice versa, that may have consequences for political action and the choice of regional development strategies. The level of trust and whom that is trusted in a regional governance system may produce certain action space where different actors play different roles. High level of trust to the political system in certain political fields from actors outside the political system will make a different political action space for politicians than lower level of trust. At the same time may politicians trust other agents in the regional governance system that give action space to those who are trusted, at the same time as another action space is constructed for the politicians. It is to anticipate that the politician role will be different in different trust regimes, or in different spaces of trust. In for instance economic regional development theories and models it is common to describe what kind of role different actors have to take in facilitating development. Early put SCHUMPETER (2002 [1934]) emphasis on the entrepreneur. In PERROUX (1955) theory of growth poles, and later BOUDEVILLE (1957), was it put emphasis on leading key industries. In Fordism should the state take the leading role as both investor and as owner (AGLIETTA 1979). 11

12 In later theories as in cluster theories (PORTER 1990) and in regional innovation system theories (COOKE 1992) is de-centralization of power and public institutions in focus, and cooperation between different sorts of public and private actors is highlighted, like for instance between universities, companies and public authorities. All these examples of theories and understandings of how regional development take place mean different sorts of role taking. In our case is it especially important what kind of role politicians should have in capacity of being a politician. Cluster theories and theories like regional systems of innovation are now may be some of the most important inspiration in policy strategies for local and regional development (JAKOBSEN 2004; PIKE et al. 2006). It is therefore particular interesting that these theories, especially the latter, relies on the presence of governance networks. Network development and collaborative strategies are therefore often integral components in local and regional strategies for development (PIKE et al. 2006). In such regimes of governance is trust a quite essential dimension and is vital if we want to understand the social construction of politician role and the importance that may have for the choice of regional development strategies. But trust may also be a matter of power and power-relations. Who we trust is in a position of power, and trust may thus be viewed as a result of power relations. The distribution of power is however embedded in values and culture for interaction and political leadership, according to LUKES (1974). This is part of Lukes argument about a threedimensional view on power. Lukes is against a unilateral individualistic approach to power that argues for example that power is only about decision-making in issues with observable conflict, and thus that power can be identified as such. Lukes is also critical to perspectives that only emphasize for example informal influence and direct force, authority and manipulation in actual observable conflicts as its main argument. Instead does Lukes bring these two elements of power, which separately are insufficient, into what he calls a three- 12

13 dimensional view on power. For our purpose when we seek to answer what determines regional leadership from a position on trust and the social construction of political leadership, is Lukes view on power of particular interest. That s because Lukes focus upon power as routinized practices, values, norms, ideologies and attitudes which inform policy, and which we don t necessarily are conscious about. The highlighting of routinized practices and values are also important in urban regime theory. This theory is concerned with the interface between state and market, and is of particular interest in the two Norwegian cases which we address here. Building on the neopluralist position both ELKIN (1987) and STONE (1989) recognize a division of labour between state and market, were ownership of productive assets rests largely in the hands of the private sector while the machinery of government is subject to popular control. For Stone regime is the organism, the embodiment of local leadership that mediates the relationship between popular control of the political sphere and the private control of the economy. STONE (1989) also builds on LINDBLOM (1977) in the sense that he argues that in market-economy based societies, governments are strongly predisposed toward the preferences of business leaders. In Stone s terminology, this is labelled systemic power. For Stone the result of this systemic power is an indirect conflict between favoured and disfavoured groups. The favoured are those concerned with economical growth, while the disfavoured are those concerned with redistribution. A second central concept in urban regime theory is pre-emptive power. Pre-emptive power is to be understood as actor s ability to occupy, hold, and make use of a strategic position. Pre-emptive power derives from systemic power because the state-market division tends to endow business interests rather than other groups in society. Systemic power creates the conditions in which pre-emption occurs, but pre-emption itself is dependent upon the 13

14 exercise of those capacities. The two concepts, systemic and pre-emptive power, are cornerstones of urban regime theory (DAVIES 2002). After this elaboration of trust and power is it possible, in an analytical manner to treat trust as independent of power, but our critical discussion of the concepts leads us towards a concept of trust that also include power, and vice versa. In the following analytical part we will address the two different approaches, namely trust and power. IS REGIONAL LEADERSHIP DETERMINATED BY TRUST AND SOCIAL CAPITAL? If one of the two city regions could be demonstrated to have more social capital, more trusting relations between business and political spheres it could be interpreted as an explanation for why city-region governance leadership being anchored outside the representative political system, in the region having higher scores in social capital and trust categories. According to Putnam can low trust be seen as correlated with lower confidence in local government, local leaders and the local news media, and further, less expectation that others will cooperate to solve dilemmas of collective action, lower political efficacy, etc. (PUTNAM 2007). Given the presence of influential governance networks in both city regions could high level of social capital and trust provide the basis for local actors to be relatively unconcerned with if the actors representing the actual leadership is anchored in the hierarchical political sphere, the network sphere or the market sphere (POWELL 1990). One could therefore assume that leadership will tend to naturally end up with actors located in the middle the network sphere, since the networks could be seen as the natural mediators between the political and the market spheres. Low level of social capital and trust could be an explanation for regional governance leadership being located either in the formal and regulated administrative system or contract based market system. Given the strong state tradition of Norwegian society 14

