Raimonds Rublovskis Latvia

Global Security and Defence Environment in the 21 st Century. Is Constitution of Latvia an Effective Legal Tool to Counter Security Challenges and Threats? Raimonds Rublovskis Latvia Abstract: Fundamental changes in global security and defence environment in the 21 st century have created new security threats and risks which significantly impact the ability of states to deal with security challenges. The membership of Latvia in NATO, the strategic partnership of Latvia with the United States of America, the limited military capabilities of the Latvian National Armed Forces determine challenges for civilian and military leadership of Latvia to perform their duties within state security and defence realm according to the Constitution of Latvia. The Articles of Satversme, which determine the responsibility of the President, the Saeima and the Government during wartime or military conflict, most probably, will not constitute relevant legal framework for the leadership of Latvia to act according to the Constitution of Latvia due to an increasingly complex nature of the 21 st century warfare. There should be new pro posals by relevant institutions which have to maintain effective and time-sensitive decision-making process in case of hypothetical military action. Key words: the Constitution of Latvia (Satversme), President, Parliament (the Saeima), Government, Security and defence environment, NATO, the United States 101

Introduction The Constitution of the Republic of Latvia (Latvijas Republikas Satversme) was approved by Parliament (Saeima) in 1922. Since then it has been amended numerous times in order to comply with changing environment within the societal structure, institutional structure, and legal structure which all have changed dramatically within the last 90 years. However, one would argue that a very important domain has been neglected and is not amended according to the situation in the 21 st century. This domain is defence and security. The aim of this paper is to examine and analyze whether or not the Articles of the Constitution (Satversme) which cover state defence and state security realm are in compliance with global security and defence risks and challenges of the 21 st century. Secondly, if one could conclude that those Articles should be amended, certain recommendations and solutions will be delivered. The paper will address several key issues, which have very important implications on the Articles of Satversme, devoted to state defence and security. One would argue that there are several key aspects which fundamentally challenge the current substance and form of those Articles. Those aspects include the historical background, the fundamental change of security challenges, threats and risks in the 21 st century, fundamental changes within the military technology domain, significant changes in military capabilities, tactics, techniques and procedures, fundamental changes within global security and defence institutions and security arrangements. All those aspects have a key influence on every document on every level which deals with security and defence issues. Global security and defence risks and challenges in the 21 st century The first decade of the 21 st century has clearly shown new security risks, threats and challenges with an increasingly global reach and increasing lethality. The further process of globalization, severe 102

financial and economic crisis have confirmed that no state alone is able to successfully counter and neutralize the growing security and defence challenges. It is, especially, a valid point for small countries with a rather small number of inhabitants, weak economies, very limited resources, both personnel- and finance-available for state defence and security. All this directly applies to the Republic of Latvia. The most important global actors have already defined their security and defence concerns within overarching National Security and Defence documents such as National Security Concepts and Military Doctrines. NATO has approved its new Strategic Concept in Lisbon in November 2010. The key security and defence challenges and risks that stem from those overarching documents are very important to understand in Latvia s case. According to several overarching strategic documents, the development of global security and defence trends after 2000, as well as trends and drivers of changes up to 2020, can be characterized by growing instability, both in the relations between the states, and in the relationships between groups within the states. States and non-state actors will exist in conditions of persistent competition. Both-state and non-state actors will seek to combine conventional, irregular, and asymmetric methods concurrently, often in the same time and space and across the combined domains of the air, land, sea, space and cyberspace. Now and in the future we will have no less than five interdependent geographies for warfare mentioned above. It has been seldom in the history for the new geography to be added to the elite short list of environments for the warfare. Now there are two such new geographies, space and cyberspace, and we are becoming ever more dependent upon them both. The future conflict is likely to involve a wide range of transnational, state, group and individual participants who will operate on a global strategic as well as on a local tactical level. In some types of conflict, there is likely to be concurrent inter-communal violence, terrorism, insurgency, criminality and widespread social disorder. Tactics, techniques, and technologies will continue to develop as adversaries rapidly adapt to seek advantage and influence, including through economic, financial, legal and diplomatic means. All of these 103

