Alberta Reliability Standard Cyber Security System Security Management CIP-007-AB-5
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1 A. Introduction 1. Title: 2. Number: 3. Purpose: To manage system security by specifying select technical, operational, and procedural requirements in support of protecting BES cyber systems against compromise that could lead to misoperation or instability in the bulk electric system. 4. Applicability: 4.1. For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following list of entities will be collectively referred to as Responsible Entities. For requirements in this reliability standard where a specific entity or subset of entities are the applicable entity or entities, the entity or entities are specified explicitly [Intentionally left blank.] a legal owner of an electric distribution system that owns one or more of the following facilities, systems, and equipment for the protection or restoration of the bulk electric system: each underfrequency load shedding or under voltage load shed system that: is part of a load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a reliability standard; and performs automatic load shedding under a common control system owned by the entity in subsection , without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more; each remedial action scheme where the remedial action scheme is subject to one or more requirements in a reliability standard; each protection system (excluding underfrequency load shedding and under voltage load shed) that applies to transmission where the protection system is subject to one or more requirements in a reliability standard; and each cranking path and group of elements meeting the initial switching requirements from a contracted blackstart resource up to and including the first point of supply and/or point of delivery of the next generating unit or aggregated generating facility to be started; the operator of a generating unit and the operator of an aggregated generating facility; the legal owner of a generating unit and the legal owner of an aggregated generating facility; [Intentionally left blank.] [Intentionally left blank.] Effective: Page 1 of 14
2 the operator of a transmission facility; the legal owner of a transmission facility; and the ISO For the purpose of the requirements contained herein, the following facilities, systems, and equipment owned by each Responsible Entity in subsection 4.1 above are those to which these requirements are applicable. For requirements in this reliability standard where a specific type of facilities, system, or equipment or subset of facilities, systems, and equipment are applicable, these are specified explicitly One or more of the following facilities, systems and equipment that operate at, or control elements that operate at, a nominal voltage of 25 kv or less and are owned by a legal owner of an electric distribution system or a legal owner of a transmission facility for the protection or restoration of the bulk electric system: each underfrequency load shedding or under voltage load shed system that: is part of a load shedding program that is subject to one or more requirements in a reliability standard; and performs automatic load shedding under a common control system owned by one or more of the entities in subsection 4.2.1, without human operator initiation, of 300 MW or more; each remedial action scheme where the remedial action scheme is subject to one or more requirements in a reliability standard; each protection system (excluding underfrequency load shedding and under voltage load shed) that applies to transmission where the protection system is subject to one or more requirements in a reliability standard; and each cranking path and group of elements meeting the initial switching requirements from a contracted blackstart resource up to and including the first point of supply and/or point of delivery of the next generating unit or aggregated generating facility to be started; Responsible Entities listed in subsection 4.1 other than a legal owner of an electric distribution system are responsible for: each transmission facility that is part of the bulk electric system except each transmission facility that: is a transformer with fewer than 2 windings at 100 kv or higher and does not connect a contracted blackstart resource; radially connects only to load; radially connects only to one or more generating units or aggregated generating facilities with a combined maximum authorized real power of less than or equal to 67.5 MW and does not connect a contracted blackstart resource; or Effective: Page 2 of 14
3 radially connects to load and one or more generating units or aggregated generating facilities that have a combined maximum authorized real power of less than or equal to 67.5 MW and does not connect a contracted blackstart resource; a reactive power resource that is dedicated to supplying or absorbing reactive power that is connected at 100 kv or higher, or through a dedicated transformer with a high-side voltage of 100 kv or higher, except those reactive power resources operated by an end-use customer for its own use; a generating unit that is: directly connected to the bulk electric system and has a maximum authorized real power rating greater than 18 MW unless the generating unit is part of an industrial complex; within a power plant which: is not part of an aggregated generating facility; is directly connected to the bulk electric system; and has a combined maximum authorized real power rating greater than 67.5 MW unless the power plant is part of an industrial complex; within an industrial complex with supply transmission service greater than 67.5 MW; or a contracted blackstart resource; an aggregated generating facility that is: directly connected to the bulk electric system and has a maximum authorized real power rating greater than 67.5 MW unless the aggregated generating facility is part of an industrial complex; within an industrial complex with supply transmission service greater than 67.5 MW; or a contracted blackstart resource; and control centres and backup control centres The following are exempt from this reliability standard: [Intentionally left blank.] cyber assets associated with communication networks and data communication links between discrete electronic security perimeters [Intentionally left blank.] for the legal owner of an electric distribution system, the systems and equipment that are not included in subsection above. Effective: Page 3 of 14
