UK: Telecoms. Mark Simpson, Caroline Thomas and Amanda Town Norton Rose Fulbright LLP

Transcription

1 UK: Telecoms Mark Simpson, Caroline Thomas and Amanda Town Overview The dynamic and ever-changing nature of technology is a well observed feature of telecommunications markets. It underpins the evolution of consumer expectations and the products offered by communications service providers, and is therefore the foundation of competition that delivers innovation, choice and efficiency in these markets. The challenge for policy makers and enforcement agencies is to ensure that competition policy and regulation provides a level playing field for competitors to deliver these outcomes to consumers. Traditionally, in simple terms, this has meant providing regulated access to the legacy copper networks and maintaining market structures in mobile based on multiple competing networks. This traditional approach has recently been subject to challenge. Surprisingly it has not been the result of that catch-phrase of the 2000s convergence between mobile and fixed services, although it might be argued that the proliferation of superfast mobile and broadband is leading towards a convergence of sorts. Rather, the challenge for network operators (fixed and mobile) follows from the enormous costs faced in upgrading and rolling out new technology networks. This has to be funded in a world where margins remain under pressure and there is a continual threat of customer disintermediation, for example from device makers and over-the-top service providers. Network operators face the challenging task of having to justify the cost of generational investments in new technology networks to shareholders without any certainty that consumers will be willing to pay significantly more for the infrastructure to meet their hunger for data, for greater bandwidth and for higher speeds. The only certainty might be of the emergence of new technology competitors with business models that ride the coattails of the operators investments in these new telecommunications highways. One way that incumbent telecommunications operators across Europe have been looking to meet these challenges is through consolidation vertical mergers to integrate fixed and mobile businesses to achieve costs synergies and bring new products to market, network sharing agreements, and horizontal mergers between mobile operators to reduce costs and finance new infrastructure investments. At the same time, smaller competitors have sought to achieve wholesale access to next-generation networks on a similar basis to older technology networks so they can continue to compete for customers. These developments present new challenges for competition and regulatory policy makers. Calls for greater tolerance of market concentration in mobile markets has put competition authorities under pressure to review mergers that increase market concentration, to allow deals that will deliver consumer benefits and at the same time protect competition. In recent years this has seen the European Commission review four-to-three mergers in mobile markets in Austria, Ireland and Germany clearing each deal on the basis of a similar approach to concessions that preserves competition from mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) and potential new entrants. This wave of consolidation has also put pressure on regulatory authorities in their approach to spectrum auctions and spectrum re-farming. There are also challenges for regulators in ensure ex ante rules are fit for purpose for next generation networks to ensure that wholesale access provides competitive pressure at the retail level without curtailing the investment incentives for the owners of fibre networks. The UK is often viewed as having telecommunications markets that facilitate effective competition through the prototype regulatory rules for fixed wholesale access provided through the BT Openreach commitments, and through a strong four-operator mobile market with significant MVNO competition. However, as we describe in this chapter, the past 12 months have laid the foundations for some significant changes in the UK telecoms landscape, through the announcement of two significant mergers and a raft of new regulatory rules and market reviews that are likely to result in further changes yet. We describe these developments and also provide a roundup of other developments in competition law and related regulatory matters in the telecoms section in the UK. Mergers The past six months has seen the announcement of two deals between major players in the UK telecoms market, which together (or even by themselves) have the potential to dramatically change the competitive landscape. Both deals are conditional on merger clearances by the competition authorities. At the time of writing one of the deals British Telecom s (BT) acquisition of Everything Everywhere (EE) had been notified to the UK s Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), while the other Hutchison s acquisition of Telefónica UK was yet to be notified to the European Commission. BT/EE BT is the UK s largest fixed line operator, and also the largest wholesale provider of many of the key inputs for communications networks (including mobile backhaul products) through its separately-managed arm Openreach. EE itself was created by the merger of the UK mobile operations of Deutsche Telekom and Orange, which was cleared by the European Commission in It has the largest mobile customer base and the most expansive 4G network in the UK. On 5 February 2015 BT announced a deal to purchase EE from Deutsche Telekom and Orange. 