forms of conflict will transcend conventional understanding of what equates to irregular and regular military activity. Adaptive adversaries will continue to seek to utilize the media and the opponent s political system to their advantage. States will increasingly sponsor proxies, seeking to exploit gaps within the international system while minimizing state-on-state confrontation risks. The rapid growth of the global population is likely to result in further urbanization when more than 65% of all population will live within enormous urban areas, many of them, especially in regions suffering from poor governance, are likely to become centres of criminality and disaffection, and may also be focal points for extremist ideologies. Rapid urbanization is likely to lead to an increased probability of urban, rather than rural, insurgency. The worst case scenario would display substantial urban areas to fail with significant humanitarian and security implications. Availability of the resources may be yet another issue that will significantly affect security and defence realms. Although sufficient energy, food and water resources are likely to be available to sustain the growing global population, and the global economy, distribution and access to resources will be uneven with local and regional shortages of the resources frequently occurring. This situation may increase instability within certain states as well as trigger further disagreements among the states and initiate conflicts. Therefore, one could conclude that frequency, scale, and duration of humanitarian crisis are to increase. The third powerful factor that will influence security is emergence of new ideologies and legal patterns, which would directly challenge those of the West. These new ideological patterns will be driven by religion, ethnic differences, inequality or combination of these factors. Ideological conflicts are likely to occur and extremist groups will use violence to achieve political objectives. Diaspora communities most likely will increase in size and influence, and a certain number of the representatives of those communities will be involved into ideologically driven conflicts and may act as proxies for other states. The overall assessment of the current and future security and defence environment, risks, threats and challenges leads to several 104

conclusions. Firstly, the pressure on the availability and distribution of the resources, global population growth, changing distribution of power are most likely to result in increased instability and likelihood of armed conflict. Secondly, although a total military conflict across the full spectrum of warfare with all military capabilities, including WMD between states or groups of states is unlikely, disagreements between major powers over borders, influence and resources are probable, and may lead to limited wars, where adversaries deliberately exercise restraint in the methods of warfare, their level of commitment or objectives sought. Thirdly, intra-state conflict will remain the most common type of conflict. The use of proxies and partners of major powers is possible, and it means, that these powers could be involved into military conflict with each other via their own proxies and small allies. Implications of NATO membership of Latvia on security and defence of state Certainly, Latvia, as a NATO member state, enjoys the highest level of security and defence in the history, although, there should be very clear cut understanding that state security, defence, and the very independence of Latvia is heavily dependent on the ability of NATO Alliance to detect, deter, counter, and, if necessary, defeat upcoming security challenges and threats. This ability of the Alliance highly depends on proper military capabilities, effective decision-making process on the national and international levels, sustainment of appropriate defence budgets of NATO members, especially, NATO European countries. To some extent, strategic questions and options for Latvia remain mostly the same throughout the 20 th century, and the beginning of the 21 st century the ability of NATO to remain as an effective political and military organization in the 21 st century, military and security capacity of the security sector of Latvia, the situation with national minorities, the weakness of Latvia within nonmilitary security, particularly in customs and border controls on its borders with Russia and Belarus, the institutional capability of Latvia to deal 105

with security and defence concerns and challenges, and defensibility of the Baltic States with conventional military means. However, some experts are in doubt whether or not NATO is able to successfully defend the territory of the Baltic States. The new NATO Strategic Concept, which was approved in Lisbon in November 2010, recommits Alliance commitments towards all member states. At the same time, there are some contradictions with the Russian National Security Concept and Russian Military Doctrine, especially on the further NATO Enlargement issue and deployment of NATO military infrastructure and personnel in close proximity to the borders of Russia. Small state issue and its impact on security and defence aspects Why all those issues of global threats and challenges, technological development of military capabilities, and membership in NATO are so important to Latvia? Why those factors have deep impact on Latvian Constitution? The answer would be that Latvia is a small state. There is no clear-cut definition of what does it mean of being a small state. The qualitative definitions encompass physical and geographical characteristics of small states, degree of insularity, and vulnerability. In terms of quantitative characteristics, it includes land area, the population size, the Gross National Product, the Gross Domestic Product, and per capita income. Perhaps, the key feature that determines the definition of small state is not only the size of the territory, population and economy. One could rather emphasize the heavy dependence of the small states on their own security and defence arrangements on the politically powerful and military capable global actor or security and defence organization where such an actor plays a prominent role. The key argument to determine whether or not a state is small is to address its key security and defence issues. External factors profoundly impact small state security mentality. 106

