MASTER IN CORPORATE COMMUNICATION

Transcription

1 MASTER IN CORPORATE COMMUNICATION AARHUS BSS DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS COMMUNICATION A CASE STUDY OF MALAYSIA AIRLINES CRISIS COMMUNICATION DURING THE DISAPPEARANCE OF FLIGHT MH370 WRITTEN BY SØREN KRONBORG THOMAS MAEGAARD-NIELSEN SUPERVISOR BO LAURSEN

2 The total amount of characters in this thesis amounts to 224,244 compliant to standard pages. Conferring with the requirements, this excludes Spaces, Abstract, Table of Contents, and Appendices. Appendixes are encloses separately. June 1, 2015 Søren Kronborg Thomas Maegaard-Nielsen

3 Abstract Purpose: With departure in reputation management and crisis communication, the aim of the thesis is to investigate how Malaysia Airlines executed its crisis communication during the disappearance of flight MH370. Furthermore, the thesis seeks to investigate to which degree Malaysia Airlines was able to protect its reputation during the crisis. Design/methodology/approach: The thesis is a case study of Malaysia Airlines crisis communication consisting of both a qualitative and quantitative research combined in a mixed methods research. The qualitative research is carried out on the basis of sampled company documents and analyzed using a qualitative content analysis. The qualitative investigation additionally forms the basis for conducting the quantitative research, which consists of data gathered from an online questionnaire survey and analyzed using a frequency table analysis. The effect of Malaysia Airlines crisis communication is uncovered by combining the two separately conducted investigations in an overall discussion. Findings: The thesis found that Malaysia Airlines failed to provide an adequate and consistent information flow to its stakeholders during the crisis, which resulted in a double crisis that gave the airline an unprecedented communication challenge. Malaysia Airlines mistakenly decided to adopt its own crisis framing, and the airline therefore misjudged the crisis type which served as a launch point for the employment and combination of several inappropriate crisis response strategies. Consequently, it proved difficult for Malaysia Airlines to maintain positive stakeholder relations, and the airline s reputation became severely damaged. Malaysia Airlines lost its means to sustain profitability, and it ultimately made the organization aware of the need to restructure its business operations. Practical implications: The findings can give crisis managers useful insight into the communicative challenges they may face during a crisis. If an organization mismanages the original crisis, it may be overlaid by a double crisis. In such an instance, it may prove difficult for crisis managers to carry out a successful crisis communication strategy due to a gap in existing literature. Originality/value: The thesis provides a deep insight into the crisis communication effort carried out by Malaysia Airlines in a corporate communication context from both an organizational and a stakeholder perspective. Keywords: Corporate communication, reputation management, crisis management, crisis communication, crisis type and intensifying factors, crisis response strategies, guidelines with recommendations, stakeholder perceptions, and customers.

4 Table of Contents 1. INTRODUCTION (SHARED) PROBLEM STATEMENT SCIENTIFIC APPROACH, RESEARCH METHOD AND DATA COLLECTION THESIS SCOPE AND DELIMITATIONS STRUCTURE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK (SØREN) INTRODUCING CORPORATE COMMUNICATION (THOMAS) CORPORATE REPUTATION (THOMAS) Corporate Reputation Defined (Thomas) One or Several Reputations (Søren) Why Corporate Reputation is Important (Thomas) Reputation Building (Søren) Managing Corporate Reputation (Søren) CRISIS MANAGEMENT (SØREN) Crisis Definition: a Socially Constructed Phenomena (Søren) Image Restoration Discourse and Crisis Communication (Thomas) The Theory of Image Restoration Discourse (Thomas) Suggestions for Effective Image Repair Discourse (Søren) Situational Crisis Communication Theory (Søren) Stage One: Crisis Type and Intensifying Factors (Søren) Stage Two: Crisis Response Strategies (Søren) Stage Three Guidelines with Recommendations for Crisis Response Selection (Thomas) Two Important Research Traditions (Søren) THEORY OF SCIENCE (THOMAS) ONTOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS (SØREN) The Ontological Position of Constructionism (Søren) The Epistemological Position of Interpretivism (Thomas) METHODOLOGY (SØREN) The Case Study Design (Thomas) Research Strategy: Mixed Methods Research (Thomas) Why Both Methods? (Søren) Data Collection (Thomas) Documents as Sources of Data (Søren) Sampling Strategy (Thomas) Validity of the Qualitative Study (Søren) Qualitative Data Analysis (Søren) Online Survey (Søren) Questionnaire Design (Søren) Sampling Strategy (Thomas) Validity of the Quantitative Study (Thomas) Quantitative Data analysis (Søren) CASE PRESENTATION (THOMAS) ANALYSIS (SØREN) CRISIS TYPE AND INTENSIFYING FACTORS (THOMAS) The Crisis Occurs (Thomas) The Intensity of the Rumor Crisis Increases (Thomas) MH370 is Deemed Lost (Thomas) Stakeholders Question the Credibility of the Crisis Communication (Thomas) Interpreting the Findings (Søren) Ambiguity Creates Rumors (Søren)... 60

5 Contributing to Rumor Creation (Søren) Assessing the Crisis (Søren) Intensifying Factors (Søren) CRISIS RESPONSE STRATEGIES (SØREN) The Initial Strategy (Søren) Shifting Strategies (Søren) Strategies following the Announcement of the Plane Crash (Søren) Interpreting the Findings (Thomas) Denial Posture Strategies (Thomas) Diminishment Posture Strategies (Thomas) Rebuilding Posture Strategies (Thomas) Bolstering Posture Strategies (Thomas) Overall use of Crisis Response Strategies (Thomas) STAKEHOLDER PERCEPTIONS OF MAS CRISIS COMMUNICATION (THOMAS) Survey Results (Thomas) Interpreting the findings (Søren) DISCUSSION (SØREN) CONCLUSION (SHARED) IMPLICATIONS FOR CRISIS COMMUNICATION PRACTICE (SHARED) BIBLIOGRAPHY ARTICLES BOOKS WEBSITES

6 1. Introduction On March 8, 2014, Malaysian Airlines (MAS) was put to the test. The organization experienced one of the worst crises in modern aviation history, when flight MH370 on route from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing disappeared. Air traffic control centers lost all contact with the plane at 2:40am local Malaysian time, and an international search and rescue mission from Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam was mobilized hours later (Appendix 1). The search for flight MH370 was initially carried out in the South China Sea and then widened to include Malaysian Peninsular, the Malacca Strait, and the Andaman Sea (Appendix 8). On March 15, the search was widened to include a northern and southern corridor (Appendix 11). However, the decision to widen the search did not shed light on the circumstances surrounding the disappearance of flight MH370. Consequently, MAS decided to inform the general public on March 24 that the plane presumably ended its route in the southern Indian Ocean and that no one could possibly have survived the plane crash. A British global mobile satellite communications company, Inmarsat, had performed further calculations on the satellite data which indicated that the last known positon of flight MH370 was in the middle of the southern Indian Ocean far from any possible landing sites (Appendix 13). Nevertheless, if MAS had predicted that the crisis would eventually be buried by drawing this conclusion, the airline was terribly mistaken. There is still no physical evidence to support the conclusion, and it has presented MAS with an unprecedented communication challenge. One might say that the MH370 crisis became an unprecedented challenge because it was what Fink (2002) refers to as sudden, unexpected, unanticipated, and short-fused, which arguably made it very difficult to manage (Fink 2002: 55). There seems to be a general consensus among crisis communication writers that a crisis is a negative phenomenon that compose a direct threat to the organization and can have a serious impact on its reputation. Fink encapsulates that consensus in his definition of a crisis: A crisis is an unstable time or state of affairs in which a decisive change is impending ( ) with has the distinct possibility of a highly undesirable outcome ( ) (Ibid: 15). According to Cornelissen (2008), protecting an organization s reputation by building and maintaining the relationship with important stakeholders is considered one of the most valued criteria of corporate communication (Cornelissen 2008: 3). Besides from its reputation, an organization s relations with its stakeholders can also have a profound impact on its overall Page 1 of 102

7 performance, as the ( ) ability to create value for the customer directly influences revenues (Samanta 2014: 206). One key element in managing an organization s reputation is also the ability to manage crisis situations through effective communication strategies. In fact, organizations frequently find themselves in situations that can be defined as crises (Coombs & Holladay 2010a: 17). Crisis communication represents a set of factors designed to combat crises, lessen the actual damage inflicted and minimize the reputational threat. In other words, crisis communication seeks to prevent or lessen the negative outcomes of a crisis by protecting the organization, its stakeholders, and the industry from harm (Coombs 2012: 5). Crisis communication is one of the most critical elements of effective crisis management, and it can broadly be defined as ( ) the collection, processing, and dissemination of information that is required to address a crisis situation (Ibid). If the organization in crisis is incapable of running the communication processes which is supposed to contribute to the initial handling of the crisis, a double crisis may occur where the original crisis is overlaid by a communication crisis (Johansen & Frandsen 2007: 79). If this turns out to be the case, the crisis can be a serious threat to the organization s legitimacy. Johansen & Frandsen (2007) argue that crises can violate the expectations that stakeholders have about how organizations should act. When expectations are breached, stakeholders perceive the organization less positively and the reputation is harmed. As a result, it is emphasized that crises should be considered very dangerous to an organization s overall reputation and future existence (Coombs 2012: 3). One of crisis communication s corner stones was laid by Benoit (1997), when he used the concepts of apologia and accounts to develop his theory of image restoration discourse as an approach for understanding corporate crises. Apologia is communication with the purpose of defending reputation from public attack, and accounts is communication used to explain the organization s behavior when it is called into question (Benoit 1997: 154). However, Benoit s theory focuses primarily on the verbal defense strategies applied by organizations when their image or reputation is under attack. It does not take into account the contextual factors that may influence the communication processes. In continuation of Benoit s image restoration discourse, Coombs (1999, 2007, 2012, and 2015) combines elements of the rhetorical approach to crisis communication with Weiner s (2006) conceptualization of attribution theory in his Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT). The theory includes the notion that stronger attributions of the organization as the source of the cause lead to greater attributions of crisis responsibility, which in turn leads to an increased threat to Page 2 of 102

8 an organization s reputation (Coombs & Holladay 2010b: 247). SCCT operates with three stages that seek to provide crisis managers with a set of guidelines to assist them in choosing the most effective responses for the protection of the organization s reputational assets. The first stage seeks to establish the crisis level of reputational threat and determine if the crisis has any intensifying factors. The second stage proposes different crisis communication strategies to provide the maximal reputational defense, and the third stage provides a system of guidelines with recommendations for effective crisis communication (Coombs 1999: 143). The goal of the SCCT is to match crisis response strategies with specific situations. Roughly, the greater the reputational threat is, the more accommodative the crisis response strategy is expected to be (Coombs & Holladay 2010b: 249) Problem Statement Based on the information presented so far, we have been inspired to devise a problem statement consisting of two research questions. With departure in reputation management and crisis communication, we wish to investigate: 1. How did MAS execute its crisis communication during the disappearance of flight MH370? 2. To which degree was the airline able to protect its reputation during the crisis? In order to address the first research question, we will apply Coombs (1999, 2007, 2012, and 2015) SCCT to investigate how MAS executed its crisis communication during the crisis. The second research question will be addressed in an investigation of MAS ability to protect its reputation by exploring how a specific customer group perceived the communication effort. It has been emphasized that one of the most important stakeholder groups for any organization is the customers, as they can have a profound effect on its overall performance. The customers should therefore provide an interesting point of departure for a supplementary investigation of MAS reputation Scientific Approach, Research Method and Data Collection The scientific approaches influencing this thesis are comprised of both ontological and epistemological considerations, which will be expressed rather implicit than explicit. The thesis first and foremost takes its point of departure in the ontological position of constructionism to study the reality and context created by MAS and its key stakeholders. Constructionism generally implies that social phenomena are constructed by social actors through interactions and conversations that Page 3 of 102

9 do not exist independently from the people participating. The approach invites the researcher to consider the ways in which social reality is an ongoing accomplishment of social actors rather than something external to them (Bryman 2012: 33). By embracing the constructionist approach, it can be asserted that crises and their meanings are continually being constructed not only by MAS, but also by other social actors such as the stakeholders. As a result, the reality of the crisis should be regarded as a socially constructed phenomenon created by both MAS and its key stakeholders (Coombs 2012: 2). The ontological position of constructionism should enable an investigating of the communication effort carried out by MAS from both an organizational and a customer perspective. Additionally, epistemology is the different forms of knowledge that can be employed to understand social realities more in-depth. In order to reach a more holistic understanding of the social reality created by MAS and its customers, the epistemological position of interpretevism has been adopted. The interpretivist approach embraces a worldview that is affected by the social constructions of reality and based on the researcher s subjective observations influenced by personal values. We will employ the hermeneutic-phenomenological tradition, which is one of the most prominent intellectual heritages of interpretivism, to interpret the meaning created between MAS and its customers in a wider context. By gaining access to the common-sense thinking of MAS and its customers, we should be capable of interpreting their actions and their social world from their viewpoints (Bryman 2012: 30). The investigation takes it point of departure in a case study of MAS crisis communication during the disappearance of flight MH370. The single case study should allow us to capture the complexity and particular nature of the case in question where our emphasis will be placed on an extensive examination of MAS crisis communication from two perspectives. There is a widespread tendency to associate case studies with qualitative research, but such identification is inappropriate as case studies are frequently sites for the employment of both qualitative and quantitative research methods (Ibid: 68). The same argument applies to the scientific link between ontology, epistemology and methodology; it is important but not determinant for the chosen research strategy. For this thesis, we have decided to conduct research that cuts across the qualitative and quantitative divide within a single research project, namely what Bryman (2012) refers to as mixed methods research. Mixed methods research can be carried out in several ways, and different rationales exist for combining qualitative and quantitative research. Our incentive for combining qualitative and quantitative research in a mixed methods research is placed within the rationale of completeness, Page 4 of 102

10 which dictates that a more complete answer to a set of research questions can be achieved by including two different research methods (Ibid: 637). Qualitative research will account for the principal data-gathering tool of the mixed methods research. The qualitative data will be gathered by sampling documents from MAS and the Malaysian Government s official MH370 websites, and it covers both press releases, transcripts of press conferences and annual reports during a period from March 8 to August 29, It should be noted that all statements by both MAS and the Malaysian Government are accredited to MAS. The reason for this accreditation is the fact that at the time of the crisis, 70% of the airline was owned by the Malaysian Government through its strategic investment fund, Khazanah Nasional Berhad. A qualitative content analysis will consequently be employed to analyze the sampled documents and should enable an answer to the first research question. Qualitative content analysis is one of the most prevalent approaches to the qualitative analysis of texts, and it is comprised of searching for underlying themes and concepts in the sampled documents. The SCCT contains several theoretical concepts and categories, and we therefore find it sensible to use them as themes when examining the sampled documents. Bryman does not specify in detail the process through which the themes are extracted, but they will be illustrated in quotations and statements derived from the documents when we write down our findings. Another important element in qualitative content analysis is to interpret the findings, which means that we will reflect on the overall importance of our findings for the research questions and the research literature that have driven the collection of data (Ibid: 559). Although the predominant research strategy of the thesis is deemed qualitative, most qualitative research methods do not allow data to be evaluated in terms of measurement, and we therefore needed an additional approach that would allow us to measure how the customers perceived MAS crisis communication. When the findings derived from the qualitative content analysis have been interpreted, they will form the basis for conducting an online questionnaire survey. In other words, we have employed a quantitative investigation to help shed light on the findings drawn from the qualitative. According to Bryman, it is possible to use the in-depth knowledge of social contexts acquired through qualitative research to inform the design of e.g. questionnaire surveys (Ibid: 644). The questionnaire will primarily be comprised of attitude questions in the form of a Likert Scale design. The Likert Scale is one of the most frequently encountered formats for measuring attitudes, and the questions will be specifically geared towards addressing the thesis second research question (Ibid: ). Page 5 of 102

11 There are many available online software packages to design a questionnaire, and we decided to use SurveyXact since it is a free and acclaimed instrument offered by Aarhus BSS. Using SurveyXact should also eliminate the obligation of coding a relatively large number of questionnaires, and it reduces the likelihood of errors in the processing of data. Each respondent s replies are logged into a database, and the entire dataset can be retrieved and used in a frequency table analysis once the data collection phase is complete (Ibid: 671). The statistical analysis of the respondents perceptions of MAS crisis communication will be described by providing the reader with short and simple summaries about the sample and its measurements. Albeit qualitative research has had almost a monopoly of the ability to study meaning over the years, the widespread inclusion of questions about attitudes in social surveys suggests that quantitative researchers are interested in matters of meaning as well (Ibid: 617). When we ask the respondents about their perceptions of different elements of MAS crisis communication, it also implies that we need to uncover issues of meaning in the quantitative investigation. This aspect further supports the idea that qualitative and quantitative research is probably not as wide and distinct as is often supposed by many social researchers Thesis Scope and Delimitations In terms of scope, the thesis will conduct an investigation of MAS crisis communication during the disappearance of flight MH370. The crisis is contained to the period between March 8, when the plane disappears, and August 29, when the plan to delist MAS is announced. The qualitative investigation of press releases, transcripts of press conferences, and annual reports is conducted with the purpose of ensuring that the content of all the collected data speaks to how the airline utilized communication to manage the MH370 crisis. Articles including statements from unofficial sources like newspapers and other media have been excluded because they may angle the story to bring their version of it. We did however make a few exceptions in order to bring relevant information that was unavailable on the official websites, but when exceptions were made it was always the unedited information of the article that was utilized in the analysis. MAS use of social media communication during the crisis has been excluded for a variety of reasons, but first and foremost because it has not been the focus of the thesis. Additionally, it is user-generated communication, which makes it impossible to distinguish between users and exclude people that are partial to the airline, e.g. the relatives of the passengers and crew members of flight MH370. The statements made by the relatives in the press are also excluded because they are deemed partial and do not form a representative sample. Instead, we have conducted an online questionnaire Page 6 of 102

12 survey of potential customers with the purpose of providing a different and perhaps more realistic perspective of how the stakeholders perceived MAS crisis communication. The quantitative investigation is made with the purpose of ensuring that the respondents are a fair sample of MAS potential customers. One might say that the majority of MAS potential customers are located in other areas of the world, but since it is the absolute size of a sample that is important and not the relative, the investigation will arguably be just as valid when sampling from a Danish population. For the purpose of this thesis, we have identified golf players of Mollerup Golf Club in Aarhus as the population and specific stakeholder group from which a probability sample will be drawn. Golf players generally represent a wide section of the Danish population that travels to Asian countries, and they are therefore considered a fair sample of MAS potential Danish customer base. In regards to the theoretical framework of the thesis, a delimitation was made to utilize crisis theory that has a strong focus on the communication produced by the organization in crisis and not by other actors involved. It was chosen for its ability to both enable a study of how organizations in crisis defend their reputation through an application of various types of crisis response strategies, as well as its ability to illuminate how the organization s attribution of crisis responsibility impacts its response strategy choice. Although it was considered, we ultimately chose to exclude the inclusion of theory that applies a multi vocal approach to crisis communication such as the Rhetorical Arena (Johansen & Frandsen 2007). It was considered because of its ability to capture the complexity of the many communication processes that take place inside the rhetorical arena, thereby characterizing crisis communication in its entirety. It was excluded because the thesis scope does not include the communication from multiple stakeholder groups. The focus is instead placed on the one-way crisis communication of MAS and on an analysis of how the airline s communicative effort was perceived by its customers. Additionally, we recognize that corporate communication is a holistic discipline and encompasses internal as well as external dimensions, but it should be noted that the thesis sole focus is on external communication in regards to the MH370 crisis. Finally, it is recognized that the MH370 crisis is situated in a specific social reality and that no two crises are identical. However, a single case study allows for theory-based generalizations, which makes the scientific context relevant for providing insights into how organizations should communicate during a double crisis and why the findings of this thesis should be regarded as contributions to the field of crisis communication. Page 7 of 102

13 1.4. Structure The thesis extends over eight chapters, beginning with the preliminary considerations of the introduction. Chapter two consists of the theoretical framework, and it focuses primarily on the corporate communication sub-disciplines of reputation management and crisis communication, which together formed the basis for the development of the problem statement and its accompanying research questions. The theoretical framework will provide an extensive account of the two disciplines that should be regarded as the theoretical foundation for assessing the case. Chapter three contains the thesis underlying research orientation including ontological and epistemological considerations as well as the methodologies for data collection and data analysis. Chapter four will provide the reader with a case presentation to ensure a contextual understanding of the subsequent chapters. In chapter five, the theoretical and methodological considerations will be applied in an investigation of MAS crisis communication effort during the disappearance of flight MH370. Chapter six will consist of a discussion of the findings derived from both the qualitative and quantitative analysis while taking a critical perspective towards MAS crisis communication. Whereas chapter seven will present an account of the problem statement and provide the concluding remarks of the thesis, chapter eight will attempt to offer alternative perspectives for future research within the field of crisis communication. 2. Theoretical Framework In this chapter, we have conducted a theoretical framework that is intended to help us understand the social world and the phenomenon we are investigating. The framework has been particular important in our research process because it has provided a backcloth and rationale for the research that is being conducted on MAS crisis communication during the disappearance of flight MH370. Basically, what we have done is to construct a multiple layered theoretical chapter with different theoretical approaches. The idea is that one theory will support another in its limitations, which will enable the existence of a connection thread throughout the thesis. The theoretical framework is comprised of reputation management and crisis management theories, both sub-disciplines of corporate communication. The two disciplines have been employed to enable an answer of the problem statement and its accompanying research questions. Page 8 of 102

14 2.1. Introducing Corporate Communication The history of corporate communication begins with the discipline being considered a subset of journalism. Since the need for that type of communication was created by journalists, many CEO s believed that they should hire journalists to deal with media relations (Argenti 1996: 74). Corporate communication became more than just public relations when internal and external stakeholders began demanding more information from organizations (Cornelissen 2008: 4). Argenti (1996) argues that although communication schools began training practitioners of public relations, business schools are now the most appropriate home of the discipline: ( ) like other functional areas of the organization, e.g. marketing, finance, production etc., corporate communication exists as a real and important part of most organizations (Argenti 1996: 74). Argenti also provides a list of different activities within corporate communication, and although he acknowledges that it is not all-encompassing, it does represent the most important sub-functions. His list of modern corporate communication practices contain: image and identity; corporate advertising; media relations; financial communication; employee relations; community relations and corporate philanthropy; government relations, and; crisis communications (Ibid: 77). Even though the corporate communication function incorporates a number of specialized disciplines, its communication with both internal and external stakeholders always starts from the perspective of the bodily organization as a whole (Cornelissen 2008: 5). Corporate communication transcends the specialties of individual communication practices, e.g. media relations, investor relations, internal and external communications, etc., and crosses these specialist boundaries to harness the strategic interests of the organizations at large (Ibid). Protecting an organization s reputation by building and maintaining the relationship with important stakeholders is considered one of the core tasks of corporate communication, and it is also one of the most important strategic objectives in most modern organizations. There seems to be a widespread consensus among managers that the future of an organization actually depends on how it is perceived by key stakeholders. Therefore managing and executing strategic programs is the key to building and nurturing these relationships (Ibid: 3). The general idea is that the sustainability and success of an organization depends on how it is perceived by its stakeholders, and communication is a critical part of building, maintaining and protecting such relationships (Ibid: 5). Although corporate communication originated in media relations and subsequently spread to other functions, today it is a discipline that begins with the bodily perspective of the organization. Because it has its roots in the overall nature of the corporation, it does not have the in depth Page 9 of 102

15 knowledge of the sub-functions of the organization s communication. As a consequence, it risks losing the details that can make all the difference when the organization s communication professionals are managing its various stakeholders to strengthen its corporate reputation. Stakeholder management is one of the more important elements of corporate communication, as an organization s relationships with its stakeholders can have profound effect on its overall performance. Freeman (1984) defines a stakeholder as: ( ) any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization s objectives (Freeman 1984: 46). According to Fiedler (2011), one of the most important stakeholders for any organization is its customers: ( ) customers ( ) are indeed the most important stakeholder group (Helm et al. 2011: 134). The notion that customers are the most important external stakeholder is supported by Samanta (2014). She states that customers are ( ) the raison d'être of any company (Samanta 2014: 206), which means that they are the organization s very reason for existing. Moreover, she states that ( ) customer value is the primary objective since the ability to create value for the customer directly influences revenues (Ibid) Corporate Reputation Fombrun (1996) is one of the most recognized and referenced writers within corporate reputation. According to him, ( ) a reputation embodies the history of other peoples experiences with a service provider. Good reputations increase credibility, making us more confident that we ll really get what we re promised (Fombrun 1996: 3). Fombrun references the reader s own life when explaining why a good reputation is important, saying that when we choose our dentist, electrician, lawyer, doctor, travel agent, etc.; we do so because they come recommended by someone we trust. The main reason for why a good corporate reputation is valuable is that it makes the individual confident that he or she will really get what is promised by the organization (Ibid) Corporate Reputation Defined Looking for a clear-cut definition of what constitutes corporate reputation can be close to impossible. Every book or article seems to have a different variation on how the concept should be defined, and this section therefore begins with the root of the construct: reputation. We found that the word reputation was defined quite similarly in various dictionaries as a belief or opinion held by others about someone or something. Additionally, we found that it is the: Overall quality or character ( ) (Webster), something that ( ) is generally held about someone or something (Oxford), and something that reflects ( ) what has happened in the past Page 10 of 102

