TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AN ENHANCED FRAMEWORK FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN JAPAN AND AUSTRALIA IN COUNTER- TERRORISM

1 TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AN ENHANCED FRAMEWORK FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN JAPAN AND AUSTRALIA IN COUNTER- TERRORISM The threat A Presentation to the Second Japan-Australia 1.5 Track Security Dialogue Japan Institute of International Affairs Tokyo, Japan 14-15 April 2004 by Aldo Borgu Program Director, Operations and Capability Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) Terrorism is a major contemporary security problem and will remain so for the foreseeable future. There have been some important successes to date. Al Qaeda (AQ) has been thrown out of its bases in Afghanistan, had thousands of its operatives either killed or captured and its leadership is continually on the run. Jemaah Islamiah (JI) has also been weakened since the Bali and Jakarta Marriot bombings. By the end of 2003 some 200 JI members had been arrested including Hambali, JI s operations chief, and 33 convictions have been handed down from the Bali bombing. The impact of Madrid But terrorism is a long-term form of warfare. Most past terrorist campaigns have taken place over a 20-30 year time frame. Islamic extremism may confront us for even longer and eventually adopt different forms of confrontation. So while we have enjoyed a fair degree of success so far, the successes to date have been largely tactical, the strategic appeal of AQ's message remains as strong as ever, perhaps even stronger. If the recent Madrid bombings prove to have been committed or directed by mainstream AQ then it would be a sign that they've regained some of their ability to undertake truly international operations. And it would also be the first time that they've both attempted and succeeded in attacking a European country. From the time AQ lost their bases in Afghanistan to the present day they've largely focussed and limited their attacks to the Middle East region. Targets in Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Turkey and Iraq have been the priority while AQ tries to regain its capability to attack the US more

2 globally. That seems to mirror the approach they took in the run up to 9/11, which was preceded by the African Embassy and USS Cole bombings. Given how close Spain is to North Africa, where AQ has a strong influence, an attack on Spain could be seen as an extension of that strategy. It really depends on where the next attack occurs. If the UK, Italy, or the Eastern European countries are next then the warning signs for Australia and Japan will become only all too clear. We also need to recognise that AQ may have more strategic thinking behind their objectives than we give them credit for. We can't always assume that violence has become an end in itself. Even if securing the fall of the pro-us Spanish government wasn't an aim of AQ in undertaking the Madrid bombings, the subsequent defeat of the Popular Party due to the attack may encourage them to try to replicate the effect. After all the change of government in Spain has led to the withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq and further isolated the US internationally. The real test will be whether AQ and its offshoots now target key US allies supportive of the US effort in Iraq and rather than attack Western countries in general, in an attempt to further divide their resolve. Attacking France at the moment, for instance, would demonstrate somewhat of a lack in strategic sophistication on AQ's part. The uncertainty surrounding who is responsible for the Madrid bombings also highlights a possible future diversification of the terrorist threat. Older more "traditional" terrorist groups may yet adopt AQ methods and tactics in an attempt to compete for attention. AQ s relative success serves as an inspiration for like-minded groups to the point where it doesn t need to direct specific terrorist operations in order to benefit from them. And future cooperation between AQ and other terrorist groups also remains a definite risk, even if they do not share the same ideology or objectives. More practical considerations may be enough motivation for cooperation. The threat to Australia Does this mean Australia and Japan are under greater threat? Obviously that ultimately depends on who was responsible for the recent train bombings. But we don't need the Madrid bombings to tell us that we're under threat, whether from AQ or anyone else. And even if it wasn't AQ Australia at least still faces a higher risk of major terrorist attack in our country, and against Australians abroad, than at any time in our history, albeit from a very low base. One of the threats Australia faces which is related to the growth of Islamic extremist groups in our regional neighbourhood, especially in Indonesia. While JI s abilities to undertake relatively sophisticated operations may have been degraded, their ability to attack soft targets remains. Like AQ it s likely that JI has adapted based on the reaction of regional governments to it, probably by focussing its efforts on Indonesia and the Philippines and less on Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand. But also like AQ, JI s message may yet inspire and produce other terrorist groups in the immediate region such as those who ideology is based on Darul Islam and as a result prove to be more dangerous and less predictable. We may yet witness a diversification of the JI threat similar to that we have witnessed so far from AQ. And like AQ, sooner or later JI will have to demonstrate its continued relevance. The root causes of its motivation are as relevant now as they ever were. And elections in Indonesia in April and June this year will present a number of attractive targets though the lack of terrorist violence during parliamentary elections may yet point to how severe the disruption to JI has

