Oil and Gas Industry A Comprehensive Security Risk Management Approach.
|
|
|
- Suzan Bates
- 10 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 Oil and Gas Industry A Comprehensive Security Risk Management Approach
2 Introduction This white paper explores the key security challenges facing the oil and gas industry and suggests specific countermeasures from the security risk management standpoint, to mitigate risks. It also covers successful implementation strategies of recommended security solutions to optimize monetary investments. RiskWatch International proposes to follow this approach during oil and gas industry projects. Inclusion of security expertise early in the planning process will result in a better-coordinated and more cost effective approach to security.
3 Threats Facing the Oil and Gas Industry Security is of paramount importance in the oil and gas industry in general, and the infrastructures of the sector in particular as petroleum products dominate current worldwide consumption. The demand surge is expected to continue in the foreseeable future, with the International Energy Agency (IEA) projecting a more than one-third demand growth over the period to Therefore, the safeguarding of oil and gas infrastructure from all internal and external threats becomes a top priority. Risks related to asset damage, business interruption, human casualties and damage to properties are intrinsic to oil and gas activities. Several prominent agencies throughout the world have consistently signaled at asymmetric threats from various extremist groups. The oil and gas industry is a potentially easy target primarily because of the very nature of the products used. The chemical properties present at the facilities attract attacks as the release of the same could have devastating impact. The fact that stability in the industry may render the government powerful also fuels the attacks. Further, the concentration of the oil and gas industry infrastructure in limited geographic areas renders it particularly vulnerable to non-traditional threats. Also, the importance of petroleum products for the overall economic stability domestic and international makes the oil and gas industry an attractive option for disruption of operations. 1 IEA, World Energy Outlook 2012
4 The Potential Targets: Infrastructures While the entire oil and gas industry infrastructure is a potential target, attacks are also targeted at their strategic resources which include specific segments, equipment, support systems, transportation facilities, and technological systems. Some specific segments such as oil and gas wells, pipelines and pumping stations and storage facilities are more often located above ground in isolated areas, making them accessible for sabotage with little fear of immediate counterattack. As a specific segment, a refinery s is vulnerable because of its urban proximity. Equipments and support systems are usually targeted to cripple local operations. Transportation systems are vulnerable because they are symbolic of the global reach of the petroleum industry. The oil and gas industry is broadly divided into various segments that cover exploration, extraction, refining and transportation. This segmentation enables terrorist groups to design varied attacks. These emerging unconventional and wider asymmetric threats coupled with the overwhelming dependence on petroleum raise serious questions about the oil and gas infrastructure protection. Technological systems that companies in the oil and gas industry use are normally Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Systems (SCADA), which are remotely controlled. Being remotely controlled renders them susceptible to malicious attacks. Also, the sector is vulnerable where it uses newer technologies that may be subject to sophisticated attacks. Therefore, as these strategic assets face unique vulnerabilities the countermeasures should also be distinctive to adapt to the security risk level. Companies in the oil and gas industry face a growing number of security challenges. Their private security forces are confronting non-traditional strategy and tactics of opponents, both internal and external. The adversaries include national and international extremists, well-organized criminal syndicates, cyber security threats, ideologically driven actors, and disgruntled employees. As the opponents and adversaries vary so do their capabilities and intentions to irrevocably damage the oil and gas industry infrastructure and thereby the heart of the economy. Their coordinated attacks can exploit the vulnerabilities inherent in protecting complex oil and gas infrastructure.