1 The CMA launched its merger inquiry on 18 May 2015 and at the time of writing was in the early stages of a Phase II review. 2 The transaction will result in BT moving back into the mobile market, a market which it exited in 2002 when it spun off its Cellnet mobile division, which became O2 and is now Telefónica UK. If cleared, the deal is also likely to result in BT offering mobile, fixed and TV bundles in the UK in competition with other operators that already offer triple- and quad-play bundles. There are limited horizontal overlaps, but the CMA is likely to focus its attention on concerns expressed by competitors about BT favouring its 1

2 UNITED KINGDOM own mobile business through access to mobile backhaul and similar inputs and whether the Openreach commitments will remain fit for purpose. The merger is also significant for three procedural reasons. First, the size and value of the transaction is unusually large to fall for review by the CMA under the UK merger control regime. Typically, a transaction on this scale would fall within the jurisdiction of the European Commission in Brussels, as have nearly all of the significant telecoms mergers in recent years. This has allowed the European Commission to build up a team with experience in reviewing telecoms markets and to apply a consistent approach to analysis and remedies. However, in this case, the specific UK focus of both parties means that the CMA has jurisdiction under the twothirds rule in the EU Merger Regulation, and the transaction falls for review pursuant to its Enterprise Act 2002 powers. This raises the prospect that the CMA could take a divergent approach to the European Commission s practice in assessing the potential competitive effects of the transaction. Second, the merger inquiry is the first time that the CMA has fast-tracked a merger to a detailed Phase II investigation. This option is provided under the Enterprise Act, at the request of the parties, for more complex transactions where it is clear that a Phase I clearance will not be forthcoming. It allows the parties to avoid re-hashing arguments that are necessarily complex and are likely to require a detailed, in-depth assessment by the CMA. On 18 May, when the CMA launched its formal investigation, it announced that the parties had requested the fast-track reference. The CMA subsequently undertook a short-form Phase I assessment, including consultation, to satisfy itself that the test for a reference to Phase II was met, that it may be the case that the transaction may result in a substantive lessening of competition in any market in the UK. Two potential concerns were mentioned to in the reference decision the effects on the supply of wholesale access and call origination services to MVNOs and concerning fibre mobile backhaul services provided to mobile network operators in the UK. This list is not, however, necessarily exhaustive of the issues the CMA might consider at Phase II. On 9 June 2015 the CMA announced its decision to refer the transaction to Phase II, which in the UK is a 24-week process that can be extended by a further eight weeks in some circumstances. A decision is therefore likely before the end of Third, a further indication of the complexity of the issues that will need to be considered in assessing the transaction is that it is the first time the CMA has put out a call for third party comments prior to receiving a notification and formally opening the merger inquiry process. This occurred in pre-notification discussions, which are typically private discussions between the CMA and the parties to confirm that the notification will include all the information that the CMA will need to make its Phase I assessment within the 40 work day statutory time limit. Given the strict timetables now in place for its Phase I investigations, the CMA may look to make greater use of the pre-notification period in this way to pre-load its work in other suitable merger situations. Hutchison/Telefónica UK On 25 March 2015 Hutchison Whampoa (parent of the smallest UK mobile operator Three) announced it had agreed to purchase Telefónica s UK mobile business (which predominately trades under the O2 brand). 