3 been to date. Transport infrastructure remains a favoured target, so it might be only a matter of time before groups target the generally overcrowded ferry system in South East Asia. But Australia also faces a threat from AQ more directly. The Brigitte case is likely to prove to be an early indicator of AQ interest in Australia totally separate from that of JI. And should JI prove itself to be incapable of mounting serious operations against Australia we may well witness AQ taking even more of a direct interest in targeting Australia. It may well be that we face a threat from JI within the region, and a threat from AQ both globally and domestically in Australia. The threats Australia faces are in all likelihood similar to the ones Japan faces. The highest risk Australian target remains our troops currently deployed in Iraq. The second highest risks are our embassies, high commissions and business presence overseas as well as areas where Australian tourists and visitors might gather. This is especially the case in our immediate neighbourhood. Finally there is the risk of an attack on Australian soil. Australia is by no means a soft target but that doesn t mean we can rule out the probability of attack in the short term. Just because a threat can t be definitely identified doesn t mean it doesn t exist. But even then any terrorist attack in Australia in the foreseeable future is more likely to originate overseas than domestically. That places the highest priority on our intelligence, border security and issues such as identity fraud to prevent terrorists from entering Australia and setting up a base of operations here. New and future trends So we need to be prepared against what is generally accepted as the usual types of terrorist threats. But terrorism is a method of warfare and like all methods of waging war it evolves over time. It also adapts in reaction to the counter measures taken against it. And as Australia's role and responsibilities in our own region increases, the terrorist threat will change to keep up. The current resistance to US occupation in Iraq has given rise to the phenomenon of the Iraqi resistance paying Iraqi criminal elements large amounts of money to attack US interests in Iraq. Given the global nature of terrorism and Islamic extremism it s fairly likely that terrorists learn from one another. Therefore it shouldn t be beyond imagination to believe that groups such as JI with apparently large amounts of funding available might end up paying raskal gangs in PNG and other criminal elements to attack Australian interests in PNG and the South Pacific. The chance of this occurring may increase while our involvement in the South Pacific is perceived as Australia s contribution to the global war on terror. By the same token we should be prepared for the possibility that JI will play a greater role in attempting to ferment civil war in Indonesia by involving itself more in secessionist issues with the archipelago. East Timor would also be a tempting future target for Islamic extremism, not least given the Australian presence and role played there during independence. First principles for counter-terrorism cooperation So as terrorism evolves and adopts so must our responses to the threat. Now much of the language used when speaking of combating terrorism is naturally emotive. We speak of the

4 cowardice of terrorists, the murderous nature of their attacks which then requires that we fight a global war on terror to eliminate the threat. But while such language is no doubt effective politically, it doesn t help to properly understand the threat nor effectively combat it. So before we develop a strategy to effectively combat terrorism there are a few principles we need to acknowledge and accept: terrorism can't be defeated, it s always been a tactic of the weak against the strong, so at best terrorism can only be contained to the point where the threat is manageable. terrorism as we know it today can't be fought unilaterally, it requires regional and international cooperation. terrorism can't be met through military force alone or even predominantly, it requires a comprehensive whole of government approach with particular emphasis on intelligence, law enforcement and emergency response. This final point has particular relevance to improving regional efforts to combat terrorism, especially in attempting to gain wider regional cooperation in that fight, and also to the nature of any possible Australia-Japan cooperation, of which I speak more on later. Underlying all of these factors is the need to place the threat of terrorism in some perspective and context. If we accept that the new strategic environment is characterised by complexity and uncertainly then we also need to accept that such complexity defies any one single issue or threat from dominating the strategic agenda. That includes the threat of terrorism, no matter how serious that threat may appear to us to be at present. And just because terrorism is a long term form of warfare and is likely to confront us for the next 20-30 years does not mean it will be the defining issue that confronts us for those 20-30 years. Australia s efforts to enhance regional cooperation Given that the primary terrorist threat to Australia is more likely than not to originate overseas, particularly the immediate region, it s only natural that many of the Government s policies should focus on effective regional and international cooperation. The Government has appointed an Ambassador for Counter-Terrorism to Australia to provide a focal point for coordinating, promoting and intensifying the Government's international efforts to combat terrorism. It has also put into place a network of bilateral counter terrorism Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) with nine countries in the region Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, Fiji, Cambodia, PNG, East Timor and India. These MoUs underpin practical cooperation in areas such as intelligence and information exchange, law enforcement cooperation, transport security, border management, capacity building and anti-terrorist financing. According to the Australiana Government, these MoUs have resulted in the prevention and disruption of terrorist activities and the arrest of numerous terrorist figures. The MoU with Indonesia provided the basis for POLRI-AFP cooperation and the success in bringing the Bali bombers to justice. Under the MoU with Philippines the AFP assisted investigations in to the