5 Security Risk Assessment To counter the threats in the industry the security as well as the security risks requires a committed analysis, because the risk constitutes the threat probability and the enormity of impact on a complex resource post disaster. This is a very complex scenario that calls for desperate countermeasures. An all encompassing security risk management approach can be adopted. The methodology will identify the security risks and assess the capabilities of the organization and its security solutions, both human and technological. While the technological assessment will include, among others, the logical, physical and environmental issues, the human solutions will cover the security forces. The security risks assessment begins once the threats, the critical assets and the vulnerabilities are ascertained and identified. It is then followed by setting of security objectives for each individual security risk that needs to be countered. Criteria of critical representative impact include: Human casualties, killed & injured Economic loss of infrastructure destruction and trade disruption Business impact Civilian inconvenience due to loss of energy supply Environmental degradation due to hydrocarbon release Time loss in repair Potential for interdependency effects. Comprehensive Security Risk Management The purpose of security risk management in oil and gas is to establish a collective process to define a security program. The program enables identifying potential threats which could affect personnel, assets or operations. It also involves prioritizing those risks and identifying mitigations strategies. In this section the white paper presents an elaborate description of the security management process to counter the potential risks and to develop a security program.
6 Set Up the Security Organization Setting up the internal security organization is the first step towards initiating the risk management process. The objective of the organization is to make sure that the quality of the security management process is maintained. The internal organization will help in guiding and defining the scope and objectives of the Security Committee and the Security Working Groups. The organization to be set up should comprise Security Committee (SC) and Security Working Groups (SWG): The SC should include members from the top-level management who establish strategic and operational priorities, select courses of action, and allocate resources to develop a robust security strategy. The SWG on the other hand will prepare the planning documents, conduct risk assessments and develop the policy. As the SWG take on-the-ground actions, it will be positioned to recommend modifications future advancements. The Threat WG constitutes one of the key SWGs. It comprises representatives from counterintelligence, law enforcement, information operations and the chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives (CBRNE). Larger installations may usually incorporate additional personnel as assigned by the SC from time to time. As stated, the security organization aims to make sure that the quality of the security management process is maintained using the Plan, Do, Check, Act (PDCA) Model. Plan: Establish or update the Security Master Plan (SMP) to improve security Do: Implement and operate the actions defined in the SMP Check: Monitor, review the actions and report the results to decision makers Act: Maintain and improve the actions Define Security Strategy and Mitigate Risks To mitigate the security risks the key threat areas need to be identified and duly addressed. To identify these critical threats documentation, interviews, technical review and site surveys are used. The areas that require to be addressed will include assessment of threat, criticality, vulnerability and risk. The scope of Threat Assessment includes defining alert levels, threats identification and probability evaluation. Criticality Assessment covers identification of critical assets and defining asset criticality levels. Vulnerability Assessment involves spotting vulnerability areas and measurement of criticality. It also covers review of manpower and security force protection. Risk Assessment provides a review to identify and evaluate the risks based on previous assessments conclusions. Once these risks are identified, the management analyzes and takes a decision whether the particular risk should be overlooked, controlled, insured or accepted.
7 Implement Solutions The security solutions should conform to the security objectives. Key security concerns focus on the protection of the critical assets. Security solutions are based on organization, human factors and technology. If the management decides to mitigate the risk, it specifies the security objectives based on risk priority and offers solutions. The solutions are classification, detection, response and recovery. Prevention emphasizes that appropriate measures are in place to limit the probability of an incident. Detection prioritizes the implementation of detection systems and the expert monitoring of security activities. Response comprises measures that aim at analyzing alerts and follow-up response procedures. Recovery includes the measures to be taken into consideration to restore the damage. Recovery is essential to ensure the business continuity of the operations. Finally, conclusions are formalized in the SMP. To ensure safety, organizations should implement the security solutions defined in the SMP. The implementation should constitute a series of actions covering: Security solutions prioritization Planning accomplishment supported by adequate funding. Once additional countermeasures are identified and implemented, it is time to reassess the security risks. In this regard, a risk management scorecard is of immense help. Also, it is very vital to conduct complete risk assessment on yearly basis. Pipeline Systems Oil Refineries Mass Storage Facilities Reservoirs Wells Offshore Production Facilities