3 The merger, subject to competition clearance, would create the UK s largest mobile operator, leapfrogging EE and leaving Vodafone as number three thereby reducing the UK mobile market to three network operators, together with several MVNOs. Unlike the BT/EE transaction, the merger falls squarely within the jurisdiction of the European Commission. At the time of writing, the deal is yet to be notified but Hutchison has announced that it expects to receive a merger clearance decision in Three and O2 are both exclusively mobile operators they do not provide fixed broadband services, O2 having sold its broadband network to Sky in The transaction will therefore test the approach adopted by the European Commission in reviewing and clearing four-to-three mergers in recent years in Germany 4, Ireland 5 and Austria 6. Applying the framework of analysis used in those merger decisions, there could still be some challenging issues for the merging parties to address even taking into account the relatively strong MVNO presence in the UK. For example: The European Commission will need to carefully consider whether the merger will remove a particular competitive constraint on the merging parties. This includes the claim that Three might be regarded as a maverick in the UK market, and whether Three has traditionally caused price disruption and led plan innovations. In addition, The Commission will need to assess whether Three and O2 might be perceived as each other s closest competitor, based on target consumers and churn. The deal will also have implications for network sharing arrangements. This was a significant issue in the Commission s review of Hutchison s acquisition of O2 Ireland, where the effects on network sharing agreements were scrutinised closely. In the UK, four mobile network operators (MNOs) share two networks; Mobile Broadband Network Limited is a joint venture between EE and Three, and Cornerstone Telecommunications Infrastructure Limited is a joint venture between Vodafone and O2 (cleared by the Office of Fair Trading (the CMA s predecessor) in 2012). A merged Three/O2 would have to select one network sharing arrangement, which will leave one of the remaining operators (EE or Vodafone) funding and operating a single network in competition with the other network. Related to concerns about the effects on network sharing and investment, the Commission can also be expected to scrutinise closely whether the transaction will affect the incentives on the remaining wholesale providers to provide access to MVNOs, and the network capacity available to MVNOs. However, the transaction is unlikely to result in concerns about Three and O2 s combined spectrum holdings, as the merged entity will arguably still have less attractive spectrum than EE and Vodafone in relation to 4G spectrum. If the European Commission considers that the merged entity holds a disproportionate amount of spectrum, there could be a redistribution of spectrum, having knock-on effects on Ofcom s upcoming spectrum auction. Ofcom s statement and consultation published in May 2015 invites potential bidders to provide their views on how best to proceed with the auction, especially in light of potential changes in market circumstances. Ofcom suggests that options in this context include reducing the volume of spectrum to be awarded. Clearly, the European Commission s assessment will need to take account of any clearance decision from the CMA in the BT/EE case that occurs prior to its own decision. Indeed, it will be challenging for both the CMA and the Commission to construct counterfactuals in their assessment of the competitive effects of each transaction that factors in the potential effects of the other. 2 The European Antitrust Review 2016

3 TELECOMS Phones4U: EE and Vodafone Following the entry of Phones4U into administration in September 2014, two of the UK s MNOs acquired some of its shops and staff, in one instance prompting a merger inquiry by the CMA. EE bought 58 shops for 2.5 million in a deal with Phones4U s administrators. EE reported that the stores and staff would be transferred and rebranded with immediate effect. The CMA did not review the EE acquisition, possibly because it did not have jurisdiction to do so owing to the size of the deal. However, the CMA considered that Vodafone s acquisition of 140 Phones4U stores gave rise to a relevant merger situation and investigated the transaction. In doing so, the CMA invoked its powers to impose an initial enforcement order compelling Vodafone to freeze its acquisition of the Phones4U stores while the CMA s investigation took place. The CMA subsequently cleared Vodafone s acquisition at Phase I in February 2015, deciding that the acquisition of the portfolio of stores did not threaten retail competition for the supply of mobile connections, handsets and accessories on either a national basis or in any of the affected local markets. 7 Phones4U was one of two national indirect retailers of mobile connections in the UK, re-selling operator contracts and airtime, handsets and accessories. The strong presence of the indirect channel has long been a relatively unique feature of the UK mobile market, but the demise of Phones4U leaves Dixons Carphone (created by the 2014 merger between Carphone Warehouse and the electronics retailer Dixons) as the sole national chain that competes against the main operators own shops a significant change in the competitive landscape. Enforcement Competition enforcement investigations concerning Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the equivalent UK provisions, the Chapter I and II Prohibitions under the Competition Act 1998 are relatively rare. However, a feature of the UK system is that Ofcom, the telecommunications regulator, has concurrent powers to enforce competition law within the sector. Ofcom has exercised these powers in a number of cases over the last 10 or so years, in particular looking into complaints alleging an abuse of dominant position by incumbent communications providers. The most recent enforcement case concerns a complaint made in 2013 by TalkTalk, predominately a fixed line and broadband operator, alleging that BT was abusing a dominant position by failing to maintain a sufficient margin between its upstream (wholesale) costs and downstream (retail) prices in the superfast broadband access market. TalkTalk alleged that BT was therefore operating an abusive margin squeeze that was detrimental to its competitors, contrary to the Chapter II Prohibition against abuse of a dominant position. Ofcom ultimately closed the competition case in October 2014, on the basis of a decision that there were no grounds for action. 