DNSSEC - Why Network Operators Should Care And How To Accelerate Deployment
|
|
|
- Ethel Annabelle Pope
- 9 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 DNSSEC - Why Network Operators Should Care And How To Accelerate Deployment Dan York, CISSP Senior Content Strategist, Internet Society Eurasia Network Operators' Group (ENOG) 4 Moscow, Russia October 23, 2012
2 Internet Society Deploy360 Programme Providing real-world deployment info for IPv6, DNSSEC and other Internet technologies: Case Studies Tutorials Videos Whitepapers News, information English content, initially, but will be translated into other languages. 10/30/12
3 A Normal DNS Interaction Server 3 example.com? 1 DNS Resolver Resolver checks its local cache. If it has the answer, it sends it back. example.com If not web page Browser
4 A Normal DNS Interaction.com NS root.com Server 5 example.com? 1 DNS Resolver 2 example.com NS example.com 6 web page Browser
5 DNS works on speed" " First result wins"
6 Attacking DNS.com NS root.com Server 5 example.com? 1 DNS Resolver 2 example.com NS example.com web page Browser Attacking example.com
7 A Poisoned Cache Server 3 example.com? 1 DNS Resolver Resolver cache now has wrong data: example.com web page Browser This stays in the cache until the Time-To-Live (TTL) expires!
8 A DNSSEC Interaction root.com Server 5 example.com? 1 DNS Resolver 2 example.com 6 web page Browser DNSKEY RRSIGs
9 DNS Resolver:" Uses DNSKEY to perform calculation on DNS records" Compares result with RRSIG records"
10 Spoof DNSSEC?"
11 Delegation Signer (DS) Record" " Fingerprint of DNSKEY sent to registry"
12 A DNSSEC Interaction.com NS DS root.com Server 5 example.com? 1 DNS Resolver 2 example.com NS DS example.com 6 web page Browser DNSKEY RRSIGs
13 The Global Chain of Trust.com NS DS root.com Server 5 example.com? 1 DNS Resolver 2 example.com NS DS example.com 6 web page Browser DNSKEY RRSIGs
14 Attempting to Spoof DNS.com NS DS root.com Server 5 example.com? 1 DNS Resolver 2 example.com NS DS example.com 6 web page Browser DNSKEY RRSIGs DNSKEY RRSIGs Attacking example.com
15 Attempting to Spoof DNS.com NS DS root.com Server 5 example.com? 1 DNS Resolver 2 example.com NS DS example.com 6 web page Browser 4 SERVFAIL DNSKEY RRSIGs DNSKEY RRSIGs Attacking example.com
16 Integrity of DNS answers"
17 Ensuring info entered into DNS is the SAME info end user receives"
18 But if I have SSL (TLS), why do I need DNSSEC?"
19 The Typical TLS (SSL) Interaction root Server.com example.com TLS-encrypted web page 2 example.com? 1 DNS Resolver Browser
20 The Typical TLS (SSL) Interaction root Server.com example.com TLS-encrypted web page 2 example.com? 3 Is this encrypted with the CORRECT certificate? Browser DNS Resolver
21 What About This? Server DNS Server TLS-encrypted web page with CORRECT certificate Firewall (or attacker) TLS-encrypted web page with NEW certificate (re-signed by firewall) Browser
22 Problems? Server DNS Server TLS-encrypted web page with CORRECT certificate Firewall TLS-encrypted web page with NEW certificate (re-signed by firewall) Browser
23 Problems? Server DNS Server TLS-encrypted web page with CORRECT certificate Firewall Log files or other servers TLS-encrypted web page with NEW certificate (re-signed by firewall) Browser Potentially including personal information
24 Issues A Certificate Authority (CA) can sign ANY domain. Now over 1,500 CAs there have been compromises where valid certs were issued for domains. Middle-boxes such as firewalls can re-sign sessions.
25 TLS = encryption + limited integrity protection"
26 DNSSEC = strong integrity protection"
27 encryption + strong integrity protection?"
28 TLS + DNSSEC = DANE!
29 DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Q: How do you know if the TLS (SSL) certificate is the correct one the site wants you to use? A: Store the certificate (or fingerprint) in DNS (new TLSA record) and sign them with DNSSEC. A browser that understand DNSSEC and DANE will then know when the required certificate is NOT being used. Certificate stored in DNS is controlled by the domain name holder. It could be a certificate signed by a CA or a selfsigned certificate.