16 (Longman). For this thesis we have summarized the three dictionary definitions and taken reputation to mean the overall opinion or belief generally held by people towards someone or something because of what has happened in the past. Bromley (2002) provides one definition of corporate reputation by stating it is ( ) reflecting a firms relative standing, internally with employees and externally with other stakeholders, in its competitive and institutional environment (Bromley 2002: 36). Griffin (2008) provides another view on corporate reputation by arguing that ( ) any attempt to deconstruct and compartmentalize corporate reputation risks missing the point: your reputation is difficult to pin down as it is based on perceptions (Griffin 2008: 12). A third definition of corporate reputation is proposed by Doorley & Garcia (2011), who suggest that three critical components must be included in the definition: ( ) corporate reputation is the sum of images and it is made up of performance, behavior and communication (Doorley & Garcia 2011: 4). According to Helm (2011), the reason that no clear-cut definition exist is the number of different disciplines that take an interest in reputation without a common language or an agreement on the terms and axioms of their analyses (Helm et al. 2011: 5). Helm therefore summarize the various definitions by condensing the findings on the construct interpretations and describes corporate reputation as ( ) a stakeholder s overall evaluation of a firm in respect to its past, present, and future handling of stakeholder relationships that reflects a firm s ability and willingness to meet stakeholders expectations continuously and describes the firm s overall appeal to all of its constituents when compared with other firms (Ibid: 7) One or Several Reputations All of the above definitions operate with the notion that an organization only has one corporate reputation, but several writers question this notion. In fact, Bromley (2002) claims that an organization can have ( ) as many reputations as there are social groups (Bromley 2002: 36). Additionally, Liehr-Gobbers & Storck (2011) claim that a reputation can vary from stakeholder group to stakeholder group and additionally from country to country (Helm et al. 2011: 29). These views are somewhat supported by Davies et al. (2003), who argue that ( ) different stakeholders can have different images of the same organization (Davies et al. 2003: 61). In their definition, they use the term image, which is one of two elements that they argue a reputation is composed of: image the view of the organization held by external stakeholders, and; identity the view of the organization held by internal stakeholders. Page 11 of 102

17 A further explanation of the relationship between image, identity and reputation is provided by de Camara (2011), who emphasizes that: ( ) corporate identity represents the internal culture, values and behavior of an organization, as well as its visual appearance (Helm et al. 2011: 48). In her summarization of what an image is, she argues that ( ) corporate image resides in the heads of the stakeholders, whereas identity resides in the heads of the organization (Ibid: 49). She also explains why some might state that more than one corporate reputation exist, saying: ( ) the term should be corporate images for there are as many as there are individuals having relationships with, or knowledge of, the firm (Ibid). The approach taken by most studies of corporate reputation and by this thesis towards understanding the relationship between corporate identity, image and reputation is the holistic view. This view perceives reputation building as a cross-functional and organizational activity that concerns all stakeholder groups (Ibid: 51). To a large extend, de Camara and Davies et al. also agree on what corporate reputation ultimately is. Davies et al. argue that it is ( ) a collective term referring to all stakeholder s views of corporate reputation (Davies et al. 2003: 61), whereas de Camara argues that it is ( ) an external reflection of internal organizational behavior (Helm et al. 2011: 54) Why Corporate Reputation is Important A survey from 2003 indicates that reputation among business leaders is regarded as a more important criterion for the success of a business than e.g. price development and profitability (Helm et al.: 2011: 27). Additionally, reputation management does not have an assigned budget in several organizations, as it is considered so central to business success that it cannot be a budgeted area. Instead, reputation management is regarded as a top level role, and more than 80% of managers agree that reputation is ultimately the responsibility of the CEO (Davies et al. 2003: 51-52). The question one might ask is why reputation is so important for organizations and ultimately more important than profitability and price development. This question is partly answered by Liehr- Gobbers & Storck (2011) in two parts. Firstly, developing and protecting reputation have the objective of securing the cooperation of internal and external stakeholders and securing maximum cooperation, which can lead to achieving the strategic goals of the organization. Secondly, a good reputation leads to better chances of overcoming crises, as reputation serves as a sort of buffer or safety net (Helm et al. 2011: 19). The buffer that Liehr-Gobbers & Storck speak of is also referred to as reputational capital, which is something that every organization has in greater or lesser amount. Reputational capital can be Page 12 of 102

18 considered a form of intangible wealth closely related to goodwill or brand equity, and by having a large stock of reputational capital an organization can gain a competitive advantage against its rivals. This advantage is achieved through gaining the trust and respect of the customer, which means that the organization is granted the benefit of doubt in ambiguous situations and that we willingly pay handsomely for their products because we trust them to deliver on our expectations. In other words, reputational capital enables an organization to charge premium prices for its products, to achieve lower marketing costs, and to benefit from greater freedom in decisionmaking (Fombrun 1996: 9-11). In order to fully understand how reputational capital can serve as a buffer in crisis situations, Helm provides an example where the reputation equals a sand dune and the crisis equals the blowing wind. The size of the dune is determined by how good the reputation is: the greater the reputation, the bigger the dune. Now, when the blowing wind of a crisis occurs, the size of the sand dune plays an important role. A strong wind takes away the uppermost layer of sand at first and leaves the lower layers and the core of the dune (the historical values of the firm) untouched. Depending on the severity of the storm, this means that the core and maybe even the lower layers can stay unaffected by the big wind gust. However, if the sand dune is very small, the lower layers and the core of the dune may also be severely affected by the blowing wind of a crisis (Helm et al. 2011: 13) Reputation Building Fombrun (1996) argues that reputation building is a form of an enlightened self-interest, and that building an organization s reputation means entering into competition with its rivals: Reputation is both a product and a by-product of competition. It is produced directly as a firm builds competitive advantage in pursuing uniqueness, as it differentiates itself from rivals (Fombrun 1996: 32). Pursuing uniqueness is the way to differentiate the organization from its rivals by finding the unique value that it alone can deliver to a chosen marketplace. The development of management practices that reinforce the found uniqueness of the organization will enable it to foster consistent images of it as credible, reliable, responsive, and trustworthy (Ibid: 23). And when these images are benchmarked against rivals, communicated persuasively to stakeholders, perceived by those to cohere and maintained over time they enhance the company s reputation and build competitive advantage (Ibid: 23-24). However, according to Drucker (2006) uniqueness is worth nothing without effective executives practicing mundane management. He states that the way to be a truly effective executive is to Page 13 of 102

19 perform a small number of fairly simple practices well, and to ask oneself: What can I and no one else do which, if done really well, would make a real difference to this company (Drucker 2006: 59). One might say that Drucker combines the concept of uniqueness with the role of the effective executive. He expects the executive to ask what he and only he can do that makes a real difference to the organization and then to develop the simple mundane habit of doing it day in and day out: When you come down to it, building reputation is downright mundane (Fombrun 1996: 30) Managing Corporate Reputation In reputation management, the organization s stakeholders are usually managed through separate departments that are exclusively devoted to that one stakeholder group. Most companies deal with their publics in a fragmented manner. For the most part, they delegate them to distinct functional silos finance, marketing, human resources with minimal opportunity for contact or coordination. Doing so reflects a poor understanding of the determinants of corporate reputation (Fombrun 1996: ). This way of conducting business can work fine at a micro level, but if an organization seeks to manage its reputation at a more strategic macro level, then simply managing the various silos of the organization will not be sufficient. According to Fombrun (1996), It also imperceptibly damages an organization s competitiveness and profitability while increasing its riskiness and vulnerability to crisis (Ibid). We have examined several writings on reputation management in order to determine what the subjacent fields of an organization s reputation are. The examination resulted in the authors taking the subjects of writings by various reputation management practitioners as an indication of what constitute an organization s reputation. Those subjects were: corporate identity and image, stakeholder management, investor relations, issues management, crisis communication, customer relations, employee relations, government relations, media relations and corporate social responsibility. All of these fields can arguably be considered part of good corporate communication as well as good reputation management, which speaks to the complex nature of an organization s reputation. Griffin (2008) furthermore argues that compartmentalizing corporate reputation risks missing the point: a reputation is difficult to pin down as it is based on perceptions (Griffin 2008: 12). Davies et al. (2003) state that defending reputation begins with ( ) thinking the unthinkable and then planning for that eventuality (Davies et al. 2003: 99). Additionally, Fink (2002) suggests that ( ) the problems in managing crisis occur when they become sudden, unexpected, unanticipated, short-fused crises (Fink 2002: 55). He also states that success in defending reputation essentially Page 14 of 102

20 consists of planning ahead for what and whom will be needed as that will save valuable time in the heat of the crisis, which saves the organization from having to (a) decide what is needed and (b) then finding it. Furthermore, he states that an effective plan presents certain key decisions on the mechanical portions of the crisis those aspects that rarely vary and leaves one free to manage the content portion of the crisis with your hands unfettered (Ibid: 55). When an organization has experienced the need to defend its reputation following a crisis it will then need to rebuild its reputation. Before an organization begins rebuilding, it can choose to conduct a reputational audit. An audit is done through three principal steps: 1) Diagnosing the current stage, which is a diagnostic view of the organization's current identity, image and reputation. 2) Designing the future state, which is a strategic analysis of the trends, plans, and competitive positioning that defines the organization s desired future state. 3) Managing the transition, which is a review of the plans for managing the transition towards the future state (Fombrun 1996: ). The first step has three parts and consists of an identity analysis (1), which is a review of all organizational communication with its stakeholders. An image analysis (2) assesses the perceptions of how well the projections are communicated, which is done by conducting a comprehensive survey of the organization s principal stakeholders. The final part is a coherence analysis (3) that explores the coherence of the different images obtained in the surveys. In the second step, the organization s top managers develop a consensus on where they would like the organization to be positioned. This development is done through an understanding of the organization s strategic intentions and competitive circumstances, through discussions of the strategic position within the industry, and through a discussion of its rivals relative reputational standings and self-presentations. The third step is managing the transition. This step requires a close involvement of a representative cross section of employees to ensure the success of the intervention, and secrecy is therefore not essential and broad internal discussions are encouraged (Ibid: ). Generally, one issue with managing corporate reputation is the number of different definitions that exist. The lack of consensus in the definition of a corporate reputation means the researcher can take a variety of approaches, making it a somewhat blurred field of study. Another subject of disagreement is whether an organization has one overall reputation or several reputations. Some Page 15 of 102

21 argue that an organization has several reputations, while others call for the existence of one overall reputation. Finally, there is the question of how to manage reputation, which is a question without one correct answer. Additionally, one must also incorporate the management of the subjacent fields of reputation in the overall plan, which then begs the question of which department should oversee the reputational management. Should it be the communications department, which most articles claim, or do they have too much focus on the communicative aspect. Perhaps it will be managed better by another department where the focus is also placed upon the performance and behavior of the organization. All these unanswered questions indicate that the field of reputation management is currently a work in progress with far more questions than answers Crisis Management According to Coombs (2012), crisis management is not merely developing a plan and executing it during a crisis. Instead, it is appropriately viewed as an ongoing process. Every day, organizational members should be scanning for potential crises, taking actions to prevent them, or considering any number of aspects of the crisis management process to increase the level of preparedness (Coombs 2012: 6). Coombs further suggests that crises are ubiquitous, and various developments in today s environment have made all types of organizations more susceptible to them. Unprepared organizations have more to lose today than ever before, and especially mismanagement costs seem to escalate (Ibid: 13). Crisis management therefore represents a set of factors, including crisis communication, which is designed to combat crises and to lessen the actual damage inflicted. In other words, it seeks to prevent or lessen the negative outcomes of a crisis and thereby protect the organization, stakeholders, and industry from harm. Crisis communication is probably one of the most critical elements of effective crisis management, and it can broadly be defined as ( ) the collection, processing, and dissemination of information that is required to address a crisis situation (Ibid: 5). Page 16 of 102

22 Crisis Definition: a Socially Constructed Phenomena Coombs & Holladay (2010a) emphasize that organizations frequently find themselves in situations that can be defined as crises (Coombs & Holladay 2010a: 17). The crisis communication field is characterized by rich definitions as to what constitutes a crisis and how it should be managed. However, there is a general consensus among writers that a crisis is a negative phenomenon which should be regarded as a direct threat to the activities and the livelihood of the organization. This reasoning is especially evident in Fink s (2002) crisis definition: A crisis is an unstable time or state of affairs in which a decisive change is impending ( ) with the distinct possibility of a highly undesirable outcome ( ) (Fink 2002: 15). Fink further suggests that a crisis should be perceived as any situation that runs the risk of: escalating in intensity; falling under close media or government scrutiny; interfering with the normal operation of business; jeopardizing the positive public image presently enjoyed by an organization or its officers, and; damaging an organization s bottom line in any way. If any or all of these developments occur, the turning point most likely will take a turn for the worse (Ibid: 15-16). Doorley & Garcia (2011) have built their definition around the premise of Fink s definition by arguing that A crisis is a non-routine event that risks undesired visibility that in turn threatens significant reputational damage (Doorley & Garcia 2011: 310). In continuation hereof, Coombs (2012) describes a crisis as being fairly unpredictable, but not unexpected. He suggests that wise organizations know that crises will befall them sooner rather than later: A crisis is the perception of an unpredictable event that threatens important expectancies of stakeholders and has the power to seriously impact an organization s performance and generate negative outcomes (Coombs 2012: 2). Coombs definition is a synthesis of various perspectives on crises, since it tries to capture the common traits that other writers have used when describing them. It can also be derived from the following statement that a crisis is perceptual and that the existence of a crisis depends on the perception of key stakeholders: If stakeholders believe an organization is in crisis, a crisis does exist, and stakeholders will react to the organization as if it is in crisis (Ibid). In other words, Coombs operates with a definition that perceives a crisis as being a socially constructed phenomenon. He emphasizes that a crisis is constructed by the stakeholders perceptions of whether a crisis exists or not. Stakeholders tend have their own perceptions and interpretations of a crisis, but at the same time they are also capable of shaping and influencing the perceptions of other people. Although a crisis may not be directly caused by a human act, crises are often socially created through human intervention. Page 17 of 102

23 In addition to Coombs crisis definition, Johansen & Frandsen (2007) have developed a broader approach that may occur if the organization s crisis communication is insufficient: A double crisis is a crisis where the original crisis is overlaid by a communication crisis in a way that the organization is not capable of running the communication processes which is supposed to contribute to the handling of the original crisis (Johansen & Frandsen 2007: 79). The definition contains the explanation that the original crisis may be overlaid by a communicative crisis, if the organization is incapable of running its communication processes which is supposed to contribute to the management of the original crisis. The definition has certain similarities with other crisis definitions, but it is limited in its applicability as it does not propose a best practice for managing two dependable crises. However, the definition stands apart by recognizing that a communicative crisis should be treated with similar importance as the original (Ibid). The double crisis definition is relevant in the context of this thesis because such a crisis may occur if the organization is incapable of handling the issues at the very beginning. If this turns out to be the case, the crisis can be a serious threat to the organization s legitimacy. Crises can violate expectations that stakeholders hold about how organizations should act. For instance, planes are supposed to land safely on the ground and not disappear out of the blue. Crises therefore have the potential to disturb some stakeholders expectations, which can result in people becoming angry and upset and thereby threaten the long term relationship between the organization and its stakeholders. When expectations are breached, stakeholders perceive the organization less positively and the reputation is harmed. Based on the different crisis definitions that are included in this section, crises should be considered very dangerous to an organization s overall reputation and future existence (Coombs 2012: 3). Following Johansen & Frandsen s double crisis definition, Shibutani (1966) presents an intriguing hypothesis that may arise if the organization is incapable of providing adequate information in a crisis situation. He defines a crisis as ( ) any situation in which the previously established social machinery breaks down, a point at which some kind of readjustment is required (Shibutani 1966: 172). He postulates that during a crisis, an Inability to act may also arise from the perplexity of those who are caught in a dilemma (Ibid). According to Shibutani, these inabilities often arise from ambiguity during a crisis which can also lead to the creation of rumors. Rumors ( ) emerge in ambiguous situations (Ibid: 56-57), and they generally ( ) develop when there is an unsatisfied need for information (Ibid: 173). The variables of importance and ambiguity dictate the amount of rumors circulating in a crisis situation. In other words, the amount of rumors will vary Page 18 of 102

24 with the importance of the subject to the concerned individuals and the ambiguity of the available evidence. During a crisis, the established sources must supply adequate information, for if they do not and the problem remains unsolved, it will give basis for even more frustration: If enough news is not available to meet the problematic situation, a definition must be improvised. Rumor is the collective transaction in which such improvisation occurs (Ibid). On the basis of his observations, Shibutani has formulated the following hypothesis: If the demand for news in a public exceeds the supply made available through institutional channels, rumor construction is likely to occur (Ibid) Image Restoration Discourse and Crisis Communication Benoit s (1997) Theory of Image Restoration Discourse is probably the most cited theory within crisis communication. The theory builds on two theoretical traditions: rhetoric and sociology. Within rhetoric, Benoit is inspired by Ware & Linkugel s Apologia Theory (1973) and Burke s Theory of Purification (1941 and 1961) (Johansen & Frandsen 2007: 204). Within sociology, Benoit s source of inspiration has primarily been Scott & Lymann s Theory of Accounts (1968) (Ibid: 205). In general, crisis response strategies represent the actual responses that an organization can use to address a crisis. Crisis response strategies involve both words (verbal aspects) and actions (nonverbal aspects) which are directed toward the crisis. Crisis response strategies were first examined as apologia or the use of communication to defend one s reputation from public attack. Since crises threaten reputations, it was believed that organizations would use apologia to defend their reputations. However, several critics found that apologia offered a rather limited number of crisis response strategies, and the number of strategies was therefore expanded by examining the concept of accounts. Accounts are statements people use to explain their behavior when that behavior is called into question. According to Benoit, a crisis response can be a form of account, and similar to apologia, accounts involve protecting one s reputation from a threat (Ibid). Following the theories of apologia and accounts, Benoit developed the theory of image restoration discourse as an approach for understanding corporate crisis situations. The theory is very useful for practitioners to help design messages during crises and also by critics or educators to critically evaluate messages produced by organizations or individuals during crises (Benoit 1997: 177). Benoit further emphasizes that there are differences in the repair efforts of individuals and organizations. First of all, organizations might use different strategies than individuals, or employ them in different configurations. Organizations often tend to bring greater resources to image repair Page 19 of 102

25 efforts than individuals, although he suggests that the basic options are the same for both individuals and corporate image repair efforts (Ibid) The Theory of Image Restoration Discourse The basic key to understanding image repair discourse is to consider the nature of attacks or complaints that prompt such responses or instigate a corporate crisis (Benoit 1997: 178). The nature of attacks and complaints has two components: that the accused is held responsible for an action, and; that act is considered offensive. In this regard, the important thing is not whether the organization in fact is responsible for the offensive act, but whether the organization is thought of as being responsible for it by the relevant audience. What must be remembered is that as long as the audience thinks the organization is responsible for the offensive act, the image is at risk. Similarly, the key question is not if the act was in fact offensive, but whether the act is believed by the relevant audience to be offensive. However, if the organization is not really to blame for the offensive act, or if the act in question was not actually offensive, it can be an important component of the organization s response (Ibid). The theory focuses on message options rather than describing the crisis types or the distinct stages in a crisis. This aspect makes the theory more exhaustive than the earlier theories of apologia and accounts on which it is build. Benoit s theory offers five broad categories of image repair strategies: Denial and evasion of responsibility address the first component of persuasive attack, and the categories have two and four sub-responses respectively. Reducing offensiveness and corrective action address the second component of persuasive attack. While reducing offensiveness has six sub-categories, corrective action simply consist of the organization promising to correct the problems. Mortification is the final broad category and consists of the organization trying to restore its image by asking forgiveness for the offensive act committed (Ibid: ). Benoit (1997) recommends that organizations develop a contingency plan before a crisis occurs, since judicious planning may reduce response time and possibly prevent missteps in the initial response to a crisis. Although crises can take a variety of forms, some potential crises can be anticipated and prepared for (e.g. an airline company should anticipate the possibility of a crash). Once the contingency plans have been developed, they should be reviewed periodically and Page 20 of 102

26 implemented thoughtfully: elements of the actual problem may differ from the anticipated problem, so plans should be modified as needed (Ibid: 182). When a crisis occurs, it is important to understand both the nature of the crisis and the perceived severity of the alleged offense. Hence, the response should be tailored to the offense. As mentioned previously, it is also vital to clearly identify the salient audience(s). An organization facing a crisis may hope to favorably influence more than one audience. If so, Benoit suggests that it is best to prioritize the audiences, making sure that the most important audience is appeased first, and then devoting time and effort to the other audiences as possible. This may be done with different messages delivered to different groups (while separate messages may stress different points, according to the intended audience, it is risky to develop contradictory messages), or by directing different passages or aspects of a message to different audiences (Ibid: 183) Suggestions for Effective Image Repair Discourse It is claimed by Benoit (1997) that ( ) image restoration rhetoric is a form of persuasive discourse, and that effectiveness can be derived from our understanding of persuasion such as: avoid making false claims; provide adequate support for claims, and; avoid arguments that may backfire (Benoit 1997: 183). An organization that is at fault should probably admit this immediately. However, image restoration concerns may, admittedly, conflict with a desire to avoid lawsuits, and the organization must decide whether it is more important to restore its image or avoid litigation (Ibid: ). Apart from the fact that this is morally the correct thing to do, attempting to deny true accusations can backfire. An organization that falsely denies responsibility for offensive actions risks substantially damaging its credibility if the truth emerges. Benoit also suggests that one should recognize that the powers of persuasion are rather limited, and his theory of image restoration discourse should therefore be used with caution (Ibid). According to Johansen & Frandsen (2007), Benoit has admitted that his theory on image restoration is to some extend inadequate. He is perfectly aware that the theory can and should be revised, since the five broad categories of image restoration strategies are operating on a higher level of abstraction that do not necessarily entail theoretical or conceptual advantages. In fact, Benoit refers to other writers that operate with far more detailed lists of strategies. The theory of image restoration discourse focuses primarily on the verbal defense strategies applied by organizations when their image or reputation is under attack. It does not take into account the contextual factors that may influence the communication process, which is why we now turn to an examination of Coombs (1999, 2007, 2012, and 2015) SCCT. Page 21 of 102

27 Situational Crisis Communication Theory Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) combines elements of the rhetorical approaches to crisis communication with Weiner s (2006) conceptualization of attribution theory. Attribution theory holds that people search for causes when negative and unexpected events occur, making them perfect for triggering attributions of cause and responsibility. Typically, the attributions of cause and responsibility also shape the effect generated by the event and future interactions with the person or organization involved in the event. For crisis management, stronger attributions of the organization as the source of the cause lead to greater attributions of crisis responsibility. In turn, stronger crisis responsibility leads to increased anger towards the organization in crisis, reduced purchase intention, increased intentions to engage in negative word-of-mouth, and increased threat to the organization s reputation (Coombs & Holladay 2010b: 247). The SCCT operates with three stages: stage one seeks to establish the level of reputational threat posed by the crisis combined with a set of intensifying factors that influence this process; stage two is concerned with a selection of the different crisis communication strategies that should provide the maximal reputational defense for that threat level, and; stage three is about matching the communication strategy with the crisis type (Coombs 1999: 143). To summarize, the three stages seek to provide crisis managers with a set of guidelines to assist them in choosing the most effective responses for protecting the organization s reputational assets Stage One: Crisis Type and Intensifying Factors As mentioned, stage one seeks to evaluate the level of the reputational threat posed by the crisis and has two steps. The first step is to decide the crisis type and the actual reputational threat. Coombs (2007) distinguishes between three degrees of reputational threats: mild, moderate and severe reputational threat. He further divides the crisis types into three subcategories by level of responsibility. It is important for an organization to determine the degree of reputational threat as crisis responsibility can be a threat to an organization s image and reputation - stronger attribution of crisis responsibility causes greater reputational damage (Coombs 2007: 142). 1) Victim crises: The reputational threat is mild, and the attribution of responsibility is very little. These crises could be: Natural disasters: Acts of nature such as tornados or earthquakes. Rumors: False and damaging information being circulated about the organization. Page 22 of 102