8 Security Management Best Practices Decades of working along with its global oil and gas industry partners have enabled RiskWatch International to help several organizations with unmatched security solutions. With such unparalleled expertise RiskWatch has identified some best practices in the oil & gas industry security management. They include: Risk management: Corporates should aim at integrating a comprehensive security risk management system into the organizations overall risk management process. Security organization set up: To ensure that the quality of the security risk management process is maintained, create senior level security committee, SWGs, corporate security risk team and local security officers including IT, safety and facility. Coordination: Facilitating coordination with government and stakeholders including customers, suppliers and infrastructure providers to achieve collaborative development. Security Master Plan: Defining the SMP serves as a cohesive security solution and addresses all aspects of security planning simultaneously. Resilience management: An effective resilience management approach helps organizations manage operational risk and improve operational resilience. Interdependencies: Interdependencies calls for evaluation of contingency plans from an infrastructure interdependencies perspectives. It enhances coordination with industry wide infrastructure providers. Human resource: It has a multidimensional role to play from ensuring background investigations and periodic updates for employees to defining a hiring policy to raising employee awareness. Physical security: The physical security division serves as a strategic partner in combating the growing number of challenges in the industry. It helps guard sensitive areas by restricting access, and should provide increased security checkpoints, robust manned facilities and video surveillance. Information System and Network architecture: As part of a robust IT security policy, organizations should specify LAN/WAN network perimeter, curtail external connections and keep up to date mapping of network. Traffic filtering, authentication controls, encryption, and access controls should be covered. This white paper proposes a Scope Of Work that details a security strategy development which includes the best practices.
9 Typical RiskWatch Scope of Work RiskWatch International has defined the Scope of Work to support oil & gas companies in developing an efficient security risk management process. As depicted in the figure below, the RiskWatch SOW involves five key components: Step 1: Specify the Scope RiskWatch reckons defining the scope of the Risk Management Program as the first important step and proposes: Meeting senior management to set up and define the SWG. Understanding the business objectives to formalize the scope of the System. Defining the scope of the System to formalize the planning of the security risk management program. Step 2: Understand the organization and the System As the second key step, in understanding the organization and the System RiskWatch considers: Understanding the organization and its System, its relations with government agencies and identifying the regulatory challenges to acquire an understanding of the context. The objective of the SOW is to provide a foundation for conducting risk assessments and evaluating security risk management options. To this purpose, RiskWatch International has developed Critical Asset Security Risk Management, CASRIM. CASRIM is a unique software program that assists RiskWatch engineers to fully analyze the major security risks. The software generates graphical display of the risk analysis after a careful scrutiny of the situation. Step 3: Risks Assessment Evaluating the prevailing security risks in the System constitutes the next step. In this regard RiskWatch recommends: A thorough review of the System, and undertaking the threat, criticality and vulnerability assessment. Categorization of risks to accept, to ignore, to control or to ensure, and suggesting security objectives. Advising security solutions to mitigate risks. All the above three should lead to the security risk measurement report. Step 4: Formalize the security master plan Based on the decisions provided by the SC and the SWG, a SMP is formalized to define the security policy and the operational concept. RiskWatch International considers the following: Prepare & propose implementation of security solutions, return on security investment (ROSI) calculations. It leads to documents concerning Security Risk Management Methodology, SMP, Security doctrine and operational concept. The output should include implementation plan report and the ROSI report. Step 5: Devise and implement solutions In this last step of implementing the Security Master Plan actions, Riskwatch proposes: Defining a new security organization including the SC and SWGs, developing operational security procedures, designing security control rooms, implementing physical security, and individual protective measures. Developing operational and technical training program and implementation of communications security. Implementing a robust information technology security solution and building particular software to generate daily scorecard of the risk condition. Developing effective resilience solutions to manage operational risk and improve operational resilience. Sustain the quality of the security solution participating in the PDCA process. All the above ensure that the security solutions are implemented and maintained.
