IEncrypt a work-in-progress
|
|
|
- Bruno Floyd
- 10 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 IEncrypt a work-in-progress open-source initiative to increase encryption of traffic to and from.ie web sites, starting with newly registered second-level.ie domains. Developed by Tolerant Networks Limited Funded by IEDR Considered important by both:-) October 2015, ICANN54, Dublin, Ireland 1/27
2 Aside... I'm doing this presentation on behalf of IEDR as I did the dev work:-) I'm not doing this as IETF security area director nor for Trinity College Dublin 2/27
3 Contents Problem Initial Goals Benefits of Success Technical Approach Plan Proof-of-Concept Conclusion <Boring Extra Details as Backup> <Demo as we go, or later, or earlier> 3/27
4 Problem 20 years on, only about 30% of web sites talk https Precise figure not the point but the trajectory in particular for smaller web sites Cleartext => larger attack surface For example: Firesheep, great-cannon More attacks => more support/cost/trouble Getting certificates for domains and web-sites is too hard for an average registrant or site admin, or they don't care (enough) or they don't even think of it 4/27
5 Initial Goals IEncrypt check-box for registrants as they create a new.ie domain with associated web server hosting We're providing proof-of-concept for what's behind that checkbox and happy to talk about providing more From the very first DNS query and the very first HTTP response, the hosted site will benefit from state of the art security protocols: DNSSEC validating, chaining up to.ie and. Web site gets an A from e.g. ssllabs site tester WebPKI leveraging DNSSEC (at issuance time) using Letsencrypt.org Aim is medium level security, reliability and simplicity are more important goals Opportunistic security design pattern (RFC7435) says that's a valid approach 5/27
6 Benefits of Success Site visitors less likely to be hacked via bogus access point attacks (simple cookie theft) Site can make better use of powerful features that may no longer be available in browser via cleartext Fewer browser warnings (e.g. mixed content) to annoy visitors Fewer support calls to registrar as sites consider whether/how to setup TLS and as they (try) do that note: that's a guess, feedback /facts welcome Common good helping realise a better Internet [RFC7258] SEO ranking - https scores better! 6/27
7 Technical Approach Registrant wants a new.ie domain and web-site hosting (e.g. apache via VIP), with all being provided by Registrar Either by default or via a checkbox, the IEncrypt option is selected An IEncrypt advanced could allow client key gen and other options via CLI, with step-by-step guidance (later) Registrar uses DNSSEC and letsencrypt.org (LE) CA to get apache running on port 443 from the very start with no browser warnings and no registrant effort Registrar Registry gets DNSSEC setup Registrar LE web server certs setup based on DNSSEC signed zone 7/27
8 DNSSEC Setup Registrar generates ZSK and KSK and submits DS to registry Extend existing API hosted by Registry Registry signs zone including DS Registrar populates zone with DNSSEC RRs DNSSEC rollover automation is very important But actually much less so in this case! A DNSSEC rollover-fail will not affect the web site (today) 8/27
9 Web Server Cert Setup Registrar generates web server key pair (and initial content) Registrar sets up authorization for new domain with LE and is issued with a DNS-challenge Registrar includes response to DNS-challenge in signed zonefile for new domain Registrar instantiates VM image in hosting Registrar runs apache or nginx install with bettercrypto.org recommended settings and key pair Web site gets an A from ssllabs.com site tester from start 9/27
10 Reliability Critical goal: don't make things worse Need key rolling for DNSSEC to work seamlessly with no registrar effort dnssec-tools 'rollerd' does this New RFCs coming on automating DS rollover Web server cert update will be seamless letsencrypt.org client does this Can be independent of DNSSEC after 1 st keys done 10/27
11 Plan 1) IEDR and TN demo a Proof-of-Concept (PoC) 2) Discuss details with Registrars/Hosters 3) Implement DNSSEC authorization with LE 4) Incorporate registrar/le feedback into code 5) Implement and deploy in registry 6) Registrars who want to play can test 7) All code/tooling will be open-source, BSD license 11/27