The size and military capabilities of armed forces, size and capability of entire security sector of the state, defence budget in both, real money investment and percentage of the GDP, will determine whether or not the particular state should be viewed as small from the perspective of security and defence. All of those key characteristics of the small state directly apply to Latvia. A very limited size of the military personnel, the quality of military personnel and leader ship, a very low level of state defence budget, a low percentage of GDP allocated to Latvia s defence needs, the extremely limited military capabilities of the Latvian National Armed Forces. All the abovementioned characteristics should be compared with global patterns. The current State Defence Concept, which is one of the core defence planning documents of Latvia, has been approved by the Saeima (Parliament) in 19 June 2008. Since then some significant changes have occurred within the global security environment. Those changes have deeply affected security and defence capabilities and the structure of Latvia. Firstly, the severe consequences of the global financial crisis for the economy of Latvia and, subsequently, for the state defence budget, which has suffered significant cuts since 2008. It is not even close to figures of Latvia s defence spending in 2004 2007 in both, real financial resources and the percentage of the GDP. Secondly, the outcome of Russian Georgian conflict in August 2008 has also put an emphasis on security and defence issues in Latvia. According to the current State Defence Concept of 2008, the size of National Armed Forces of Latvia is limited to 5800.The project of the new State Defence Concept of Latvia, which should be approved by Parliament in 2012, displays even less amount of military personnel 5500. The defence budget issue is also very important for Latvia s defence and security. It is far below of 2%of GDP benchmark for NATO member country to be spent for defence needs. It is a significant challenge to sustain the defence budget of Latvia even on the level of 1% of the GDP, and this very fact put substantial internal and external political pressure, because it is one of the smallest in the NATO Alliance and this is a very negative political signal from Latvia. 107

The challenges for Latvianpolitical leadership to perform their duties according to the Satversme within the state defence realm in the 21 st century security environment It is obviously that threats and challenges of the 21 st century security environment, the rapid development of military technology and capabilities, Latvia s membership in NATO, extremely limited military capabilities of Latvian National Armed Forces, and issues of state internal security have significant influence on the ability of Latvian key leadership to perform their duties according to the Satversme. One would argue that the rather weak institutional capability, which has been significantly influenced by the abovementioned aspects, seems to be the key challenge for the Latvian leadership to execute their duties in state security and defence realms. This paper seeks to address whether or not the Constitution of Latvia (Satversme) fulfils the necessary overarching legal framework for state defence and security domain. According to the Satversme, there are very few key leadership persons and institutions having the highest authority and responsibility in state defence and security domain: the State President, the Parliament (Saeima), and the Government (Ministru Kabinets). There are several questions that should be addressed concerning the effectiveness of the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia against the background of the complex security environment of the 21 st century where this overarching legal document operates. What are the key tasks and responsibilities of these persons and institutions in the defence realm according to the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia? What is the security and defence environment where actions are required? Are key political leadership persons and institutions able to perform their duties and responsibilities effectively within the complex security environment of the 21 st century? One has to pay attention to the entire text of the Articles and 108