5 Davao bombings of March 2003. It seems that it s yet to be determined whether we require such MoUs with North East Asian countries or with ASEAN as a whole to effectively combat terrorism in the region. We also have a 4-year $10 million assistance package with Indonesia to strengthen law enforcement capabilities which has been used to establish a financial intelligence unit and strengthen travel security arrangements. A similar 3-year $5 million package with the Philippines focuses on law enforcement, border security and port controls. A few months ago the Australian Foreign Minister Downer co-chaired with his Indonesian counterpart a regional ministerial meeting on counter-terrorism in Bali. The meeting apparently identified practical ways of enhancing regional cooperation in the areas of law enforcement, information exchange and legal arrangements. It followed a similar regional ministerial meeting in Bali in December 2002 which focussed on steps to combat the financing of terrorism. The Bali meeting also welcomed an Australian initiative to establish a counter terrorism centre in Indonesia, the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) to which Australia is contributing $38.3 million over five years. Finally Australia is providing counter-terrorism assistance through the Pacific Island Forum Secretariat to implement the Nasonini Declaration, including in-country legislative drafting support to enable Pacific Island Countries to meet their commitments under the 12 UN antiterrorism instruments. Options for greater Australia-Japan cooperation So where does this leave Australia and Japan in combating terrorism? The most obvious and major challenge facing us is to support the consolidation of democracy in South East Asia, especially in Indonesia and to establish stronger links with moderate Islamic groups. We also need to ensure that there are no contradictions or tensions between the need to combat terrorism and the need to promote democratic institutions in our policy approaches to these countries. There s also the question of where and how to best deliver any assistance we have to offer, in particular the balance to be struck between bilateral and multilateral assistance. Multilateral groups such as ASEAN and APEC have yet to prove themselves as organisations that are capable of transforming themselves to deal with the modern threat of terrorism, let alone security more broadly. This will remain the case for as long as ASEAN maintains a strict definition of the non-interference in members internal affairs policy. The terrorist threat dictates that you can t differentiate between foreign and domestic strategies and institutions in combating the threat. So for the short term any assistance we give is likely to be far more useful at the bilateral level, but part of our medium to longer-term effort should also be devoted to strengthening and developing the ability of those multilateral institutions to effectively deal with the threat. A recent RAND report recommends that with respect to counter terrorism cooperation with Europe, the US should pursue military and intelligence cooperation on a bilateral basis and it should increasingly pursue financial and law enforcement cooperation on a multilateral basis. I m not sure the principle applies as easily in Asia. I have my doubts that military cooperation