12 PoC Status proof-of-concept Plays the role of the cctld in the PoC testbed.ie pretends to be.ie PoC allows one to create a new child domain that is DNSSEC signed and with web server cert issued by LE Working now, runs asynchronously (~5min cycle) Screen-shots + details in backup slides Implementation available, all BSD license Mercurial repo, bogus TLS cert:-) May move to github, soon's I get a chance If so, look below 12/27
13 PoC Hosts htps://<foo>.testbed.ie (hoba.ie) request staging web server virtual hosts web server config & keygen (webcfg) LE client (after DNSSEC done) NS1 (jell.ie) request staging Child - zone signing, KSK & ZSK generation Parent add child to named.conf.local, add DS to zonefile, zone signing NS2 (down.dsg.cs.tcd.ie) request staging Re-configure named.conf.local to add slaves Secondary DNS server 13/27
14 PoC Pictures 14/27
15 PoC Pictures 15/27
16 Conclusion It is entirely possible to make DNSSEC useful and easy (actually invisible) to help more web sites use HTTPS today automatically and for free Invisible security like this should become the norm Once ubiquitous, similar automation can be done for other things (SMTP/DANE) Registrars who are hosters and (esp. cctld) registries are well positioned to help and be key to success 16/27
17 Thanks! Questions? Contact 17/27
18 Backup Slides 18/27
19 Future Goals Handle more kinds of hosting Help existing domains to use TLS at renewal time SMTP/STARTTLS with DANE 19/27
20 PoC Software Off-the-shelf: Ubuntu 14.04, Bind (9.9.5), Apache (2.4.7) dnssec-tools (2.0.0, zonesigner, rollerd) letsencrypt client (0.1) openssl (1.01f), curl (7.35.0), php (5.5.9), bash (4.3.11) Chewing gum and string: IEncrypt scripts, some via cron, some as root 20/27
21 PoC repos Chewing gum, string and docs (this mainly) Letsencrypt client 21/27
22 PoC Workflow - Registrant Registrant requests foo.testbed.ie at testbed.ie If invalid, error If being processed say to wait else foo.testbed.ie added to inwork list If not ready, return esimated seconds until ready If ready, return link to Non-error HTML response pages autorefresh every N seconds N = uniform random between 5 and 15 22/27
23 PoC Workflow - DNSSEC (every 5 mins) NS1/children grabs list of new children from testbed.ie Via mutually-authenticated (client-cert) TLS and hidden SNI If valid, generates new zonefile, KSK/ZSK and DS Signs Zonefile (every 5 mins) NS1/parent grabs list of new children (via file system) Adds DS to parent zone and re-signs Add children to named.conf.local Pushes child to NS2/parent via mutually-authenticated (client-cert) TLS and hidden SNI Ready to add new slave Pushes child to testbed.ie via mutually-authenticated (client-cert) TLS and hidden SNI Ready to start webcfg client processing (next slide) Re-starts BIND (every 5 mins) NS2/parent grabs list of new children from file system Via mutually-authenticated (client-cert) TLS and hidden SNI Add children as new slaves to named.conf.local Re-starts BIND 23/27
24 PoC Workflow - ACME ACME is the protocol used between LE client and CA service, implemented by letsencrypt client, so once DNSSEC is done... (Every 5 minutes) webcfg checks what children to process LE client generates key pair for authorization and account handling (for foo.testbed.ie) LE client authorizes itself to LE service for foo.testbed.ie Currently via standalone option Requires IEncrypt briefly stopping apache on testbed.ie LE client generates new key pair for foo.testbed.ie web server and requests certificate LE service issues certificate IEncrypt re-starts apache and sets status of foo.testbed.ie to ready Registrant 24/27
25 PoC Restrictions LE service today uses fake CA, happy hacker fake CA happy-hacker-fake-ca.pem Standalone authoritzation used No DNS, or DNSSEC, DNS is on the way from LE though We'll be signing anyway, we may need to help them verify that the DNS challenge response is from a signed zone Means testbed.ie web server is done now and then for a few seconds No port 80 for testbed.ie or <foo>.testbed.ie just due to sharing the same apache install with hoba.ie, hence no HSTS etc. PoC children only ever run on /27
26 PoC Pictures 26/27
27 PoC pictures 27/27
DNSSEC. Introduction. Domain Name System Security Extensions. AFNIC s Issue Papers. 1 - Organisation and operation of the DNS