analyze those Articles of the Constitution within the following pattern: Position action required/ taken the security/defence environment. The President is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Latvia. During wartime, the President appoints a Supreme Commander (Art. 42). The President declares war on the basis of the decision of the Saeima (Art. 43). The President has the right to take whatever steps are necessary for the military defence of the State should another state declare war on Latvia or an enemy invade its borders. Concurrently, and without delay, the President shall convene the Saeima, which shall decide as to the declaration and commencement of war (Article 44). The Parliament. The Saeima shall determine the size of the Armed Forces of the State during peacetime (Art. 67). The Government. If the State is threatened by an external enemy, or an internal insurrection which endangers the existing political system, arising or threatening to arise in the State or in any part of the State, the Cabinet has the right to proclaim a state of emergency and shall inform the Presidium within twenty four hours, and the Presidium shall, without delay, present such decision of the Cabinet to Saeima (Article 62). Bearing in mind the core nature of global security and defence threats, risks and challenges, as well as fundamental changes within the nature of the military conflict of the 21 st century one has to address the key challenges which the President, the Saeima, and the Government would face in order to fulfil their tasks within the state defence realm according to the Constitution framework. Taking into account that the President, the Saeima, and the Government have obligations to take very important and necessary steps within their legal capacity, such as decision on the commencement of war, declaration of war, appointment of the Supreme Commander, proclamation of a state of emergency, it is obvious, that the key task of an adversary would be to disrupt and eliminate the possibility to gather, discuss, take decisions, and issue necessary documents and orders. According to Clausewitz theory of Centres of Gravity, one has to consider national leadership and functioning institutions 109

of state power as strategic level Centres of Gravity. As such, they are the most effective target to blow and the hub of all power on which everything depends and against which all efforts should be directed. Consequently, they are High Value Targets for an adversary planning in order to disrupt and eliminate timely and professional decisionmaking procedure and military command and control arrangements. The key tasks from the opposite point of view would be to prevent or eliminate the possibility to gather, discuss the issue, exercise command and control arrangement over the units of National Armed Forces of Latvia, other units of Security sector of Latvia. In the case of modern warfare conditions, most probably there will be no time for the President, the Saeima, and the Government to exercise their obligations within the defence domain. One would argue that in such case, there will be not enough time to convene Saeima by the President, time to discuss the issue among the President, the Saeima, and the Government, gather necessary numbers of the Parliament and the Government members in order to take necessary decisions, issue necessary orders and decisions and, as a result there will be no declaration of the state of war. If those arrangements are disrupted, neutralized or eliminated, there is no legal mechanism, which allows Latvian National Armed Forces to commence military operations without formal decision of the Saeima, and formal order of the President. Therefore, one of the key tasks of opponent side would be prevent the possibility of Saeima and the President to exercise timely and effective command and control over Latvian National Armed Forces (LNAF) in order to impact legally sound basis for the military operations carried out by LNAF. One would argue that the Chief of Defence of Latvia (CHOD) should have the possibility to activate subordinate unites even without any orders received from the key leadership of Latvia in the cases mentioned above. The scope of certain trends and events should allow the Chief of Defence act legally sound even without overarching legal acts from the President and the Saeima in time-sensitive conditions and uncertainty of the military conflict. Another very important issue stems from the Latvian membership in NATO and the strategic partnership with the United States. 110

One would argue that the membership in NATO and partnership with the US brings significant impact on the decision-making procedures on the security and defence domain of Latvia. Firstly, Latvian membership in NATO means, that Article 5 conditions apply to Latvia, and there would be no possibility of external military attack on Latvian borders, because it is also the external border of NATO and the EU, and a military attack on a NATO member state falls under provisions of Article 5. Therefore, a hypothetical military action against Latvia would mean military action against NATO with all the consequences for the attacking side. Secondly, a declaration of war issue is highly unlikely due to the NATO membership. Bearing in mind the relative weakness of Latvian military capabilities, it is impossible to imagine under what circumstances the Saeima and the President could decide on the declaration of war without enhanced consultations with Allies. From the pure military perspective, it is highly unlikely that either the President or the Saeima could ever exercise those tasks in reality. Most probably, the decision to take a military action within Latvian territory will be taken by the United States and relevant NATO bodies. It would lead to another issue which could challenge the ability of Latvian leadership to exercise their tasks according the Constitution. In order to successfully counter hypothetical military engagement in the Baltic Sea region, the United States and NATO should exercise prudent military contingency planning. It requires Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR) which displays necessary military capabilities for fulfilment of military tasks in the territory of Latvia. If there is such a decision of deployment of the military capabilities of the United States and other NATO countries to Latvia, most probably, their personnel and capabilities will significantly exceed those of Latvian National Armed Forces. One could see no option when the President or any other key leadership personnel of Latvia would be in any charge of those assets and personnel during military engagement. It means that those assets and personnel will have NATO/US command and control arrangements during military engagement in the Latvian territory, and this very fact directly 111