8 Its analysis of BT s costs and revenues, including the net costs of the television channels provided by BT Sport (which BT currently offers free of charge to its broadband consumers), concluded that BT (at the time) would make a sufficient margin to cover its downstream costs (including in providing free sports content). Ofcom believed that this margin would enable an equally efficient operator to compete with BT s offerings. Subsequently, however, Ofcom has introduced ex ante regulation to prevent BT in future applying a margin squeeze in relation to Virtual Unbundled Local Access (VULA) as discussed in the next section. New regulation, regulatory proposals and strategic reviews As required under the EU telecommunications framework, Ofcom conducts regular reviews of specific telecommunications markets to identify and remedy areas of limited competition. Several of these are currently ongoing or at formative stages. In addition, Ofcom s programme of work includes a forward-looking strategic review that attempt to address the challenges for policy competition from new technologies and market evolution. Business Connectivity Market Review In the Business Connectivity Market Review, undertaken every three years, Ofcom assesses the markets for the provision of leased lines in the UK. These are lines used for dedicated point-to-point transmission services, including by mobile and fixed service providers. Ofcom undertakes a two-stage assessment, first analysing which providers have significant market power (SMP) in each product market and then refining or imposing regulations to concerns about the effects on competition. In May 2015, Ofcom published its provisional findings for consultation, in which it concluded: that BT has significant market power in a number of wholesale markets; that wholesale price controls should apply in respect of leased lines; and that BT should provide access to its dark fibre. 9 Ofcom expects to publish its final decisions on these proposals in early Ofcom s leased lines proposals were further detailed in June The regulator believes price controls are necessary to prevent BT imposing excessive charges on buyers and to incentivise BT to achieve efficiency gains. Ofcom has proposed inflation-linked controls on the wholesale prices charged by BT for products using leased lines. This is intended to protect downstream competition for the provision of high-speed data links for businesses, superfast broadband and mobile services. Ofcom s dark fibre proposals concern the provision of next generation fixed broadband and mobile backhaul. Dark fibre refers to fibre-optic lines that a communications provider has put in the ground, to reduce long-term investment costs by future proofing against expected increases demand in bandwidth. Access is controversial because operators that make the investment typically want to maintain future capacity for their own use. Ofcom has, however, identified the potential that access to dark fibre would have to allow competing companies to take direct control of their own connections using their own connection equipment, requiring the provision of physical access only rather than through managed wholesale services. Ofcom has proposed that companies providing leased lines should be granted access to BT s dark fibre (by placing their own equipment at either end of that fibre cable). Ofcom has suggested that (wholesale) dark fibre access prices should be based on BT equipment used for high-speed Ethernet products, minus the cost of the electronics that BT provides, as detailed in its proposed wholesale price controls for leased lines. BT is likely to continue to oppose the new proposed controls. VULA margin squeeze control In March 2015, as an outcome of its recent fixed markets access review, Ofcom decided to impose new obligations on BT which control the margin between BT s wholesale and retail prices for superfast (fibre) broadband. 11 The new ex ante regulation has been designed to protect the retail competition that is provided through access to BT s next-generation fibre broadband network, via a wholesale product called VULA. The concern about the potential 3