AFNIC s Issue Papers DNSSEC Domain Name System Security Extensions 1 - Organisation and operation of the DNS 2 - Cache poisoning attacks 3 - What DNSSEC can do 4 - What DNSSEC cannot do 5 - Using keys
Next Steps In Accelerating DNSSEC Deployment
Next Steps In Accelerating DNSSEC Deployment Dan York, CISSP Senior Content Strategist, Internet Society DNSSEC Deployment Workshop, ICANN 45 Toronto, Canada October 17, 2012 Internet Society Deploy360
SSL and Browsers: The Pillars of Broken Security
SSL and Browsers: The Pillars of Broken Security Ivan Ristic Wolfgang Kandek Qualys, Inc. Session ID: TECH-403 Session Classification: Intermediate SSL, TLS, And PKI SSL (or TLS, if you prefer) is the
DNSSEC - Why Network Operators Should Care And How To Accelerate Deployment
DNSSEC - Why Network Operators Should Care And How To Accelerate Deployment Dan York, CISSP Senior Content Strategist, Internet Society Eurasia Network Operators' Group (ENOG) 4 Moscow, Russia October
DNS Security Tools (http://www.dnssec-tools.org)
DNS Security Tools (http://www.dnssec-tools.org) Russ Mundy SPARTA, Inc. DNSSEC-Tools SPARTA is developing DNSSEC applications http:/// Components: Applications, Utilities, ETC Infrastructure: DNSSEC
WHITE PAPER. Best Practices DNSSEC Zone Management on the Infoblox Grid
WHITE PAPER Best Practices DNSSEC Zone Management on the Infoblox Grid What Is DNSSEC, and What Problem Does It Solve? DNSSEC is a suite of Request for Comments (RFC) compliant specifications developed
DNS at NLnet Labs. Matthijs Mekking
DNS at NLnet Labs Matthijs Mekking Topics NLnet Labs DNS DNSSEC Recent events NLnet Internet Provider until 1997 The first internet backbone in Holland Funding research and software projects that aid the
IETF DPRIVE WG: Encrypting DNS
IETF DPRIVE WG: Encrypting DNS Sara Dickinson Sinodun ICANN 54 - Tech Day October 2015 DPRIVE WG Focus is stub to recursive Group created IETF91 IETF92 IETF93 A ID: problem-statement RFC7626 ID: dns-tls-newport
DNS Risks, DNSSEC. Olaf M. Kolkman and Allison Mankin. [email protected] and [email protected]. http://www.nlnetlabs.nl/ 8 Feb 2006 Stichting NLnet Labs
DNS Risks, DNSSEC Olaf M. Kolkman and Allison Mankin [email protected] and [email protected] 8 Feb 2006 Stichting NLnet Labs DNSSEC evangineers of the day Allison: Independent consultant Member of the Internet2
DNSSEC Applying cryptography to the Domain Name System
DNSSEC Applying cryptography to the Domain Name System Gijs van den Broek Graduate Intern at SURFnet Overview First half: Introduction to DNS Attacks on DNS Second half: DNSSEC Questions: please ask! DNSSEC
DNSSEC in your workflow
DNSSEC in your workflow Presentation roadmap Overview of problem space Architectural changes to allow for DNSSEC deployment Deployment tasks Key maintenance DNS server infrastructure Providing secure delegations
Introduction to the DANE Protocol
Introduction to the DANE Protocol ICANN 47 July 17, 2013 Internet Society Deploy360 Programme Providing real-world deployment info for IPv6, DNSSEC, routing and other Internet technologies: Case Studies
Deploying DNSSEC: From End-Customer To Content
Deploying DNSSEC: From End-Customer To Content March 28, 2013 www.internetsociety.org Our Panel Moderator: Dan York, Senior Content Strategist, Internet Society Panelists: Sanjeev Gupta, Principal Technical
Using EMC Unisphere in a Web Browsing Environment: Browser and Security Settings to Improve the Experience
Using EMC Unisphere in a Web Browsing Environment: Browser and Security Settings to Improve the Experience Applied Technology Abstract The Web-based approach to system management taken by EMC Unisphere
Apache Security with SSL Using Ubuntu
Apache Security with SSL Using Ubuntu These materials are licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 Unported license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/) Some SSL background
A Step-by-Step guide for implementing DANE with a Proof of Concept
A Step-by-Step guide for implementing DANE with a Proof of Concept Sandoche BALAKRICHENAN, Stephane BORTZMEYER, Mohsen SOUISSI AFNIC R&D {sandoche.balakrichenan, stephane.bortzmeyer, mohsen.souissi}@afnic.fr
Step-by-Step DNSSEC-Tools Operator Guidance Document
Step-by-Step DNSSEC-Tools Operator Guidance Document Using the DNSSEC-Tools v1.0 distribution SPARTA, Inc. Table of Contents 1. Introduction... 1 Organization of this Document... 1 Key Concepts... 2 Zones