contradicts with the President s position as the Commander-in-Chief of LNAF, and the same concern applies to the person who would be appointed by the President as the Supreme Commander during wartime, according to Article 42 of the Constitution. Taking into account the complex nature of military environment in the 21 st century and the extremely limited military capabilities of Latvian National Armed Forces, one would have significant reservations on the effectiveness of this person. There are only few obvious candidates for such a position either the Prime Minister or the Chief of Defence. However, bearing in mind the very fact that, most probably, in the case of a military action in the Baltic region and Latvia, in particular, the Supreme Commander will not have any possibility to exercise any military authority over NATO/the United States military personnel and capabilities in the territory of Latvia. Probably, the main task of Supreme Commander would be coordination of Host Nation Support (HNS) activities in order to facilitate deployment of NATO Task Force to Latvia. This leads to the key question of national sovereignty versus military effectiveness. If hypothetical military engagement occurs in the territory of Latvia, it is obvious from the pure military perspective that due to extremely limited military capabilities Latvian National Armed Forces will not be able to sustain effective military action alone. One would assume that in order to be effective during a military action, LNAF should be part of the larger and more capable NATO Task Force with respective Land, Air, Maritime, and Special Operations Forces(SOF), Combat Support (CS), and Combat Service Support(CSS) capabilities becoming the part of tailored NATO Land, Air, Maritime, SOF, CS, CSS components. Under such a circumstances, LNAF would cease to exist as a Latvian military institution with all the necessary command and control arrangements established through NATO and the United States chain of command. This would be the most probable institutional structure of NATO Task Force if the military engagement occurs, but, on the other hand, it completely undermines the ability of the President, the Saeima, and the Government to exercise effectively any of their key tasks according to the Constitution of Latvia. 112

One would argue that smallness of the state, a very limited military personnel and capabilities, geographical location, the very core nature of global security and defence risks, threats and challenges, the strategic partnership with the United States, and membership of Latvia in NATO, the time sensitive decision-making process of the modern military conflict determine that the core institutions of the Republic of Latvia, according to the Constitution of Latvia, responsible for national defence matters, are significantly limited in their freedom of action and in the scope of objects of their decision authority, compared with the situation in 1922. Therefore, the majority of the tasks determined by the Satversme to President, Parliament, and the Government in security and defence domains are not executable within conditions of modern warfare and military conflict. Taking into account all the considerations listed above, one would argue that there should be a backup institution which has all the necessary legal power to activate and execute all tasks within the state defence realm if the President, the Saeima and the Government are not able to act swiftly and decisively for whatever reason. One would detect the National Security Council (NSC) as a proper institution that could be the backup body to exercise all necessary legal actions in wartime or in the event of a military conflict. NSC has only coordinating authority on national security issues and its decisions have only limited power as recommendations for action within the National Security domain for the time being. It could be necessary to empower NSC with the necessary legal tools, and it could also be necessary to place this institution in the text of Satversme. Conclusions and recommendations The Articles of the Constitution of Latvia on State security and defence have not been updated according to the fundamental changes in the 21 st century security environment. The technological development, development of military capabilities, membership of Latvia in NATO, extremely limited military capabilities of Latvian National Armed Forces determine significant impact on the ability of the 113