6 has a role to play in South East Asia. And if it s to be of any use intelligence has to be shared more widely than on just a bilateral basis. On the more specific areas of dealing with the threat there are three levels of action to pursue. The first relates to the domestic developments we can both be expected to take individually within our respective countries but which still acts to help limit the spread and influence of terrorism within our respective immediate regions and more broadly. These measures include better border security and immigration procedures, enhancements to domestic security legislation and increased resources and better coordination of intelligence agencies. There's still a lot more Australia can do in this regard. For example, despite the emphasis we seem to place on the terrorist threat we still have no overarching national counter-terrorism strategy. We have lots of plans to deal with terrorist attacks after they occur but no whole of government, whole of nation strategy to fight it on an ongoing basis and before we wait for an attack. The Government's recently announced White Paper could be a useful vehicle to develop such a strategy, but if it's just going to be a public relations exercise to highlight the terrorist threat before a federal election then it will prove to be an lost opportunity. Secondly there s the bilateral cooperation between our two countries which mirrors the broader international cooperation that we all undertake through organisations such as the UN, G8 and APEC. These include the outlawing of terrorist organisations and associated groups, stronger restrictions on the financing of terrorism and greater assistance in nation building in failed states where terrorism might breed and consolidate its support. The third area for action and cooperation is one of the more vital roles to take, namely the support we give directly to individual countries in South East Asia, and in particular, the aid and assistance to develop and enhance their own domestic capabilities to combat terrorism. The emphasis for greater cooperation in the short to medium term should be on the two countries where the terrorist threat is highest, the respective country s resolve and ability to combat the threat is weakest and hence the need for assistance is currently greatest, namely Indonesia and the Philippines. Helping regional countries to help themselves Emergency response assistance One aspect is direct assistance such as the operational level cooperation evidenced during the aftermath of the Bali bombing. In February this year the Government adopted a position ASPI had been advocating for some time, namely the development of a deployable capability in the Australian Federal Police, the International Deployment Group (IDG). The stated emphasis of this group is to enable the strategic deployment of personnel undertaking peacekeeping operations, restoration of law and order missions and the delivery of capacity-building initiatives in the region. Its role could also usefully be expanded to deal with emergency response. DFAT is currently finalising a review to strengthen the coordination and command and control of existing agency resources to deploy emergency response teams in future mass casualty and terrorism incidents overseas. Creation of dedicated groups would seem to be a better option. The US has its Foreign Emergency Support Teams (FEST) to help US missions and host governments respond quickly and

7 effectively to terrorist attacks and similar incidents. The US FEST teams are able to be deployed within four hours of any incident. Australia could develop teams within the IDG that can move just as quickly and supply critical consequence management, communications, logistics, security, forensics and investigative specialists as well as the ability to augment Embassy and High Commission staff. Future incidents may require particular expertise such as Chemical, Biological and Radiological (CBR) response capabilities. There should also be a heavy emphasis on multiple teams able to deal with concurrent incidents. Developmental assistance The second aspect of aid is developmental assistance to enhance the domestic counterterrorist capabilities of those countries. This financial year the Australian Government is providing over $12 million in counter-terrorism capacity-building assistance to our regional neighbours. That figure is expected to grow as new projects come on-line though it remains unknown how such new projects are being determined. And measured against Australia s Defence Cooperation Program (DCP) which delivers about $67.7 million of aid annually this could still be considered as too low. The nature of the threat and the long lead times required to develop some capabilities means there s an urgent need to identify new projects fairly quickly. A counter-terrorism capability audit of regional capabilities could usefully be undertaken to identify the greatest and most serious weaknesses in those countries and ways to overcome them. There s no shortage of the areas for cooperation and assistance that such an audit might reveal. They might include: Identity and documentation fraud Border security including the development of systems and software to collect and analyse traveller data. Financial intelligence and tracking Transport and infrastructure security Maritime patrol measures Assistance in the drafting of security legislation Forensic and bomb scene analysis, disaster victim identification Development of chemical, biological and radiological response capabilities Medical emergency infrastructure and response capabilities Broader consequence management capabilities Cyber protective measures Assistance to meet each countries international obligations particularly all relevant UN counter-terrorism conventions and protocols One of the major problems we face is that we have little understanding of the threat or who we are fighting. Assistance in interviewing and interrogating jailed JI members to build up a better knowledge base of the organisation and its membership would be a welcome step. It s doubtful that Indonesia and Philippines have the resources or inclination to do so by themselves. This information could also serve as the basis for the development of a region wide database on terrorist activities, organisations, personalities and tactics. We shouldn t