Networking Domain Name System
IBM i Networking Domain Name System Version 7.2 IBM i Networking Domain Name System Version 7.2 Note Before using this information and the product it supports, read the information in Notices on page
Automated Certificate Management
Automated Certificate Management ACME + Let s Encrypt Richard Barnes @rlbarnes What problem are we trying to solve? Not enough use of encryption in applications ~40% of Firefox pageloads
DANE Secured E-Mail Demonstration. Wes Hardaker Parsons <[email protected]>
DANE Secured E-Mail Demonstration Wes Hardaker Parsons Overview My Background In scope topics Securing E-Mail Requirements Implementing Each Requirement 2 My Background Part of the Network Security
Securing End-to-End Internet communications using DANE protocol
Securing End-to-End Internet communications using DANE protocol Today, the Internet is used by nearly.5 billion people to communicate, provide/get information. When the communication involves sensitive
DNSSEC Practice Statement (DPS)
DNSSEC Practice Statement (DPS) 1. Introduction This document, "DNSSEC Practice Statement ( the DPS ) for the zones under management of Zodiac Registry Limited, states ideas of policies and practices with
Acano solution. Security Considerations. August 2015 76-1026-01-E
Acano solution Security Considerations August 2015 76-1026-01-E Contents Contents 1 Introduction... 3 2 Acano Secure Development Lifecycle... 3 3 Acano Security Points... 4 Acano solution: Security Consideration
Defending your DNS in a post-kaminsky world. Paul Wouters <[email protected]>
Defending your DNS in a post-kaminsky world Paul Wouters Overview History of DNS and the Kaminsky attack Various DNS problems explained Where to address the DNS problem Nameservers,
Automatic Configuration of Slave Nameservers (BIND 9.7.2 only)
DNSSHIM 1 DNSSHIM is an open-source software that implements the Domain Name Name System (DNS) protocol for the Internet. Its main feature is to work as a Hidden Master nameserver, that is, provide information
Overview of DNSSEC deployment worldwide
The EURid Insights series aims to analyse specific aspects of the domainname environment. The reports are based on surveys, studies and research conducted by EURid in cooperation with industry experts
TECHNICAL NOTE Stormshield Network Firewall AUTOMATIC BACKUPS. Document version: 1.0 Reference: snentno_autobackup
Stormshield Network Firewall Document version: 1.0 Reference: snentno_autobackup CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 3 OPERATION 3 Storing in the Mystormshield.eu client area 3 Storing on a customized server 3 FIREWALL
Deploy Your First CF App on Azure with Template and Service Broker. Thomas Shao, Rita Zhang, Bin Xia Microsoft Azure Team
Deploy Your First CF App on Azure with Template and Service Broker Thomas Shao, Rita Zhang, Bin Xia Microsoft Azure Team Build, Stage, Deploy, Publish Applications with one Command Supporting Languages
Analyzing DANE's Response to Known DNSsec Vulnerabilities
Analyzing DANE's Response to Known DNSsec Vulnerabilities Matthew Henry Joseph Kirik Emily Scheerer UMBC UMBC UMBC [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] May 9, 2014 Abstract: SSL/TLS is currently
Project X Mass interception of encrypted connections
Project X Mass interception of encrypted connections What? SSL/TLS interception TOR interception ...a thorny path Common Issues Public Key Pinning avoids rogue CA to sign certs Common Issues Google and
Load Balancing Microsoft Sharepoint 2010 Load Balancing Microsoft Sharepoint 2013. Deployment Guide
Load Balancing Microsoft Sharepoint 2010 Load Balancing Microsoft Sharepoint 2013 Deployment Guide rev. 1.4.2 Copyright 2015 Loadbalancer.org, Inc. 1 Table of Contents About this Guide... 3 Appliances
WebStore Guide. The Uniform Solution
WebStore Guide The Uniform Solution Copyright 2009-2013 Premier Data Systems All rights reserved. This publication is protected by copyright and all rights are reserved by Premier Data Systems. It may
Dry Dock Documentation
Dry Dock Documentation Release 0.6.11 Taylor "Nekroze" Lawson December 19, 2014 Contents 1 Features 3 2 TODO 5 2.1 Contents:................................................. 5 2.2 Feedback.................................................