4 UNITED KINGDOM for BT to set an insufficient margin and squeeze competitors had been explored in Ofcom s investigation into the TalkTalk competition complaint referred to above. Although Ofcom concluded that there was no evidence that BT had applied a margin squeeze to TalkTalk, the new VULA control acknowledges that BT may have both the incentive and the ability to do so. Ofcom was particularly concerned about the risk that BT could apply a margin squeeze to gain market share as greater numbers of consumers migrate from standard to superfast broadband in the next few years. A particularly contentious issue was Ofcom s assessment of the relevance of the cost of BT s acquisition of sports content, and BT s strategy of offering this free of charge to fibre broadband customers with bundled television. In response to comments from the European Commission on the draft VULA proposal, 12 Ofcom revisited its cost assessment model, and has provided for a longer term horizon for BT s cost recover of sports content. Nonetheless, the final Ofcom decision has been appealed to the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT), as we explain below in the regulatory appeals and disputes section. Mobile Call Terminations Market Review In March 2015, Ofcom published its final statement in relation to its review of the wholesale mobile call termination (MCT) markets for the period 1 April 2015 to 31 March MCT wholesale services are provided by mobile communications providers that connect calls to a recipient on its network. The terminating mobile communications providers are paid a mobile termination rate (MTR) by the fixed or mobile communications providers. This is subject to the price control for each of the network operators, deemed to have SMP in respect of their own network. In its decision for the upcoming price control, Ofcom has signalled some important changes for the regulation of MTRs over the next control period in order to promote competition and protect consumers. The most important is to extend the finding of SMP, and therefore the application of the charge controls, from the four main MNOs only to include all UK mobile communications providers that hold mobile numbers issued by Ofcom. This means a total of 72 operators are now subject to the single maximum price cap on MTRs. Previously, smaller operators were subject only to an obligation to provide network access on fair and reasonable terms, which also applied to charges. Ofcom has now decided that a charge control will be more effective than a fair and reasonable terms approach, to regulate the setting of charges by some smaller operators that had previously been above the efficient cost benchmark. All operators remain subject to an obligation to provide network access on fair and reasonable terms and conditions and a price transparency obligation concerning their MTRs. The four main MNOS are subject to an additional obligation not to unduly discriminate in relation to the provision of network access for MCT. High data capacity spectrum auction Looking further ahead, Ofcom is beginning to lay the ground work for the next spectrum auction, which will make available further spectrum for the mobile sector to meet consumer demand, in particular ever-increasing demand for high-speed data services and bandwidth. The released spectrum will allow companies to expand their 4G coverage and quality, and also allow development of 5G technology. The allocation of new spectrum will therefore inevitably affect the conditions for competition in the mobile market. In May 2015 Ofcom published a statement and consultation regarding public sector spectrum release, which will award companies the 2.3 and 3.4GHz spectrum bands, which Ofcom notes could be suitable for providing very high capacity data transmission. 14 Potential bidders have been asked to provide their views on how best to proceed with the auction, particularly in light of the market consolidation that would follow the significant mergers referred to above with the result that Ofcom may release a lower volume of spectrum than originally planned. The timing of the auction and the rules that apply may be affected by the outcome of the BT/EE and Hutchison/Telefónica UK merger investigations. Strategic review of digital communications In March 2015, 10 years after completing its first strategic review, Ofcom announced its second-ever major review of the UK s digital communications markets. 15 This will encompass competition, investment, innovation and availability analyses in respect of the UK s broadband, mobile and landline markets. The review is wider than its three-yearly reviews of individual telecoms markets and is designed to ensure that communications services and providers are meeting the needs of consumers and businesses. Ofcom will focus on three overarching questions that could result in significant changes in regulation: how incentives for efficient private sector investment can be maintained and strengthened to ensure widespread availability and high quality of services; what the focus should be in future competition policy of networks; and whether there is scope for deregulation of networks and services downstream. The strategic review will therefore provide an important opportunity for communications providers to make submissions to the UK regulator on the scale of investment they are required to make and how competition is likely to function in the future in relation to the telecommunications sector. Regulatory disputes and appeals Disputes and appeals concerning regulatory and competition issues have long been a feature of the UK sector. Disputes between operators are generally subject to first review by Ofcom, with decisions being heard in the CAT. In addition, changes in regulation resulting from Ofcom s reviews often provide fertile ground for appeals to the CAT for both fixed and mobile telecommunications companies. VULA appeals For example, in May 2015, BT filed an appeal with the CAT regarding Ofcom s approach to VULA margin in its fixed access market review decision of March 2015 (mentioned above). 