4 Responsible Entities that identify that they have no BES cyber systems categorized as High Impact or Medium Impact according to the CIP 002-AB 5.1 identification and categorization processes. 5. [Intentionally left blank.] 6. [Intentionally left blank.] B. Requirements and Measures R1. Each Responsible Entity shall implement, in a manner that identifies, assesses, and corrects deficiencies, one or more documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in CIP 007-AB 5 Table R1 Ports and Services. M1. Evidence must include the documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in CIP 007-AB 5 Table R1 Ports and Services and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation as described in the Measures column of the table. Table R1 Ports and Services 1.1 High Impact BES cyber systems with external routable connectivity and their associated: 1.2 High Impact BES cyber systems Where technically feasible, enable only logical network accessible ports that have been determined to be needed by the Responsible Entity, including port ranges or services where needed to handle dynamic ports. If a device has no provision for disabling or restricting logical ports on the device then those ports that are open are deemed needed. Protect against the use of unnecessary physical input/output ports used for include, but are not limited to: Effective: Page 4 of 14 documentation of the need for all enabled ports on all applicable cyber assets and electronic access points, individually or by group. listings of the listening ports on the cyber assets, individually or by group, from either the device configuration files, command output (such as netstat), or network scans of open ports; or configuration files of hostbased firewalls or other device level mechanisms that only allow needed ports and deny all others. include, but is not limited to, documentation showing types
5 Table R1 Ports and Services systems at control centres network connectivity, console commands, or removable media. of protection of physical input/output ports, either logically through system configuration or physically using a port lock or signage. R2. Each Responsible Entity shall implement, in a manner that identifies, assesses, and corrects deficiencies, one or more documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in CIP 007-AB 5 Table R2 Security Patch Management. M2. Evidence must include each of the applicable documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in CIP 007-AB 5 Table R2 Security Patch Management and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation as described in the Measures column of the table. Table R2 Security Patch Management 2.1 High Impact BES cyber 2.2 High Impact BES cyber A patch management process for tracking, evaluating, and installing cyber security patches for applicable cyber assets. The tracking portion shall include the identification of a source or sources that the Responsible Entity tracks for the release of cyber security patches for applicable cyber assets that are updateable and for which a patching source exists. At least once every 35 days, evaluate security patches for applicability that have been released since the last evaluation from the source or sources identified in part 2.1. include, but is not limited to, documentation of a patch management process and documentation or lists of sources that are monitored, whether on an individual BES cyber system or cyber asset basis. include, but is not limited to, an evaluation conducted by, referenced by, or on behalf of a Responsible Entity of security related patches released by the documented Effective: Page 5 of 14
6 Table R2 Security Patch Management 2.3 High Impact BES cyber 2.4 High Impact BES cyber For applicable patches identified in part 2.2, within 35 days of the evaluation completion, take one of the following actions: apply the applicable patches; or create a dated mitigation plan; or revise an existing mitigation plan. Mitigation plans shall include the Responsible Entity s planned actions to mitigate the vulnerabilities addressed by each security patch and a timeframe to complete these mitigations. For each mitigation plan created or revised in part 2.3, implement the plan within the timeframe specified in the plan, unless a revision to the plan or an extension to the sources at least once every 35 days. include, but are not limited to: Effective: Page 6 of 14 records of the installation of the patch (e.g., exports from automated patch management tools that provide installation date, verification of BES cyber system component software revision, or registry exports that show software has been installed); or a dated plan showing when and how the vulnerability will be addressed, to include documentation of the actions to be taken by the Responsible Entity to mitigate the vulnerabilities addressed by the security patch and a timeframe for the completion of these mitigations. include, but is not limited to, records of implementation of mitigations.