10 Benefits of a Comprehensive Approach Risk assessment involves the integration of threat, vulnerability, and consequence information followed by protective measures based on an agreed upon risk mitigation strategy. Risk determination aids the management in prioritizing the protection of critical assets after relative study of the asset valuation and the probable vulnerabilities. This, in turn, helps the management in accepting the vulnerability risks. However, the management must guard against all risk exposures by building a risk management framework to prevent incident, deploy countermeasures to mitigate the incident enormity, and recuperate post incident. Adopting a comprehensive approach enables minimal financial costs to yield sizeable benefits in cases of security solutions for already identified risks. Further, organizations gain efficiencies due to integration between the security technology, the organizations objectives and processes. All this is achieved while remaining secure throughout. Implementation of security measures on existing structures tends to be operationally less useful than those adopted during initial infrastructure facility design. Similarly, security measures aimed at covering up a lack of initial stage planning don t always produce the desired benefits. Delays in adopting a security and control strategy could lead to a costly outcome such as network attacks, production interruptions and loss of reputation. Therefore, it is profitable to incorporate strategic security measures during initial infrastructure facility design and initial planning. Conclusion The oil & gas industry is subject to countless potential security breakdowns. Companies can adopt a comprehensive security risk management strategy to adapt security solutions to the emerging threats and security risks. The risk management framework will also help in balancing fund allocation on the basis of the required protection. While security for mega infrastructures should reflect financial capabilities, security projects for infrastructures with limited funding should be planned at a manageable cost. The methodology presented in this white paper is scalable and can be adopted to measurably improve the security scenario from a single infrastructure to the entire oil and gas value chain upstream, midstream and downstream.
Oil & Gas Industry Towards Global Security. A Holistic Security Risk Management Approach. www.thalesgroup.com/security-services
Oil & Gas Industry Towards Global Security A Holistic Security Risk Management Approach www.thalesgroup.com/security-services Oil & Gas Industry Towards Global Security This white paper discusses current
Best Practices in ICS Security for System Operators. A Wurldtech White Paper
Best Practices in ICS Security for System Operators A Wurldtech White Paper No part of this document may be distributed, reproduced or posted without the express written permission of Wurldtech Security
EEI Business Continuity. Threat Scenario Project (TSP) April 4, 2012. EEI Threat Scenario Project
EEI Business Continuity Conference Threat Scenario (TSP) April 4, 2012 EEI Threat Scenario 1 Background EEI, working with a group of CIOs and Subject Matter Experts, conducted a survey with member companies
CYBER SECURITY GUIDANCE
CYBER SECURITY GUIDANCE With the pervasiveness of information technology (IT) and cyber networks systems in nearly every aspect of society, effectively securing the Nation s critical infrastructure requires
TEXAS HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGIC PLAN 2015-2020: PRIORITY ACTIONS
TEXAS HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGIC PLAN 2015-2020: PRIORITY ACTIONS INTRODUCTION The purpose of this document is to list the aligned with each in the Texas Homeland Security Strategic Plan 2015-2020 (THSSP).
Subject: Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection
For Immediate Release Office of the Press Secretary The White House December 17, 2003 Homeland Security Presidential Directive / HSPD-7 Subject: Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization,
U.S. DoD Physical Security Market
U.S. DoD Physical Security Market Technologies Used for DoD Applications June 2011 Table of Contents Executive Summary 7 Introduction 8 Definitions and Scope 9-11 Percentage of FY 2010 Total Budget Request
December 17, 2003 Homeland Security Presidential Directive/Hspd-7
For Immediate Release Office of the Press Secretary December 17, 2003 December 17, 2003 Homeland Security Presidential Directive/Hspd-7 Subject: Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization,
MAJOR PROJECTS CONSTRUCTION SAFETY STANDARD HS-09 Revision 0
MAJOR PROJECTS CONSTRUCTION SAFETY SECURITY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM STANDARD HS-09 Document Owner(s) Tom Munro Project/Organization Role Supervisor, Major Projects Safety & Security (Canada) Version Control:
JOB ANNOUNCEMENT. Chief Security Officer, Cheniere Energy, Inc.