30 DANE Server DNS Server TLS-encrypted web page with CORRECT certificate Firewall (or attacker) example.com? DNSKEY RRSIGs TLSA Log files or other servers TLS-encrypted web page with NEW certificate (re-signed by firewall) DANE-equipped browser compares TLS certificate with what DNS / DNSSEC says it should be. Browser w/dane
31 DANE Not Just For The DANE defines protocol for storing TLS certificates in DNS Securing transactions is the obvious use case Other uses also possible: via S/MIME VoIP Jabber/XMPP? 10/30/12
32 DANE Resources DANE Overview and Resources: IETF Journal article explaining DANE: RFC DANE Use Cases: RFC 6698 DANE Protocol:
33 Opportunities DANE is just one example of new opportunities brought about by DNSSEC Developers and others already exploring new ideas 10/30/12
34 Getting DNSSEC Deployed
35 The Two Parts of DNSSEC Signing Validating Registries Applications Registrars Enterprises DNS Hosting ISPs
36 Key Questions What needs to be done to get more domains signed with DNSSEC? How can DNSSEC validation be more widely deployed? Are there technical issues or are the issues more of communication and awareness? How can we as a community address these challenges to increase the usage and availability of DNSSEC?
37 Opportunities to Accelerate Deployment 1. Registrar / DNS hosting provider engagement Encouraging more registrars to provide DNSSEC and making it easier for domain name holders. 2. Validating name servers Expanding the deployment of DNSSEC-validating name servers at multiple levels, including ISPs, operating systems and applications. 3. Enterprise signing of domains Helping enterprises and other large organizations understand the added security value they can achieve with DNSSEC, particularly with the new capabilities of DANE. 4. Government activity with DNSSEC Encouraging governments to expand their promotion and usage of DNSSEC
38 Registries / Registrars / DNS Hosting Providers
39 DNSSEC Signing - The Individual Steps Registry Registrar DNS Hosting Provider Domain Name Registrant Signs TLD Accepts DS records Publishes/signs records Accepts DS records Sends DS to registry Provides UI for mgmt Signs zones Publishes all records Provides UI for mgmt Enables DNSSEC (unless automatic)
40 DNSSEC Signing - The Players Registries Registrars DNS Hosting Providers Registrar also provides DNS hosting services Domain Name Registrants
41 DNSSEC Signing - The Players Registries Registrars DNS Hosting Providers Domain Name Registrants Registrant hosts own DNS
42 Strong Growth In Signed Domains Sources: PowerDNS and Verisign Labs dnssec/statistics/
43 Increasing Number of Domain Name Registrars Need to increase number of domain name registrars supporting DNSSEC Good news is that the list keeps increasing! List from ICANN at: If you are a registar and support DNSSEC, you can ask to be added to ICANN s list. Source:
44 Validating Name Servers
45 Validating Name Servers How do we increase the percentage?
46 Availability of DNSSEC-Validating Resolvers Consumers need easy availability of DNSSEC-validating DNS resolvers. Examples: Comcast in North America recently rolled out DNSSECvalidating resolvers to 18+ million customers Almost all ISPs in Sweden and Czech Republic provide DNSSEC-validating resolvers
47 SURFnet Validating Server Whitepaper New document in August Steps through cost/benefit, requirements, planning Provides instructions for: BIND 9.x Unbound Windows Server /30/12
48 Comcast Case Study Presentation at October 2012 DNSSEC Deployment Workshop at ICANN 45 Slides and audio for workshop: toronto45.icann.org/node/34375 Comcast presentation: Customer interaction Lessons learned Next steps 10/30/12
49 Many DNSSEC Tools Now Available dnssec/tools/ 10/30/12
50 Next Steps
51 New Industry Initiative Forming With Focus On: 1. Deployment Documentation What do we need in the way of better documentation/tutorials/etc? 2. Tools What are the missing tools? 3. Unsolved Technical Issues What technical issues remain that need to be addressed? 4. Measurement How do we measure progress of DNSSEC deployment? Can we get more TLDs, ISPs to help provide statistics?
52 Join The Initial Discussions Public mailing list, dnssec-coord, available and open to all: Focus is on better coordinating promotion / advocacy / marketing activities related to DNSSEC deployment. Planning for monthly conference calls to support online activities. Stay tuned for more info (and join the list!)