American International Group, Inc. DNS Practice Statement for the AIG Zone. Version 0.2
American International Group, Inc. DNS Practice Statement for the AIG Zone Version 0.2 1 Table of contents 1 INTRODUCTION... 6 1.1 Overview...6 1.2 Document Name and Identification...6 1.3 Community and
DNSSEC Deployment a case study
DNSSEC Deployment a case study Olaf M. Kolkman [email protected] RIPE NCCs Project Team: Katie Petrusha, Brett Carr, Cagri Coltekin, Adrian Bedford, Arno Meulenkamp, and Henk Uijterwaal Januari 17, 2006
Switching Your DNS WiredTree
Switching Your DNS Switching your DNS Now that you have your new account with us it is time to start planning on moving your current hosting over to your new server. This getting started guide covers switching
A Study of What Really Breaks SSL HITB Amsterdam 2011
A Study of What Really Breaks SSL HITB Amsterdam 2011 v1.0 Ivan Ristic Michael Small 20 May 2011 Agenda 1. State of SSL 2. Quick intro to SSL Labs 3. SSL Configuration Surveys 4. Survey of Actual SSL Usage
ALTERNATIVES TO CERTIFICATION AUTHORITIES FOR A SECURE WEB
ALTERNATIVES TO CERTIFICATION AUTHORITIES FOR A SECURE WEB Scott Rea DigiCert, Inc. Session ID: SEC-T02 Session Classification: Intermediate BACKGROUND: WHAT IS A CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY? What is a certification
IANA Functions to cctlds Sofia, Bulgaria September 2008
IANA Functions to cctlds Sofia, Bulgaria September 2008 Kim Davies Internet Assigned Numbers Authority Internet Corporation for Assigned Names & Numbers What is IANA? Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
Web Security. Mahalingam Ramkumar
Web Security Mahalingam Ramkumar Issues Phishing Spreading misinformation Cookies! Authentication Domain name DNS Security Transport layer security Dynamic HTML Java applets, ActiveX, JavaScript Exploiting
Fast, Scalable And Secure Web Hosting For Entrepreneurs
Fast, Scalable And Secure Web Hosting For Entrepreneurs Learn to set up your server and website Wim Bervoets This book is for sale at http://leanpub.com/fastscalableandsecurewebhostingforentrepreneurs
Setting Up SSL on IIS6 for MEGA Advisor
Setting Up SSL on IIS6 for MEGA Advisor Revised: July 5, 2012 Created: February 1, 2008 Author: Melinda BODROGI CONTENTS Contents... 2 Principle... 3 Requirements... 4 Install the certification authority
Deployment Guide Microsoft IIS 7.0
Deployment Guide Microsoft IIS 7.0 DG_IIS_022012.1 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 Introduction... 4 2 Deployment Guide Overview... 4 3 Deployment Guide Prerequisites... 4 4 Accessing the AX Series Load Balancer...