16 BT contests, among other things, Ofcom s analysis and claims it was incorrect, because it failed to properly take into account the European Commission s views on the draft proposals to reflect certain costs of BT s sports content. BT further contends that Ofcom is stifling pay-tv competition by introducing a regulatory barrier to BT s expansion in the market because of how Ofcom requires BT to recover its fixed sports costs, as a competitor in the broadband/ TV/fixed line market would not necessarily need to incur the same sports content costs. TalkTalk has also appealed Ofcom s approach to imposing a VULA margin on BT, and claims that Ofcom s regulatory aim in preventing margin squeeze has not been achieved owing to flaws in its analysis The European Antitrust Review 2016

5 TELECOMS 08 numbers BT s long-running dispute with Ofcom regarding the introduction of termination charges to certain 08-numbers (such as 080, 0845 and 0870) hosted on BT s network and originating from the MNOs networks, was finally concluded in December The resolution of this dispute will result in more transparent consumer access and service charges being introduced from July 2015 for certain 08-numbers, and ensuring Freephone numbers (0800 or 0808) will be free for consumers calling from mobiles. In restoring the CAT s decision, the Supreme Court concluded that Ofcom had erred in disallowing BT s contractual right to introduce a ladder pricing approach to wholesale termination charges for 08-numbers whereby the wholesale price of termination paid by an MNO would depend on its own retail price, incentivising mobile operators to maintain moderate retail prices. The economic effects of this approach were deemed too complex to understand whether the change would be beneficial or harmful to consumers. Contrary to Ofcom s assertion, the courts have held that proving this either way was irrelevant to the legal arguments as the welfare test should only be applied where a pricing innovation would clearly disadvantage consumers indeed, prohibition of pricing innovations could in itself be anti-competitive. 18 Conclusions and predictions The past 12 months have seen the emergence of transformative changes to the structure of UK telecommunications market, in particular through the announced mergers between BT and EE and between Hutchison s Three and Telefónica UK. The fate of those deals is currently in the hands of the competition authorities, but it is likely that one of those deals at least could result in remedies that entail further knock-on effects aimed at softening the transaction s effects on competition. What is less certain is the extent to which the CMA and the European Commission will apply a consistent approach to the assessment of the competitive effects of each transaction in the first place. It is also currently uncertain whether Ofcom may have to consider the implications of the mergers for areas of regulation currently under view, for example, access to fibre and the next spectrum auction. In addition, further consolidation or partnerships may follow as other competitors in the market develop their own strategies to deal with the challenges to new technologies and challenges from disruptive competitors looking to piggyback operators investments in next generation networks. Regulators will need to continue to be nimble in developing competition policy and using regulatory tools to address competition in these fast changing markets. Theirs is an unenviable task achieving a balance between the need to take decisive steps where intervention is required to protect competition, against the risks of getting it wrong at the outset with premature or excessive interventions that will impact negatively on the roll-out of next generation networks and services and on the development of future innovations For consumers, mergers and the availability of new technology networks bring exciting times the ability to consume more content, in more places, at faster speeds, and the prospect of bundled product offerings. This, of course, is contingent on policymakers getting the balance right between measures to promote investment and innovation on the one hand, and setting rules and taking enforcement action to ensure that competition is not stifled and prices are not too high on the other. Therein lies a not insignificant challenge. Notes 1 E7CD-4FD9-B90B-6C4D0E3D1E3B Case M.7019 Telefónica Deutschland /E-Plus. 5 Case M.6992 Hutchison 3G UK Holdings Limited / Telefónica Ireland Limited. 6 Case M.6497 Hutchison 3G Austria GmbH / Orange Austria Telecommunications GmbH. 7 f0b /full_text_decision.pdf summary/bcmr_sections.pdf summary/llcc-dark-fibre.pdf/ statement/ec_response_to_draft_statement.pdf/ Telecommunications-PLC.html PLC.html Telecommunications-PLC-Termination-Charges-080-calls.html. 5