28 Workplace violence: Attack by former or current employee on current employees on site. Product tampering/malevolence: External agent causes damage to the organization. 2) Accident crises: The reputational threat is moderate, and the attribution of responsibility is low. These crises could be: Challenges: Stakeholders claim that the organization is operating in an inappropriate manner. Technical-error accidents: Equipment or technology failure that causes an industrial accident. Technical-error product harm: Equipment or technology that causes a product to be defective or potentially harmful. 3) Preventable crises: The reputational threat is severe, and the attribution of responsibility is strong. The stakeholders often believe that the organization is responsible for the crisis. These crises could be: Human-error accidents: Industrial accident caused by human error. Human-error product harm: Product is detective or potentially harmful because of human error. Organizational misdeed: Management actions that put stakeholders at risk and/or violate the law (Ibid: ) It has now been demonstrated how each crisis type creates attributions of crisis responsibility among stakeholders. The subcategories presented suggest that the victim cluster induces a mild reputational threat with a low level of attribution of crisis responsibility. In other words, stakeholders perceive the organization to be a victim itself. The accidental cluster induces a moderate reputational threat with a low level of attribution of crisis responsibility, whereas the preventable crisis cluster induces a severe reputational threat with a strong attribution of crisis responsibility. In the latter crisis cluster, the stakeholders may believe that the organization was intentionally engaged in the behavior that caused the crisis (Coombs 2012: 157). Although most crises easily fall into one of the abovementioned crisis clusters, it is fair to assume that an organization and its stakeholders may disagree on the crisis type. If this turns out to be the case, Coombs (2012) suggests that the crisis management team should consider adopting the stakeholders framing (Ibid). Page 23 of 102

29 The second step is to determine if either of the two intensifiers of the reputational threat appears in the situation. The two intensifiers are crisis history and prior reputation. If an organization is known to have had similar crises in the past, the crisis responsibility and reputational threat are intensified. Constituencies do not have long memories, but crisis media coverage may reveal if the organization has had past crises. A prior negative reputation also serves to intensify crisis responsibility and the reputational threat. If either of the intensifiers exists, the initial threat assessment is revised upwards. In practical terms, a victim crisis should be treated as if it is an accident crisis, and an accident crisis should be treated as a preventable crisis (Ibid: 158). What can be learned so far is that organizations are attributed a distinct level of crisis responsibility depending on the crisis type and its accompanying intensifying factors. By identifying the crisis type, the organization should be capable of anticipating how much responsibility stakeholders will attribute to the organization and thereby be able to carry out an efficient crisis communication strategy. When the crisis type and the reputational threat have been defined, the crisis management team then moves along to the next stage, which is concerned with a selection of the different crisis communication strategies that should provide the maximal reputational defense Stage Two: Crisis Response Strategies Within the second stage of his SCCT, Coombs (2007) suggests that the organization should divide crisis response strategies into primary and secondary categories. The primary response strategies should then be grouped into three postures: denial posture; diminishment posture, and; rebuilding posture. Denial strategies seek to eliminate crisis responsibility by ensuring the organization is not perceived to be involved in or responsible for the crisis; diminishment strategies seek to minimize the crisis responsibility by either lowering the perception of how much control the organization has over the crisis or reducing its negative impact, and; rebuilding strategies seek to repair the organization s reputation through the use of words and/or actions. Each of the three postures represents a set of response strategies that share similar communicative objectives. The response strategies reflect the amount of responsibility that an organization seemingly accepts during a crisis. Furthermore, the response strategies employed by the organization also indicate the degree of sympathy that it has for the victims or other affected constituents (Coombs 2007: ). Each of these primary postures contains different strategies and will be briefly accounted for in the following: Page 24 of 102

30 1) Denial Posture: Attacking the Accuser: The crisis manager confronts the person or group that claims that a crisis exists. The response may include a threat to use force (e.g. a lawsuit) against the accuser. Denial: The crisis manager states that no crisis exists. The response may include explaining why there is no crisis. Scapegoating: Some other person or group outside of the organization is blamed for the crisis by the crisis manager. 2) Diminishment Posture: Excusing: The crisis manager tries to minimize the organization s responsibility for the crisis. The response can include claiming that the organization had no control of the events. Justification: The crisis manager tries to minimize the perceived damage associated with the crisis. The response can include attempting to justify the actions of the organization. 3) Rebuilding Posture: Compensation: The organization provides gifts or money to victims. Apology: The crisis manager publicly states that the organization takes full responsibility for the crisis and asks for forgiveness (Ibid: 155). The secondary response strategies, also referred to as bolstering strategies, can be used as a supplement to the primary strategies. The secondary response strategies are intended to build and maintain a positive connection between the organization and its stakeholders, but because the strategies focus on the organization they can seem rather egocentric if used alone. 4) Bolstering Strategies: Reminding: The organization reminds stakeholders about its past good work. Ingratiation: The organization praises stakeholders who help address the event. Victimage: The organization explains how it too is a victim of the crisis (Ibid). As mentioned previously, the various response strategies share similar communicative objectives, but when the response strategy becomes more accommodative and displays a general concern for the victims, the stakeholders will often perceive the organization as taking greater responsibility for the crisis. In contrast, defensive response strategies attempts to remove crisis responsibility from the Page 25 of 102

31 organization and direct it towards something or someone else, which will either be perceived as reliable or unreliable by the organization s stakeholders (Ibid: 170). It is very likely that an organization will consider applying more than one crisis response strategy during a crisis, and as we are about to explore in the following, the response strategies can be used in a variety of combinations Stage Three Guidelines with Recommendations for Crisis Response Selection The first two stages of the SCCT have been concerned with identifying the crisis type and selecting the response strategies that should provide the maximal reputational defense. The third stage represents a system of guidelines with recommendations for crisis response selection to find the best possible match. 1. Provide instructing information to all victims or potential victims in the form of warnings and directions for protecting themselves from harm. 2. Provide adjusting information to victims by expressing concern for them and providing corrective action when possible. Note: Providing instructing and adjusting information is enough of a response in victim crises for an organization with no crisis history or unfavorable prior reputation. 3. Use diminishment strategies for accident crises when there is no crisis history or unfavorable prior reputation. 4. Use diminishment strategies for victim crises when there is a crisis history or an unfavorable prior reputation. 5. Use rebuilding strategies for accident crises when there is a crisis history or an unfavorable prior reputation. 6. Use rebuilding strategies for any preventable crisis. 7. Use denial strategies in rumor crises. 8. Use denial strategies in challenges when the challenge is unwarranted. 9. Use corrective action (adjusting information) in challenges when other stakeholders are likely to support the challenge. 10. Use bolstering strategies as supplement to the other response strategies. 11. The victimage response strategy should be used only with the victim cluster. 12. Be consistent: Do not mix denial strategies with either diminishment or rebuilding strategies. Page 26 of 102

32 13. Diminishment and rebuilding strategies can be used in combination with one another. Table 8.4 Situational Crisis Communication Theory: Recommendations for Crisis Response Selection (Coombs 2015: 152). The aforementioned table is Coombs (2015) conceptualization of the key matches or recommendations of his SCCT. It is important to remember that the conceptualization is premised on instructing and adjusting information being delivered prior to any attempt to repair the reputation. This is also one of the main reasons why the SCCT is often referred to as a set of normative guidelines (Coombs & Holladay 2010b: 249).In addition to the recommendations for crisis response selection, Coombs has also included a table that lists the assets, liabilities and most appropriate usage of the various response strategies. Crisis Response Strategy Asset for Crisis Liability for Crisis Communication Communication Most Appropriate Situation Attacking the Refutes claims that a crisis Builds sympathy for the Rumor crisis accuser exists attacker Offends victims Denial Refutes claims that a crisis Offends victims Rumor crisis exists Scapegoating Eliminates responsibility for Angers victims and Should be avoided a crisis nonvictims Excusing Reinforces minimal Angers victims and Crises with low levels of crisis responsibility for the crisis nonvictims responsibility Justification Reinforces minimal damage Angers victims and Crises with low levels of crisis from the crisis nonvictims responsibility Compensation Indicates the organization is Increases expenses for the Any crisis with visible victims taking responsibility for the organization crisis Page 27 of 102

33 Apology The organization accepts responsibility for the crisis Increases expenses for the organization Any crisis where there is evidence that the organization is the primary actor responsible for the crisis Reminding Adds positive information about the organization Victims and nonvictims may view it as an attempt When an organization has a favorable prior reputation to distract from the crisis Integration Adds positive information about the organization Victims and nonvictims may view it as an attempt Any crisis that involves help from outside actors to distract from the crisis Victimage Builds sympathy for the organization Victims and nonvictims may view it as an attempt to distract from the crisis Product tampering, hacking, workplace violence, and natural disaster crises Table 8.2 Guidance for Using Crisis Response Strategies (Coombs 2015: 148). The SCCT generally seeks to match the crisis response strategy to the situation. Roughly, the greater the reputational threat is, the more accommodative the crisis response strategy is expected to be. The SCCT arrays crisis response strategies according to the level of accommodation. Accommodation is a function of focus on the victim and the amount of responsibility the crisis response strategy seems to accept for the crisis (Coombs & Holladay 2010b: 249). By applying the SCCT, we should be capable of investigating how MAS executed its crisis communication during the disappearance of flight MH370. We seek to identify the reputational threat posed by the crisis type and to determine the specific crisis communication strategies that should provide the maximal reputational defense for the threat level against the airline. This should enable us to assess whether the organization has matched the communication strategy with the crisis type accordingly. In other words, the SCCT will set the scene for examining MAS crisis communication both descriptively and normatively descriptively by analyzing the crisis type and the specific response strategies employed by the organization, and normatively by analyzing if MAS responded correctly according to the guidelines of recommendations. Although the SCCT is a very useful tool, there are some issues that can be criticized. It focuses primarily on contextual factors like the relational history between organizations and stakeholders, organizational legitimacy, the causal attributions made by key stakeholders, and the complex relationship between crisis type, Page 28 of 102

34 crisis responsibility and choice of verbal response. The theory does not take into account that stakeholders may have different perceptions and understandings of a crisis Two Important Research Traditions So far, we have been able to explore the development of two important research traditions within the field of crisis communication. The first research tradition can be characterized as rhetorical or text-oriented where researchers are first and foremost interested in studying what and how an organization communicates when a crisis threatens its image or reputation. The findings produced by this tradition most often appear in the form of lists of verbal defense strategies established on the basis of a series of case studies. The most important sources of inspiration for this tradition are corporate apologia research, and sociological work on accounts. One of the most important representatives of this tradition is arguably Benoit (1997) and his theory of image restoration discourse (Coombs & Holladay 2010a: 427). The second research tradition can be characterized as strategic or context-oriented where researchers have an interest in studying when, where and to whom an organization communicates during a crisis situation. The findings produced by this tradition constitute theories explaining how certain situational variables or contextual factors have or should have an impact on the crisis communication of the organization concerned. In this line of research, the most important sources of inspiration are rhetorical approaches to crisis communication and the conceptualization of attribution theory. One of the most significant representatives of this tradition is Coombs (1999, 2007, 2012, and 2015) and his symbolic approach, most notably the SCCT (Ibid). It is fair to say that both traditions have contributed important findings improving our understanding of how organizations communicate in text and contexts in a crisis situation. However, the two traditions also have certain limitations. Crisis communication research is typically interested in studying how organizations in crisis defend their image or reputation by applying various types of crisis response strategies, or how situational factors such as the attribution of crisis responsibility to the organization in crisis made by stakeholders have or should have an impact on the choice of response strategy. What the traditions do not take into account is that stakeholders may understand and perceive the crisis differently. Instead, with a few exceptions, there is a strong focus on the crisis communication produced exclusively by the organization in crisis, and not by other actors involved. Page 29 of 102

35 3. Theory of Science There is a general consensus among researchers that social science is conducted with the purpose of understanding social reality the way different people see it (Anderson & Bennett 2003: 153). According to Bryman (2012), social science is conducted because an aspect of our understanding of what goes on in society is to some extent unresolved (Bryman 2012: 5). Consequently, social research is most often carried out because a development in society provides an interesting point of departure for an investigation of one or several research questions. The focal point of this thesis is to investigate MAS crisis communication during the disappearance of flight MH370. The incident has provided an interesting point of departure for the development of various research questions. During a crisis, it can be difficult for an organization to retain a strong reputation if its communicative effort is not executed in accordance with the requirements of its key stakeholders. Therefore, besides from determining which communication strategies MAS applied during the disappearance of flight MH370, it is just as important to examine how the customers perceived the airline s crisis communication Ontological and Epistemological Considerations It can be argued that social research is essential to the ultimate success of a master s thesis. Both the general stance towards the world and the specific problems of the research methods have to be considered carefully during this process. Writing a master s thesis involves the reflections in which we, as researchers, ground our investigation. Basically, we need to ensure that our ontological and epistemological considerations and methods for data collection, analysis and interpretation are closely aligned. The primary choices made in this thesis are influenced by our ontological and epistemological positions, which mean that they are expressed rather implicit than explicit through methodology and the general approach. Marsh & Furlong (2002) emphasize that the ontological and epistemological positions are pivotal to one s research, because they shape the approach to theory and the specific methods employed (Marsh & Furlong 2002: 17). In the following sections, we will demonstrate how our ontological and epistemological stances are grounded in our beliefs about the social world. Page 30 of 102

36 The Ontological Position of Constructionism Ontology is the science or theory of reality, and the central question within this philosophy is whether social entities can be considered objective with a reality external to social actors, or if social entities should be considered social constructions built from the perceptions and actions of social actors. These two positions are respectively referred to as objectivism and constructionism (Bryman 2012: 32). Where the ontological position of objectivism implies that social phenomena confront us as external factors that are beyond our reach or influence, constructionism invites the researcher to consider the ways in which social reality is an ongoing accomplishment of social actors rather than something external to them and something that totally constrains them (Ibid: 33). Constructionism implies that social phenomena are constructed by social actors through interactions and conversations that do not exist independently from the participating people. Entities such as organizations, cultures and contexts are neither fixed nor homogenous, but individuals instead have to construct and reconstruct their understanding of them (Ibid). In line with the reality and context of this thesis, the constructionist approach influences the research process. According to Coombs (2012), a crisis is a socially constructed phenomenon created by both the organization in crisis and the perceptions of key stakeholders (Section 2.3.1). In other words, a crisis cannot be perceived objectively because the organization in crisis and its key stakeholders interpret the crisis differently and may disagree on several factors such as attribution of crisis responsibility, level of reputational threat and so forth. The reality of the crisis is created first and foremost by the MAS, as it provides information to the general public through various channels. However, since a crisis is often perceived as being a socially constructed phenomenon, the perceptions of MAS stakeholders cannot be neglected or overlooked. Constructionism asserts that crises and their meanings are continually being constructed by not only the organization in crisis, but also by other social actors. Moreover, crises are not only restricted to being produced through social interaction they are in a constant state of revision. By embracing this ontological position, we should be capable of investigating the communication effort carried out by MAS from both an organizational and a stakeholder perspective. As we have illuminated so far, the ontology of constructionism suggests that social reality is an ongoing accomplishment constructed by social actors. But how do we reach an understanding of such a worldview? We will provide an answer to this question in the following section. Page 31 of 102

37 The Epistemological Position of Interpretivism According to Bryman (2012), ( ) epistemology is the study of knowledge and justified belief (Bryman 2012: 27). In other words, epistemology is the different forms of knowledge that can be employed to understand social realities more in-depth. A returning issue in this context is the question whether the social world can and should be studied in accordance with the same principles and procedures as the natural sciences (Ibid). As a result of this ongoing discussion, two major distinctions have to be made. The positions that affirm the importance of imitating the natural sciences are perpetually associated with the epistemological positions of positivism and realism (including empirical realism and critical realism). Although these positions are best thought of as general epistemological approaches in their own rights, they occupy similar intellectual spaces in two important respects. Both positivism and realism share the belief that the natural and social sciences can and should apply the same approaches to the collection and explanation of data. Further, they also share a commitment to the view that there is an external objective reality that is separate from our understanding of it (Ibid: 28). Generally, the positivist and realist traditions emphasize that it is possible to acquire knowledge about the world objectively. In contradiction to the epistemological positions of positivism and realism, our worldview is affected by the social constructions of reality and based on subjective observations where personal values influence the research process. Our epistemological position is thus inspired by interpretivism, which is an alternative denotation to the positivist orthodoxy that has dominated the philosophy for decades. The interpretivist approach respects the differences between people and the objects of the natural sciences, and it therefore requires the social scientists to grasp the subjective meaning of social action (Ibid: 30). There is a general tendency for social researchers to include Max Weber s (1947) notion of verstehen, the hermeneutic-phenomenological tradition, and symbolic interactionism in the intellectual heritage of interpretivism. Verstehen and the hermeneutic-phenomenological tradition share certain similarities with an emphasis upon social actions as being meaningful to actors coupled with the rejection of positivism (Ibid). There is also a tendency among researchers to view symbolic interactionism as occupying the same intellectual spaces, but the parallelism should not be exaggerated. Symbolic interactionism is a theoretical approach within sociology that has distinctive epistemological implications, where interaction takes place in such a way that the individual is continually interpreting the symbolic meaning of his or her environment and acts on the basis of this imputed meaning (Ibid: 31). Page 32 of 102

38 Instead, we have been influenced by the hermeneutic-phenomenological tradition where especially Alfred Schutz s (1962) initial applications of phenomenological ideas have been a source of inspiration to conduct an investigation of MAS crisis communication. By embracing Schutz hermeneuctic-phenomenological position, we should be capable of gaining access to the commonsense thinking of both MAS and its customers and interpreting their actions and their social world from their viewpoints (Ibid: 30) Methodology As we sought to account for in previous sections, our ontological and epistemological considerations influence methodology. However, this does not necessarily imply that the relationships between ontology, epistemology and methodology are as directional as is often supposed, and that different methods cannot be employed within the same research project. The link between the three scientific positions is important, but not determinant for the chosen research strategy. In this section, we will reflect upon our choice of research methods by going through the process in all its phases. From the preliminary considerations of formulating strategic research objectives, to choosing specific research methods for securing participants, and for collecting, analyzing, and interpreting data The Case Study Design The decision to conduct a case study research should allow us to capture the complexity and particular nature of the MH370 crisis. What distinguishes a case study is that the researcher is usually concerned with elucidating the unique features of the case, which is known as an idiographic approach. The case study design can be applied to the context of this thesis, since the MH370 crisis functions as the specific unit of analysis. We are interested in investigating MAS crisis communication in its own rights and seek to provide an in-depth elucidation of the communication effort. Bryman (2012) emphasizes that there is a tendency to associate case studies with qualitative research, but such identification is inappropriate. Despite the fact that advocates of the case study design often favor qualitative methods as a mean to generate an extensive examination of a case, it is important to notice that case studies are frequently sites for the employment of both qualitative and quantitative research methods (Bryman 2012: 68). Page 33 of 102

39 Research Strategy: Mixed Methods Research In recent years, mixed methods research has become an increasingly used approach to conducting social research. By mixed methods research, Bryman (2012) is referring to research that combines qualitative and quantitative research methods within a single research project (Bryman 2012: 628). Qualitative research can be construed as a research strategy that usually emphasizes words rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of data, whereas quantitative research can be construed as a research strategy that does emphasize quantification in the collection and analysis of data (Ibid: 36). Qualitative and quantitative research thereby represent different research strategies with striking differences in terms of the role of epistemological issues and ontological concerns. However, the distinction is not as clear-cut as one might think, and we have thus been inspired by a growing preparedness to think of research methods as techniques of data collection and/or analysis that are not as encumbered by epistemological and ontological baggage as often supposed (Ibid: 649). Mixed methods research can generally be carried out in several ways, and different rationales exist for combining qualitative and quantitative research. In the next section, we will present the incentives for combining qualitative and quantitative research in a mixed methods research Why Both Methods? There are various ways of classifying mixed methods research in terms of the purposes and the roles that the qualitative and quantitative components play in such studies. Bryman (2012) emphasizes that it might be beneficial for a social researcher to classify mixed methods research in terms of priority and sequence, as it is deemed a useful way of approaching the fundamental aspects of mixed methods research design. In this thesis, the predominant research strategy is deemed qualitative, and in terms of making a priority decision, the qualitative method will also be the principal data-gathering tool. Additionally, a sequential decision has then been made to let the quantitative method succeed the qualitative (Bryman 2012: ). Alternative avenues of enquiry also exist for combining qualitative and quantitative research. The most traditional rationale behind combining the two research methods is that of triangulation, where two methods are combined in a mixed methods research to investigate the same phenomenon. Offset is another rationale for conducting mixed methods research, which implies that the weaknesses of e.g. a qualitative method can be offset by including a quantitative method with different strengths. Page 34 of 102

40 We have however been motivated by Bryman s third rationale of completeness, which dictates that a more complete answer to a research question or a set of research questions can be achieved by including two different research methods that cuts across the qualitative and quantitative divide (Ibid: 637). In order to provide a more comprehensive answer to our problem statement, the quantitative method has been employed to shed light on findings drawn from the qualitative investigation. According to Bryman, the in-depth knowledge of social contexts acquired through qualitative research can be used to form the design of survey instruments (Ibid: 644). Two kinds of data will thus be gathered for the purpose of this thesis. Qualitative data that will allow us to gain access to the perspectives of the people we are studying, that is, to perform an investigation of MAS crisis communication during the disappearance of flight MH370. And quantitative data that will allow us to explore specific issues in which we are interested, that is, to investigate to which degree the airline was able to protect its reputation during the crisis. We decided to adopt a more structured approach to answer the second research question, since most qualitative research methods do not allow data to be evaluated in terms of measurement. As the number of participants needed to conduct a representative and valid assessment of MAS reputation would arguably result in a significant amount of raw data, most qualitative methods are deemed inappropriate for this thesis. Qualitative methods are viewed as particularly helpful in the generation of intensive and detailed examinations of data, not to measure concepts like perceptions of an organization s reputation. Gathering two different kinds of data and performing two separate investigations and combining them in an overall discussion should enable us to uncover the effect of the crisis communication. We have now provided a rationale for the use of mixed methods research and given the reader a better sense of the relationship between the research questions and the research methods, and what the combination of two methods was meant to achieve for the overall thesis objective. In the following sections, we will strive to provide a detailed account for all the methodological details of the thesis qualitative and quantitative components. This is accomplished by ensuring that information about e.g. sampling, design and administration of research instruments and analysis of data are provided for both components. In general, mixed methods research can assist us in providing a more comprehensive answer to the thesis problem statement. Mixed methods research carries several advantages for the purpose of this thesis, but it should not be considered as an approach that is universally applicable. Some writers have even argued against the use of mixed methods research within social research, since they share the perception that research methods carry with them ontological and epistemological Page 35 of 102

41 commitments. However, the position that research methods are ineluctably rooted in epistemological and ontological commitments is very difficult to sustain, as they are capable of being put to a variety of tasks (Ibid: 629). Another argument against the use of mixed methods research is grounded in the world view that perceives qualitative and qualitative research as separate paradigms, and that mixed methods is therefore not a feasible or desirable option. This argument generally conceives that qualitative and quantitative research are separate paradigms in which ontological and epistemological assumptions, values and methods are inseparably entwined and incompatible. It is therefore suggested that, when researchers combine methods that cut across the qualitative and quantitative divide, they are not really conducting a mixed methods research, because integration only takes place at a superficial level and within a single paradigm (Ibid). This argument does not seem to hold water either. In the context of social research, it cannot be demonstrated that there is interconnectedness between method and epistemology in particular. Moreover, it is not clear that qualitative and quantitative research rationally can be regarded as separate paradigms as there are areas of overlap and commonality between them (Ibid: 630). We therefore find ourselves in a position to believe that qualitative and quantitative research methods exist independently from their so-called paradigms and can be combined in an overall research project Data Collection Data collection is arguably the key point of any research project, as it is the process for gathering and measuring information that should enable the researcher to analyze, interpret, and evaluate the findings (Bryman 2012: 12). As we have sought to account for in previous sections, two kinds of data will be gathered for the purpose of this thesis by combining qualitative and quantitative research methods in a mixed methods research. For most researchers, sampling is inevitably a feature that constitutes an important stage of the research process. We do not find ourselves in a position where we are able to collect data from all articles in newspapers relating to the disappearance of flight MH370, or send questionnaires to all possible individuals who are deemed appropriate to our research area. Time and cost issues have provided us with certain constraints that we had to address before moving on with the research process. The conclusion we reached was that we had to conduct samples in order to collect appropriate data for both the qualitative and quantitative investigations. Page 36 of 102

