Software Safety Tutorial (Status Update)
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1 Status Update 1 Software Safety Tutorial (Status Update) Jeff Tian, tian@engr.smu.edu CSE, SMU, Dallas, TX Topics Project Overview Software Safety Overview Project Tasks/Schedule/Progress
2 Status Update 2 What Is Software Safety? Software safety: The property of being accidentfree for (embedded) software systems. Accident: failures with severe consequences Hazard: condition for accident Specialized techniques Software safety engineering (SSE): Goal: to ensure software safety via hazard identification/analysis techniques hazard resolution alternatives hazard elimination/reduction/control (tracking/mitigation/control NASA) safety and risk assessment safety and process improvement Qualitative focus, systematic approach
3 Status Update 3 Project Overview Sponsor: Dennis Frailey (David Struble), Raytheon. Motivation: DoD commitment to safety (personnel/system/property/environment) DoD goal: 0 mishaps (accidents above) DoD guidance: MIL-STD-882D (2000) Goal: Software safety should become a core competency for real-time software engineers. Project team: Jeff Tian (SMU): Basics of SSE D.T. Huynh and Eric Wong (UTD): related research and extensions
4 Status Update 4 Overall Approach Basics about software safety (Tian): Basic definitions and concepts Hazard identification/analysis techniques, primarily fault-/event-tree analyses Design for safety via hazard elimination/reduction/control Leveson s SSP (software safety program) and STAMP (sys. theoretic accident modeling and processes) Formal verification of safety New applications and development Tailoring to meet project sponsor goals: Include DoD MIL-STD-882D (Tian) Testing for safety (Wong) Formal methods for safety (Huynh)
5 Status Update 5 Comparison: Lutz/NASA Software safety: 7 directions: 1 integration of informal/formal methods 2 safe reuse 3 testing/evaluation of SCS 4 runtime monitoring 5 education 6 certification and standards 7 collaboration with related fields Coverage in our SST: 1/3/5: existing research/course 6: focus on DoD MIL-STD-882D 2/4/7: existing expertise
6 Status Update 6 Basic Definitions Accident or mishap: unplanned (series of) events leading to unacceptable loss - death, injury, illness - equip./property/environment damage excess energy/dangerous substance computers relatively safe but computer control accidents Hazard: a set of conditions leading to accidents under certain environmental conditions e.g.: guard gates at rail-crossing safety focus: control factors (vs. env. factors beyond control) analysis and resolution SSE
7 Status Update 7 Basic Definitions Risk: function of 3 elements likelihood(hazard) likelihood(hazard accident) worst possible loss due to accident (compare to expected loss) (System) safety engineering: ensuring acceptable risk scientific/management/engineering reducing risk factors context for software safety hazard identification, assessment, analysis, and resolution
8 Status Update 8 Safety Analysis & Resolution Hazard analysis: Fault trees: (static) logical conditions Event trees: dynamic sequences Combined and other analyses Generally qualitative Related: accident analysis and risk assessment Hazard resolution (pre-accident) Negate/block/mitigate/etc. Hazard elimination/reduction/control Damage reduction (post-accident)
9 Status Update 9 Hazard Analysis: FTA Fault tree idea: Top event (accident) Intermediate events/conditions Basic or primary events/conditions Logical connections Form a tree structure Elements of a fault tree: Nodes: conditions and sub-conditions terminal vs. no terminal Logical relations among sub-conditions AND, OR, NOT Other types/extensions possible
10 Status Update10 Hazard Analysis: FTA Example Collision AND Fail to Stop Other object OR Driver error ABS did not engage ABS engaged but fail to stop OR Breakpad woreout Software problem Other problems Example FTA for an automobile accident
11 Status Update11 Hazard Analysis: FTA FTA construction: Starts with top event/accident Decomposition of events or conditions Stop when further development not required or not possible (atomic) Focus on controllable events/elements Using FTA: Hazard identification logical composition (vs. temporal composition in ETA) Hazard resolution (more later) component replacement etc. focused safety verification negate logical relation
12 Status Update12 Hazard Analysis: ETA ETA: Why? FTA: focus on static analysis (static) logical conditions Dynamic aspect of accidents Timing and temporal relations Real-time control systems Search space/strategy concerns: Contrast ETA with FTA: FTA: backward search ETA: forward search May yield different path/info. ETA provide additional info.
13 Status Update13 Hazard Analysis: ETA Example ABS worked No collision Break in time ABS did not work Collision Obstacle appears Cruising Did not break in time Collision No obstacle No collision Example ETA for an automobile accident Compare/contrast with FTA a few slides back.
14 Status Update14 Hazard Analysis: ETA Event trees: Temporal/cause-effect diagram (Primary) event and consequences Stages and (simple) propagation not exact time interval logical stages and decisions Event tree analysis (ETA): Recreate accident sequence/scenario Critical path analysis Used in hazard resolution (more later) esp. in hazard reduction/control e.g. creating barriers isolation and containment
15 Status Update15 Design for Safety Eliminate identified hazard sources in material/component/software/etc. Reduce hazard likelihood/severity via: Creating hazard barriers, Minimizing failure probability, etc. Control hazard (after detection) via: Isolation and containment, Fail-safe design, etc. Reduce damage (post-accident, as compared to pre-accident for the above)
16 Status Update16 Hazard Elimination Hazard sources identification elimination (Some specific faults prevented or removed.) Traditional QA (but with hazard focus): Fault prevention activities: education/process/technology/etc formal specification & verification Fault removal activities: rigorous testing/inspection/analyses Safe design: More specialized techniques: Substitution, simplification, decoupling. Human error elimination. Hazardous material/conditions.
17 Status Update17 Hazard Reduction Hazard identification reduction (Some specific system failures prevented or tolerated.) Traditional QA (but with hazard focus): Fault tolerance Other redundancy Safe design: More specialized techniques: Creating hazard barriers Safety margins and safety constraints Locking devices Reducing hazard likelihood Minimizing failure probability Mostly passive or reactive
18 Status Update18 Hazard Control Hazard detection control Key: failure severity reduction. Post-failure actions. Failure-accident link weakened. Traditional QA: not much, but good design principles may help. Safe design: More specialized techniques: Isolation and containment Fail-safe design & hazard scope Protection system More active than passive Similar techniques to hazard reduction, but focus on post-failure severity vs. pre-failure hazard likelihood.
19 Status Update19 Accident Analysis & Damage Control Accident analysis: Accident scenario recreation/analysis possible accidents and damage areas Generally simpler than hazard analysis Based on good domain knowledge (not much software specifics involved) Damage reduction or damage control Post-accident vs. pre-accident hazard resolution Accident severity reduced Escape route Safe abandonment of material/product/etc. Device for limiting damages
20 Status Update20 Software Safety Program (SSP) Leveson s approach (Leveson, 1995) Software safety program (SSP) Process and technology integration Limited goals Formal verification/inspection based But restricted to safety risks Based on hazard analyses results Safety analysis and hazard resolution Safety verification: few things carried over In overall development process: Safety as part of the requirement Safety constraints at different levels/phases Verification/refinement activities Distribution over the whole process
21 Status Update21 Tasks/Schedule/Progress Major tasks: 1 state-of-the-art survey 2 literature/research survey 3 tutorial 4 annotated bibliography Schedule (6 months in summary table): 3 months: interim review 6/9/12 months: draft/semi-/final tutorial Progress to date: Basis/extensions for all tasks identified Personnel/responsibility specified draft in 3 months
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