53 Three Requests For Network Operators 1. Deploy DNSSEC-validating DNS resolvers 2. Sign your own domains where possible 3. Help promote support of DANE protocol Allow usage of TLSA record. Let browser vendors and others know you want to use DANE. Help raise awareness of how DANE and DNSSEC can make the Internet more secure.
54 Internet Society Deploy360 Programme Can You Help Us With: Case Studies? Tutorials? Videos? How Can We Help You? 10/30/12
55 Dan York, CISSP Senior Content Strategist, Internet Society Thank You!
Deploying DNSSEC: From End-Customer To Content
Deploying DNSSEC: From End-Customer To Content March 28, 2013 www.internetsociety.org Our Panel Moderator: Dan York, Senior Content Strategist, Internet Society Panelists: Sanjeev Gupta, Principal Technical
Introduction to the DANE Protocol
Introduction to the DANE Protocol ICANN 47 July 17, 2013 Internet Society Deploy360 Programme Providing real-world deployment info for IPv6, DNSSEC, routing and other Internet technologies: Case Studies
Next Steps In Accelerating DNSSEC Deployment
Next Steps In Accelerating DNSSEC Deployment Dan York, CISSP Senior Content Strategist, Internet Society DNSSEC Deployment Workshop, ICANN 45 Toronto, Canada October 17, 2012 Internet Society Deploy360
DNSSEC Applying cryptography to the Domain Name System
DNSSEC Applying cryptography to the Domain Name System Gijs van den Broek Graduate Intern at SURFnet Overview First half: Introduction to DNS Attacks on DNS Second half: DNSSEC Questions: please ask! DNSSEC
Part 5 DNS Security. SAST01 An Introduction to Information Security 2015-09-21. Martin Hell Department of Electrical and Information Technology
SAST01 An Introduction to Information Security Part 5 DNS Security Martin Hell Department of Electrical and Information Technology How DNS works Amplification attacks Cache poisoning attacks DNSSEC 1 2
A Step-by-Step guide for implementing DANE with a Proof of Concept
A Step-by-Step guide for implementing DANE with a Proof of Concept Sandoche BALAKRICHENAN, Stephane BORTZMEYER, Mohsen SOUISSI AFNIC R&D {sandoche.balakrichenan, stephane.bortzmeyer, mohsen.souissi}@afnic.fr
DANE Secured E-Mail Demonstration. Wes Hardaker Parsons <[email protected]>
DANE Secured E-Mail Demonstration Wes Hardaker Parsons Overview My Background In scope topics Securing E-Mail Requirements Implementing Each Requirement 2 My Background Part of the Network Security
DNS Risks, DNSSEC. Olaf M. Kolkman and Allison Mankin. [email protected] and [email protected]. http://www.nlnetlabs.nl/ 8 Feb 2006 Stichting NLnet Labs
DNS Risks, DNSSEC Olaf M. Kolkman and Allison Mankin [email protected] and [email protected] 8 Feb 2006 Stichting NLnet Labs DNSSEC evangineers of the day Allison: Independent consultant Member of the Internet2
DNSSEC. Introduction. Domain Name System Security Extensions. AFNIC s Issue Papers. 1 - Organisation and operation of the DNS
AFNIC s Issue Papers DNSSEC Domain Name System Security Extensions 1 - Organisation and operation of the DNS 2 - Cache poisoning attacks 3 - What DNSSEC can do 4 - What DNSSEC cannot do 5 - Using keys
Computer Networks: Domain Name System
Computer Networks: Domain Name System Domain Name System The domain name system (DNS) is an application-layer protocol for mapping domain names to IP addresses DNS www.example.com 208.77.188.166 http://www.example.com
One year of DANE Tales and Lessons Learned. sys4.de
One year of DANE Tales and Lessons Learned sys4.de DANE secures Security Why secure Security? Encryption Models Opportunistic Encryption > Expect anything > Proceed if absent > Try if offered > Proceed
Securing End-to-End Internet communications using DANE protocol