President, the Saeima, the Government to effectively perform their duties on State defence and security domain in the case of war or a military conflict. It is high probability that the President will have extremely limited ability to execute his duties according to the Constitution concerning the appointment of the Supreme Commander, declaration of war, and the only steps necessary to take are timely consultations with NATO Allies. It is high probability that Saeima will have extremely limited ability to execute its duties concerning the decision on commencement of war. It is high probability that only peacetime tasks of the President, the Saeima, and the Government within state security and defence domain are to be effectively relevant. All wartime/military conflict tasks of the President, the Parliament, and the Government according to the Constitution will have significant limitations. NATO/the United States military capabilities, personnel, command and control arrangements will be executed via NATO/the United States chain of command with limited influence from the side of Latvian leadership. There should be a smaller body than the Parliament and the Government in order to exercise an effective military decision making during a wartime/military conflict. The National Security Council should be empowered with the necessary legal tools in order to provide an effective decision making in time-sensitive critical conditions in the case the Parliament s and Government s effectiveness is limited /eliminated. NSC has to have backup institution function; NSC has to be mentioned in the text of Satversme. A very significant impact on the ability to perform military tasks by the National Armed Forces in wartime/military engagement almost none could be performed without NATO/the United States military capabilities, personnel and command and control arrangements. It is highly unlikely that the agreement between Latvia and NATO on the status of military personnel in the case of a military 114

action in the territory of Latvia will transfer the authority from NATO/the United States to Latvian civilian and military leadership. NSC and the Chief of Defence (CHOD) should have to have legal tools to activate the units of Latvian National Armed Forces if the Saeima and the Government are not able to exercise an effective decision-making. Bibliography Asmus, R.D., Nurick, R.C. NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996. Brzezinski, Z. U.S. Policy toward Northeastern Europe. New York, NY: Scribner, 1999. Clausewitz, C. On War. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989. Grey, C.S. Another Bloody Century. London: Weidenfeld and Nickolson, 2005. Grey, C.S. The 21 st Century Security Environment and the Future of War. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2008. Knudsen, O.F. Stability and Security in the Baltic Sea Region. Trowbridge, Great Britain: The Cromwell Press, 1999. Lucas, E. Loose Ends and Their Virtues : Or, a conceptual non-framework for Nordic- Baltic security cooperation. Nordic-Baltic Security in the 21 st Century: The Regional Agenda and the Global Role. Atlantic Council, 2011. Multiple Futures Project. Final Report. NATO Headquarters Supreme Allied Command Transformation, 2009. Neretnieks, K. Can NATO Defend the Baltic States? Strategic Outlook. Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2011. Strange, J.. Perspectives on Warfighting. Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities. Marine Corps University Foundation, 1996. The Constitution of the Republic of Latvia. www.satv.tiesa. gov. lv Valsts Aizsardzības Koncepcija. Latvijas Republikas Aizsardzības Ministrija, 2008. Vayryanen, R. Small States: Persisting Despite Doubts. The National Security of Small States in the Changing World. London: Frank Cass, 1997. 115

About the Author Raimonds Rublovskis is a Colonel (retired) with 23 years of service in the National Armed Forces of the Republic of Latvia. During his military service, he held various key command and staff positions in the domains of security, defence against terrorism, law enforcement and strategic planning such as Commander of Military Police of Latvian National Armed Forces, Commander of Parliament and State President Security Service, Commander of Special Operations Forces, National Military Representative of the Republic of Latvia at NATO SHAPE (Mons, Belgium), and Chief of Strategic Planning Department (J5) of Joint Headquarters of Latvian National Armed Forces. R. Rublovskis holds his Master s degree in History (University of Latvia), as well as Higher Professional Education degree in Law (University of Latvia). He has graduated from the United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College with the Master s degree of Military Studies. Currently R. Rublovskis is working on his PhD paper, which is related to the security and defence issues of Latvia, he is a lecturer in Rīga Stradiņš University (RSU) in the International Security Course, and a Research Fellow of the Latvian Institute of International Affairs (LIIA). 116