DANE for SMTP. Viktor Dukhovni & Wes Hardaker. IETF 87, Berlin July 2013
DANE for SMTP Viktor Dukhovni & Wes Hardaker IETF 87, Berlin July 2013 1 Addresses in SMTP is security agnostic: SMTP with and without TLS runs over port 25 There is no URI scheme
SSL: Paved With Good Intentions. Richard Moore [email protected]
SSL: Paved With Good Intentions Richard Moore [email protected] Why do we need SSL? Privacy Online shopping Online banking Identity Protection Data Integrity Early SSL First public version was SSLv2
The IANA Functions. An Introduction to the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) Functions
The IANA Functions An Introduction to the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) Functions Contents SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION 4 SECTION 2: POLICY, STAKEHOLDERS AND STEWARDSHIP IMPLEMENTATION 6 SECTION
DevShop. Drupal Infrastructure in a Box. Jon Pugh CEO, Founder ThinkDrop Consulting Brooklyn NY
DevShop Drupal Infrastructure in a Box Jon Pugh CEO, Founder ThinkDrop Consulting Brooklyn NY Who? Jon Pugh ThinkDrop Consulting Building the web since 1997. Founded in 2009 in Brooklyn NY. Building web
E-Commerce for IT Advanced. Louis Aguila & Matt Burt
Advanced Louis Aguila & Matt Burt Class Objectives To explore Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS) use and troubleshooting Basic E-Commerce site setup in IIS Use of Application Pools and settings
Installing and Using the vnios Trial
Installing and Using the vnios Trial The vnios Trial is a software package designed for efficient evaluation of the Infoblox vnios appliance platform. Providing the complete suite of DNS, DHCP and IPAM
Secure Domain Name System (DNS) Deployment Guide
Special Publication 800-81 Sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security Secure Domain Name System (DNS) Deployment Guide Recommendations of the National Institute of Standards and Technology Ramaswamy
DNS SRV Usage June 22, 2011
DNS SRV Usage June 22, 2011 Proprietary 2011 Media5 Corporation Table of Contents Scope of this Document... 3 DNS SRV (RFC 2782)... 3 Deployment Scenario... 4 Mediatrix Unit Configuration... 5 Scenario
Finding and Preventing Cross- Site Request Forgery. Tom Gallagher Security Test Lead, Microsoft
Finding and Preventing Cross- Site Request Forgery Tom Gallagher Security Test Lead, Microsoft Agenda Quick reminder of how HTML forms work How cross-site request forgery (CSRF) attack works Obstacles
Introduction to the EIS Guide
Introduction to the EIS Guide The AirWatch Enterprise Integration Service (EIS) provides organizations the ability to securely integrate with back-end enterprise systems from either the AirWatch SaaS environment
CHAPTER 7 SSL CONFIGURATION AND TESTING
CHAPTER 7 SSL CONFIGURATION AND TESTING 7.1 Configuration and Testing of SSL Nowadays, it s very big challenge to handle the enterprise applications as they are much complex and it is a very sensitive
Glossary of Technical Terms Related to IPv6
AAAA Record An AAAA record stores a 128-bit Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) address, which does not fit the standard A record format. For example, 2007:0db6:85a3:0000:0000:6a2e:0371:7234 is a valid
Installation and usage of SSL certificates: Your guide to getting it right
Installation and usage of SSL certificates: Your guide to getting it right So, you ve bought your SSL Certificate(s). Buying your certificate is only the first of many steps involved in securing your website.
CA Performance Center
CA Performance Center Single Sign-On User Guide 2.4 This Documentation, which includes embedded help systems and electronically distributed materials, (hereinafter referred to as the Documentation ) is
ENABLING RPC OVER HTTPS CONNECTIONS TO M-FILES SERVER
M-FILES CORPORATION ENABLING RPC OVER HTTPS CONNECTIONS TO M-FILES SERVER VERSION 2.3 DECEMBER 18, 2015 Page 1 of 15 CONTENTS 1. Version history... 3 2. Overview... 3 2.1. System Requirements... 3 3. Network
DNS and BIND. David White
DNS and BIND David White DNS: Backbone of the Internet Translates Domains into unique IP Addresses i.e. developcents.com = 66.228.59.103 Distributed Database of Host Information Works seamlessly behind
Remote Monitoring Service - Setup Guide for InfraStruXure Central and StruxureWare 1 5
Remote Monitoring Service Setup Guide for InfraStruXure Central and StruxureWare Overview This document explains how to setup Remote Monitoring Service using InfraStruXure Central or StruxureWare server.