Securing End-to-End Internet communications using DANE protocol Today, the Internet is used by nearly.5 billion people to communicate, provide/get information. When the communication involves sensitive
Securing DNS Infrastructure Using DNSSEC
Securing DNS Infrastructure Using DNSSEC Ram Mohan Executive Vice President, Afilias [email protected] February 28, 2009 Agenda Getting Started Finding out what DNS does for you What Can Go Wrong A Survival
DNSSEC for Everybody: A Beginner s Guide
DNSSEC for Everybody: A Beginner s Guide San Francisco, California 14 March 2011 4:00 to 5:00 p.m. Colonial Room The Schedule 2 This is Ugwina. She lives in a cave on the edge of the Grand Canyon... This
DNS security: poisoning, attacks and mitigation
DNS security: poisoning, attacks and mitigation The Domain Name Service underpins our use of the Internet, but it has been proven to be flawed and open to attack. Richard Agar and Kenneth Paterson explain
NANOG DNS BoF. DNS DNSSEC IPv6 Tuesday, February 1, 2011 NATIONAL ENGINEERING & TECHNICAL OPERATIONS
NANOG DNS BoF DNS DNSSEC IPv6 Tuesday, February 1, 2011 NATIONAL ENGINEERING & TECHNICAL OPERATIONS The Role Of An ISP In DNSSEC Valida;on ISPs act in two different DNSSEC roles, both signing and valida;ng
Where is Hong Kong in the secure Internet infrastructure development. Warren Kwok, CISSP Internet Society Hong Kong 12 August 2011
The Internet is for Everyone. Become an ISOC Member. Cyber Security Symposium 2011 Where is Hong Kong in the secure Internet infrastructure development Warren Kwok, CISSP Internet Society Hong Kong 12
DNS Root NameServers
DNS Root NameServers An Overview Dr. Farid Farahmand Updated: 9/24/12 Who- is- Who! Over half million networks are connected to the Internet 5 billion users by 2015! Network numbers are managed by ICANN
DNSSEC in your workflow
DNSSEC in your workflow Presentation roadmap Overview of problem space Architectural changes to allow for DNSSEC deployment Deployment tasks Key maintenance DNS server infrastructure Providing secure delegations
DNSSEC Practice Statement (DPS)
DNSSEC Practice Statement (DPS) 1. Introduction This document, "DNSSEC Practice Statement ( the DPS ) for the zones under management of Zodiac Registry Limited, states ideas of policies and practices with
Analyzing DANE's Response to Known DNSsec Vulnerabilities
Analyzing DANE's Response to Known DNSsec Vulnerabilities Matthew Henry Joseph Kirik Emily Scheerer UMBC UMBC UMBC [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] May 9, 2014 Abstract: SSL/TLS is currently
DNS at NLnet Labs. Matthijs Mekking
DNS at NLnet Labs Matthijs Mekking Topics NLnet Labs DNS DNSSEC Recent events NLnet Internet Provider until 1997 The first internet backbone in Holland Funding research and software projects that aid the
American International Group, Inc. DNS Practice Statement for the AIG Zone. Version 0.2
American International Group, Inc. DNS Practice Statement for the AIG Zone Version 0.2 1 Table of contents 1 INTRODUCTION... 6 1.1 Overview...6 1.2 Document Name and Identification...6 1.3 Community and
FAQ (Frequently Asked Questions)
FAQ (Frequently Asked Questions) Specific Questions about Afilias Managed DNS What is the Afilias DNS network? How long has Afilias been working within the DNS market? What are the names of the Afilias
A quick overview of the DANE WG. * DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities
A quick overview of the DANE WG * DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities Some background... When you connect to https://www.example.com you use SSL (actually TLS) to secure your connection. Need a
Security in the Network Infrastructure - DNS, DDoS,, etc.