15 (CHRISTENSEN 2003), expectations would then be that governance leadership in regions with low levels of trust between business and politics is anchored among leaders within the representative democratic system. Thus, when entering analysis of the data we expected, given our knowledge of differences in governance network leadership practices in the two regions, to find higher scores on social capital and trust variables in Kristiansand than within Stavanger. Since regional governance network leadership in the Kristiansand city region has had strong anchoring outside the formal political administrative system (NORMANN 2007), while Stavanger has been known to have strong political leadership. The following set of tables below summarizes our findings from the leadership survey. Participation in social life and community activity is key indicators of levels of social capital in a given area PUTNAM (1995, 2007). The table below compares associationalism between the two city regions and for the three groups of leaders (political representatives, public sector, and private sector) both within and between regions. Table 2. Indicators of associationalism among leaders in the two city regions 4 Stavanger Kristiansand Interpretation * All leaders 3,3 3,5 Not signf. (.296) # Private sector leaders 3,3 2,8 Not signf. (.557) Political leaders 4,9 4,7 Not signf. (.798 ) Note: *N=364, #N= 125, and N= 20, public sector leaders are included in *all leaders. The table above indicates differences in level of associationalism between leaders engaged in politics and leaders in private sector that are not engaged in politics. Even though Kristiansand scores higher (0.2) on associationalism for all leaders, Stavanger scores higher (0.5) for private sector leaders. The differences are not significant of the leadership types between regions. There are however, as could be expected, a notable higher level of associationalism within the political leader group than the other groups. Thus a central indicator of social capital provided us with a nil result in terms of explaining differences in local governance leadership. 15

16 authorities. We also asked leaders in private sector about their relationship to local public Figur 1: We have a good dialogue with local authorities 50 % Private sector leaders Kristiansand 45 % 40 % 44 % Private sector leaders Stavanger 35 % 38 % 30 % 25 % 20 % 21 % 22 % 24 % 24 % 15 % 10 % 14 % 5 % 0 % Fully agree To some extent agree either - or 6 % To some extent disagree 3 % 5 % Fully disagree Note: N=114, Gamma.519 There are no clear differences between the two city-regions regarding how private sector leaders describe the quality of their dialogue with local authorities. We also asked leaders in private sector in what extent they trust public sector employees in their region. The asked questions could indicate how leaders in private sector understand the quality of the relationship to public sector, and how public sector leaders perform their work with respect to the industry. 16

17 Figur 2: I trust public sector employees in this region 50 % 45 % Private sector leaders Kristiansand Private sector leaders Stavanger 40 % 35 % 40 % 37 % 30 % 31 % 25 % 20 % 24 % 20 % 15 % 17 % 10 % 5 % 9 % 10 % 8 % 6 % 0 % Fully agree To some extent agree either - or To some extent disagree Fully disagree Note: N=321, Gamma.851 The variation between categories to some extent agree and either or should not be emphasized since those who disagree to some extent or fully disagree shows similar levels. We therefore do not interpret any significant differences between private sector leaders in the two city-regions regarding this question. The central question is however to what extent private sector leaders actually say they trust politicians in their own region. A variation on this question could be interpreted as support for the argument that social capital and levels of trust between private sector leaders and political leaders is important for the influence of political leaders in governance based development systems. 17

18 Figur 3: I trust politicians in this region 50 % 45 % 40 % Private sector leaders Kristiansand Private sector leaders Stavanger 35 % 30 % 25 % 26 % 34 % 30 % 32 % 28 % 20 % 21 % 15 % 10 % 5 % 6 % 6 % 8 % 10 % 0 % Fully agree To some extent agree either - or To some extent disagree Fully disagree Note: N=320, Gamma.631 There is no notable difference in how private sector leaders trust politicians in their respective regions. The distribution between the different categories is virtually identical. However, the levels of trust in both regions seem to be relatively low. A more specific way to assess this is in terms of network governance is to ask to what extent private sector leaders view local authorities as helpful collaborators in development processes. The figure below shows results from such a question. 18