JOB ANNOUNCEMENT Chief Security Officer, Cheniere Energy, Inc. Position Overview The Vice President and Chief Security Risk Officer (CSRO) reports to the Chairman, Chief Executive Officer and President
NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY
NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY JANUARY 2012 Table of Contents Executive Summary 1 Introduction 2 Our Strategic Goals 2 Our Strategic Approach 3 The Path Forward 5 Conclusion 6 Executive
v. 03/03/2015 Page ii
The Trident University International (Trident) catalog consists of two parts: Policy Handbook and Academic Programs, which reflect current academic policies, procedures, program and degree offerings, course
Managing IT Security with Penetration Testing
Managing IT Security with Penetration Testing Introduction Adequately protecting an organization s information assets is a business imperative one that requires a comprehensive, structured approach to
Critical Infrastructure & Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) CYBER PROTECTION
Critical Infrastructure & Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) CYBER PROTECTION ALBERTO AL HERNANDEZ, ARMY RESERVE OFFICER, SOFTWARE ENGINEER PH.D. CANDIDATE, SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PRESENTATION
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS Continuous Monitoring 1. What is continuous monitoring? Continuous monitoring is one of six steps in the Risk Management Framework (RMF) described in NIST Special Publication
National Cyber Security Policy -2013
National Cyber Security Policy -2013 Preamble 1. Cyberspace 1 is a complex environment consisting of interactions between people, software and services, supported by worldwide distribution of information
DESIGNATED CONTRACT MARKET OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY TECHNOLOGY QUESTIONNAIRE
DESIGNATED CONTRACT MARKET OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY TECHNOLOGY QUESTIONNAIRE Please provide all relevant documents responsive to the information requests listed within each area below. In addition to the
Best Practices in ICS Security for Device Manufacturers. A Wurldtech White Paper
Best Practices in ICS Security for Device Manufacturers A Wurldtech White Paper No part of this document may be distributed, reproduced or posted without the express written permission of Wurldtech Security
Enterprise Risk Management taking on new dimensions
Enterprise Risk Management taking on new dimensions October 2006 The practice of Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) is becoming more critical and complex every day. There is a growing need for organizations
Water Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector-Specific Plan as input to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan Executive Summary
Water Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector-Specific Plan as input to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan Executive Summary May 2007 Environmental Protection Agency Executive Summary
CyberSecurity Solutions. Delivering
CyberSecurity Solutions Delivering Confidence Staying One Step Ahead Cyber attacks pose a real and growing threat to nations, corporations and individuals globally. As a trusted leader in cyber solutions
1. Computer Security: An Introduction. Definitions Security threats and analysis Types of security controls Security services
1. Computer Security: An Introduction Definitions Security threats and analysis Types of security controls Security services Mar 2012 ICS413 network security 1 1.1 Definitions A computer security system
National Surface Transport Security Strategy. September 2013. Transport and Infrastructure Senior Officials Committee. Transport Security Committee
National Surface Transport Security Strategy September 2013 Transport and Infrastructure Senior Officials Committee Transport Security Committee 1 National Surface Transport Security Strategy (NSTSS) Foreword
Table of Contents ESF-12-1 034-00-13
Table of Contents Primary Coordinating Agency... 2 Local Supporting Agencies... 2 State, Regional, and Federal Agencies and Organizations... 2 Purpose... 3 Situations and Assumptions... 4 Direction and
COJUMA s. Legal Considerations for Defense Support to Civil Authorities. U.S. Southern Command Miami, Florida Draft
COJUMA s Legal Considerations for Defense Support to Civil Authorities U.S. Southern Command 28 Miami, Florida Miami, Florida Draft Table of Contents Legal Considerations for Defense Support to Civil Authorities.....10
Considerations for Hybrid Communications Network Technology for Pipeline Monitoring
Considerations for Hybrid Communications Network Technology for Pipeline Monitoring Craig Held White Paper April 2012 Abstract The concept of automation (and its corresponding technologies) is a primary
CYBER SECURITY AND RISK MANAGEMENT. An Executive level responsibility
CYBER SECURITY AND RISK MANAGEMENT An Executive level responsibility Cyberspace poses risks as well as opportunities Cyber security risks are a constantly evolving threat to an organisation s ability to
Why Should Companies Take a Closer Look at Business Continuity Planning?