Security in the Network Infrastructure - DNS, DDoS,, etc. GTER, São Paulo December 8, 2006 Steve Crocker, [email protected] Russ Mundy, [email protected] Proactive Security Build security into the infrastructure
DNSSEC Deployment a case study
DNSSEC Deployment a case study Olaf M. Kolkman [email protected] RIPE NCCs Project Team: Katie Petrusha, Brett Carr, Cagri Coltekin, Adrian Bedford, Arno Meulenkamp, and Henk Uijterwaal Januari 17, 2006
DNS and BIND. David White
DNS and BIND David White DNS: Backbone of the Internet Translates Domains into unique IP Addresses i.e. developcents.com = 66.228.59.103 Distributed Database of Host Information Works seamlessly behind
SSL and Browsers: The Pillars of Broken Security
SSL and Browsers: The Pillars of Broken Security Ivan Ristic Wolfgang Kandek Qualys, Inc. Session ID: TECH-403 Session Classification: Intermediate SSL, TLS, And PKI SSL (or TLS, if you prefer) is the
Unbound a caching, validating DNSSEC resolver. Do you trust your name server? Configuration. Unbound as a DNS cache (SEC-less)
Unbound a caching, validating DNSSEC resolver UKUUG Spring 2011 Conference Leeds, UK March 2011 Jan-Piet Mens $ dig 1.1.0.3.3.0.8.1.7.1.9.4.e164.arpa naptr Do you trust your name server? DNS clients typically
WHITE PAPER. Best Practices DNSSEC Zone Management on the Infoblox Grid
WHITE PAPER Best Practices DNSSEC Zone Management on the Infoblox Grid What Is DNSSEC, and What Problem Does It Solve? DNSSEC is a suite of Request for Comments (RFC) compliant specifications developed
DNS Cache Poisoning Vulnerability Explanation and Remedies Viareggio, Italy October 2008
DNS Cache Poisoning Vulnerability Explanation and Remedies Viareggio, Italy October 2008 Kim Davies Internet Assigned Numbers Authority Internet Corporation for Assigned Names & Numbers Agenda How do you
DNSSEC: A Vision. Anil Sagar. Additional Director Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In)
DNSSEC: A Vision Anil Sagar Additional Director Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In) Outline DNS Today DNS Attacks DNSSEC: An Approach Countering DNS Attacks Conclusion 2 DNS Today DNS is
Lesson 13: DNS Security. Javier Osuna [email protected] GMV Head of Security and Process Consulting Division
Lesson 13: DNS Security Javier Osuna [email protected] GMV Head of Security and Process Consulting Division Introduction to DNS The DNS enables people to use and surf the Internet, allowing the translation
A Best Practices Architecture for DNSSEC
WHITEPAPER A Best Practices Architecture for DNSSEC Cricket Liu, Vice President of Architecture Background The Domain Name System is the Internet s standard naming service. DNS is responsible for mapping
Internet-Praktikum I Lab 3: DNS
Kommunikationsnetze Internet-Praktikum I Lab 3: DNS Mark Schmidt, Andreas Stockmayer Sommersemester 2015 kn.inf.uni-tuebingen.de Motivation for the DNS Problem IP addresses hard to remember for humans
SAC 049 SSAC Report on DNS Zone Risk Assessment and Management
SAC 049 SSAC Report on DNS Zone Risk Assessment and Management A Report from the ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee (SSAC) 03 June 2011 SAC049 1 Preface This is a Report of the Security and
Monitoring the DNS. Gustavo Lozano Event Name XX XXXX 2015
Monitoring the DNS Gustavo Lozano Event Name XX XXXX 2015 Agenda 1 2 3 Components of the DNS Monitoring gtlds Monitoring other components of the DNS 4 5 Monitoring system Conclusion 2 Components of the
Domain Name System Security
Domain Name System Security Guevara Noubir Network Security Northeastern University 1 Domain Name System DNS is a fundamental applica=on layer protocol Not visible but invoked every =me a remote site is
IANA Functions to cctlds Sofia, Bulgaria September 2008
IANA Functions to cctlds Sofia, Bulgaria September 2008 Kim Davies Internet Assigned Numbers Authority Internet Corporation for Assigned Names & Numbers What is IANA? Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
DNSSec Operation Manual for the.cz and 0.2.4.e164.arpa Registers
DNSSec Operation Manual for the.cz and 0.2.4.e164.arpa Registers version 1.9., valid since 1 January 2010 Introduction This material lays out operational rules that govern the work of the CZ.NIC association
Local DNS Attack Lab. 1 Lab Overview. 2 Lab Environment. SEED Labs Local DNS Attack Lab 1
SEED Labs Local DNS Attack Lab 1 Local DNS Attack Lab Copyright c 2006 Wenliang Du, Syracuse University. The development of this document was partially funded by the National Science Foundation s Course,
DNSSEC Root Zone. High Level Technical Architecture
DNSSEC Root Zone Prepared by the Root DNSSEC Design Team Joe Abley David Blacka David Conrad Richard Lamb Matt Larson Fredrik Ljunggren David Knight Tomofumi Okubo Jakob Schlyter Version 1.2.1 October
Computer Networks: DNS a2acks CS 1951e - Computer Systems Security: Principles and Prac>ce. Domain Name System
Computer Networks: DNS a2acks CS 1951e - Computer Systems Security: Principles and Prac>ce 18/02/15 Networks: DNS attacks 1 Domain Name System The domain name system (DNS) is an applica>on- layer protocol
DNSSEC in stats. GC-SEC Global Cyber Security Center. Andrea Rigoni. CENTR Bruxelles, 7th October 2010. Global Cyber Security Center Director General
Global Cyber Security Center DNSSEC in stats CENTR Bruxelles, 7th October 2010 Andrea Rigoni Global Cyber Security Center Director General [email protected] On the 7 th of May 2010 Poste Italiane
The Domain Name System from a security point of view
The Domain Name System from a security point of view Simon Boman Patrik Hellström Email: {simbo105, pathe321}@student.liu.se Supervisor: David Byers, {[email protected]} Project Report for Information Security
Networking Domain Name System
IBM i Networking Domain Name System Version 7.2 IBM i Networking Domain Name System Version 7.2 Note Before using this information and the product it supports, read the information in Notices on page
DNSSEC: The Antidote to DNS Cache Poisoning and Other DNS Attacks
F5 Technical Brief DNSSEC: The Antidote to DNS Cache Poisoning and Other DNS Attacks Domain Name System (DNS) provides one of the most basic but critical functions on the Internet. If DNS isn t working,
DNS Security: New Threats, Immediate Responses, Long Term Outlook. 2007 2008 Infoblox Inc. All Rights Reserved.