42 Documents as Sources of Data According to Krippendorff (2004), the universe of available texts is too large to be examined as a whole. When communication researchers ask questions that available texts could answer, they can easily be overwhelmed by volumes of relevant data. Researchers who are unfamiliar with the theory and techniques of sampling might realize at some point during data analysis that their task exceeds the available resources and may be forced to terminate their data analysis prematurely (Krippendorff 2004: ). Therefore, when researchers analyze a sample of texts in place of a larger population of texts, they need a sampling plan to ensure that sampled texts do not bias the answers to the research question(s) (Ibid: 113). We have chosen to limit our research to a manageable body of texts by using documents as sources of data. Documents are a very heterogeneous group in general, but one that has been used often is company documents. The documents that we have chosen to sample is placed within the public domain and covers both press releases, transcripts of press briefings and annual reports from MAS and the Malaysian Government s official MH370 websites. The data that has been collected cover a period from March 8 to August 29, These particular documents should provide us with sufficient material to analyze the airline s crisis communication during the MH370 crisis. Bryman (2012) suggests that one of the greatest advantages gained by sampling documents derived from private sources is that they are more likely to be authentic as well as being clear and comprehensible to the researcher. We have been very cautious in sampling documents primarily from MAS and the Malaysian Government s official websites and generally excluded data from the mass media, where authenticity issues can be difficult to ascertain. Journalists of the mass media sometimes frame a story or even a statement for the good of the news agency in which they are employed, and it can therefore be difficult to know whether the account can be relied upon or not (Bryman 2012: 553). We did however make a few exceptions in order to bring relevant information that was unavailable on the official websites, but when exceptions was made it was always the unedited information of the article that was utilized in the analysis We believe that sampling official documents derived from MAS and the Malaysian Government s official websites should provide a realistic account of the airline s crisis communication. We are granted access to a great amount of information concerning the disappearance of flight MH370, and there is no need to validate the accuracy of the documents or their authorship. In other words, the authenticity is already confirmed as MAS is the sender of the press releases, which verifies credibility issues as well (Ibid: 551). Page 37 of 102

43 Sampling Strategy In qualitative research, several sampling strategies can be employed to sample documents as units of analysis, but most approaches will entail purposive sampling of some kind. According to Bryman (2012), what links the various kinds of purposive sampling approaches is that the sample is conducted with reference to the goals of the research topic. In other words, the units of analysis are selected in terms of criteria that will allow the research questions to be answered (Bryman 2012: 418). The sampling approach that we will apply is what Bryman refers to as sequential sampling, which also entails the broad characteristic of purposive sampling. Sequential sampling implies that sampling is an evolving process where the researcher usually begins with an initial sample and gradually adds to the sample as it benefits the research questions (Ibid). The sample will thus be conducted strategically by selecting the units by virtue of their relevance to the first research question. During this process, we will attempt to ensure that the sample has a good deal of variety so that the specific units contain elements of both the crisis type and the different response strategies employed by MAS Validity of the Qualitative Study There is a tendency among case study researchers whose point of reference lies primarily with a qualitative research strategy to minimize or ignore the salience of reliability, replicability, and validity, whereas those researchers who have been strongly influenced by the quantitative research strategy tend to depict them as more significant (Bryman 2012: 69). Some qualitative researchers therefore propose that their investigations should be judged or evaluated according to different criteria from those used in relation to quantitative research. Scott (1990) has made useful distinctions relating to the criteria for assessing the quality of official documents in qualitative research. The first criterion is authenticity, which means that the document has to be genuine and of unquestionable origin. We have already explained that one of the greatest advantages gained by sampling documents derived from MAS and the Malaysian Government s official MH370 websites is that the authenticity has already been confirmed. One might say that the second criterion of credibility is verified in the same sentence. MAS is the sender of the crisis communication, which verifies credibility issues as well. The third criterion for evaluating official documents is representativeness and deals with the typicality of the collected evidence. We do not disregard the importance of representativeness when assessing the validity of the qualitative investigation, but we are aware that it is difficult to yield representative findings that can be applied to other cases and contexts in most qualitative research. However, the main purpose of the qualitative investigation is Page 38 of 102

44 not to generalize to other cases or populations beyond this context. What we instead aim to generate is an intensive examination of MAS crisis communication. From our point of view, the crucial question is not whether these findings can be generalized to a wider context, but instead how well we are capable of engaging in an incisive theoretical analysis and discussion based on the findings. The fourth and last of Scott s criteria is meaning, and it is concerned with the question of whether the evidence derived from the documents are clear and comprehensible to the researcher. The majority of the content in the documents was written in clear and comprehensible English, and it has therefore not been difficult to establish meaning (Ibid: 306) Qualitative Data Analysis Bryman (2012) emphasizes that qualitative content analysis is one of the most prevalent approaches to the qualitative analysis of documents, and it is comprised of a search for underlying themes. The process through which the themes are extracted is often not specified in detail, but it is usually illustrated with quotations or statements from various documents (Bryman 2012: 559). We have previously defined that the objective of the qualitative research is to use the SCCT to investigate how MAS executed its crisis communication. Using the SCCT in the collection and analysis of data arguably contains elements of what Bryman refers to as deductive theory. With the deductive approach, theory is something that guides the research process (Ibid: 24). Consequently, the SCCT will be used to collect all relevant data that are related to the concepts and categories of the theory. In the end, we should be capable of generating an index of themes to assist us in the analysis and interpretation of the sampled data. During the search for themes in the sampled documents, we will always keep the bigger perspective in mind, and we are aware that the process does not account for the entire analysis, it is part of it. It is a mechanism for thinking about the meaning of our data and for reducing the vast amount of data we come across. Another important element in qualitative content analysis is to interpret the findings. In line with the hermeneutic-phenomenological tradition of interpretivism, we have been inspired by the hermeneutic approach to qualitative content analysis in which the analyst of a text must seek to bring out its meanings from the perspective of the original author (Ibid: 560). This aspect is an important element in the investigation of MAS crisis communication effort during the MH370 crisis. The hermeneutic-phenomenological position should allow us to gain access to MAS common-sense thinking and enable an interpretation of the airline s actions and social reality from an organizational perspective. Page 39 of 102

45 Online Survey Since most qualitative research methods do not allow data to be evaluated in terms of measurement, we need an additional approach that will allow us to measure to which degree MAS succeeded in protecting its reputation during the crisis. We will therefore use the first units of a qualitative content analysis as the basis for conducting an online survey. In recent years, there has been considerable growth in the number of surveys being administered online. Bryman (2012) emphasizes that a crucial distinction has to be made between surveys being administered by where a self-completion questionnaire is sent via to the respondents, and surveys administered via the internet where the respondents are directed to a website in order to answer a self-completion questionnaire (Bryman 2012: 670). The aim of the online survey is to conduct a study of a specific target population that can be characterized as potential customers. Since the survey is a widely used and accepted instrument for the study of homogenous groups of people, we decided to conduct an survey to investigate the customers perceptions of MAS crisis communication. The authors are aware that an survey under normal circumstances requires a distinguishing between embedded and attached questionnaire surveys. With the embedded questionnaire, the questions are to be found in the body of the , and there may be an introduction in the upper part followed by some marking that divides the introduction form the questionnaire itself. Respondents have to indicate their replies using notations, or they will be asked to delete alternatives that do not apply. Once completed, the respondents just need to type click on the reply button to return the questionnaire to the researcher (Ibid). With the attached questionnaire, the questionnaire is a file attachment to an . The respondents also have to select or type their answers, but when returning the questionnaire to the researcher they have to reattach the questionnaire in a reply . However, what Bryman does not account for in his book Social Research Methods is that it is in fact possible to carry out an survey by attaching a link that directs the respondent to a website where the questionnaire can be completed electronically. Bryman only pays minor attention to the issue by acknowledging that most approaches to surveys saw the light during the early days of online surveys, and that there may be a need for revision for the same reason (Ibid: 671). There are several advantages associated with using one of the many available software packages designed to produce e.g. self-completion questionnaires. As mentioned, the questionnaire can be completed online, which means that the respondents only have to press a button to select the answers. The response rate will arguably be Page 40 of 102

46 higher since they do not have to return the questionnaire by answering an or attaching any file to it. In his own studies, Bryman often uses SurveyMonkey for online surveys. Nevertheless, SurveyXact will be employed in this thesis for two main reasons: it is an acclaimed free instrument offered by Aarhus University to its students, and; it offers a complete and processed questionnaire package. Using a computer software program like SurveyXact should eliminate the necessity of coding a relatively large number of questionnaires. No coding means saving time and it will also reduce the likelihood of errors in the processing of data. Each respondent s replies are logged into a database, and the entire dataset can be retrieved once the data collection phase is complete (Ibid: 671) Questionnaire Design Developing a questionnaire requires the researcher to establish what he or she needs to know in order to answer the research questions that drive the process, and design questions in the questionnaire that will allow the collected data to answer those research questions (Bryman 2012: 12). When researchers design a self-completion questionnaire, one of the most significant considerations is whether to ask a question in an open or closed format (Ibid: 246). The questions designed for the purpose of this thesis will be in a closed format. This is mainly due to the problems associated with the processing of answers to open questions: they are very time-consuming to administer, and they require greater effort from respondents who would need to write for much longer compared to closed questions (Ibid: 247). The closed questions format is particularly advantageous in the context of this thesis, since the aim of the survey is to compare the respondents perception of MAS crisis communication, and closed questions generally enhance the comparability of a survey. The major part of the questionnaire will contain attitude questions by employing a variation of a Likert Scale design, which is one of the most frequently encountered formats for measuring attitudes (Ibid: ). The reason why it is considered a variation of a Likert Scale design is that we opted not to provide comprehensive instructing information at the beginning of the Likert Scale questions. Instead of informing the respondents that in the next 10 questions SA equals Strongly Agree, we chose to write it in full for each question. Before administering the self-completion questionnaire to a sample, it is desirable to conduct a pilot study to ensure that the research as a whole functions well. Bryman (2012) emphasizes that ( ) pilot studies may be particularly crucial in relation to a self-completion questionnaire, since there will not be an interviewer present to clear up any confusion (Ibid: 263). The pilot study will be Page 41 of 102

47 used to stir up any confusion in the questionnaire design, since it should be possible to determine how well the questions flow and whether it is necessary to move some of them around to improve this feature. The pilot study will not be carried out on people that are potential members of the sample employed in the full study. Instead, we will select a small set of respondents who are comparable to members of the population from which the sample will be taken (Ibid: 264) Sampling Strategy According to Bryman (2012), many people associate sampling with surveys and the quest for representative samples that can act as a microcosm of a wider population (Bryman 2012: 11). However, it is incredibly difficult to derive a truly representative sample, as sampling bias is likely to occur. Bryman emphasizes that sampling bias is ( ) a distortion in the representativeness of the sample that arises when some members of the population (or more precisely the sampling frame) stand little or no chance of being selected for inclusion in the sample (Ibid: 187). Since the objective of the quantitative investigation is to create a representative sample that can be generalized to a wider population, we have attempted to keep sample bias to a minimum by following the guidelines for conducting a quantitative survey. The first step in the sampling strategy has been to address the question of how big a sample size is needed to conduct a representative investigation. Bryman suggests that it is the absolute size of a sample that is important and not the relative size. Therefore, it is not relevant to the validity of this study whether a probability sampling is carried out in Denmark or in China, although the latter has a much larger population (Ibid: 197). It can therefore be argued that a Danish population of potential customers is as good as any Asian population. Although the majority of MAS potential customers are arguably located in other areas of the world, there is evidence to suggest that the investigation will be just as valid when sampling from a Danish population. We have thus identified golf players of Mollerup Golf Club in Aarhus as the population and specific customer group from which the sample will be drawn. Golf players generally represent a wide section of the Danish population that travels to Asian countries, and they are therefore considered a fair sample of MAS potential Danish customer base. Several Danish travelling agencies today offer exclusive golf packages to Asia, and it has seen an increasing amount of Danish golf players vacationing and golfing in Asia each year. According to MAS website, the airline does offer flight routes to and from Copenhagen Airport. There is thus a high degree of certainty that air travelling golf players could possibly choose MAS the next time they decide to spend their holidays in Asia, making them a potential customer to the airline. Additionally, it was quite straightforward to gain access to this Page 42 of 102

48 specific group of people, since one of the authors of this thesis is a golf player at Mollerup Golf Club himself. To avoid sampling bias and any conflict of interest, he has not been included in the sampling frame. There is a policy at Mollerup Golf Club that, under normal circumstances, only golf-related news is issued per to the members. Additionally, the management is not interested in handing out the members contact information either. The argument was that all personal information regarding the members is treated confidentially, and we will therefore not be able to use the distribution option provided by SurveyXact. However, the management is willing to make an extraordinary exception. The chairman has agreed to randomly select 150 membership numbers of a total population of 1,200 (1 out of 8), which means that all members of the population from which the sample is gathered stand equal chance of being included in the overall sampling frame. He will then distribute the on our behalf containing a presentation of the questionnaire and a link that directs the respondents to the survey. It is generally assumed that a somewhat representative sample is likely to be the outcome when the method of simple random selection from a population is made, which will contribute to keeping sampling error to a minimum (Bryman 2012: 187). Since we are not allowed access to the entire population, probability sampling is an important procedure in making inferences from information about a random sample to the population from which it will be selected. We should thereby be capable of generalizing the findings derived from our sample to the entire population (Ibid: 195). When a sample has been selected using probability sampling, any findings can only be generalized to the population from which that sample is taken. That is, the 1,200 golf players of Mollerup Golf Club. However, one might say that findings from this type of investigation have some kind of broader applicability, and that they could provide a more realistic picture of how MAS crisis communication was perceived by its stakeholders. In closing, we generally believe that the opportunities for conducting probability sampling in surveys should be considered as good as those conducted offline. Today, almost anyone have online access through a computer and are thus likely to be familiar with the details of using internet to which the questionnaire link will be directed. As a result, surveys of samples of populations using the internet can be conducted using essentially the same probability sampling procedures as conducted offline (Ibid: 674). Page 43 of 102

49 Validity of the Quantitative Study Bryman (2012) suggests that the most prominent criteria for the evaluation of quantitative research are reliability, replication, and validity. Firstly, reliability is concerned with the question of whether the results of a study are repeatable and whether the devised measurements are consistent and stable, which in practical terms means that results that are measured one day should be similar to those measured on another day (Bryman 2012: 46). As time constraints have limited the survey to be conducted only once and not on two or more occasions, it is difficult to measure the questionnaire s reliability and stability with a 100% degree of certainty. Nevertheless, we believe that it is fair to assume that the answers are to some extend consistent and that they would not vary significantly if the survey had been conducted three or five months ago. The questionnaire is concerned with a communication effort that was carried out in 2014, and the respondents perceptions have arguably not changed considerably since then. Secondly, the idea of reliability is very close to another criterion of evaluating quantitative research namely replicability. Replicability is concerned with replicating the findings of others, and the criterion may become relevant if there is a feeling that the original results of a study do not match other evidence that is available to the domain in question (Ibid: 47). Nevertheless, we do not find ourselves in a position to replicate the finding of others, as that is not the purpose of this study. We are interested in the perceptions of a specific customer group where only a few, if any, have been granted access to conduct a survey on a previous occasion. Furthermore, replication is generally very uncommon in social research, and the criterion will not be attached any further importance. Thirdly, the criterion of validity is for many the most important tool for evaluating quantitative research. Validity is concerned with the integrity of the conclusions that are generated from the quantitative survey, and there are four main types of validity to distinguish between. Measurement validity (often referred to as construct validity) concerns whether the quantitative measure that is devised actually does reflect how the customers perceived MAS crisis communication, which it is supposed to be denoting (Ibid). If it does not, the survey s findings will be very questionable. In general, measurement validity is closely related to reliability. As it has been assumed that the answers provided by the respondents are to some extend consistent and reliable and that they would not vary significantly had the survey been conducted at another time, the investigation should be providing a valid measure of the concept in question (Ibid). The second type of validity is internal validity, which is concerned with the question of whether a conclusion that incorporates a causal relationship between two or more variables holds water. Page 44 of 102

50 However, internal validity is irrelevant in the context of this thesis. The aim of the survey is not to investigate whether a relationship between two or more variables exist, but instead to explore how the customers perceived MAS crisis communication (Ibid). The third type of validity is external validity, and it is concerned with whether the results of the quantitative investigation can be generalized to a wider context (Ibid). The issue will be addressed more thoroughly in the analysis section where the response rate is also calculated. The higher the response rate, the greater is the likelihood that the findings can be considered representative and generalized to the entire population (Ibid). The last of the four types of validity is ecological validity, which is concerned with whether social scientific findings are applicable to people s natural settings. Generally, the findings derived from the survey should not be considered applicable to contexts beyond this case study, since it is highly unlikely that the same results would have been obtained in another setting (Ibid: 48) Quantitative Data analysis Over the years, qualitative research has had almost a monopoly of the ability to study meaning. The proponents ( ) essentially claim that it is only through qualitative research that the world can be studied through the eyes of people that are studied (Bryman 2012: 617). However, the widespread inclusion of questions about attitudes in surveys suggests that quantitative researchers are interested in matters of meaning as well (Ibid). When we ask the respondents of the questionnaire about their perceptions of different elements of MAS crisis communication, it also implies that we need to uncover issues of meaning in the quantitative investigation as well. These considerations also support the idea that qualitative and quantitative research is probably not as wide and distinct as often supposed. Generally, quantitative data analysis does provide the researcher with an unambiguous set of rules about how to handle data, but the analysis still require an interpretation of the results, and compared to qualitative data analysis there are relatively clear rules for getting to that point. Under normal circumstances, the computer software IBM SPPS for Windows would be utilized by social researchers to analyze quantitative data derived from e.g. questionnaires. However, SurveyXact presents some basic analysis methods which are deemed sufficient to analyze the findings derived from the questionnaires. We are only interested in analyzing one variable at a time, not in exploring whether there is a connection between two or more variables. SurveyXact is therefore a useful software package that contains several features for performing simple analyses on our data such as a frequency table analysis, which is referred to by Bryman as univariate analysis Page 45 of 102

51 of one variable at a time (Ibid: 337). A frequency table analysis indicates statistically how many respondents selected each of the available choices in both the yes or no category and the attitude questions of the Likert Scale. One of the main advantages by employing this specific type of statistical analysis is that the relative distribution of answers provided by the respondents can be illustrated as a percentage for each possible choice. The statistical analysis of the respondents perceptions of MAS crisis communication will consequently be described by providing the reader with short and simple summaries about the sample and its measurements. A statistical description is employed to yield a comprehensive quantitative description amenable to statistical analysis, where the dataset retrieved from SurveyXact is analyzed with the purpose of drawing conclusions from the respondents main perceptions. Using this method of analyzing quantitative data should provide us with sufficient resources to assess how the customers perceived MAS crisis communication. Additionally, it should be possible to discuss to which degree the airline was able to protect its reputation during the crisis. 4. Case Presentation To create a more comprehensive contextual understanding of the specific units of analysis in the following chapters, a case description will account for a selection of the most prominent events during the disappearance of flight MH370. MAS flight MH370 carrying 227 passengers and 12 crewmembers disappeared on March 8, Subang air traffic control lost all contact with the plane at 2:40am local Malaysian time, and MAS stated later the same day that neither emergency signals nor distress messages had been received (Appendix 1). Within a few days rumors began to spread and the airline had to address them on several occasions. On March 10, it was questioned whether two passengers who travelled on false passports had anything to do with the disappearance of flight MH370 (Appendix 3). Additionally, on both March 12 and March 17 MAS had to spend time dismissing rumors that insinuated MAS was hiding something (Appendix 5 & 10). Seven days after the plane s disappearance, on March 15, the Malaysian Prime Minister ascertained that the Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) was disabled when the plane was flying over Malaysia s east coast and that the transponder was switched off at the border between the Malaysian and Vietnamese air traffic control. A military radar additionally displayed an aircraft believed to be MH370 change its original flight path, when it turned back and flew in a westerly direction over the Malaysian Peninsular before turning northeast. Up until then, the Page 46 of 102

52 movements of the plane were consistent with deliberate action taken by someone on board (Appendix 8). During the following days, MAS released several confusing press statements to the general public. The airline ascertained that there were 227 passengers and 12 crew members on board of flight MH370, which is equivalent to the passenger manifest that was released (Appendix 1). However, in its 23 rd media statement, MAS stated that 239 souls of MH370 were comprised of 226 passengers and 13 crew members (Appendix 13). Information regarding the last known communication with the plane was also changed rather significantly as the days passed and the raw data was analyzed. Contrary to what had been communicated in the early days following the disappearance of flight MH370, the Malaysian Government released a preliminary report on May 2 based on recorded communication between direct lines. According to the report, Vietnamese air traffic controllers informed the air traffic control center in Kuala Lumpur on March 8 at 1:38am that no verbal contact could be established with flight MH370. MAS responded to the queries at 2:03am and stated that the plane was in Cambodian airspace. At 2:15am, MAS confirmed that it had been able to exchange signals with flight MH370 and that it was flying in Cambodian airspace with nothing unusual to report. However, air traffic controllers in Ho Chi Minh stated at 2:18am that the planned route was only through Vietnamese airspace. Cambodian air traffic controllers further advised that it had no information or contact with MH370 in Cambodian airspace. MAS did not respond to the further queries until 3:30am, when it reported that the previous shared information was based on flight projections and not on actual flight positioning. The report revealed that MAS provided inaccurate information to the air traffic control centers in Malaysia, Vietnam and Cambodia, causing a delay of two hours at a very crucial stage of the plane s disappearance (Appendix 22). When the search and rescue for flight MH370 was finally mobilized, the search area changed in both size and location several times as the raw data was analyzed. The search began in the South China Sea and was subsequently widened to include Malaysian Peninsular and also the Malacca Strait and the Andaman Sea (Appendix 8). On March 15, the search team was informed that they should search along a northern and southern corridor, a total area of 2.24 million square nautical miles (Appendix 11), which covered both shallow seas, large tracts of land that crossed 11 countries, and deep and remote oceans (Appendix 9). During the MH370 crisis, the airline repeatedly referred to it as being unprecedented, both in terms of the support it was receiving and in terms of the situation itself. In fact the terminology was utilized on more than 6 of the first 16 days of the crisis. Page 47 of 102

53 On March 24, MAS released a press statement in which it stated that Inmarsat, the company that pointed the search towards the northern and southern corridors, had performed further calculations on the satellite data which could shed more light on MH370 s flight path. Based on this analysis, Inmarsat calculated that the plane flew along the southern corridor, and that its last position was in the middle of the southern Indian Ocean, west of Perth. Since the location is remote and far from any possible landing sites, MAS concluded that MH370 ended its route in the southern Indian Ocean and no one survived the plane crash (Appendix 13). Almost 1,000 family members received the tragic news through text messages. The CEO of MAS stated that text messages was only employed as a way of communicating, because the airline was given as little as 30 minutes to notify thousands of relatives before the Prime Minister shared the news in a live press conference (Appendix 15). On March 28, the search area was moved north east, as a reexamination of the Inmarsat data indicated that MH370 flew at a higher speed, causing it to use more fuel and thereby making it unable to travel as far (Appendix 16). A briefing session on April 25 at the Lido Hotel ballroom in Beijing resulted in MAS staff being held by more than 200 family members. The family members expressed dissatisfaction in obtaining details about the missing aircraft and requested the presence of a Malaysian official, which was not present at the briefing. The MAS staff was held for 10 hours and 44 minutes (Appendix 20). The airline announced on May 1 that it would be closing all the family assistance centers from May 7, which meant that the families were to vacate the hotels and return to their own homes. Simultaneously, the airline announced that it would make advanced compensation payments to the nominated next of kin as soon as possible after they had returned home (Appendix 21). On June 9, the airline was asked to comment on a group of Chinese families planning to recruit money to conduct their own investigation of the disappearance, to which MAS stated that if they wanted to engage by employing investigators they could do so, and that hopefully they would share the outcome of their investigations with MAS (Appendix 25). MAS announced on August 29 that weak financial performances had made the airline aware of the need to restructure its operations (Appendix 28). As a result, the Malaysian Government would take full ownership of MAS through its strategic investment fund, Khazanah Nasional Berhad. MAS would furthermore be delisted from the Malaysian stock exchange, and a plan for returning the airline group towards profitability was under development (Ibid). Page 48 of 102

54 5. Analysis The data analysis stage is fundamentally about data reduction that is, it is concerned with reducing the large corpus of information that the researcher has gathered so that he or she can make sense of it (Bryman 2012: 12). In this thesis, the qualitative data is reduced by employing a qualitative content analysis where the textual material is grouped into categories of Coombs (1999, 2007, 2012, and 2015) SCCT. The analysis will consist of two accompanying sections: the first stage seeks to identify the crisis type and any potential intensifying factors that can have implications on the selection of crisis response strategies; the second stage seeks to analyze which crisis response strategies MAS utilized to defend its reputation. The quantitative data is subsequently reduced with a frequency table analysis by producing tables and descriptions of the statistics. This stage accounts for the third and last part of the analysis and should illuminate how the customers perceived the airline s crisis communication effort Crisis Type and Intensifying Factors The first step in the analysis is to determine the crisis type and the actual reputational threat. Determining the degree of reputational threat at an early stage in its crisis response is very important for MAS, because the attribution of crisis responsibility can be a direct threat to the airline s image, reputation, and legitimacy. One half of establishing MAS level of reputational threat means assessing if there are any intensifying factors that applies to the organization. The first intensifier is the crisis history, but it proved impossible to get that information from the airline itself. Therefore, an article from the Malaysian Insider has been included as data. The article suggests that MAS s crisis history prior to the disappearance of MH370 was comprised of three instances. In 1977, a hijacking turned into a plane crash, when flight MH653 crashed into a swamp in Tanjong Kupang in Johor, resulting in the death of 100 passengers and crew members. In 1983, all passengers and crew members survived a bad weather crash two kilometers short of the runway at Subang airport. In 1995, 34 people died when flight MH2133 overshot the runway at Tawau airport because of pilot error (Appendix 1). The second intensifier is the airline s prior reputation. The process of determining MAS s reputation prior to the disappearance of flight MH370 has led the authors to investigate the 2013 annual report. The report illustrates an organization that had a profit in 2009 and 2010, but a deficit in all of the three following years. The deficit in both 2011 and 2013 is arguably considerable enough to cause the stakeholders to loose trust in the airline s ability to deliver on its promises. Page 49 of 102