whitepaper Why Should Companies Take a Closer Look at Business Continuity Planning? How Datalink s business continuity and disaster recovery solutions can help organizations lessen the impact of disasters
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION BUILDING ORGANIZATIONAL RESILIENCE
1 CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION BUILDING ORGANIZATIONAL RESILIENCE Gavin McLintock P.Eng. CISSP PCIP 2 METCALFE POWER STATION 16 April 2013 Sophisticated physical attack 27 Days outage $15.4 million
How Secure is Your SCADA System?
How Secure is Your SCADA System? Charles Drobny GlobaLogix, Inc. Houston, TX, USA Our Industry is a Target 40% of cyber attacks on Critical Infrastructure targets are aimed at the Energy Industry The potential
Unit Guide to Business Continuity/Resumption Planning
Unit Guide to Business Continuity/Resumption Planning (February 2009) Revised June 2011 Executive Summary... 3 Purpose and Scope for a Unit Business Continuity Plan(BCP)... 3 Resumption Planning... 4 Assumptions
KPMG Information Risk Management Business Continuity Management Peter McNally, KPMG Asia Pacific Leader for Business Continuity
INFORMATION RISK MANAGEMENT KPMG Information Risk Management Business Continuity Management Peter McNally, KPMG Asia Pacific Leader for Business Continuity ADVISORY Contents Agenda: Global trends and BCM
Industrial Cyber Security Risk Manager. Proactively Monitor, Measure and Manage Cyber Security Risk
Industrial Cyber Security Risk Manager Proactively Monitor, Measure and Manage Cyber Security Risk With Today s Cyber Threats, How Secure is Your Control System? Today, industrial organizations are faced
BUSINESS CONTINUITY PLANNING
Policy 8.3.2 Business Responsible Party: President s Office BUSINESS CONTINUITY PLANNING Overview The UT Health Science Center at San Antonio (Health Science Center) is committed to its employees, students,
AUDITOR GENERAL S REPORT. Protection of Critical Infrastructure Control Systems. Report 5 August 2005
AUDITOR GENERAL S REPORT Protection of Critical Infrastructure Control Systems Report 5 August 2005 Serving the Public Interest Serving the Public Interest THE SPEAKER LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY THE PRESIDENT
Nine Steps to Smart Security for Small Businesses
Nine Steps to Smart Security for Small Businesses by David Lacey Co-Founder, Jericho Forum Courtesy of TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION... 1 WHY SHOULD I BOTHER?... 1 AREN T FIREWALLS AND ANTI-VIRUS ENOUGH?...