DNS Security: New Threats, Immediate Responses, Long Term Outlook 2007 2008 Infoblox Inc. All Rights Reserved. A Brief History of the Recent DNS Vulnerability Kaminsky briefs key stakeholders (CERT, ISC,
DNSSEC Policy Statement Version 1.1.0. 1. Introduction. 1.1. Overview. 1.2. Document Name and Identification. 1.3. Community and Applicability
DNSSEC Policy Statement Version 1.1.0 This DNSSEC Practice Statement (DPS) conforms to the template included in RFC 6841. 1. Introduction The approach described here is modelled closely on the corresponding
IEncrypt a work-in-progress
IEncrypt a work-in-progress open-source initiative to increase encryption of traffic to and from.ie web sites, starting with newly registered second-level.ie domains. Developed by Tolerant Networks Limited
Secure Domain Name System (DNS) Deployment Guide
NIST Special Publication 800-81-2 Secure Domain Name System (DNS) Deployment Guide Ramaswamy Chandramouli Scott Rose C O M P U T E R S E C U R I T Y NIST Special Publication 800-81-2 Secure Domain Name
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) In this video you will learn the quite a bit about Public Key Infrastructure and how it is used to authenticate clients and servers. The purpose of Public Key Infrastructure
DNS SECURITY TROUBLESHOOTING GUIDE
DNS SECURITY TROUBLESHOOTING GUIDE INTERNET DEPLOYMENT OF DNS SECURITY 27 November 2006 Table of Contents 1. INTRODUCTION...3 2. DNS SECURITY SPECIFIC FAILURE MODES...3 2.1 SIGNATURES...3 2.1.1 Signature
Defending your DNS in a post-kaminsky world. Paul Wouters <[email protected]>
Defending your DNS in a post-kaminsky world Paul Wouters Overview History of DNS and the Kaminsky attack Various DNS problems explained Where to address the DNS problem Nameservers,
Secure Domain Name System (DNS) Deployment Guide
Special Publication 800-81 Sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security Secure Domain Name System (DNS) Deployment Guide Recommendations of the National Institute of Standards and Technology Ramaswamy
Domain Name System (DNS) RFC 1034 RFC 1035 http://www.ietf.org
Domain Name System (DNS) RFC 1034 RFC 1035 http://www.ietf.org TCP/IP Protocol Suite Application Layer DHCP DNS SNMP HTTP SMTP POP Transport Layer UDP TCP ICMP IGMP Network Layer IP Link Layer ARP ARP
Remote DNS Cache Poisoning Attack Lab
SEED Labs Remote DNS Cache Poisoning Attack Lab 1 Remote DNS Cache Poisoning Attack Lab Copyright c 2014 Wenliang Du, Syracuse University. The development of this document is/was funded by the following
DNSSEC. What is DNSSEC? Why is DNSSEC necessary? Ensuring a secure Internet
SEC Ensuring a secure Internet What is SEC? SEC is an extension of the Domain Name System (), that ensures the authenticity and integrity of the data in replies. Technical measures have been implemented
Introduction to the Domain Name System
CHAPTER 14 The Domain Name System (DNS) handles the growing number of Internet users. DNS translates names, such as www.cisco.com, into IP addresses, such as 192.168.40.0 (or the more extended IPv6 addresses),
Defending your DNS in a post-kaminsky world. Paul Wouters <[email protected]>
Defending your DNS in a post-kaminsky world Paul Wouters Vendor and NGO's involved Two phase deployment First release a generic fix for the Kaminsky attack that does not leak information
Reverse Proxy Guide. Version 2.0 April 2016
Version 2.0 April 2016 Reverse Proxy Guide Copyright 2016 iwebgate. All Rights Reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, transmitted, transcribed, stored in a retrieval system, or translated
Basic DNS Course. Module 1. DNS Theory. Ron Aitchison ZYTRAX, Inc. Page 1 of 24
Basic DNS Course Module 1 Ron Aitchison ZYTRAX, Inc. Page 1 of 24 The following are the slides used in this Module of the course. Some but not all slides have additional notes that you may find useful.