55 (Appendix 27) The Crisis Occurs On March 8 at 7:24am, MAS confirms that it has ( ) lost contact with flight MH370 (Appendix 1). The flight was carrying 227 passengers and 12 crew members on its way from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing. This event indicates that a crisis has hit the surface. Whether the flight has landed safely, crashed into the ocean or something else remain unknown at this stage. At 9:00am, the CEO of MAS, Jauhari bin Yahya, provides an extended update on the former statement: ( ) we are deeply saddened this morning with the news on MH370. Malaysia Airlines confirms that flight MH370 had lost contact with Subang Air Traffic Control at 2:40am today ( ) We are working with authorities who have activated their Search and Rescue team to locate the aircraft. Our team is currently calling the next of kin of passengers and crew (Ibid). MAS again confirms that flight MH370 has lost all contact with Subang air traffic control, but gives no verdict Page 50 of 102

56 on what has happened to the flight. The only information provided by MAS at this point has been to inform the relatives of the passengers and crew members that the flight is missing, and that a search and rescue team has been mobilized. Meanwhile, since MAS is unable to verify the current location of flight MH370, rumors about the crisis start mongering with potentially false and damaging information being circulated about the airline. According to the CEO of MAS, There has been speculation that the aircraft has landed at Nanning. We are working to verify the authenticity of the report and others (Ibid). A 4:20pm statement indicates that a rumor crisis has begun to escalate: There are many unconfirmed reports out in the media and Malaysia Airlines strongly urges the media and the public at large to only report from official statements from Malaysia Airlines and the Government of Malaysia (Ibid). At a 9:30am press briefing on March 9, MAS provides further information about the crisis. The search and rescue teams are still unable to detect the whereabouts of flight MH370, and the following statement could indicate that MAS is preparing for the worst: The airline has called in a disaster recovery management specialist from Atlanta, USA, to assist MAS in this crucial time (Appendix 2). Usually, a disaster recovery management specialist is used in natural disasters such as tornados or earthquakes, so one might say that the airline does not yet know what it is dealing with. On March 10, MAS confirms at 5:30pm that new rumors are circulating: We are receiving many queries about how the passengers with the stolen passports purchased their tickets. We are unable to comment on this matter as this is a security issue. We can however confirm that we have given all the flight details to the authorities for further investigation (Appendix 3). Evidently, uninvited passengers have been on board of the flight, and some people have begun to question whether they have anything to do with the disappearance of flight MH370. The first time MAS confirms that a crisis exists is on March 11 in an 11:30pm media statement: As you are aware, we are in the midst of a crisis, and we do not want our attention to be diverted (Appendix 4). Page 51 of 102

57 On March 12 at a 5:30pm press conference, the media is accusing MAS of hiding information from the general public. The Minister of Defense and Acting Minister of Transport, Hishammuddin Hussein, does not deny the accusations, but instead seeks to direct the attention towards something else: This is unprecedented that we are going through. Coordinating so many countries together, it s not something easy. We are looking at so many vessels and aircrafts, so many countries to coordinate and a vast area for us to search (Appendix 5). The fact that MAS is incapable of locating the aircraft seems to increase the amount of rumors circulating about the organization. In the same press conference, the minister is also made aware of the continuous criticism made by China for a lack of transparency in MAS s external communication. China will obviously feel angry because they have so many of their nationals involved. It is also natural in crisis and tragedy ( ) (Ibid). This statement could indicate that the crisis is also an accident crisis where some stakeholders claim that the organization is operating in an inappropriate manner, and the Chinese accusations could potentially cause major communicative challenges for MAS. On March 14, the minister again refuses to make any further comments about whether MAS is withholding information: Malaysia Airlines is fully aware of the on-going media speculations and we have nothing further to add to the information we have already provided. Our primary focus at this point in time is to care for the families of the passengers and crew of MH370. This means providing them with timely information, travel facilities, accommodation, meals, medical and emotional support (Appendix 7) The Intensity of the Rumor Crisis Increases In a 3:23pm press statement on March 15, the Prime Minister of Malaysia does not rule out that the disappearance of flight MH370 is caused deliberately by someone on the plane. The rumor has started to spread in various media and gained strength during the last couple of days: In view of this latest development the Malaysian authorities have refocused their investigation into the crew and passengers on board. Despite media reports that the plane was hijacked, I wish to be very clear: we are still investigating all possibilities as to what caused MH370 to deviate from its original flight path (Appendix 8). The Prime Minister also responds to a growing demand for information from the Chinese families which continue to create challenges in MAS external communication: We understand the desperate need for information on behalf of the families and those watching around the world. But we have a responsibility to the investigation and the families to only release information that has Page 52 of 102

58 been corroborated (Ibid). One might say that there is nothing wrong with this statement as such, but the next sentence contradicts the former: Based on new satellite information, we can say with a high degree of certainty that the Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) was disabled just before the aircraft reached the East coast of peninsular Malaysia (Appendix 8). At 5:45pm the same day, MAS releases an updated press statement. Once again, the airline confirms that it will only release validated information to the general public, although it in fact did release new satellite data that was certain only to a high degree a few hours ago: We remain absolutely committed to sharing confirmed information with family members and the wider public in a fully open and transparent manner. However given the nature of the situation, the importance of validating new information before it is released into the public domain is paramount (Appendix 8). On March 16, minister Hishammuddin Hussein responds to speculative theories about the two pilots potential involvement in the disappearance of flight MH370: Yesterday, officers from the Royal Malaysia Police visited the home of the pilot. They spoke to family members of the pilot and experts are examining the pilot s flight simulator. The police also visited the home of the co-pilot. According to Malaysia Airlines, the pilot and co-pilot did not ask to fly together on MH370 (Appendix 9). The minister also attempts to dismiss any rumors saying that the crisis is caused by a technical-error or technical-error product harm: Malaysia Airlines has confirmed that the aircraft was subjected to the required maintenance program: the Boeing Maintenance Planning Document. Checks are done according to this program. The aircraft had been fully serviced and was fit to fly (Ibid). According to MAS, neither equipment nor technology have caused the flight to be defective and potentially harmful to the passengers on board of MH370. In a 5:30pm press conference on March 17, minister Hishammuddin Hussein attempts to address and dismiss the rumors that Malaysia has held back important information in regards to the last recorded location of MH370: I would also like to address the speculation that Malaysia has held back information about MH370 s movements. ( ) We would not withhold any information that could help. But we also have a responsibility not to release information until it has been verified by the international investigations team. This responsibility is not only to the families and to the Page 53 of 102

59 investigation, but also the search and rescue operation. It would be irresponsible to deploy substantial assets merely on the basis of unverified and uncorroborated information (Appendix 10). At 5:30pm on March 19, minister Hishammuddin Hussein speaks at a press conference where he provides answers to some of the many rumors that are being circulated about the organization: Regarding reports that the plane was sighted in the Maldives, I can confirm that the Malaysian Chief of the Defence Force has contacted his counterpart in the Maldives, who has confirmed that these reports are not true. I am aware of speculation that additional waypoints were added to the aircraft s flight routing. I can confirm that the aircraft flew on normal routing up until the waypoint IGARI. There is no additional waypoint on MH370 s documented flight plan, which depicts normal routing all the way to Beijing (Appendix 11). The minister also dismisses reports saying that terrorists have been on board and hijacked the plane: We have received passenger background checks from all countries apart from Ukraine and Russia, both of which had nationals on board. So far, no information of significance on any passengers has been found (Ibid). On March 22, minister Hishammuddin Hussein responds to new rumors that flight MH370 was carrying too heavy cargo, saying that a potential accident is not caused by either organizational misdeeds or human-error: Preliminary investigation of the cargo manifest has not shown any link to anything that might have contributed to MH370 s disappearance. As was stated yesterday, all cargo carried on MH370 was in compliance with International Civil Aviation Organization and International Air Transport Association standards (Appendix 12). On March 24 at a 5:30pm press conference, minister Hishammuddin Hussein is asked whether there is any indication that a pilot or someone on the place was responsible for the disappearance, or if it was caused by a technical issue or something else that is not human. He provided the following answer: The best way I can answer that is that we are not discounting that fact. But (...) if I answer that question I will also be speculating (Appendix 13). Page 54 of 102

60 MH370 is Deemed Lost At 10:15pm on March 24, MAS communicated to the relatives of the passengers and crew members of flight MH370 that it probably ended its route in the southern Indian Ocean: Malaysia Airlines deeply regrets that we have to assume that MH370 ended in the southern Indian Ocean. As you will hear in the next hour from Malaysia s Prime Minister, new analysis of satellite data suggests the plane went down in the southern Indian Ocean (Appendix 13). At this point, neither the plane nor any physical wreckage has been located. Thus, one might say that MAS contributes to further speculation and more rumor creation among its key stakeholders by sharing unverified and uncorroborated information. One hour and 12 minutes later, the Prime Minister of Malaysia states that Inmarsat has performed new calculations on the satellite data which suggests that flight MH370 most likely ended its route in the southern Indian Ocean: "Based on their new analysis, Inmarsat and the AAIB have concluded that MH370 flew along the southern corridor, and that its last position was in the middle of the Indian Ocean, west of Perth. This is a remote location, far from any possible landing sites. It is therefore with deep sadness and regret that I must inform you that, according to this new data, flight MH370 ended in the southern Indian Ocean (Ibid). On March 25, MAS releases a new press statement at 12:30am which states: It is with deep sadness that Malaysia Airlines earlier this evening had to confirm to the families of those on board Flight MH370 that it must now be assumed the flight had been lost ( ) We know that while there have been an increasing number of apparent leads, definitive identification of any piece of debris is still missing (Appendix 14). This statement is a contradiction to the airline s earlier standpoint of not wanting to release any information before it has been validated. In fact, the type of analysis conducted and calculated by Inmarsat in the investigation has never been used before. MAS conclusion will presumably invoke more speculation than credibility. On March 26, the CEO of MAS participates in an interview with BBC at 6:00am. The CEO responds to new media speculation that the pilot or the co-pilot has flown MH370 into the ocean deliberately: We don t know. Based on their records they have been quite exemplary. The captain has 18,000 hours, has been with Malaysia Airlines for I think more than 30 years and he is also an examiner for the 777, so there is no disciplinary record or anything that is out of order as I call it (Appendix 15). Page 55 of 102

61 In the interview, the CEO again reassures that MAS is not hiding or withholding information. Since MAS concluded that flight MH370 ended its route in the southern Indian Ocean, the Chinese relatives have been criticizing the airline of operating in an inappropriate manner: I think is it unfair. I think we have done all we can within our means to help them. The only thing you must realize that in an incident like this normally in any tragedy there is always some evidence in place, we have not had any evidence until maybe last night (Ibid). The CEO was also asked to give his verdict on a working theory of flight MH370. He was asked whether he believed that the disappearance is caused by human-error or a technical problem: We don t know what happened. We honestly don t know. All right, I think the best thing is actually to locate the aircraft, recover the evidence and piece the evidence together to know exactly what happened with flight MH370 (Ibid). One might say that if a technical problem has caused the plane s disappearance, it has got far more implications for MAS, for Boeing, and for others involved in the manufacturing of these aircrafts. At a 5:30pm press briefing on March 28, minister Hishammuddin Hussein responds to continuous criticism. The stakeholders are not impressed with MAS s crisis communication and believe that the airline is operating in an inappropriate manner: I don t think we could have done anything different from what we have done ( ) Malaysia has been very consistent in not speculating ( ) unless we have evidence that we have corroborated and verified ( ) maybe today with emotions running high ( ) people are clouded by what Malaysia has done (Appendix 16). MAS has evidently not been able to earn the trust from some of the stakeholders, and the criticism still creates major communicative challenges for the airline Stakeholders Question the Credibility of the Crisis Communication On March 31, Chinese relatives demand that MAS provides them with physical evidence that flight MH370 actually ended its route in the southern Indian Ocean. They are convinced that MAS is covering up the truth. At a 6:15pm press briefing, minister Hishammuddin Hussein responds to the rumors: We understand that it has been a difficult time for all the families. And we appreciate that many families want to see physical evidence before they will accept that MH370 ended in the southern Indian Ocean. We find ourselves in a difficult position ( ) the question that the families principally want answered, is the question we simply do not have the answer to - namely, where their loved ones are, and where is MH370 (Appendix 17). Page 56 of 102

62 On April 5, MAS is accused of being complicit in the disappearance of flight MH370. Minister Hishammuddin Hussein responds to the rumors at a 6:06pm press briefing: Before I end, let me touch on some unfounded allegations made against Malaysia. These allegations include the extraordinary assertion that Malaysian authorities were somehow complicit in what happened to MH370. I should like to state, for the record, that these allegations are completely untrue (Appendix 18). On April 19, it is revealed that only 26% of the Malaysian population thinks the Government is telling the truth about flight MH370. The media believes that MAS unwillingness to release basic information has caused the sentiment. Minister Hishammuddin Hussein responds to the speculation: I think that is not true. I met all the leaders from so many countries and they are saying this is an unprecedented situation. So how you are going to bench mark that as far as our performance is concerned ( ) is purely speculative and it is irresponsible and it does not represent the majority of the views out there. There is a small group of people that maybe cynical about how we are going to go forward but the truth will always prevail. We have nothing to hide ( ) (Appendix 19). The Chinese relatives continue to create major challenges for MAS crisis communication. On April 25, MAS confirms in a media statement that ( ) its staff was held at the Lido Hotel ballroom in Beijing by the family members of MH370 as the families expressed dissatisfaction in obtaining details of the missing aircraft (...) The over 200 family members requested for the presence of a Malaysian official as only Malaysia Airlines staff were present at the briefing session (Appendix 20). However, MAS further confirms that the Chinese relatives expressed their dissatisfaction on more than one occasion: In another incident, a Malaysia Airlines Security supervisor ( ) was attacked by a Chinese family member whilst on duty at the Lido Hotel in Beijing. The airline staff tried to stop an aggressive family member who demanded access to the secretariat, when the latter kicked the staff in his left knee (Ibid). On May 19, MAS is being accused of abandoning the relatives of the passengers and crew members of flight MH370 who turn to legal prosecution of the airline. MAS responds to the new media rumors at 06:45am: MAS wishes to respond to media reports that circulated yesterday stating that MAS abandons families of MH370 crew who seek legal help. MAS clarifies that certain crew Page 57 of 102

63 member families have retained foreign lawyers to represent their interests, and these foreign lawyers have directed that MAS cease from any further direct communication with their clients, and that MAS direct all further communications regarding these crew member families to them (Appendix 23). On May 20, in light of recent demands from Chinese relatives, MAS decides to provide further information on the discussion with Inmarsat. However, the data communication logs and the technical description of the analysis are not released for public consumption yet. The joint press statement by Inmarsat UK and DCA Malaysia states: In line with our commitment towards greater transparency, all parties are working for the release of the data communication logs and the technical description of the analysis for public consumption (Appendix 24). At a press conference on June 9, the Director General of DCA Malaysia responds to rumors suggesting that Chinese relatives of the passengers plan to recruit money themselves to establish their own investigation in order to shed light on the mystery: I think that, we leave it to them. If they want to engage, they say that they have been collecting 5 million or something like that and they want to employ investigators not technical, I think they can do so (Appendix 25) Interpreting the Findings A plane crash will typically be deemed an accident of some sort, either because of equipment malfunctioning, human error, or a storm that no one could have foreseen. On March 24, the Malaysian Prime Minister stated that the disappearance of flight MH370 was in all probability a plane crash. However, the conclusion was made without the support of an investigation of the black boxes or any physical wreckage for that matter. It can be argued that the Malaysian authorities drew their own conclusions on the basis of theoretical analyses without any precedent for doing so, and that the normal procedure for reaching a final conclusion was put aside. Coombs (2012) claims that a crisis is perceptual and that the perception of key stakeholders is what decides if an organization is in crisis. If stakeholders believe an organization is in crisis, a crisis exists. The first time MAS actually recognizes that it is facing a crisis is on March 10, which is illustrated in the following statement: As you are aware, we are in the midst of a crisis, and we do not want our attention to be diverted (Appendix 4). Recognizing that a crisis exists is a clear indication that MAS major stakeholders also perceive the airline to be in a crisis. Page 58 of 102

64 According to the SCCT, the first step in a crisis is to determine the crisis type and the actual reputational threat. This particular stage is important because the determination of the airline s perceived level of crisis responsibility has a clear impact on how its image and reputation is perceived throughout the crisis. The stronger the attribution of crisis responsibility, the greater is the potential reputational damage. The disappearance of flight MH370 begins as one could expect, namely as an accident crisis. On March 8 at 7:24am, MAS releases its first press statement and confirms that it ( ) has lost contact with flight MH370 (Appendix 1). At 9:00am, the CEO of MAS, Jauhari bin Yahya, elaborates on this matter by stating: ( ) we are deeply saddened this morning with the news on MH370. Malaysia Airlines confirms that flight MH370 had lost contact with Subang Air Traffic Control at 2:40am today ( ) We are working with authorities who have activated their Search and Rescue team to locate the aircraft. Our team is currently calling the next of kin of passengers and crew (Ibid). These statements point to the simple fact that the location of the plane is unknown, and that the authorities have mobilized a search and rescue operation supported by MAS and other parties. Although MAS does not provide any verdict on what has happened to the flight, the crisis is in all probability some kind of an accident. Meanwhile, since MAS is unable to verify the exact location of flight MH370, rumors start mongering about the mysterious circumstances surrounding the disappearance of the plane. There are even indications that MAS is beginning to address the general speculation itself: There has been speculation that the aircraft has landed at Nanning. We are working to verify the authenticity of the report and others (Ibid). Further, in a 4:20pm statement, MAS confirms that there are ( ) many unconfirmed reports out in the media ( ) (Ibid) and strongly encourages the media and general public ( ) to only report from official statements from Malaysia Airlines and the Government of Malaysia (Ibid). One might wonder why speculation and rumors begin to form at such an early stage, but according to Shibutani (1966), rumor creation is simply something that happens in ambiguous situations. It is probably difficult to find a more ambiguous situation than an airplane disappearing in the middle of the night without sending any emergency signals or distress messages. In other words, rumor creation is arguably not abnormal at this crisis stage. Since MAS is incapable of providing the necessary information to meet the problematic situation, its stakeholders will often attempt to improvise a crisis definition through rumor creation. During the first days of flight MH370 s disappearance, MAS releases several press statements and holds daily joint press briefings with Malaysian officials. Those statements include information on what is Page 59 of 102

65 transpiring in terms of the search for the plane, and initial rumors that begin to spread and gain strength in various media are also addressed. However, when it comes to addressing what could potentially have happened to flight MH370, the official sources fall silent. Although there seems to be a growing unsatisfied need for information, MAS does not wish to share a clear working theory with the general public. As we are about to explore more extensively, rumors will eventually form Ambiguity Creates Rumors During a crisis, it is critical that the established sources provide an adequate information flow. If they do not, then the concerned individuals will keep viewing the problem as unsolved. In a crisis where rumors begin to form instantly, one might advise the organization under siege to pay attention to Shibutani s (1966) notion that rumor creation emerges in ambiguous situations, and that the amount of rumors will vary with the importance of the subject to the concerned individuals and the ambiguity of the available evidence. The various rumors that circulate following the disappearance of flight MH370 refer to the disappearance as different kinds of crisis types. What is particularly evident is that the rumors do not have any clear direction; instead they are spread far and wide. The existence of a potential rumor crisis is evident in the various rumors and speculation that MAS addresses in the 16 days between the plane s disappearance and the day when the Malaysian Prime Minister states that MH370 has presumably ended its route in the southern Indian Ocean. Besides from the first rumor suggesting that flight MH370 had landed at Nanning Airport, MAS addresses speculation on March 10 regarding some of the passengers who boarded the plane with stolen passports by stating: We are unable to comment on this matter as this is a security issue ( ) (Appendix 3). On March 15, the airline is once again forced to comment on rumors when the Malaysian Prime Minister addresses media reports suggesting that the plane has been hijacked by terrorists. He does so through a statement that one might say is somewhat emptied of substantive content: Despite media reports that the plane was hijacked, I wish to be very clear: we are still investigating all possibilities as to what caused MH370 to deviate from its original flight path (Appendix 8). The rumor is neither confirmed nor dismissed, and it therefore continues to circulate. Consequently, the airline has to address it again on March 19: We have received passenger background checks from all countries apart from Ukraine and Russia, both of which had nationals on board. So far, no information of significance on any passengers has been found (Appendix 11). Because the airline is unwilling to dismiss any rumors, it arguably expands the rumors lifespan and causes some to resurface. Page 60 of 102

66 Another rumor was addressed on March 17 when ongoing media speculation suggests that a technical-error accident has caused the disappearance of the plane: Malaysia Airlines has confirmed that the aircraft was subjected to the required maintenance program: the Boeing Maintenance Planning Document. Checks are done according to this program. The aircraft had been fully serviced and was fit to fly (Appendix 9). Five days later minister Hishammuddin Hussein has to address another rumor which arguably indicates that the crisis is caused by organizational misdeeds Preliminary investigation of the cargo manifest has not shown any link to anything that might have contributed to MH370 s disappearance. As was stated yesterday, all cargo carried on MH370 was in compliance with International Civil Aviation Organization and International Air Transport Association standards (Appendix 12). These statements are indicators of two things: 1) that the rumors circulating in the initial stage of the MH370 crisis are without any clear direction, and 2) through its approach to the management of the rumor crisis, MAS is not exactly lowering the level of ambiguity that surrounds the mystery of flight MH Contributing to Rumor Creation According to MAS, the airline is aware that it has an obligation to only share confirmed information with the general public during the crisis. However, in contrast to what is promised, MAS is arguably a direct contributor to rumor creation itself by providing conflicting statements to the general public on several occasions. As previously mentioned, MAS contributes to the initial speculation by addressing a rumor on March 8: There has been speculation that the aircraft has landed at Nanning Airport. We are working to verify the authenticity of the report and others (Appendix 1). On March 15, MAS releases a statement which highlights its responsibility of providing consistent, transparent and adequate information to the general public: We remain absolutely committed to sharing confirmed information with family members and the wider public in a fully open and transparent manner. However given the nature of the situation, the importance of validating new information before it is released into the public domain is paramount (Appendix 8). On the same day MAS again contradicts itself by contributing to the growing speculation and rumor creation, stating that ( ) we can say with a high degree of certainty that the Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) was disabled just before the aircraft reached the East coast of peninsular Malaysia ( ) (Ibid). One might say that a high degree of certainty is not sufficiently valid to provide an extensive account of some of the circumstances surrounding the crisis. Page 61 of 102

67 On March 24, just hours before it is announced that the plane is deemed to be lost, MAS states that new rumors cannot be discounted: The best way I can answer that is to say that we are not discounting those facts. But (...) if I answer that question I will also be speculating (Appendix 13). These statements of rather unverified and uncorroborated information are shared with the general public, although MAS repeatedly states that it has a responsibility not to release information until it has been verified by the international investigations team. In fact, the airline is of the perception that ( ) it would be irresponsible to deploy substantial assets merely on the basis of unverified and uncorroborated information (Ibid). Nevertheless, deploying substantial assets on the basis of unverified and uncorroborated information is exactly what the airline does on March 25 by claiming that flight MH370 ended its route in the southern Indian Ocean: It is with deep sadness that Malaysia Airlines earlier this evening had to confirm to the families of those on board Flight MH370 that it must now be assumed the flight had been lost ( ) We know that while there have been an increasing number of apparent leads, definitive identification of any piece of debris is still missing (Appendix 14). If the conclusion is really reached without an investigation of any debris, it can arguably be said that MAS drew its own conclusion without any precedent for doing so. When minister Hishammuddin Hussein states that (...) this type of analysis has never been done in an investigation of this sort (Ibid), it is an indication that the normal procedures in a plane crash investigation was put aside. Instead, the conclusion was based on calculations rather than physical evidence and the statement will probably contribute to further speculation rather than bury the crisis with the drawn conclusion. Shibutani (1966) stresses that, during a crisis, the established sources must supply adequate information, for if they do not and the problem remains unsolved, it will cause even more frustration among stakeholders. It is believed that the unsatisfied need for information will fuel rumor creation further, and that the importance of the subject to the concerned individuals and the ambiguity of the available evidence are the main variables that determine how many rumors are created. The importance of providing information to the relatives of the passengers and crew members in regards to the disappearance flight MH370 cannot be overstated. However, it is arguably also very important for the general public to be kept informed and updated as people may begin to ask if the same could happen to them the next time they travel with MAS. The level of ambiguity is similarly high as neither MAS nor the various authorities searching for the plane seem to know what caused the events to transpire in the manner they did. To summarize, it can be argued that while Shibutani s theory of rumor creation correlates with the official sources ability to meet Page 62 of 102