7 Table R2 Security Patch Management timeframe specified in part 2.3 is approved by the CIP senior manager or delegate. R3. Each Responsible Entity shall implement, in a manner that identifies, assesses, and corrects deficiencies, one or more documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in CIP 007-AB 5 Table R3 Malicious Code Prevention. M3. Evidence must include each of the documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in CIP 007-AB 5 Table R3 Malicious Code Prevention and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation as described in the Measures column of the table. Table R3 Malicious Code Prevention 3.1 High Impact BES cyber Deploy method(s) to deter, detect, or prevent malicious code. include, but is not limited to, records of the Responsible Entity s performance of these processes (e.g., through traditional antivirus, system hardening, policies, etc.). 3.2 High Impact BES cyber Mitigate the threat of detected Effective: Page 7 of 14
8 Table R3 Malicious Code Prevention malicious code. include, but are not limited to: 3.3 High Impact BES cyber For those methods identified in part 3.1 that use signatures or patterns, have a process for the update of the signatures or patterns. The process must address testing and installing the signatures or patterns. records of response processes for malicious code detection records of the performance of these processes when malicious code is detected. include, but is not limited to, documentation showing the process used for the update of signatures or patterns. R4. Each Responsible Entity shall implement, in a manner that identifies, assesses, and corrects deficiencies, one or more documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in CIP 007-AB 5 Table R4 Security Event Monitoring. M4. Evidence must include each of the documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in CIP 007-AB 5 Table R4 Security Event Monitoring and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation as described in the Measures column of the table. Effective: Page 8 of 14
9 Table R4 Security Event Monitoring 4.1 High Impact BES cyber 4.2 High Impact BES cyber systems with external routable connectivity and their associated: 4.3 High Impact BES cyber Log events at the BES cyber system level (per BES cyber system capability) or at the cyber asset level (per cyber asset capability) for identification of, and after thefact investigations of, cyber security incidents that includes, as a minimum, each of the following types of events: detected successful login attempts; detected failed access attempts and failed login attempts; detected malicious code. Generate alerts for security events that the Responsible Entity determines necessitates an alert, that includes, as a minimum, each of the following types of events (per cyber asset or BES cyber system capability): detected malicious code from part 4.1; and detected failure of part 4.1 event logging. Where technically feasible, retain applicable event logs include, but are not limited to, a paper or system generated listing of event types for which the BES cyber system is capable of detecting and, for generated events, is configured to log. This listing must include the required types of events. include, but are not limited to, paper or system generated listing of security events that the Responsible Entity determined necessitate alerts, including paper or system generated list showing how alerts are configured. include, but are not limited to, Effective: Page 9 of 14
10 Table R4 Security Event Monitoring identified in part 4.1 for at least the last 90 consecutive days except under CIP exceptional circumstances. systems at control centres and their associated: 4.4 High Impact BES cyber and 2. protected cyber assets Review a summarization or sampling of logged events as determined by the Responsible Entity at intervals no greater than 15 days to identify undetected cyber security incidents. documentation of the event log retention process and paper or system generated reports showing log retention configuration set at 90 days or greater. include, but are not limited to, documentation describing the review, any findings from the review (if any), and dated documentation showing the review occurred. R5. Each Responsible Entity shall implement, in a manner that identifies, assesses, and corrects deficiencies, one or more documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in CIP 007-AB 5 Table R5 System Access Controls. M5. Evidence must include each of the applicable documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in CIP 007-AB 5 Table 5 System Access Controls and additional evidence to demonstrate implementation as described in the Measures column of the table. Table R5 System Access Controls 5.1 High Impact BES cyber Have a method(s) to enforce authentication of interactive user access, where technically feasible. include, but is not limited to, documentation describing how access is authenticated. Effective: Page 10 of 14
11 Table R5 System Access Controls systems at control centres and their associated: systems with external routable connectivity and their associated: 5.2 High Impact BES cyber Identify and inventory all known enabled default or other generic account types, either by system, by groups of systems, by location, or by system type(s). include, but is not limited to, a listing of accounts by account types showing the enabled or generic account types in use for the BES cyber system. 5.3 High Impact BES cyber Identify individuals who have Effective: Page 11 of 14
12 Table R5 System Access Controls authorized access to shared accounts. systems with external routable connectivity and their associated: 5.4 High Impact BES cyber 5.5 High Impact BES cyber Change known default passwords, per cyber asset capability. For password only authentication for interactive user access, either technically or procedurally enforce the following password parameters: include, but is not limited to, listing of shared accounts and the individuals who have authorized access to each shared account. include, but are not limited to: Effective: Page 12 of 14 records of a procedure that passwords are changed when new devices are in production; or documentation in system manuals or other vendor documents showing default vendor passwords were generated pseudorandomly and are thereby unique to the device. include, but are not limited to: system generated reports or screen shots of the system enforced password parameters, including
13 Table R5 System Access Controls password length that is, length and complexity; or at least, the lesser of eight attestations that include a characters or the maximum reference to the length supported by the cyber documented procedures asset; and that were followed. 5.6 High Impact BES cyber systems with external routable connectivity and their associated: 5.7 High Impact BES cyber minimum password complexity that is the lesser of three or more different types of characters (e.g., uppercase alphabetic, lowercase alphabetic, numeric, nonalphanumeric) or the maximum complexity supported by the cyber asset. Where technically feasible, for password only authentication for interactive user access, either technically or procedurally enforce password changes or an obligation to change the password at least once every 15 months. Where technically feasible, either: limit the number of unsuccessful authentication attempts; or generate alerts after a include, but are not limited to: Effective: Page 13 of 14 system generated reports or screen shots of the system enforced periodicity of changing passwords; or attestations that include a reference to the documented procedures that were followed. include, but are not limited to: documentation of the account-lockout parameters; or rules in the alerting
14 Table R5 System Access Controls threshold of unsuccessful authentication attempts. systems at control centres and their associated: Revision History configuration showing how the system notified individuals after a determined number of unsuccessful login attempts. Date Description Initial release. Effective: Page 14 of 14
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