Overview of DNSSEC deployment worldwide
The EURid Insights series aims to analyse specific aspects of the domainname environment. The reports are based on surveys, studies and research conducted by EURid in cooperation with industry experts
Internet Standards. Sam Silberman, Constant Contact
Internet Standards Sam Silberman, Constant Contact What are Standards? World without Standards We live in a connected world Topics DMARC (Indirect flows) Security/Privacy TLS over SMTP End-to-end encryption
Use Domain Name System and IP Version 6
Use Domain Name System and IP Version 6 What You Will Learn The introduction of IP Version 6 (IPv6) into an enterprise environment requires some changes both in the provisioned Domain Name System (DNS)
How to set up the Integrated DNS Server for Inbound Load Balancing
How to set up the Integrated DNS Server for Introduction Getting Started Peplink Balance has a built-in DNS server for inbound link load balancing. You can delegate a domain s NS/SOA records, e.g. www.mycompany.com,
ALTERNATIVES TO CERTIFICATION AUTHORITIES FOR A SECURE WEB
ALTERNATIVES TO CERTIFICATION AUTHORITIES FOR A SECURE WEB Scott Rea DigiCert, Inc. Session ID: SEC-T02 Session Classification: Intermediate BACKGROUND: WHAT IS A CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY? What is a certification
Namecoin as alternative to the Domain Name System
Namecoin as alternative to the Domain Name System Xander Lammertink Author, UvA System and Network Engineering [email protected] Marco Davids Supervisor, SIDN Labs Abstract: This paper researches
Apache Security with SSL Using Ubuntu
Apache Security with SSL Using Ubuntu These materials are licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 Unported license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/) Some SSL background
Using the Domain Name System for System Break-ins
Using the Domain Name System for System Break-ins Steven M. Bellovin Presented by: Thomas Repantis [email protected] CS255-Computer Security, Winter 2004 p.1/37 Overview Using DNS to spoof a host s name
DANE for SMTP. Viktor Dukhovni & Wes Hardaker. IETF 87, Berlin July 2013
DANE for SMTP Viktor Dukhovni & Wes Hardaker IETF 87, Berlin July 2013 1 Addresses in SMTP is security agnostic: SMTP with and without TLS runs over port 25 There is no URI scheme
Presented by Greg Lindsay Technical Writer Windows Server Information Experience. Presented at: Seattle Windows Networking User Group April 7, 2010
Presented by Greg Lindsay Technical Writer Windows Server Information Experience Presented at: Seattle Windows Networking User Group April 7, 2010 Windows 7 DNS client DNS devolution Security-awareness:
DNSSEC. Introduction Principles Deployment
DNSSEC Introduction Principles Deployment Overview What we will cover The problems that DNSSEC addresses The protocol and implementations Things to take into account to deploy DNSSEC The practical problems
Securing LAN Connected Devices in Industrial Sites with TLS and Multicast DNS
Securing LAN Connected Devices in Industrial Sites with TLS and Multicast DNS Tero Keski-Valkama May 28, 2015 Version 1.0 Abstract This whitepaper outlines a more flexible and more secure user interface
DOMAIN NAME SECURITY EXTENSIONS
DOMAIN NAME SECURITY EXTENSIONS The aim of this paper is to provide information with regards to the current status of Domain Name System (DNS) and its evolution into Domain Name System Security Extensions
DNSSEC Practice Statement.OVH
DPS.OVH 11/06/2013 1 DNSSEC Practice Statement.OVH Registry domain signature policy and conditions of implementation (Version 02 11/06/2013) DPS.OVH 11/06/2013 2 Document management Document identification