19 Figur 4: I think local authorities is a team player in the development of the region 50 % 45 % 45 % Private sector leaders Kristiansand Private sector leaders Stavanger 40 % 35 % 30 % 39 % 34 % 25 % 28 % 20 % 15 % 10 % 5 % 7 % 8 % 13 % 10 % 10 % 6 % 0 % Fully agree To some extent agree either - or To some extent disagree Fully disagree Note: N=112, Gamma.920 Our interpretation of this figure is, given available data, that there is no systematic differences between how relevant elected politicians is perceived to be in Kristiansand and Stavanger when it comes to their level of orientation towards collaborating with the local industry and orientation towards the needs of local business. Private sector leaders in Stavanger and Kristiansand seems to regard politicians as to be approximately equally interested/or uninterested. Based on the data sets available, we haven t been able to identify any striking differences on variables related to social capital and trust between the two regions. Results that leave the door open for other interpretations. 19

20 IS REGIONAL LEADERSHIP DETERMINATED BY POWER? The theory of social capital and trust presuppose a spatial dimension in its way nearness and co-localisation are implicit parts of the theory. Social capital and trust is thus something that develops in a spatial setting of interaction, face-to-face relations, belonging and community, according to PUTNAM (2000), see also (LARSEN et al. 2006). This, together with the spatial dimension in regional leadership put attention upon routinized practices, values norms, ideologies and attitudes, what LUKES (1974) called the three-dimensional view on power. A spatial setting of interaction, social capital and trust may then create a specific kind of regional leadership and power relations. What urban regime theory discusses are the relation between state and market, systemic power, and the ability by different actors to hold and make use of strategic positions, pre-emptive power. The following discussion of two sets of cases from the two city regions take these theoretical approaches in consideration and is an investigation of differences related to power regimes along the theoretical dimension of trust. Determining the Location of the Norwegian Oil-capital Stavanger became the Norwegian oil capital during the 1960s. But in the early 1960s, parallel and partly prior to the national Norwegian negotiations concerning oil policy, started some politicians, in cooperation with local entrepreneurs, in Stavanger to make plans for infrastructure that could facilitate for the localizations of institutions and enterprises related to oil production (KINDINGSTAD 1998). Interestingly this local process was mainly pursued by politicians, and some entrepreneurs. Compared to the parallel ongoing national process with negotiations about Norwegian oil-policy was this national process in much higher degree pursued and marked by the international oil companies than by politicians (HANISCH 1992). In 1965 started international oil companies their localization in Stavanger. During a period of three months in 1966 did Stavanger municipality built 32 houses for foreign employees in the 20

21 oil industry (HANISCH 1992). The first foreign family that came to Stavanger, November 6 th 1965, were bided welcome by the mayor of the city, precisely to show the important symbolic dimension in the event. Localization factors like city size, good infrastructure, good airport, and nearness to the oil fields in the North Sea was of course important factors, but in addition to this was it a strong goal among the politicians in Stavanger municipality to make Stavanger be the Norwegian oil capital. In 1972 became the Norwegian state owned oil company, Statoil, established and located to Stavanger after a process where public officials in Stavanger played a very significant role in the 1960 s and 1970 s (GJERDE 2002). A cluster was established. The situation and atmosphere in Kristiansand was quite the opposite. Despite the fact that the city was located nearer the oil fields and had very good harbor facilities, did the major at that time declare that the city was not interested in oil industry (SANDVIK 1999). At that time was Kristiansand one of the fastest growing cities in Norway, while Stavanger had problems with their canning industry (SANDVIK 1999). When the stagnation period started in Kristiansand in the middle of the 1970 s was it too late to compete with Stavanger about localization of administration and base activities related to the oil production. Continued Public Ownership or Sale? In the wake of the discussion about New Public Management in the 1980s started a discussion about the appropriateness of public ownership in core institutions and enterprises owned by public authorities, municipalities or the state. In 1990, did the State government decide that the Norwegian electrical power market should be deregulated, with effect from January 1 st, It is however said that Norway was a pioneer in the privatization and liberalization of the energy market in Western Europe, and it is still one of the countries that has gone furthest in terms of market liberalization (ARNESEN 2003). 21

22 In the late 1990 s Rogaland lead by the city region of Stavanger, and the Agder region lead by the large city of Kristiansand ended up following two different paths concerning the question of continued public control of hydro-electric power stations. In 2001, the majority of the municipalities in the Agder region decided to sell 45.4 % of their shares in the regional hydro electric company Agder Energi. In the sales process Kristiansand municipality initially opted for selling all shares they owned in the energy company. In Rogaland the political decision was not to sell the similar company Lyse Energi, here politicians even tried to buy Agder Energi from Kristiansand and Agder (ARNESEN 2003; NORMANN 2007). The main rationale in Kristiansand for selling was to provide capital for new governance institutions such as Cultiva which is a foundation to: secure jobs and good living conditions in Kristiansand by providing grants to projects which set up art, cultural, and educational institutions or organisations that contribute to innovation, development and competence-building within the creative milieu of Kristiansand 5. In Rogaland, the publicly owned, Lyse Energi was seen as a central tool in the continued development of the region that continued as a private limited company under full regional political control (ENGEN and KVADSHEIM 2004; NORMANN 2007). THE SIGNIFICANCE OF POWER The short outline of the two sets of cases above illustrates diversity between the two cities concerning political and strategic issues. Just from the two parallel examples can we make a preliminary conclusion that politicians place themselves in a more proactive role in regional leadership in Stavanger than in Kristiansand. It is not our ambition, however, to analyze and characterize the regional leadership in general with the help of these two sets of cases. But these two cases have been, in a historical perspective on regional leadership, crucial for the direction in local and regional development in both city regions. The difference in regional 22