8 have to rely on waiting for future terrorist actions revealing more about their aims, tactics and organisation than making better use of what we have at our disposal at present. Then there s also the issue of intelligence cooperation and coordination. As the US 9/11 Commission of Inquiry has discovered the lack of cooperation between the FBI and CIA was a major factor in limiting the US s ability to pre-empt and interdict that terrorist attack. Those problems of coordination and cooperation are even more pronounced and accentuated in the international arena. The MoUs we have signed with regional countries are meant in part to facilitate the exchange of intelligence. Given the nature of the work involved public awareness of any existing cooperation would and should be limited. Hence it s difficult to assess how comprehensive this exchange of information and intelligence actually is. But if we are to be effective we have to be serious about exchanging intelligence on terrorism. Every government in the region should be more concerned with protecting their citizens than protecting their respective sources of information. Coordination with the US There is also an obvious imperative for Australia and Japan to coordinate their efforts to combat terrorism in South East Asia with that of the United States. We ve already had some meetings at a trilateral level and more meetings should be encouraged which would mirror the broader trilateral security dialogue our three countries have developed since the 2001 AUSMIN talks. And the US has been doing some good work in places such as Indonesia, where the US has been funding an enhanced counter-terrorism capability within the Indonesian national police, Detachment 88. This is particularly welcome as it aids in the shifts of emphasis for counterterrorism responsibility away from the military and KOPASSUS and towards the police force, reinforcing the non-military nature of our counter-terrorism response. Less successful has been the US efforts to gain wider support for its Regional Maritime Security Initiative, under which the US Pacific Command plans to place Marines and Special Forces on fast watercraft to patrol the maritime chokepoints in South East Asia. Malaysia s hostility to the proposal was hardly unexpected. The US needs to understand that overtly military responses to the terrorist threat will be resisted within the countries in our immediate region. And it s doubtful the region as a whole would welcome the proposal as it currently stands with great enthusiasm. This underlies one of the more important realities in meeting the terrorist threat. International assistance can only play a supporting role in combating terrorism in the region. The most effective action required is that which should come from the regional governments themselves. I spoke earlier about the importance of knowing who we are facing and the need to thoroughly interview captured JI operatives. So if the US is really serious about taking a truly international and multilateral approach to combating terrorism then it needs to rethink its policy of limiting access of Australian and Indonesian authorities to individual terrorists of interest that are in its possession, such as Hambali. It s difficult not to contrast the US approach to that of the French who have already given Australian law enforcement officials direct access to Willy Brigitte. Conclusion

9 It wouldn t have escaped anyone s attention that I didn t deal with other avenues for cooperation and coordination, not least issues of cooperation in Iraq, missile defence or the development of military capabilities to prosecute the war on terror. With respect to Iraq I simply don't accept the Bush Administration's identification of Iraq as central to the so-called 'war on terror', though US policy may yet make that a self-fulfilling prophecy. In any event what the US currently faces in Iraq is not terrorism but an insurgency which at times uses terrorist tactics. In the case of missile defence it s simply not relevant to the threat of terrorism that we face. In the case of military response capabilities I haven t dealt with that issue because I don t believe that terrorism calls for a military response, particularly in South East Asia. On a more practical level the future opportunities for the use of military force to combat terrorism will be more limited on even a global level. The US will hopefully come to realise that fact sooner or later. But that also means that future Japanese assistance to combating terrorism in our region need not be restricted by Japan's post WWII constitution and the limits it places on military involvement. In fact the restrictions on JSDF military deployments and cooperation could be considered a good thing when considering possible aid in counter-terrorism. Because Japan has no first recourse to military solutions to combating the threat might lead it to more innovative solutions than other countries have seen fit to pursue. I ve also focussed on more practical and targeted avenues for cooperation, particularly related to law enforcement and emergency response. There is an obvious need for proposals that address the problems of the Islamic schools and the degree to which they serve as breeding grounds for terrorism. Australia is pursuing some initiatives to aid the Indonesian education system. In some respects Japan may be better placed to provide such aid, not least given the sense of suspicion that still surrounds Australia s role in Indonesia, especially since the 1999 East Timor intervention. That in itself reflects the complimentary roles that we can play in combating the terrorist threat together. But we both have to be realistic about what we can achieve without the active participation and cooperation of the countries we are trying to help. If not handled correctly Australian aid in minimising the effect of more radical Islamic teachings could easily be turned against us and actually feed the threat we are trying to contain. Author details: Aldo Borgu is currently Program Director, Operations and Capability, at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), an independent defence and strategic policy institute set up by the Australian Government. There he is responsible for managing ASPI's policy research program on military operations, defence capability, military technology and counter-terrorism issues. He is the author of A Big Deal: Australia's Future Air Combat Capability (ASPI 2004), Beyond Bali: ASPI's Strategic Assessment 2002, and Australia's Defence after September 11 (ASPI 2002) as well as a number of articles on defence capability, terrorism, the Iraq war/insurgency and other strategic issues. Prior to joining ASPI, Aldo worked as the Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defence, policy officer in the International Policy Division of the Department of Defence and as a strategic analyst in the Defence Intelligence Organisation. He can be contacted on: Phone: 61 2 6270 5114 Fax: 61 2 6273 9566 Email: aldoborgu@aspi.org.au Address: Level 2, 40 Macquarie St Barton ACT 2600 Australia