6 UNITED KINGDOM Mark Simpson Mark is a competition and regulatory partner based in London and has considerable experience advising on the application of competition law and regulation to the telecommunications sector. This includes advising on: mergers and acquisitions, including in relation to licences, network infrastructure and other assets, and auction processes, agreements concerning MVNO and roaming, interconnection agreements, network sharing, transmission services agreements, and supplier and distribution agreements. He also advises on the application and interpretation of telecoms regulations, disputes, regulatory investigations, challenging adverse regulatory decisions through appeal processes and judicial review, and engagement with UK and EU regulators and officials. Mark s experience in telecommunications is informed from spending a period of time as senior competition counsel in-house at Telefónica UK. He regularly advises telecoms network operators, infrastructure owners, TV platform operators and investors. His transactional experience includes advising on competition and regulatory aspects of acquisitions, joint ventures and licence bids, including for Orange SA (France Télécom), Vodafone and Etisalat. Caroline Thomas Caroline Thomas is a competition lawyer based in London. She advises on all types of contentious and non-contentious competition law issues, including merger control and state aid. Ms Thomas has been involved in all types of cases before the CMA mergers, cartel investigations and market investigations. She also regularly acts in competition matters at European level and has been involved in international transactions in the telecoms field. Ms Thomas has considerable experience of competition litigation in the UK (before the English High Court and the Competition Appeal Tribunal) and Europe (including preliminary references and appeals to the European General Court and the Court of Justice). Amanda Town Amanda Town is a lawyer in the Antitrust, Competition and Regulatory practice group based in London. Amanda advises on a wide range of contentious and non-contentious UK and EU competition, antitrust, regulatory, compliance and procurement matters, with a particular focus on contentious cases in various industry sectors including telecommunications. She has been involved in cartel investigations before the CMA and the European Commission and has experience of standalone and follow-on competition litigation in the UK. Amanda has also acted on competition matters while on secondment at Norton Rose Fulbright s Tokyo office. 3 More London Riverside London SE1 2AQ United Kingdom Mark Simpson mark.simpson@nortonrosefulbright.com Caroline Thomas caroline.thomas@nortonrosefulbright.com Amanda Town amanda.town@nortonrosefulbright.com Norton Rose Fulbright is a global legal practice, providing the world s pre-eminent corporations and financial institutions with a full business law service. We have 3800 lawyers and other legal staff based in more than 50 cities across Europe, the United States, Canada, Latin America, Asia, Australia, Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia. Norton Rose Fulbright s antitrust and competition practice forms a major pillar of its global regulation and investigations group, which assists clients as they navigate the evolving and increasingly complex global and cross-border regulatory, compliance and government enforcement environment. This includes a one-stop legal service in relation to merger filings and clearances, national and cross-border regulatory and criminal investigations into anti-competitive practices including cartel activity, and civil litigation including class and group actions. Our team has considerable experience advising in the mobile and fixed telecommunications sectors, in the UK, Europe and wider EMEA region. We advise mobile operators, fixed line and broadband businesses, transmission and network services providers, content owners and investors. We have advised on some of the biggest consolidation deals in recent years, including advising France Telecom/Orange on UK regulatory aspects concerning the creation of EE, the UK s largest mobile operator, in litigation against Ofcom and between market participants and in relation to Ofcom regulatory reviews and investigations. Our team members also have experience advising on distribution issues (including the indirect channel and franchising), supply chain issues, MNVOs and access contracts, spectrum and licensing issues, tower access, network sharing, partnering for new mobile products, content deals and on industry initiatives. The global team also offers clients a significant understanding of the underlying policies which shape the regulators approach and of the sensitivities of dealing with antitrust and competition authorities. A number of its lawyers have worked within the world s leading antitrust and competition regulators, including the UK Competition and Markets Authority, the European Commission, the US Department of Justice and the US Federal Trade Commission. 6 The European Antitrust Review 2016