68 the public demand for news, it seems that MAS fails to provide an adequate information flow to its stakeholders. In the end, it may have caused the ongoing rumor creation throughout the crisis Assessing the Crisis Following the initial analysis of the crisis type, it is fair to assume that the crisis is caused by some kind of an accident. The type of accident crisis cannot be determined at this point, since any debris including the black boxes is still missing. Thus, the crisis can be a technical-error accident, technical-error product harm, or a preventable human-error accident. What has also become evident so far is that the accident crisis is accompanied by another crisis type. According to Johansen & Frandsen (2007), a broader approach to crises management is necessary when crises are managed insufficiently. In the previous section, it was illuminated how MAS failed to provide an adequate information flow to its stakeholders, which may have caused the ongoing rumor creation throughout the crisis. In such situations, a double crisis in which the original crisis is overlaid by a communication crisis may occur, if the airline is incapable of running the communication processes that are supposed to contribute to the handling of the original crisis. The incident of losing flight MH370 affects all relevant stakeholder groups such as the relatives of the passengers and crew members, the general public, Boeing as the manufacturer of the plane, the media, the customers, etc. All of these stakeholders have a clear interest in the disappearance of flight MH370, and they are already beginning to develop their own theories about the mystery. The shift from a single crisis to a double crisis arguably occurs almost instantly following the plane s disappearance. When MAS on March 8 addresses a rumor suggesting that the plane has landed at Nanning airport, an overlaying communicative rumor crisis evidently came into existence. It can thereby be postulated that both an accident crisis and an overlaying communicative rumor crisis are associated with the disappearance of flight MH370. Crises generally have the potential to seriously threaten an organization s legitimacy as they can violate the stakeholders expectations about how the organization should act. MAS stakeholders arguably expect planes to fly and land safely on the ground; not disappearing without a trace in the middle of the night. Therefore, a plane crash is a crisis that has the potential to disturb stakeholder expectations and could result in people becoming upset and angry. If stakeholders expectations are breached, they may perceive MAS less positively, and the long-term relationship may be threatened. The long-term relationship between MAS and its stakeholders is arguably the cornerstone in the airline s corporate reputation, and Page 63 of 102

69 mismanaging a crisis of such magnitude should therefore be considered potentially dangerous to its reputation and future existence Intensifying Factors As previously mentioned, there are generally two intensifying factors worth paying attention to when assessing MAS attribution of responsibility and level of reputational threat. Those are the airline s crisis history and its prior reputation. If an organization has a history of similar crises or an unfavorable prior reputation, both the attribution of crisis responsibility and level of reputational threat will be intensified. The existence of either of the intensifying factors will revise the initial threat assessment upward, which in practical terms means that a victim crisis should be treated as an accident crisis, and an accident crisis should be treated as a preventable crisis. There is no evidence to suggest that MAS has experienced similar crises to the disappearance of flight MH370, since it is considered an unprecedented mystery that may have changed aviation history. Additionally, prior to the disappearance of flight MH370, the latest crash of a MAS flight was in 1995 (Appendix 1). The other intensifying factor of an unfavorable prior reputation is more difficult to assess, as an organization s corporate reputation is its relative standing with stakeholders and based on perceptions. Having intensively examined the airline s annual report of 2013, it was found that MAS is operating with a severe profitability problem. (Appendix 27) As the annual report suggests, MAS presented negative results in 2011, 2012 and The poor results may affect how stakeholders perceive the organization. They may begin to worry whether they will get what they are promised. Shareholders may worry about whether they will receive a return on their investment, and suppliers may decide against extending the airline s credit. Page 64 of 102

70 Customers may also begin to wonder whether the recent negative financial performances will result in deficient plane quality and onboard services. The net results of the previous three years provide the following numbers in Malaysian Ringgit: a loss of 1.17bn in 2011; a loss of 431m in 2012, and; a loss of 2.52bn in While an organization s corporate reputation is comprised of much more than its financial performance, it does indicate that MAS is an organization with severe problems. If any private organization operated with a net loss like this, it would arguably only be matter of time before it would have to declare bankruptcy. However, as the Malaysian Government owns 70% of MAS shares through its strategic investment fund, the situation is unprecedented. Nevertheless, the airline s key stakeholders will not perceive an organization that is continually unprofitable in the same regard as one that is continuously delivering stable earnings year after year. Thus, MAS net results of the last three years have arguably caused an unfavorable prior reputation among specific stakeholder groups. When stakeholders begin to question whether an organization can deliver on its promises, one might say that the trust between them is fading. From a business perspective, trust is arguably an essential element in building organizational relationships, and it replaces the direct and current experience with something else the expectation that the organization s future behavior will produce satisfactory results. MAS stakeholder relations are based on its ability to meet their expectations, and if MAS fails to do so, the reputational capital and general goodwill will also be diminished. According to Fombrun (1996), an organization can gain a competitive advantage against its rivals by earning the trust and respect of its stakeholders. As MAS obviously had severe difficulties in meeting its stakeholders expectations of being a stable and profitable future business partner, the reputational capital can therefore be said to have slowly eroded during the fiscal years from 2011 to By April 19, a total of 74% of the Malaysian population did not believe that the Malaysian Government was telling the truth regarding the disappearance of flight MH370. It is arguably fair to say that the authorities have failed to live up to their expectations too. It was revealed that minister Hishammuddin Hussein responded to the national poll by questioning its validity: I think that is not true. ( ) this is an unprecedented situation ( ) it does not represent the majority of the views out there. There is a small group of people that may be cynical about how we are going to go forward but the truth will always prevail (Appendix 19). This statement indicates that MAS brushes off the notion that it has failed in its crisis management effort and sticks with its own framing of the crisis. By failing to fulfill the expectations of the Malaysian population, MAS has Page 65 of 102

71 arguably eroded its reputational capital even further, which arguably reduces the airline s goodwill and deteriorates its overall reputation. Due to the existence of an intensifying factor of an unfavorable prior, the original accident crisis is transformed to a preventable crisis. So instead of being a crisis with a moderate level of reputational threat and a low attribution of responsibility, MAS is facing a crisis with a severe reputational threat and a strong attribution of responsibility. However, this is not the worst side of it; since the crisis is a double crisis with an overlaying communicative rumor crisis, MAS level of responsibility is transformed further. The rumor crisis, which under normal circumstances is a crisis with a low reputational threat and a virtually non-existent attribution of responsibility, becomes a crisis with a moderate reputational threat and a low attribution of responsibility. When the two crisis types are coupled together in a double crisis scenario with the added element of an unfavorable prior reputation, the disappearance of flight MH370 arguably becomes a crisis that can be potentially life threatening for the future existence of the airline. In any crisis, it is only natural that some disagreement on the perception of the attribution of responsibility and level of reputational threat exists. It is for instance possible that the airline s crisis management team and its stakeholders disagree on how the crisis should be perceived. If this turns out to be the case, Coombs (2012) suggests that MAS should consider adopting the stakeholders framing. Nevertheless, several incidents have already pointed to the fact that MAS arguably decided to employ its own framing of the crisis without having a clear-cut definition of the crisis type, which could evidently be the reason why the communication effort with the stakeholders is failing in many respects. There is evidence to support a relationship between MAS and its stakeholders filled with distrust and fuelled by the airline s inability to meet their expectations as well Crisis Response Strategies Having identified the crisis type and established the level of reputational threat including the intensifying factor of a poor unfavorable reputation, the next step of the analysis will be to determine which crisis communication strategies MAS employed during the crisis. Additionally, both the second and the third stage of the SCCT will be included in this section to assess whether MAS selected the most effective crisis responses for protecting its reputational assets. Page 66 of 102

72 The Initial Strategy On March 9 at 2:00am, MAS informs the general public that an international search and rescue mission from Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam has been mobilized to detect the missing flight MH370. At this point, the chaotic situation in China is being monitored closely by MAS, who promises to provide the following compensation once the aircraft is found: Once the whereabouts of the aircraft is determined, Malaysia Airlines will fly members of the family to the location. Travel arrangements and immediate expenses of family members will be borne by Malaysia Airlines (Appendix 2). In a 5:30pm press release on March 10, MAS states that the families will receive transport and accommodation compensation to the designed areas for the family members: When the aircraft is located, a Response Coordination Centre (RCC) will be established within the vicinity to support the needs of the families. This has been communicated specifically to the families. Once the RCC is operational, we will provide transport and accommodation to the designated areas for the family members (Appendix 3). On March 12 at 1:00pm, MAS reiterates that it will provide all relatives of the passengers and crew members of flight MH370 with the following financial compensation: Malaysia Airlines' primary focus at this point in time is to care for the families of the passengers and crew of MH370. This means providing them with timely information, travel facilities, accommodation, meals, medical and emotional support. All these costs are borne by Malaysia Airlines ( ) Equal amount of initial financial assistance are being given out to all families of passengers and crew over and above their basic needs (Appendix 5). The decision to employ three rebuilding postures at such an early stage indicates that MAS is aware that its reputation runs the risk of being severely damaged if the communication effort is not executed in accordance with the expectations of its stakeholders Shifting Strategies On March 13, minister Hishammuddin Hussein arguably employs the denial posture scapegoating by claiming that the responsibility for not being able to locate flight MH370 should be placed elsewhere: We are talking about sophisticated equipment deployed by the US and China. So to say that it is just on our shoulders, I think that is unfair because the overwhelming support and unprecedented efforts on a multinational level is something we should be very proud about although we need to find the aircraft (Appendix 6). Page 67 of 102

73 In a press statement the following day, minister Hishammuddin Hussein attempts to justify the incentive for widening the search area and for the inability to locate the missing flight MH370: We want nothing more than to find the plane as quickly as possible. But the circumstances have forced us to widen our search. A normal investigation becomes narrower with time I understand, as new information focuses the search. But this is not a normal investigation. In this case, the information we have forces us to look further and further afield (Appendix 7). In a Q&A on March 16, minister Hishammuddin Hussein is asked whether he sees a need to rethink national security based on the recent developments: I think looking ahead that answer will come with time because my immediate responsibility is to look for MH370 ( ) this is an unprecedented case and what we are going through here, ladies and gentlemen, is being monitored across the world and it may have changed aviation history. I think it s a lesson to be learned by everybody (Appendix 9). The statement contains an element of the diminishment posture excusing, since the minister reiterates that the crisis is unprecedented. However, the statement also contains an aspect of the denial posture scapegoating, which has possibly been employed in an attempt to direct the crisis responsibility towards something or someone else. In a 5:30pm press briefing on March 17, minister Hishammuddin Hussein addresses speculation that MAS has held back information by employing the bolstering strategy victimage: I would also like to address the speculation that Malaysia has held back information about MH370 s movements. For the families, I understand that every day prolongs the anguish. I understand because Malaysia, too, is missing its sons and daughters. There were 50 Malaysians on board the plane (Appendix 10). In this statement, MAS victimizes itself by explaining how it too is a victim of the crisis. On March 19 at 4:10pm, MAS issues a statement in which it employs the bolstering strategy ingratiation. The airline praises specific stakeholders who help address the event that led to the disappearance of flight MH370: The Airline continues to work closely with the authorities and we appreciate the help we are receiving from all local and international agencies during this critical and traumatic period (Appendix 11). Page 68 of 102

74 At 5:30pm on March 24, MAS praises the stakeholders who help detect the location of flight MH370 and expresses sympathy for the relatives of the passengers and crew members: The search for MH370 has taken us halfway around the world. At the moment there are new leads, but nothing conclusive. Our thoughts continue to be with the families who are still waiting for news. In the meantime, we are grateful for the on-going co-operation shown by our partners in this multinational search (Appendix 13). This response is arguably a combination of two strategies: on one hand, the bolstering strategy ingratiation is employed to praise stakeholders, and on the other, MAS provides adjusting information to victims by expressing concern for them Strategies following the Announcement of the Plane Crash On March 25 at 6:50pm, the day after MAS concluded that flight MH370 ended its route in the southern Indian Ocean, minister Hishammuddin Hussein praises the stakeholders who have pointed the search towards the northern and southern corridors: As the Prime Minister stated, this type of analysis has never been done in an investigation of this sort. There remains more work to be done, and we are grateful to Inmarsat, AAIB and the international investigations team, who are continuing to work with the Malaysian authorities (Appendix 14). In this incident, MAS employs the bolstering strategy ingratiation and praises the stakeholders who have contributed in the investigation by performing new analyses of the satellite data concerning the plane s flight path. At 12:30pm, the CEO of MAS speaks to the general public: We all feel enormous sorrow and pain. Sorrow that all those who boarded flight MH370 on Saturday March 8 will not see their families again, and that those families will now have to live on without those they love. It must be remembered too that 13 of our own colleagues and fellow Malaysians were also on board (Ibid). In this statement, the CEO arguably employs the bolstering strategy victimage by outlining that it must be remembered that MAS too is a victim of the crisis. At the same press briefing, the CEO further employs the rebuilding posture compensation by stating that MAS are prepared to offer additional payments to the relatives of passengers and crew members of flight MH370 as the search continues: Malaysia Airlines has already provided initial financial assistance of USD 5,000 per passenger to the next of kin. We recognize that financial support is not the only consideration. But the prolonged search is naturally placing financial strain on the relatives. We are therefore preparing to offer additional payments as the search continues (Ibid). Page 69 of 102

75 On March 26 in a 6:22am interview with BBC, the CEO denies that MAS provided text messages to the relatives as an additional communication means two days earlier: I do not think that is true (Appendix 15). The CEO is then confronted by the interviewer who accuses him of lying. The accusation makes the CEO change his explanation: We were given 30 minutes before the announcement by the Prime Minister on a very important piece of evidence. We were given 30 minutes and within 30 minutes we had to be in touch with 1,000 family members ( ) our first priority was actually to inform them personally ( ) we just wanted to make sure that we reached each and every one of those family members before they hear it from the press (Ibid). The CEO is obviously caught lying in a worldwide interview where he employs a denial posture by simply denying that MAS used text messages to inform the relatives about the loss of their loved ones. On March 28 at 10:15pm, the CEO of MAS tries to justify the organization s recent contradicting responses: The past couple of days have been especially difficult for everyone. For Malaysia Airlines, it was very difficult to break the devastating news of the loss of the aircraft, especially to a large number of family members of passengers and crew onboard MH370, located in many places around the world, within a short time before the Prime Minister s public announcement (Appendix 16). The CEO arguably employs the diminishment posture justification in an attempt to minimize the perceived damage associated with the uncoordinated and insufficient communication effort carried out by MAS during such a crucial crisis stage. At a 5:30pm press briefing, MAS is again being criticized for its recent crisis communication effort. Minister Hishammuddin Hussein tries to minimize the damage by employing the diminishment posture justification: I don t think we could have done anything different from what we have done and I think ( ) history will judge us, a country that has been very responsible ( ) where we are today is based on a very consistent, transparent effort on our part and maybe today with emotions running high and a lot of interest on this issue, people are clouded by what Malaysia has done (Ibid). The minister evidently believes that MAS has been very consistent and transparent in its crisis communication effort, although the CEO of MAS was caught lying in a world-wide interview only a few days before. On April 5 at a 6:06pm press briefing, minister Hishammuddin Hussein employs the denial posture attacking the accuser by responding to unfounded allegations about MAS which is said to have been complicit in the disappearance of flight MH370: Before I end, let me touch on some unfounded Page 70 of 102

76 allegations made against Malaysia. These allegations include the extraordinary assertion that Malaysian authorities were somehow complicit in what happened to MH370. I should like to state, for the record, that these allegations are completely untrue (Appendix 18). At 07:00pm on May 1, the CEO of MAS attempts to rebuild the relationship with the relatives of the passengers and crew members of flight MH370 by promising to provide them with advanced financial compensation as soon as possible: Malaysia Airlines will make advanced compensation payments soonest possible to the nominated next of kin who are entitled to claim compensation in order to meet their immediate economic needs. Immediately after the next of kin have returned home, our representatives will be in touch with them at the earliest opportunity to initiate the advanced compensation payment process (Appendix 21). On May 2, it is revealed that MAS wasted costly time in the early hours of flight MH370 s disappearance, because it gave erroneous reports to air traffic controllers stating that the plane was flying in Cambodian airspace about an hour after it went missing. As a result, an official search and rescue operation for the plane was delayed by two hours. In a media statement, MAS stresses that it was the responsibility of air traffic controllers to track and monitor flight MH370, since airlines only use flight-following systems to help pilots cope with weather conditions or route diversions: The responsibility of aircraft tracking monitoring resides with Air Traffic Control Centers. For airlines, it is normal to engage flight-following systems to assist its pilots to manage in weather conditions or route diversions. Such airline flight-following systems are non-primary and nonpositive controlling. Flight-following systems also do not trigger airlines of any abnormality (Appendix 22). MAS arguably employs the denial posture scapegoating by trying to blame air traffic controllers for putting flight MH370 in Cambodian airspace when it was actually over Vietnam on the morning of its disappearance. In a press statement on June 15, the CEO of MAS explains how the past 100 days have been the longest in the airline s history: It has been the longest 100 days since the disappearance of our MH370. We feel the families pain. We miss our colleagues and friends on board MH370. We feel the families anguish, and like them, Malaysia Airlines continues to hope and seek answers that will bring us closer to finding out what happened to MH370 (Appendix 26). It can be argued that the Page 71 of 102

77 CEO uses the bolstering strategy victimage to remind the general public that MAS is also a victim of the crisis as it is missing its friends and colleagues. On August 29, MAS provides an update on its recovery plan for returning the airline to sustained profitability within three years of delisting it from the Malaysian stock exchange. In the statement, MAS reminds its stakeholders about past good work and promises to ensure future profitability and sustainability as the national carrier: We are an award winning airline - including having won World s Best Cabin Crew numerous times. It is our duty and honor to serve and we will continue to do so with pride and care. We look forward to playing our role and being a part of this effort to ensure that Malaysia Airlines becomes a profitable and sustainable national carrier of which all Malaysians can be truly proud (Appendix 28). In line with the new recovery plan, MAS seeks to repair the airline s reputation by employing the bolstering strategy reminding to remind stakeholders about its past good work and rebuild potentially broken relationships. Generally speaking, MAS and the Malaysian Government have provided all relatives of the passengers and crew members of flight MH370 with instructing information, which is one half of the base response to a crisis. All the affected family members have also been given an expression of sympathy, information about corrective actions, and trauma counselling when needed. The latter can be referred to as a type of care response, which contributes to the second half of the base response to a crisis. However, the airline has also combined and employed several response strategies in its crisis communication effort in order to provide the maximal reputational defense. In the next sections, we will interpret whether the employed response strategies are a good match for the identified crisis types Interpreting the Findings MAS decided to arrive at a definition of the crisis type through its own framing of the crisis, which means that its response strategies are grounded within this framing. However, as the airline s crisis framing does not match its stakeholders, it may prove difficult to manage their perceptions of the crisis and provide the maximal reputational defense. Counting the fact that MAS is facing a double crisis arguably has great implications for how the airline should design its crisis response strategies. As previously mentioned, an accident crisis normally has a moderate reputational threat and a low attribution of responsibility, but the intensifying factor of an unfavorable prior reputation transforms the accident crisis into a crisis with a severe reputational threat and a strong attribution of Page 72 of 102

78 responsibility. A single crisis with a severe reputational threat should arguably make crisis managers very conscious about ensuring that its crisis communication reflects its perceived level of crisis responsibility. However, since MAS is facing a double crisis, the airline must also take the rumor crisis into account. As the rumor crisis is also intensified, the reputational threat shifts from mild to moderate and its attribution of responsibility shifts from virtually non-existent to low. This may not sound like a great deal, but it may alter how MAS should manage the rumors that occur throughout the crisis. Managing double crises is not a subject that takes up much space in Johansen & Frandsen s (2007) writings, but it can arguably be deduced that the original crisis and the overlaying communicative crisis should both be treated with equal importance. However, it does not necessarily imply that MAS should design two parallel sets of primary and secondary response strategies. The emergence of an overlaying rumor crisis can be argued as serving to intensify the original accident crisis, and there is reason to suggest that the two crises fuse into one major crisis with a profound threat to the airline s overall reputation. On one hand, this perception of a double crisis suggests that the accident crisis and the rumor crisis should be managed as one major crisis. On the other, it has certain implications for applying Coombs (2015) guidelines to this specific context Denial Posture Strategies The analysis revealed that MAS employed and combined several response strategies in its crisis communication from all three primary postures in order to provide the maximal reputational defense. Additionally, response strategies from the secondary posture were also included. One might say that the idea is just as bad as the execution. Although it is recommended that the postures can be used in a variety of combinations, it is important to be consistent and not mix denial strategies with either the diminishment or rebuilding strategies. MAS does not seem to pay a great deal of attention to this issue and has arguably neglected the responsibility of matching its response strategies with the context before executing the communication effort. The airline first utilizes a denial posture on March 13 by employing the scapegoating strategy: We are talking about sophisticated equipment deployed by the US and China. So to say that it just on our shoulders, I think that is unfair because the overwhelming support and unprecedented efforts on a multinational level ( ) (Appendix 6). As a rule of thumb, any organization should avoid the use of scapegoating; the strategy is considered a gamble and has the potential to backfire. Another use of the denial posture is found on March 26, when the CEO of MAS is caught lying in a BBC interview. As a follow-up to a previous answer, the reporter concludes that MAS used text Page 73 of 102

79 messages to inform the relatives of passenger and crew members that flight MH370 was lost. The CEO replied: I do not think that is true (Appendix 15). When confronted with the lie, he changes position by providing an explanation: We were given 30 minutes before the announcement by the Prime Minister on a very important piece of evidence. We were given 30 minutes and within 30 minutes we had to be in touch with 1,000 family members ( ) (Ibid). MAS use of defensive response strategies such as scapegoating and simple denial that attempts to remove crisis responsibility from the airline and place it on something or someone else will either be perceived as reliable or unreliable by its stakeholders, making it a hit or miss response. However, it can be argued that the two denial strategies have not had the intended effect. When the CEO is caught lying in a world-wide BBC interview, it does not exactly contribute to the maintenance of a good reputation. The denial strategies have evidently backfired and potentially portrayed the airline less positively among key stakeholders and possibly angered them even further. The airline decided to use defensive response strategies on another two occasions. The first strategy is employed on April 5, when minister Hishammuddin Hussein arguably attacks the accuser as a response to allegations that the Malaysian authorities were complicit in the disappearance of flight MH370: Before I end, let me touch on some unfounded allegations made against Malaysia. These allegations include the extraordinary assertion that Malaysian authorities were somehow complicit in what happened to MH370. I should like to state, for the record, that these allegations are completely untrue (Appendix 18). The second strategy is employed on May 2, when it is revealed that MAS wasted costly time in the early hours of MH370 s disappearance by relaying false information on the location of the flight. MAS states: The responsibility of aircraft tracking monitoring resides with Air Traffic Control Centers. ( ) Such airline flight-following systems are non-primary and non-positive controlling. Flight-following systems also do not trigger airlines of any abnormality (Appendix 22). The airline can once again be said to employ the denial posture scapegoating by trying to blame the air traffic controllers for both losing the plane and for delaying the search and rescue mission. The general tendency is that MAS have employed several denial strategies to paint a prettier picture of its crisis management. However, these specific strategies should arguably have remained on the drawing board for several reasons. Coombs strongly recommends that denial strategies are not mixed with either diminishment or rebuilding strategies if the communication effort should be perceived as reliable. Although some of the denial strategies are considered appropriate for a standard rumor crisis, the question is whether they should have been utilized as a means to manage Page 74 of 102

80 the MH370 crisis. Since the rumor crisis has the intensifying factor of an unfavorable prior corporate reputation, it is recommended by Coombs (2015) that the airline should add excuse and/or justification strategies to the instructing information and care response. If MAS had followed this recommendation to the letter and added justification, excusing or both, it would have ruled out using any strategies of the denial posture. It would then seem that MAS choose poorly by including the strategies of the denial posture in its crisis responses. Instead, the airline should have opted to manage the rumor crisis strictly through the diminishment posture. By refraining from using any of the denial strategies and manage the rumor crisis using a combination of excusing and justification strategies, MAS would arguably have been capable of managing the double crisis in a more consistent manner Diminishment Posture Strategies Using a wide variety of denial strategies has not stopped MAS from employing strategies from the diminishment posture in its crisis response as well. This decision is arguably not based on an incentive to manage the rumor crisis, but rather as a means to manage the accident crisis. An example is found on March 14, when minister Hishammuddin Hussein attempts to justify widening the search area and the inability to locate the plane: We want nothing more than to find the plane as quickly as possible. But the circumstances have forced us to widen our search. A normal investigation becomes narrower with time I understand, as new information focuses the search. But this is not a normal investigation (Appendix 7). On March 16 in a reply to a question on whether he sees a need to rethink national security, minister Hishammuddin Hussein combines the diminishment and denial postures by applying the excusing and scapegoating strategies in one statement: I think looking ahead that answer will come with time because my immediate responsibility is to look for MH370 ( ) this is an unprecedented case and what we are going through here, ladies and gentlemen, is being monitored across the world and it may have changed aviation history. I think it s a lesson to be learned by everybody (Appendix 9). As mentioned, MAS should have decided not to mix the denial posture with the diminishment and/or rebuilding postures. However, the airline chooses to go against all recommendations of consistency by not only mixing the two postures, but mixing the excusing and scapegoating strategies in one statement. Minister Hishammuddin Hussein uses the unprecedented event as an excuse for MAS inability to detect flight MH370, while the airline is simultaneously relaying the responsibility of the crisis from MAS to everyone in the entire aviation industry. The reason MAS Page 75 of 102