Customer Tips. Xerox Network Scanning HTTP/HTTPS Configuration using Microsoft IIS. for the user. Purpose. Background
Xerox Multifunction Devices Customer Tips June 5, 2007 This document applies to these Xerox products: X WC Pro 232/238/245/ 255/265/275 for the user Xerox Network Scanning HTTP/HTTPS Configuration using
Securing DNS Infrastructure Using DNSSEC
Securing DNS Infrastructure Using DNSSEC Ram Mohan Executive Vice President, Afilias [email protected] February 28, 2009 Agenda Getting Started Finding out what DNS does for you What Can Go Wrong A Survival
DNSSEC for Everybody: A Beginner s Guide
DNSSEC for Everybody: A Beginner s Guide San Francisco, California 14 March 2011 4:00 to 5:00 p.m. Colonial Room The Schedule 2 This is Ugwina. She lives in a cave on the edge of the Grand Canyon... This
FAQ (Frequently Asked Questions)
FAQ (Frequently Asked Questions) Specific Questions about Afilias Managed DNS What is the Afilias DNS network? How long has Afilias been working within the DNS market? What are the names of the Afilias
Apache Security with SSL Using Linux
Apache Security with SSL Using Linux These materials are licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 Unported license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/) Some SSL background
SSL/TLS: The Ugly Truth
SSL/TLS: The Ugly Truth Examining the flaws in SSL/TLS protocols, and the use of certificate authorities. Adrian Hayter CNS Hut 3 Team [email protected] Contents Introduction to SSL/TLS Cryptography
First version of the document.
First version of the document. 2.1 Access to web forms... 6 2.2 Menu... 7 2.3 Dashboard... 8 2.4 Domain names... 9 2.4.1 Create domain name... 9 2.4.2 Query domain name details...11 2.4.3 Registrar domain
VMware vcenter Log Insight Getting Started Guide
VMware vcenter Log Insight Getting Started Guide vcenter Log Insight 1.5 This document supports the version of each product listed and supports all subsequent versions until the document is replaced by
AXIGEN Mail Server. Quick Installation and Configuration Guide. Product version: 6.1 Document version: 1.0
AXIGEN Mail Server Quick Installation and Configuration Guide Product version: 6.1 Document version: 1.0 Last Updated on: May 28, 2008 Chapter 1: Introduction... 3 Welcome... 3 Purpose of this document...
Access Gateway Guide Access Manager 4.0 SP1
Access Gateway Guide Access Manager 4.0 SP1 May 2014 www.netiq.com/documentation Legal Notice THIS DOCUMENT AND THE SOFTWARE DESCRIBED IN THIS DOCUMENT ARE FURNISHED UNDER AND ARE SUBJECT TO THE TERMS
The Canadian Internet Registration Authority (CIRA) manages a 100% up time service - the.ca domain name registry for over 2.
WHO IS.CA ( CIRA )? The organization responsible for a critical part of the Internet infrastructure; expanding its services to help organizations secure their DNS in Canada The Canadian Internet Registration
Rough Outline. Introduction Why DNSSEC DNSSEC Theory Famous last words. http://www.nlnetlabs.nl/ Universiteit van Amsterdam, Sep 2006.
page 2 Rough Outline An introduction to DNSSEC Olaf Kolkman 21 September 2006 Stichting (www.nlnetlabs.nl) Introduction Why DNSSEC DNSSEC Theory Famous last words page 3 DNSSEC evangineers of the day Olaf:
DNS Cache Poisoning Vulnerability Explanation and Remedies Viareggio, Italy October 2008
DNS Cache Poisoning Vulnerability Explanation and Remedies Viareggio, Italy October 2008 Kim Davies Internet Assigned Numbers Authority Internet Corporation for Assigned Names & Numbers Agenda How do you
Working With Virtual Hosts on Pramati Server
Working With Virtual Hosts on Pramati Server 13 Overview Virtual hosting allows a single machine to be addressed by different names. There are two ways for configuring Virtual Hosts. They are: Domain Name
DNS Security: New Threats, Immediate Responses, Long Term Outlook. 2007 2008 Infoblox Inc. All Rights Reserved.