23 leadership and role taking are therefore of particular interest. How then can the diversity in regional leadership be interpreted along perspectives of trust and power? According to LUKES (1974) three-dimensional-view is power about routinized practices, values and norms. In that perspective can the regional difference in leadership be viewed as an expression of a particular culture for governance and power relations. And further, according to urban regime theory is it in principle difficult to see why actors in any of the system spheres would disperse power if they had the possibility to control the position. The assumption is that such leadership positions is something that is fought for and acquired through political bargaining and competition, and not voluntarily and altruistically distributed by network actors working in some sort of harmony. In other words have power relations and models of regional leadership developed differently over time in these two city regions, and it seems that role takers still keep their positions and roles. This is also relevant concerning trust. The analysis have shown that there are no significant differences in level of trust between these two city regions. There are similarities in how leaders in private sector view their relations to public sector and politicians, and vice versa. Despite of similarities along the trust-dimension, do we see differences in regional leadership. One explanation is that the level of trust is generally high in both regions. According to GRIMEN (2008) and LUHMANN (2005) does high level of trust shapes an action space for those who show or give trust to carry out specific action. High level of trust open up alternatives with the possibility to select who we trust in specific situations and under what circumstances we put trust into relations. The two city regions have chosen different regional strategies where political control varies. Confidence in different principles and arguments for regional development and leadership between the two regions seems to make the difference, more than shifting levels of trust between politicians and leaders in private sector. The generally high level of trust may in other words be interpreted as confidence in a specific urban regime, understood as an abstract 23

24 system of political and technical knowledge, and as a system of particular power relations between politicians and market that historically have developed in these regions. CONCLUSION The empirical conclusion is obvious; the two city regions represents two different urban regimes but with approximately same level of trust. That throws doubt on a simply causal connection between trust and particular systems for regional network governance and regional development that partly can be found in for instance PUTNAM et al. (1993). Our conclusion highlights the significance of power in analyses of regional governance, and invites us to discuss theoretically and critically the emphasis that have been laid on trust and social capital as success criteria in theories of regional development and governance. As shown in this articles theoretical discussion is trust viewed as fundamental in an existential way (LUHMANN 2005) and in modernity in general, and particular in expert systems (GIDDENS 1990, 1991). We have also discussed how level of trust and direction of trust make certain action spaces in regional governance systems. However, trust and social capital in itself cannot predict what kind of regional governance systems, or urban regime, we will have in particular regions. Nor does level of trust indicate what kind of urban regime we have to deal with in particular regions. Instead do we have to view trust as an integrated part of power and social constructions of politician role. If we don t do that may we been forced into a situation where regional leadership, regional governance and regional development are viewed as nonpolitical, similar to what HARRISS (2001) criticized the concept of social capital for being an anti-politics machine. We have instead argued that regional leadership can be viewed in terms of what LUKES (1974) called a three-dimensional view on power that include routinized practices and values, also highlighted in urban regime theory (ELKIN 1987; STONE 1989). The systemic power perspective as a part of urban regime theory put emphasis on exactly the 24

25 political dimension in the way regional leadership is also about to choose between regimes for role taking, inclusion and exclusion. The high level of trust in our cases from the Norwegian city regions may then be interpreted as trust into particular routinized urban regimes that isolated make a perfect sense for those who trust. The argument on power from LUKES (1974) shares similarities with FOCAULT (1965) who argued that rationality and knowledge are historical and social constructs that legitimize existing power relations. ISHIHARA and PASCUAL (2008) argue in a similar way when they discuss environmental governance as collective action as a result of dominance and marginalization, rather than a result of individual rational calculation. Bourdieu argues similar for his concept of symbolic power (BOURDIEU and THOMPSON 1991), but nevertheless with an option for change in power structures. The two cases we have investigated in this article share similarities regarding trust, but not regarding what kind of urban regime they represents which made us to conclude that trust in regional leadership relations is not independent of power relations. Instead is trust a highly political matter and part of social constructions of the politician role. It remains to investigate the role of trust in particular urban regimes, how trust work as an intimate part of power relations, and how trust can be used as a dynamic force in changing of urban regimes. 25

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