81 should have refrained from using any of the denial strategies is not based on their liabilities, but rather that when they are brought into the mix it may make the stakeholders perception of the organization murky. When stakeholders find the organization s information flow to be murky and inconsistent, it becomes difficult for MAS to provide them with clear and concise information that they can trust. Since the original accident crisis, which is the crisis MAS attempts to manage via the diminishment posture, also has the intensifying factor of an unfavorable prior reputation, MAS should consider adding compensation and/or apology strategies in its crisis communication effort Rebuilding Posture Strategies MAS also decided to use the compensation strategy extensively during the MH370 crisis, especially in the initial stage of the crisis. MAS employed the compensation strategy for the first time on March 9, when the airline made the following statement: Once the whereabouts of the aircraft is determined, Malaysia Airlines will fly members of the family to the location. Travel arrangements and expenses of immediate family members will be borne by Malaysia Airlines (Appendix 2). The following day, MAS releases information on which compensation the relatives will receive once the plane has been located: When the aircraft is located, a Response Coordination Centre (RCC) will be established within the vicinity to support the needs of the families. This has been communicated specifically to the families. Once the RCC is operational, we will provide transport and accommodation to the designated areas for the family members (Appendix 3). Again on March 12, the airline reiterates that all relatives will receive compensation in the form of: ( ) timely information, travel facilities, accommodation, meals, medical and emotional support (Appendix 7). Additionally, the airline also states that it will carry the cost of these measures and that Equal amount of initial financial assistance are being given out to all families of passengers and crew over and above their basic needs (Appendix 5). During the first four days of the crisis, the airline states several times that it will provide compensation to the relatives of the passengers and crew members of flight MH370. This is a clear indication that MAS s initial crisis response is to take the disappearance very seriously by attempting to manage the development of the crisis and ensuring that any reputational effect is contained to its minimum level. It also indicates that MAS is aware of the importance of meeting its stakeholders expectations, as its reputation runs the risk of being severely damaged if those expectations are not met. The CEO of MAS applies the compensation strategy once again on March 25 by stating that the relatives will receive additional payments: Malaysia Airlines has already provided initial financial Page 76 of 102

82 assistance of USD 5,000 per passenger to the next of kin. We recognize that financial support is not the only consideration. But the prolonged search is naturally placing financial strain on the relatives. We are therefore preparing to offer additional payments as the search continues (Appendix 14). This use of the compensation strategy, in which the airline offers additional payments to what have already been provided to the relatives, could be interpreted as a means to maintain good relations with a key stakeholder group. On May 1, in what might be a continuation of the initial risk management of the airline s reputation, MAS uses its 29 th media statement to make promises of future compensation. In this statement, MAS informs its stakeholders that it will be closing down the family assistance centers, while also announcing that it will be providing advanced financial compensation to the relatives of the passengers and crew members of MH370: Malaysia Airlines will make advanced compensation payments soonest possible to the nominated next of kin who are entitled to claim compensation in order to meet their immediate economic needs. Immediately after the next of kin have returned home, our representatives will be in touch with them at the earliest opportunity to initiate the advanced compensation payment process (Appendix 21). The choice to include the compensation strategy in this specific statement could be the airline s attempt to repair its relations with the relatives by promising them financial compensation. Most of the relatives will probably not receive the news very well that they are to vacate their hotel rooms and return home, so the choice to include news of advanced compensation could be seen as another attempt to maintain good relations with one of MAS s key stakeholders Bolstering Posture Strategies The crisis response strategies that MAS have employed most often during the crisis are the secondary supplemental response strategies of the bolstering posture. The posture consists of the reminding, ingratiation, and victimage strategies, which are all intended to build and maintain a positive connection between the airline and its stakeholders during the crisis. However, since the strategies generally focus on the organization, they can seem rather egocentric if they are not used in combination with other response strategies. The first supplemental strategy MAS utilizes is the victimage strategy, which minister Hishammuddin Hussein employs on March 17 to address speculation that the airline has held back information about the circumstances surrounding the disappearance of flight MH370: For the families, I understand that every day prolongs the anguish. I understand because Malaysia, too, is missing its sons and daughters. There were 50 Malaysians on board the plane (Appendix 10). Page 77 of 102

83 On March 25, the victimage strategy is employed by the CEO of MAS in the following statement: We all feel enormous sorrow and pain. Sorrow that all those who boarded flight MH370 on Saturday March 8 will not see their families again, and that those families will now have to live on without those they love. It must be remembered too that 13 of our own colleagues and fellow Malaysians were also on board (Appendix 14). The CEO can arguably be said to ease the effect of the announcement that the plane has crashed by reminding MAS stakeholders that it has experienced a loss of fellow employees, which makes the airline a victim of the crisis too. On June 15 the CEO once again uses the victimage strategy to describe why the past 100 days have been the longest in the airline s history: It has been the longest 100 days since the disappearance of our MH370. We feel the families pain. We miss our colleagues and friends on board MH370. We feel the families anguish, and like them, Malaysia Airlines continues to hope and seek answers that will bring us closer to finding out what happened to MH370 (Appendix 26). On the 100 th day of the disappearance of flight MH370, the CEO tries to position MAS as a victim by reminding the general public that the airline lost its colleagues in the plane crash. Coombs (2015) recommends that the victimage strategy should only be used in victim crises when there are no intensifying factors, which makes the response inappropriate for both the accident and the rumor crisis. It can arguably be deduced from the statements that MAS attempts to build sympathy for itself by claiming to be a victim of the crisis rather than being the one to blame for it. The strategy should arguably have been used with more caution and only utilized if the airline was in fact a victim. Since the crisis has been identified as an accident crisis overlaid by a communicative rumor crisis, the victimage strategy will arguably make stakeholders liable to perceive the statement as an attempt to distract attention from the original crisis. Another supplemental response of the bolstering posture is employed on March 19, when MAS uses the ingratiation strategy to praise the stakeholders that participate in the investigation of flight MH370: The Airline continues to work closely with the authorities and we appreciate the help we are receiving from all local and international agencies during this critical and traumatic period (Appendix 11). On March 24 MAS utilizes two communicative strategies in one statement by employing both the ingratiation and adjusting crisis response: The search for MH370 has taken us halfway around the world. At the moment there are new leads, but nothing conclusive. Our thoughts continue to be with the families who are still waiting for news. In the meantime, we are grateful for the on-going cooperation shown by our partners in this multinational search (Appendix 13). The statement Page 78 of 102

84 utilizes the integration strategy to praise the airline s partners who contributes in the search for flight MH370 while also using adjusting information to express sympathy for the relatives. Another use of the integration strategy is found on March 25. The day after MAS announced that flight MH370 is presumed to have crashed in the southern Indian Ocean, minister Hishammuddin Hussein praises the stakeholders that are responsible for analyzing the flight s satellite data: As the Prime Minister stated, this type of analysis has never been done in an investigation of this sort. There remains more work to be done, and we are grateful to Inmarsat, AAIB and the international investigations team, who are continuing to work with the Malaysian authorities (Appendix 14). According to Coombs list of assets, liabilities and most appropriate crisis usage, the ingratiation response should be employed in any crisis that involves help from outside actors. MAS is arguably very dependent on other actors in the search for flight MH370 and in the investigation of what could possibly have led the plane to deviate from its original flight route. The decision to praise stakeholders who help address the crisis event is obviously intended as a means to adding positive information about MAS. However, since the airline has already failed in its attempt to victimize itself, there is a very small chance that victims and nonvictims will not perceive this response as a crisis distraction too. 174 days after the plane disappeared, on August 29, MAS released a statement regarding the recovery plan that is supposed to bring the airline back to profitability within three years. The organization arguably utilizes the reminding strategy as a means to highlight past successes: We are an award winning airline including having won World s Best Cabin Crew numerous times. It is our duty and honor to serve and we will continue to do so with pride and care. We look forward to playing our role and being a part of this effort to ensure that Malaysia Airlines becomes a profitable and sustainable national carrier of which all Malaysians can be truly proud (Appendix 28). This statement is arguably an attempt to promote the recovery plan by referring to the airline s past good work and remind its stakeholders of why they used to hold the airline in high regard. The most appropriate situation for using the reminding response is when an organization has a favorable prior reputation. The situation does not seem to apply to MAS, since the airline has experienced severe financial losses in the period from 2011 to 2013, resulting in an unfavorable prior reputation and questionable relations with its stakeholders. The reminding response therefore runs the risk of failing to provide the intended effect as a supplement to the other response strategies. Page 79 of 102

85 Overall use of Crisis Response Strategies The overall crisis communication effort carried out by MAS during the MH370 crisis had an incredibly varied array of different response strategies, which included all but one of Coombs s (2007) ten recommended crisis response strategies. As mentioned earlier, it is definitely possible to use several response strategies, but some of these are not a good match and should therefore not be combined. Normally, a crisis consists of a single crisis, but because MAS was incapable of managing the issues at the initial crisis stage, the airline had to manage two crises simultaneously. As some response strategies do not fit into the management of a double crisis, MAS should arguably have discarded some of the strategies. Those strategies that for several reasons should have remained on the drawing board are the victimage, attacking the accuser, denial, and scapegoating strategies. The airline decided to use the victimage strategy extensively during the crisis in an attempt to build sympathy for itself, which is a good choice in a single victim cluster crisis. However, since the crisis is an accident crisis overlaid by a communicative rumor crisis, the victimage strategy was not an appropriate response to employ in the MH370 crisis. MAS also decided to use the denial strategy and attacking the accuser, two responses that are also only applicable to the management of a single rumor crisis. Additionally, MAS utilized the scapegoating strategy, which goes directly against Coombs s (2015) recommendations. This specific strategy should always be avoided if possible. An organization that follows Coombs s recommendations would have its crisis management team instructing the spokespeople to avoid the use of the victimage strategy and the denial posture strategies altogether. When MAS mistakenly decided to use these strategies despite the recommended guidelines, it was arguably done in an attempt to protect the airline s reputation during the crisis and minimize the inflicted damage associated with it. The other five response strategies are both used correctly and a good fit for the intensified MH370 double crisis. The justification and excusing strategies are utilized somewhat interchangeably, and it can therefore be difficult to distinguish between the two as both strategies are rooted within the objective of defending MAS reputation. The compensation, reminding, and ingratiation strategies, of which reminding and integration are supplemental strategies, all have the one thing in common that they attempt to portray a positive image of MAS. The compensation strategy is used to express a general concern for the relatives of passengers and crew members and ensure that they are sufficiently cared for during their time of grief. Similarly, the secondary strategies are also used to portray a positive image of MAS. The purpose of the ingratiation strategy is to praise the airline s Page 80 of 102

86 cooperative stakeholders, and the objective of the reminding strategy is to make stakeholders remember how the airline previously set the standard for other airlines to challenge. Much like a crisis can be detrimental to an organization s reputation it can also be an opportunity to demonstrate what the organization stands for through its actions. A crisis can be said to put the spotlight on the organization, and the impact which the crisis may have on the overall reputation depends on how it responds to the crisis. If a crisis is managed properly, it has the power to transform the stakeholders perception of the organization and serve as a launch point for a positive transformation of its reputation. However, the described scenario does not seem to apply to the MH370 crisis, and a somewhat different pattern has emerged. There is evidence to suggest that neither MAS nor the Malaysian Government was prepared for the occurrence of the crisis, and it was arguably mismanaged by utilizing crisis response strategies that were inappropriate for the crisis type. The crisis type was obviously misjudged, which has served as a launch point for a damaging transformation of MAS reputation. Although MAS truly believed that it provided consistent, transparent and adequate information during the crisis, the stakeholders may have other perceptions of the airline s crisis communication Stakeholder Perceptions of MAS Crisis Communication At this point, it has been determined that MAS misjudged the crisis type, which served as a launch point for the employment of what turned out to be a series of inappropriately combined crisis response strategies. The fact that the original accident crisis was overlaid by a communicative rumor crisis suggests that a mismatch between the airline s and its stakeholders framing of the crisis exists. That mismatch may have made it difficult for MAS to provide its stakeholders with clear and concise information that they could trust. If the airline s stakeholders find its information flow to be inappropriate and inconsistent, it arguably becomes quite difficult to maintain a favorable reputation with good stakeholder relations. In this section, the quantitative data derived from SurveyXact will be analyzed to shed light on how a group of potential customers perceived MAS crisis communication. This is done in order to deduce whether the airline successfully protected its reputation despite misjudging the crisis type and, as a consequence, employed a series of inappropriately combined crisis response strategies. The data has been analyzed through a frequency table analysis, which is used to measure the central tendency of the customers perceptions. The statistics indicate how many of the respondents selected each of the available choices of the yes or no response category. For the sake of clarity, the relative distribution of the data provided by the respondents in the Likert Scale will be analyzed Page 81 of 102

87 by combining each percentage of the two nominal response categories of e.g. strongly agree/agree and strongly disagree/disagree. The statistical analysis of how the respondents perceived MAS crisis communication will consequently be described by providing short and simple summaries about the samples and its measurements. The following table indicates that 117 respondents out of the total sample size of 150 completed the questionnaire survey. Table 1: extracted from SurveyXact Bryman (2012) has proposed a tool for calculating survey response rates, which has formed the basis for the following calculation (Bryman 2012: 199): number of completed questionnaires (117) x 100 = 78% total sample (150) As illustrated, the response rate has been calculated to 78%, which can arguably be considered to be very good. The calculated response rate represents the percentage of the sample that agreed to participate in the survey Survey Results The survey found that 97% of the respondents have travelled by airplane before, while 3% is yet to use this means of transportation (Appendix 29: Table 4). In addition, 96% of the respondents replied that they have heard about the disappearance of MAS flight MH370, while 4% stated that they had no knowledge of the incident (Appendix 29: Table 6). The first question of the Likert Scale asked the respondents if they agree that MAS was right to draw the conclusion that flight MH370 had crashed in the southern Indican Ocean, when it was Page 82 of 102

88 based on calculations rather than physical evidence. 68% replied that they disagree or strongly disagree, 15% are neutral, while only 18% agree or strongly agree (Appendix 29: Table 7). Additionally, the respondents were asked whether they agree that text messages were the most appropriate tool to inform almost 1,000 relatives of the passengers and crew members of flight MH370 that their loved ones had been killed in a plane crash. 93% of the respondents either disagree or strongly disagree, 3% are neutral, while only 4% agree or strongly agree that text messages were the most appropriate tool to provide this type of information (Appendix 29: Table 8). Since MAS defended the decision to use text messages by arguing that the airline was only given 30 minutes to notify thousands of relatives before the Malaysian Prime Minister shared the tragic news in a live press conference, the respondents were asked if they agree that there seems to be a lack of coordination in the communication between MAS and the Malaysian Government. To this question, 93% replied that they agree or strongly agree, 3% replied neutrally, whereas only 4% disagree or strongly disagree (Appendix 29: Table 9). After the press conference, several relatives of the passengers and crew members of flight MH370 publicly expressed their frustration with MAS crisis management. 80% of the respondents agree or strongly agree that the relatives reacted fairly, 7% are neutral, whereas only 3% disagree or strongly disagree (Appendix 29: Table 10). During the crisis, MAS repeatedly stated that the passenger manifest of flight MH370 consisted of 227 passengers and 12 crew members. However, in its 23 rd media statement, the numbers were changed to 226 passengers and 13 crew members. 80% of the respondents replied that these messages invoke them with a sense of distrust or strong distrust in the airline, 19% are unconcerned, while only 2% are invoked with a sense of trust or strong trust (Appendix 29: Table 11). Despite the somewhat contradicting crisis messages, MAS genuinely believed that it went beyond its normal crisis response procedures during the crisis and provided consistent, transparent and adequate information on every occasion. When the respondents were asked whether they perceive this assumption to be the truth, 74% replied that they disagree or strongly disagree, 21% replied neutrally, and only 5% replied that they agree or strongly agree (Appendix 29: Table 12). On May 2, it was revealed that on the night of flight MH370 s disappearance, MAS had provided false and misleading information about the plane s positions to the Malaysian air traffic control Page 83 of 102

89 center. As a result, the activation of a rescue coordination center was delayed by two hours. The respondents were therefore asked how confident this information make them in MAS operations. 92% replied that they are unconfident or very unconfident in the airline s operations, while the last 8% are neutral. Consequently, none of the respondents chose the confident or very confident category (Appendix 29: Table 13). When MAS and the Malaysian Government repeatedly refer to the unprecedented nature of the search for flight MH370, 74% agree or strongly agree that it could be an attempt to justify their inability to locate the missing plane. 19% are unconcerned, while 7% disagree or strongly disagree (Appendix 29: Table 14). The respondents were also provided with the information that, during the crisis, many unconfirmed reports were brought in the media about the disappearance of flight MH370. The respondents were further informed that MAS did not dismiss the rumors, but ensured that every possible lead would be investigated to shed light on the mystery. The respondents were then asked if they agree that the airline could have avoided the speculation by sharing a clear working theory with the media. 80% replied that they either agree or strongly agree, 14% replied neutrally, whereas the last 6% either disagree or strongly disagree on the matter (Appendix 29: Table 15). It was announced by MAS on August 29 that recent weak financial performances had made the airline aware that it needed to restructure the organization. As a result, the Malaysian Government took full ownership of MAS, through its strategic investment fund, and started the implementation of a restructuring plan that included firing 30% of the total workforce. The respondents were asked if they agree that the restructuring plan could be a direct cause of crisis mismanagement. 82% of the respondents replied that they agree or strongly agree, 11% are neutral, while 7% disagree or strongly disagree (Appendix 29: table 16). The respondents were also asked how likely it is that they will consider MAS for their next flight to Asia. 82% of the respondents replied that it is unlikely or very unlikely, 17% took a neutral stance, and the remaining 2% replied that they would consider MAS for their next flight to Asia (Appendix 29: Table 17). The respondents were then asked about their current perception of MAS. 77% of the respondents replied that their perception of MAS are either poor or very poor, 21% have a neutral perception, while only 2% expressed a good or very good perception of the airline. Page 84 of 102

90 The statistical percentages are illustrated in the below table, which indicates that the respondents perception of the airline are rather unanimous. Table 18: extracted from SurveyXact Interpreting the findings It has already been revealed in previous chapters that the relatives of the passengers and crew members of flight MH370 expressed dissatisfaction with MAS crisis communication on several occasions. Additionally, the crisis fell under close scrutiny, and especially the media contributed to the ongoing rumor creation by continually publishing unconfirmed reports. However, albeit these two particular stakeholder groups (the relatives and the media) are important to MAS, it would not seem valid only to investigate their perceptions of the airline s crisis communication. Many writers on reputation management also emphasize that reputation can vary from stakeholder group to stakeholder group. The interpretation of customer perceptions should thus provide a different perspective on how certain stakeholders perceived the crisis communication carried out by MAS during the crisis. As illustrated in the analysis, the response rate was calculated to 78%, which should arguably be considered as very good in questionnaire surveys. The general rule being is that the higher the response rate, the greater is the likelihood that the findings can be considered representative and generalized to a wider context. It can thus be argued that the response rate is a reliable portion of the sample, and that the findings can at least be generalized to the sample. Although the generalizability of the findings to the entire population is more questionable, it is easy to believe that they provide a representative cross section of the entire population and have some kind of broader applicability. The accuracy of the survey is further validated by the fact that it presents a somewhat unambiguous picture of the respondents perception of MAS crisis communication, which irrespective of the sample size makes the chances of error less likely to occur. Thus, there is Page 85 of 102

91 further reason to believe that the survey can be deemed valid and generalized to the chosen target population. It was revealed in the previous section that the analysis of the survey found that the vast majority (97%) of the respondents have previously travelled by airplane, making it plausible to presume that they represent a potential customer group to MAS. Although 3% is yet to use this means of transportation, they cannot be disregarded - they are still potential customers (Appendix 29: Table 4). Additionally, the majority of the respondents (96%) also indicated that they have heard about the disappearance of MAS flight MH370. Even though a minority (4%) indicated that they have no knowledge of the incident, their perceptions of MAS crisis communication were deemed to be reliable as they were also presented with the essence of the airline s communication throughout the self-completion questionnaire (Appendix 29: Table 6). The survey also found that 68% of the respondents believe that MAS was wrong to draw the conclusion that flight MH370 had crashed in the southern Indian Ocean, when the investigation was based on calculations rather than physical evidence (Appendix 29: Table 7). The respondents did arguably not perceive the airline to be in a position to draw such a crucial conclusion without the presence of any physical evidence to support the theoretical investigation. Since MAS arguably put aside any normal procedures for reaching a definitive conclusion, the respondents may have questioned whether it was an attempt to put an end to the ongoing media speculation. However, if MAS had predicted that the crisis would eventually be buried by drawing this conclusion, the airline was terribly mistaken. The majority of the respondents evidently believe that there was no precedence for reaching the conclusion, which may have given rise to a violation of their expectations. Furthermore, the survey found that 93% of the respondents believe that text messages were not the most appropriate tool to inform almost 1,000 relatives of passengers and crew members of flight MH370 that their loved ones had been killed in a plane crash (Appendix 29: Table 8). Moreover, 80% of the respondents believe that the relatives reacted fairly by publicly expressing their frustration with MAS crisis communication (Appendix 29: Table 10). These perceptions are arguably another indicator that MAS violated the respondents expectations about how the airline should have acted. One half of the base response to a crisis includes, among other things, demonstrating sympathy and a general concern for the victims. Although MAS provided the relatives with both trauma counselling and promises of financial compensation several times during the crisis, the airline Page 86 of 102

92 evidently neglected one of its most important responsibilities on this occasion and did not exactly demonstrate sympathy with the use of text messages in its crisis communication. The MH370 crisis seems to have disturbed the respondent s expectations, which may have threatened the long-term relationship between them and MAS. As Coombs (2012) emphasizes, when expectations are breached stakeholders perceive the organization less positively and the reputation has potentially been harmed. When MAS defended the decision to use text messages by arguing that the airline was only given 30 minutes to notify thousands of relatives before the Malaysian Prime Minister shared the tragic news in a live press conference, the analysis also revealed that 93% of the respondents believe that this demonstrates a lack of coordination in the communication between MAS and the Malaysian Government. Fombrun (1996) argues that most organizations mistakenly manage their reputation in crisis situations in a rather fragmented manner by delegating the responsibility of specific stakeholder groups to distinct organizational departments. This also seems to apply to the MH370 crisis, where MAS evidently had the responsibility to notify the relatives of the passengers and crew members, while the Malaysian Prime Minister shared the information with the general public through the media. However, managing its reputation at a micro level was arguably not sufficient for MAS, since the majority of the respondents perceive the communication effort as uncoordinated and without careful contemplation. Fombrun further emphasizes that reputation management at a micro level reflects a poor understanding of the determinants of corporate reputation, which indicates that MAS should have sought to manage it at a more strategic macro level. Managing its reputation at a micro level may implicitly have damaged MAS competitiveness and profitability. During the crisis, MAS repeatedly stated that the passenger manifest of flight MH370 consisted of 227 passengers and 12 crew members. However, in its 23 rd media statement, the numbers were changed to 226 passengers and 13 crew members. The analysis found that 80% of the respondents replied that this inconsistency invoke them with distrust or strong distrust in the airline (Appendix 29: Table 11). Nevertheless, MAS genuinely believed that the airline went beyond its normal crisis response procedures during the crisis and provided consistent, transparent and adequate information on every occasion. It is, however, not very surprising that 74% of the respondents believe that this self-portrayal is far from being true (Appendix 29: Table 12). Since the majority of the respondents perceive MAS crisis communication to be inconsistent and inadequate, Shibutani s (1966) hypothesis comes into play. He emphasizes that if an organization is incapable of providing adequate information in a crisis situation, ( ) the previously established social machinery breaks Page 87 of 102