DNS Security: New Threats, Immediate Responses, Long Term Outlook 2007 2008 Infoblox Inc. All Rights Reserved. A Brief History of the Recent DNS Vulnerability Kaminsky briefs key stakeholders (CERT, ISC,
Introduction. What is Unbound and what is DNSSEC. Installation. Manual for Unbound on Windows. W.C.A. Wijngaards, NLnet Labs, October 2010
Manual for Unbound on Windows W.C.A. Wijngaards, NLnet Labs, October 2010 Introduction This manual aims to provide information about the Unbound server on the Windows platform. Included is installation,
A Review of Administrative Tools for DNSSEC Spring 2010
Page 1 (29) Andreas Nilsson Certezza AB Stockholm 2010-05-31 A Review of Administrative Tools for DNSSEC Spring 2010 Kornhamnstorg 61, 2 tr SE-111 27 Stockholm Sweden Telefon: +46 (0)8 791 92 00 Telefon:
DNSSEC: The Antidote to DNS Cache Poisoning and Other DNS Attacks
F5 Technical Brief DNSSEC: The Antidote to DNS Cache Poisoning and Other DNS Attacks Domain Name System (DNS) provides one of the most basic but critical functions on the Internet. If DNS isn t working,
LabVIEW Internet Toolkit User Guide
LabVIEW Internet Toolkit User Guide Version 6.0 Contents The LabVIEW Internet Toolkit provides you with the ability to incorporate Internet capabilities into VIs. You can use LabVIEW to work with XML documents,
GlobalSign Solutions
GlobalSign Solutions SNI + CloudSSL Implementation Guide Hosting Multiple SSL on a Single IP Address Contents Introduction... 3 Why do hosting companies want SNI/CloudSSL?... 3 Configuration instructions...
Cisco SSL Encryption Utility
About SSL Encryption Utility, page 1 About SSL Encryption Utility Unified ICM web servers are configured for secure access (HTTPS) using SSL. Cisco provides an application called the SSL Encryption Utility
Computer Networks: Domain Name System
Computer Networks: Domain Name System Domain Name System The domain name system (DNS) is an application-layer protocol for mapping domain names to IP addresses DNS www.example.com 208.77.188.166 http://www.example.com
Global Service Loadbalancing & DNSSEC. Ralf Brünig Field Systems Engineer [email protected] DNSSEC
Global Service Loadbalancing & DNSSEC Ralf Brünig Field Systems Engineer [email protected] DNSSEC F5 s Integrated Solution Users The F5 Solution Applications Mobile Phone PDA Laptop Desktop Application
Installing an SSL certificate on the InfoVaultz Cloud Appliance
Installing an SSL certificate on the InfoVaultz Cloud Appliance This document reviews the prerequisites and installation of an SSL certificate for the InfoVaultz Cloud Appliance. Please note that the installation
Securing the SSL/TLS channel against man-in-the-middle attacks: Future technologies - HTTP Strict Transport Security and Pinning of Certs
OWASP AppSec APAC 2012 The OWASP Foundation http://www.owasp.org Securing the SSL/TLS channel against man-in-the-middle attacks: Future technologies - HTTP Strict Transport Security and Pinning of Certs
Adobe Marketing Cloud First-Party Cookies
Adobe Marketing Cloud First-Party Cookies Contents About First-Party Cookies...3 Adobe Managed Certificate Program...4 Create CNAME Records...5 Ping the hostname...5 Update implementation code...6 Legacy
Global Registry Services Registrar Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) for TLDs using Afilias Technology
Global Registry Services Registrar Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) for TLDs using Afilias Technology Prepared by Afilias November 2013 Table of Contents Foreword... 1 Non-Technical... 1 Accreditation,
Remote DNS Cache Poisoning Attack Lab
SEED Labs Remote DNS Cache Poisoning Attack Lab 1 Remote DNS Cache Poisoning Attack Lab Copyright c 2014 Wenliang Du, Syracuse University. The development of this document is/was funded by the following
DNSSEC and DNS Proxying
DNSSEC and DNS Proxying DNS is hard at scale when you are a huge target 2 CloudFlare DNS is big 3 CloudFlare DNS is fast 4 CloudFlare DNS is always under attack 5 CloudFlare A secure reverse proxy for
Configuration Notes 0215
Mediatrix Digital and Analog VoIP Gateways DNS SRV Configuration for a Redundant Server Solution (SIP) Introduction... 2 Deployment Scenario... 2 DNS SRV (RFC 2782)... 3 Microsoft Server Configuration...