93 down, a point at which some kind of readjustment is required (Section 2.3.1). The findings reflect the importance of supplying adequate information during a crisis, as it may be one of several critical elements of a poor crisis communication strategy that ultimately made the airline rethink its business operations. MAS reiterated several times during the first few months of the crisis that the responsibility of aircraft tracking monitoring resides with air traffic control centers and that the airline could not be held responsible for losing the plane off the radar. It was nevertheless revealed on May 2 that on the night of flight MH370 s disappearance MAS had provided false and misleading information about the plane s positions to the Malaysian air traffic control center, which resulted in a two hour delay of the activation of a rescue coordination center. The analysis found that as many as 92% of the respondents replied that the event makes them unconfident or very unconfident in the abilities of MAS' operations center (Appendix 29: Table 13). Benoit (1997) suggests that an organization should generally avoid making fails claims or providing misleading information in crisis situations. An organization that falsely denies responsibility for offensive actions risks having a substantially damaged credibility if the truth emerges. It may prove costly for MAS that false and misleading information were given to the air traffic control center in Malaysia. MAS may be right by pointing out that the responsibility of aircraft tracking monitoring resides with air traffic control centers. Yet, it may have been difficult for the Malaysian air traffic control center to track flight MH370, since the information provided by MAS was false and misleading. Consequently, MAS should instead have admitted its wrongdoings immediately to avoid the credibility issue that evidently appeared at a later stage - most of all because it is the morally right thing to do. Another interesting thought is to think of the conflict that image restoration concerns seem to create. MAS may have decided that it was more important to avoid litigation than restore its image by attempting to shift the blame towards the Malaysian air traffic control center. The analysis of the survey also revealed that 74% of the respondents believe that when MAS and the Malaysian Government repeatedly refer to the unprecedented nature of the search for flight MH370, it is in all probability an attempt to justify their inability to locate the missing plane (Appendix 29: Table 14). Evidence thus suggest that MAS did not seem to accept much responsibility for the inability to discover the missing flight MH370, and the diminishment strategy justification was arguably employed to minimize the crisis responsibility by lowering the perception of how much control the airline had over the search operation. However, as the justification strategy Page 88 of 102

94 was arguably perceived by the respondents to be unreliable, it may have increased the perceived damage associated with the crisis instead of reducing it. Additionally, the survey s results revealed that 80% of the respondents believe that MAS could potentially have avoided the speculation during the crisis by sharing a clear working theory with the media (Appendix 29: Table 15). It is known that many unconfirmed reports were brought in the media about the disappearance of flight MH370. MAS did not dismiss the rumors, but instead ensured that every possible lead would be investigated to help shed light on the mystery. Shibutani emphasizes that an inability to act may arise from ambiguity during a crisis. In other words, MAS' unwillingness to share important information with the media may have increased the level of ambiguity in the airline s statements and prevented it from executing a well-coordinated crisis communication strategy. Shibutani further suggests that "these inabilities ( ) also led to the creation of rumors" (Section 2.3.1). Consequently, as MAS decided to ignore the unsatisfied need for information, as illustrated in the majority of the perceptions of the respondents, the airline indirectly contributed to rumor creation itself by investigating every possible lead or rumor that could help shed light on the mystery. When MAS on August 29 announced that recent weak financial performances had made the airline aware of the need to restructure its operations, the analysis found that 82% of the respondents perceived the decision to be related to poor crisis management (Appendix 29: Table 16). According to Coombs (2012), unprepared organizations that find themselves in crisis situations have more to lose today than ever before where especially mismanagement costs seem to escalate (Section 2.3). One might argue that MAS was not prepared for a crisis of such magnitude, since crisis mismanagement costs seem to have escalated by causing the recent weak financial performances that made the airline aware of a need to restructure its business operations. Coombs further suggest that crisis management is comprised of a set of factors, including crisis communication, which is designed to combat crises, lessen the actual damage inflicted and minimize the reputational threat. As crisis communication arguably represent one of the most prevalent factors designed for effective crisis management, it is reasonable to believe that poor crisis communication has been influential in the failed management effort. The analysis also found that 82% of the respondents find it unlikely or very unlikely that they will consider choosing MAS for their next trip to Asia (Appendix 29: Table 17). Other reasons could of course have influenced these perceptions apart from the airline's poor crisis communication effort, but it seems rather intriguing to discuss the broader applicability of the quantitative survey in this Page 89 of 102

95 regard. It was revealed that MAS' crisis mismanagement costs escalated during the crisis and may have implicitly caused the recent weak financial performances. Since the majority of the respondents will not consider MAS for their next trip to Asia, there is evidence to suggest that the mismanagement costs are perhaps comprised of a more general customer rejection of the airline's services which originates in the poor crisis communication effort. The findings also support the notion that MAS had a low amount of reputational capital when the crisis occurred due to the intensifying factor of an unfavorable prior reputation. As a result, MAS was not granted the benefit of the doubt in the ambiguous situation, and the airline lost its ability to sustain profitability. The analysis has so far revealed that the respondents perceived MAS crisis communication effort as inconsistent, inadequate and unreliable. MAS violated their expectations on several occasions during the crisis, making them unconfident in the airline s business operations and filling them with distrust. Since the respondents expectations are breached, there is evidence to suggest that they also perceive MAS less positively and that the reputation has been severely damaged. The below table confirms the proposed hypothesis by illustrating that as many as 77% of the respondents have a poor or very poor perception of MAS. Table 18: extracted from SurveyXact Since Griffin (2008) states that an organization s reputation is based on perceptions, it can be argued that MAS reputation has been severely damaged during the crisis. Cornelissen (2008) also points out that the sustainability and profitability of an organization depends on how it is viewed by its stakeholders, and communication is a critical part of building, maintaining and protecting such reputations. MAS poor crisis communication effort made crisis management costs escalate and certain customer groups obviously began to reject the airline s services and look elsewhere for their air travel provider. In the end, MAS lost its means to sustain profitability, and it ultimately made the airline aware of the need to restructure its business operations and try to restore the damaged reputation. Page 90 of 102

96 6. Discussion The qualitative content analysis of MAS crisis communication sought to identify the crisis type and any potential intensifying factors that could have implications on the selection of crisis response strategies. Moreover, it also sought to investigate which crisis response strategies MAS utilized to provide the maximal reputational defense during the crisis. MAS concluded on March 24 that flight MH370 presumably ended its route in the southern Indian Ocean. The conclusion was based exclusively on calculations rather than physical evidence such as the plane s two black boxes. Since MAS reached the conclusion before flight MH370 s debris was discovered, there is strong evidence to suggest that the normal procedures in a plane crash investigation were put aside. If MAS had predicted that the crisis would eventually be buried by referring to the loss of flight MH370 as a tragic accident crisis, they were terribly mistaken. There is still no physical evidence to support the conclusion, and it gave MAS communication effort an unprecedented challenge during the crisis. The decision to inform the general public that flight MH370 in all probability ended its route in the southern Indian Ocean is arguably a result of increasing stakeholder pressure. In the preliminary crisis stages, MAS did not wish to share a clear working theory with the general public, although there seemed to be a growing unsatisfied need for information among the airline s stakeholders. Especially the relatives of the passengers and crew members of flight MH370 expressed dissatisfaction with MAS crisis communication effort on several occasions. Nevertheless, when MAS was asked to elaborate on what could potentially have caused flight MH370 to deviate from its original flight path, the official sources fell silent. As a result, the crisis went under close scrutiny, and the media and other stakeholders attempted to improvise a crisis definition by continually publishing unconfirmed reports that contributed to the ongoing speculation. The various rumors that circulated following the disappearance of flight MH370 refer to the disappearance as different kinds of crisis types. What is particularly evident is that the rumors do not have any clear direction; instead they are spread far and wide. The existence of a potential rumor crisis is evident in the various rumors and speculation that MAS addresses in the 16 days from the plane disappears to the day when the Malaysian Prime Minister stated that MH370 had presumably ended its route in the southern Indian Ocean. During this period, MAS repeatedly shared unverified and uncorroborated information with the general public, even though the airline was aware of a responsibility not to release information until it had been verified by the international investigations team. Furthermore, MAS even decided to base the entire plane crash Page 91 of 102

97 investigation on calculations rather than physical evidence, and it contributed to more speculation rather than burying the rumor crisis, which was probably the intention. The level of ambiguity of the MH370 crisis was also increased by the conclusion, since neither MAS nor the various authorities searching for the plane seemed to know what caused the events to transpire in the manner they did. The disappearance of flight MH370 was arguably caused by some kind of accident. But what became evident was that the accident crisis was accompanied by another crisis type, namely a rumor crisis. It has been illuminated that MAS failed to provide an adequate and consistent information flow to its stakeholders, and consequently some of these began to improvise their own crisis definitions through the publishing of unconfirmed reports. As a result, a double crisis in which the original crisis was overlaid by a communication crisis occurred, and two crisis types are therefore associated with the disappearance of flight MH370: 1) an initial accident crisis where the specific type of accident crisis remains unknown, and; 2) since the initial accident crisis was mismanaged, it was consequently overlaid by a communicative rumor crisis. When assessing the attribution of crisis responsibility and level of reputational threat, there are generally two intensifying factors worth paying attention to. Those are MAS crisis history and its prior reputation. Having closely examined MAS crisis history, nothing indicates that the airline has experienced a crisis of such magnitude in the past. However, one might say that MAS had an unfavorable reputation prior to the MH370 crisis. MAS annual report of 2013 illustrates that the airline was operating with severe profitability issues by presenting negative results from 2011 to While an organization s corporate reputation is comprised of more than its financial performances, the negative results can have resulted in some stakeholders perceiving MAS less positively. Due to the existence of an intensifying factor constituted by the unfavorable prior reputation, the original accident crisis was transformed to a preventable crisis. So instead of being a crisis with a moderate level of reputational threat and a low attribution of responsibility, it becomes a crisis with a severe reputational threat and a strong attribution of responsibility. However, as the crisis has been identified as a double crisis with an overlaying communicative rumor crisis, MAS level of responsibility is transformed further. The rumor crisis, which under normal circumstances is a crisis with a low reputational threat and a virtually non-existent attribution of responsibility, becomes a crisis with a moderate reputational threat and a low attribution of responsibility. This may not sound like a great deal, but it altered how MAS should have managed the rumors that occured throughout the crisis. When the two crisis types are coupled together in a double crisis Page 92 of 102

98 scenario with the added element of an unfavorable prior reputation, the disappearance of flight MH370 arguably becomes a crisis type that has the potential to seriously threaten the airline s legitimacy. Although MAS should have taken this into consideration when designing its response strategies, the crisis communication contained an incredibly varied array of different response strategies, which included all but one of Coombs s (2012) ten suggestions. Normally, a crisis consists of a single crisis, but as MAS was incapable of providing an adequate information flow at the preliminary crisis stages, the airline had to manage two crises simultaneously. As some response strategies do not fit into the management of a double crisis, MAS should arguably have discarded these. The airline decided to use the victimage strategy extensively during the crisis in an attempt to build sympathy for itself, which is only a good response in a single victim cluster crisis. MAS also decided to use the denial strategy and attacking the accuser, two responses that are also only applicable to the management of a single crisis. Additionally, MAS utilized the scapegoating strategy, which goes directly against Coombs s (2015) recommendations. An organization that follows Coombs s recommendations would have its crisis management team instructing the spokespeople to avoid the use of the victimage strategy and the denial posture strategies altogether. When MAS decided to use these strategies despite the recommended guidelines, it was arguably an attempt to protect the airline s reputation during the crisis and minimize the inflicted damage. The other five response strategies were arguably used correctly and a good fit for the intensified MH370 double crisis. The justification and excusing strategies were utilized somewhat interchangeably, and it can therefore be difficult to distinguish between the two as both responses are rooted within the objective of defending an organization s reputation. The compensation, reminding, and ingratiation strategies, of which reminding and integration are supplemental strategies, all had the one thing in common; they attempted to portray a positive image of MAS. Despite the success with some of its crisis responses, there is evidence to suggest that neither MAS nor the Malaysian Government was prepared for the occurrence of the crisis. The crisis was arguably mismanaged as crisis response strategies that were inappropriate for the crisis type were utilized, which caused a damaging transformation of MAS reputation. Consequently, the MH370 crisis seems to have seriously damaged the airline s reputation and threatened its long-term profitability. The Malaysian Government apparently made the necessary arrangements to return MAS to profitability by taking full ownership of the airline and delisting it from the Malaysian stock exchange. Since the crisis arguably occurred at a time when MAS already had a low amount of reputational capital, it could Page 93 of 102

99 have made stakeholders doubt the airline s ability to survive the crisis, and the restructuring plan was thus inevitable. At this point, it has been emphasized that MAS misjudged the crisis type which served as a launch point for the employment and combination of several inappropriate crisis response strategies. There is evidence to suggest that there may be a mismatch between the airline s and its stakeholders framing of the crisis, since the original accident crisis was overlaid by a communicative rumor crisis. As a result, it may have proved difficult for MAS to provide its stakeholders with clear and concise information that they could trust. If the airline s stakeholders also found its information flow to be inappropriate and inconsistent, it will prove difficult for MAS to maintain a favorable reputation and good stakeholder relations. To study how MAS crisis communication was perceived by one of its most dependable stakeholders, a quantitative frequency analysis was conducted on the basis of an online questionnaire survey of a specific customer group. As customers arguably represent one of the most important stakeholder groups of people for any organization, it was emphasized that an analysis of customer perceptions would provide a different and perhaps more realistic picture of how MAS crisis communication was generally perceived. The analysis presented a rather unambiguous customer perception of MAS crisis communication. The vast majority of the customers believe that MAS was wrong to draw the conclusion that flight MH370 had crashed in the southern Indian Ocean, when the investigation was based on calculations rather than physical evidence. As MAS arguably put aside any normal procedures for reaching a definitive conclusion, the customers may have questioned whether it was an attempt to put an end to the ongoing media speculation. The survey also revealed that MAS mistakenly managed their reputation throughout the MH370 crisis in a rather fragmented manner by delegating the responsibility of specific stakeholder groups to distinct organizational departments. However, managing its reputation at a fragmented micro level was arguably not sufficient for MAS, since the majority of the customers perceived the airline s communication effort as uncoordinated and without careful contemplation. Managing a reputation at a micro level generally reflects a poor understanding of the determinants of corporate reputation, and it may also have been a contributing factor in damaging MAS competitiveness and profitability. The majority of the customers also perceived the airline s crisis communication to be inconsistent and inadequate on several occasions. Although MAS genuinely believed that the airline went above and beyond its normal crisis response procedures during the crisis and provided consistent, transparent and adequate information to its stakeholders, the customers Page 94 of 102

100 perceived this self-portrayal to be far from the truth. Since the customers perceived MAS to be incapable of providing a consistent and adequate information flow during the crisis, it may have been one of several critical elements of a poor crisis communication strategy that made the airline aware of a need to restructure. Additionally, when it was revealed on May 2 that MAS on the night of flight MH370 s disappearance had provided false and misleading information about the plane s positions to the Malaysian air traffic control center, the main part of the customers were unconfident or very unconfident in the abilities of MAS operations center. MAS should generally have avoided making falls claims or providing misleading information during the MH370 crisis. By falsely denying responsibility for offensive actions, the airline risked substantially damaging its credibility. The analysis further illuminated that the majority of the customers believed that MAS could have avoided the speculation during the crisis by sharing a clear working theory with the media. MAS' unwillingness to share important information with its stakeholders may have increased the level of ambiguity in the airline s statements and prevented it from executing a well-coordinated crisis communication strategy. Most of the customers even indicated that they perceived MAS restructuring plan to be an outcome of poor crisis management. They did not buy the argument that recent weak financial performances were the only motivator for carrying through a comprehensive restructuring of the airline s business operations. The findings support the previous notion that MAS was unprepared for a crisis of such magnitude. Crisis mismanagement costs seem to have escalated, which eventually caused the weak financial performances that made the airline aware of a need for a general restructuring. As crisis communication arguably represent one of the most prevalent factors designed for effective crisis management, it is reasonable to believe that poor crisis communication has been influential in the failed crisis management effort. Following the crisis communication effort carried out by MAS, the major part of the customers stated that it is unlikely or very unlikely that they will consider the airline for their next trip to Asia. It is therefore plausible to presume that the escalating costs of the crisis mismanagement are primarily comprised of a general customer rejection of the airline's services. The customers expectations were breached on several occasions, and 77% of the total sample thus responded that their perception of MAS following the crisis were either poor or very poor. Since the airline s reputation is based on stakeholder perceptions, it can be argued that MAS reputation has been severely damaged during the crisis. As a result, MAS has lost its means to sustain profitability, and the airline was ultimately made aware of the need to restructure its business operations and restore its reputation. Page 95 of 102

101 7. Conclusion The mysterious disappearance of flight MH370 on March 8, 2014, has been the focal point of this thesis. MAS crisis communication was the primary area of interest, and it formed the basis for conducting two investigations within a single case study research. With departure in reputation management and crisis communication, this thesis has sought to investigate how MAS executed its crisis communication during the disappearance of flight MH370. The investigation was conducted by applying certain themes of Coombs (1999, 2007, 2012, and 2015) SCCT in a qualitative content analysis of official company documents. This analysis consisted of two accompanying sections: the first section sought to identify the crisis type and any potential intensifying factors that could potentially have implications on the selection of crisis response strategies, whereas the second section sought to analyze which crisis response strategies MAS utilized to provide the maximal reputational defense. The first two units of analyses consequently formed the basis for the second investigation consisting of an online questionnaire survey of a potential Danish customer group. The focus of the investigation was to determine to which degree MAS was able to protect its reputation during the crisis by analyzing how the customers perceived the airline s crisis communication effort. The qualitative content analysis found that MAS decision to conclude that flight MH370 ended its route in the southern Indian Ocean was an attempt to put an end to the ongoing speculation and rumor creation in the media. MAS did not wish to share a clear working theory with the general public, which resulted in a growing unsatisfied need for information among some stakeholders. It was emphasized that neither MAS nor the various authorities searching for the plane seemed to know what caused the events to transpire in the manner they did, which made the crisis fall under close scrutiny. Some of the stakeholders instead began to improvise a crisis definition by continually publishing unconfirmed reports in the media. It was illuminated that MAS also contributed to the rise of a rumor crisis by addressing the various speculation in the media, and the airline even shared unverified and uncorroborated information with the general public on several occasions. Although the disappearance of flight MH370 is most likely caused by some kind of an accident, the accident crisis was overlaid by a communicative rumor crisis because MAS failed to provide an adequate and consistent information flow to its stakeholders. Instead, these stakeholders began to improvise their own crisis definitions. It was also revealed that MAS had an intensifying factor of an unfavorable prior reputation due to the airline s profitability issues prior to the disappearance of flight MH370. When the accident crisis and the rumor crisis was coupled together Page 96 of 102

102 in a double crisis scenario with the added element of an unfavorable prior reputation, the disappearance of flight MH370 became a crisis that had the potential to seriously threaten the airline s legitimacy. It was further postulated that MAS misjudged the crisis type which served as a launch point for the employment and combination of several inappropriate crisis response strategies. A mismatch between the airline s and its stakeholders framing of the crisis existed, since the original accident crisis was overlaid by a communicative rumor crisis. However, when there is disagreement on the crisis type, the crisis management team should have adopted the stakeholders framing. MAS decided against Coombs advice, and the airline s crisis communication therefore contained an incredibly varied array of different response strategies, including all but one of his ten suggestions. Some of these strategies did not fit into the management of a double crisis, and they should have remained on the drawing board for the same reason. It was revealed that MAS utilized the victimage strategy and several denial strategies extensively during the crisis. Nevertheless, MAS crisis management team should have instructed the official spokespeople to avoid the use of the victimage strategy and the denial posture strategies altogether. Despite having success with some of its other crisis response strategies, neither MAS nor the Malaysian Government seemed to be prepared for the occurrence of the crisis. The crisis was mismanaged as crisis response strategies that were inappropriate for the crisis type were utilized, causing a damaging transformation of MAS reputation and threatening its long-term profitability. Consequently, the Malaysian Government made the necessary arrangements to return MAS to profitability by taking full ownership of the airline and delisting it from the Malaysian stock exchange. Since MAS misjudged the crisis type and decided not to adopt its stakeholders framing, it proved difficult for the airline to maintain positive stakeholder relations and a favorable reputation. The quantitative investigation of MAS ability to protect its reputation during the crisis supports the aforementioned notion, as the frequency table analysis presented a rather unambiguous customer perception of MAS crisis communication. The analysis generally revealed that the customers perceived MAS crisis communication effort to be inconsistent, inadequate and unreliable. MAS violated their expectations on several occasions during the crisis, making them unconfident in the airline s business operations and filling them with distrust. As the customers expectations were breached, they perceived MAS less positively, and it served as a launch point for a damaging transformation of MAS reputation. 77% of the total sample consequently responded that their perception of MAS following the crisis were either poor Page 97 of 102

103 or very poor. Since the airline s reputation is based on stakeholder perceptions, it can be argued that MAS reputation has been severely damaged during the crisis. The insufficient and uncoordinated crisis communication effort carried out by MAS made crisis management costs escalate, and certain customers obviously began to reject the airline s services and look elsewhere for an air travel provider. Consequently, MAS lost its means to sustain profitability, and the airline became aware of the need to restructure its business operations and restore its reputation. 8. Implications for Crisis Communication Practice When we examined the fields of reputation management and crisis management, one concept that provided an interesting point of departure for future research is that of a double crisis. The concept of a double crisis has been developed by Johansen and Frandsen (2007) and can be defined as: ( ) a crisis where the original crisis is overlaid by a communication crisis in a way that the organization is not capable of running the communication processes which is supposed to contribute to the handling of the original crisis (Section 2.3.1). Based on Johansen & Frandsen s definition of a double crisis, it can arguably be deduced that a crisis may be overlaid by a communicative crisis if the organization is incapable of running its communication processes which is supposed to contribute to the management of the original crisis. If this turns out to be the case, the two crises should be managed simultaneously and treated with equal importance. Coombs (2015) has listed a series of guidelines with recommendations for how different crises should be managed. The guidelines generally work well and can aptly do what they are intended to do, namely to assist crisis managers in steering their organizations through different crises types. However, as the guidelines are primarily restricted to the management of a single crisis, they cannot be directly applied to a double crisis, because the overlaying crisis in such incidents will be of a communicative nature. The main issue is that the guidelines place limitations on how crisis managers should approach the task of mixing the organization s response strategies. It has been illuminated in this thesis that the guidelines to some extend contradict themselves when applied in a double crisis scenario. MAS was supposed to use denial strategies to manage the rumor crisis, but these strategies should not be mixed with the diminishment and rebuilding strategies that were required to manage the original accident crisis. Page 98 of 102

104 Consequently, there seems to be a gap in existing literature. If we accept the premise presented by Johansen & Frandsen that both crises of a double crisis need equal amounts of attention, the guidelines in their current configuration place severe limitations on the organization s options. When an organization through initial mismanagement of the original crisis sees it develop into a double crisis, the question that still needs to be answered is which alterations it should apply to its strategic response. As things stand now, crisis managers in the midst of a double crisis are left to their own good judgment, and there seems to be a necessity for additional research to address this gap. Page 99 of 102

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106 Doorley, John & Garcia, Helio Fred: Reputation Management The Key to Successful Public Relations and Corporate Communication. 2 nd edition, New York: Routledge, 2011 Drucker, Peter F.: The Effective Executive, London: Harper Collins Publishers, 2006 Fink, Stephen: Crisis Management: Planning for the Inevitable, Florida: Universal Publishers, 2002 Fombrun, Charles J.: Reputation: realizing value from the corporate image, Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1996 Frandsen, Finn, & Johansen, Winni: Krisekommunikation: når virksomhedens image og omdømme er truet. 1 st edition, Frederiksberg: Samfundslitteratur, 2007 Freeman, R. Edward: Strategic management: a stakeholder approach, Boston: Pitman Publishing Inc., 1984 Griffin, Andrew: New strategies for reputation management: gaining control of issues, crises and corporate social responsibility, London: Kogan Page Limited, 2008 Helm et al.: Reputation management, Springer-Verlag: Berlin Heidelberg, 2011 Krippendorff, Klaus: Content analysis: an introduction to its methodology, 2 nd edition, Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2004 Marsh, David and Furlong, Edward: Theory and Methods in Political Science, 2 nd edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002 Samanta, Irene: Strategic marketing in fragile economic conditions, Hershey: Business Science Reference (an imprint of IGI global), 2014 Shibutani, Tamotsu: Improvised News a sociological study of rumor, Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company Inc., Websites 12-point MAS Recovery Plan, Khazanah Nasional point%20mas%20recovery%20plan.pdf Assessed on May 30, 2015 Definition of Reputation, Longman, Merriam-Webster & Oxford Dictionaries o Accessed on May 30, 2015 o Page 101 of 102

107 Accessed o Accessed Flight MH370: Malaysia Airlines CEO defends response, BBC interview transcribed by authors Assessed on May 30, 2015 Malaysia Airlines Annual Report Assessed on May 30, 2015 Malaysia Airlines crash history, The Malaymail Online Assessed on May 30, 2015 Malaysia Airlines welcomes the plan Rebuilding a National Icon: The MAS Recovery Plan, Malaysia Airlines room/latest/mas_recovery_plan.html Assessed on May 30, 2015 Media Statements & information on Flight MH370, Malaysia Airlines Assessed on May 30, 2015 MH370 lost in Indian Ocean, Malaysian PM announces, CNN Assessed on May 30, 2015 Missing Malaysia Airlines Flight MH370: PM Najib Razak's Press Statement in Full as reported by Vasudevan Sridharan, International Business Times Assessed on May 30, 2015 Transcripts of official press conferences, The Malaysian Government Assessed on May 30, 2015 Page 102 of 102