22 nd WPC Topic Descriptions
22 nd WPC Topic Descriptions BLOCK 1: Exploration and Production of Oil and Gas FORUMS: F1 Exploration challenges how to reduce risk F2 Unconventional hydrocarbon resource development North American phenomena
Create Operational Flexibility with Cost-Effective Cloud Computing
IBM Sales and Distribution White paper Create Operational Flexibility with Cost-Effective Cloud Computing Chemicals and petroleum 2 Create Operational Flexibility with Cost-Effective Cloud Computing Executive
Incident Management & Communications. Top 8 Focus Areas to Mitigate Risk
Incident Management & Communications Top 8 Focus Areas to Mitigate Risk Incident Management & Communications Top 8 Focus Areas to Mitigate Risk Delays and errors in operational communications happen every
Business Continuity & Disaster Recovery
Business Continuity & Disaster Recovery Safety First Quality Every Time 1 Business Continuity & Disaster Recovery Planning Who here has a formal Business Continuity & Disaster Recovery plan? The purpose
Software & Supply Chain Assurance: Mitigating Risks Attributable to Exploitable ICT / Software Products and Processes
Software & Supply Chain Assurance: Mitigating Risks Attributable to Exploitable ICT / Software Products and Processes Joe Jarzombek, PMP, CSSLP Director for Software & Supply Chain Assurance Stakeholder
Microsoft s cybersecurity commitment
Microsoft s cybersecurity commitment Published January 2015 At Microsoft, we take the security and privacy of our customers data seriously. This focus has been core to our culture for more than a decade
During the Clinton administration, the
8 UNIVERSITIES COUNCIL ON WATER RESOURCES ISSUE 129, PAGES 8-12, OCTOBER 2004 Assessing the Vulnerabilities of U.S. Drinking Water Systems Jeffrey J. Danneels and Ray E. Finley Sandia National Laboratories
Update On Smart Grid Cyber Security
Update On Smart Grid Cyber Security Kshamit Dixit Manager IT Security, Toronto Hydro, Ontario, Canada 1 Agenda Cyber Security Overview Security Framework Securing Smart Grid 2 Smart Grid Attack Threats
Security Vulnerability Assessment
Security Vulnerability Assessment Deter, Detect, Delay, Respond the elements for minimizing your operational risk. A detailed SVA assists you to understand how best to do so. Security Vulnerability Assessment
PAPER-6 PART-1 OF 5 CA A.RAFEQ, FCA
1 Chapter-4: Business Continuity Planning and Disaster Recovery Planning PAPER-6 PART-1 OF 5 CA A.RAFEQ, FCA Learning Objectives 2 To understand the concept of Business Continuity Management To understand
Into the cybersecurity breach
Into the cybersecurity breach Tim Sanouvong State Sector Cyber Risk Services Deloitte & Touche LLP April 3, 2015 Agenda Setting the stage Cyber risks in state governments Cyber attack vectors Preparing
Airport Infrastructure Security Towards Global Security. A Holistic Security Risk Management Approach. www.thalesgroup.com/security-services
Airport Infrastructure Security Towards Global Security A Holistic Security Risk Management Approach www.thalesgroup.com/security-services Airport Infrastructure Security Towards Global Security This
CRISC Glossary. Scope Note: Risk: Can also refer to the verification of the correctness of a piece of data
CRISC Glossary Term Access control Access rights Application controls Asset Authentication The processes, rules and deployment mechanisms that control access to information systems, resources and physical
Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard
Symantec Managed Security Services support for IT compliance Solution Overview: Symantec Managed Services Overviewview The (PCI DSS) was developed to facilitate the broad adoption of consistent data security
Business, Resiliency and Effective Disaster Recovery. Anne Kleffner, PhD Haskayne School of Business, University of Calgary
Business, Resiliency and Effective Disaster Recovery Anne Kleffner, PhD Haskayne School of Business, University of Calgary CRHNet October 2012 Agenda Business resilience and community resilience in disaster
TUSKEGEE CYBER SECURITY PATH FORWARD
TUSKEGEE CYBER SECURITY PATH FORWARD Preface Tuskegee University is very aware of the ever-escalating cybersecurity threat, which consumes continually more of our societies resources to counter these threats,
Section A: Introduction, Definitions and Principles of Infrastructure Resilience
Section A: Introduction, Definitions and Principles of Infrastructure Resilience A1. This section introduces infrastructure resilience, sets out the background and provides definitions. Introduction Purpose
Keynote Speech. Beth Dugan Deputy Comptroller for Operational Risk. The Clearing House s First Operational Risk Colloquium
Keynote Speech by Beth Dugan Deputy Comptroller for Operational Risk at The Clearing House s First Operational Risk Colloquium February 11, 2015 Washington, D.C. Thank you. It s an honor to be invited
Department of Homeland Security Office for Domestic Preparedness. Campus Preparedness Assessment Process
Department of Homeland Security Office for Domestic Preparedness Campus Preparedness Assessment Process Campus Preparedness Assessment-Overview Purpose of the CPA Elements of the CPA How to use the CPA
Managing cyber risk the global banking perspective
1 Managing cyber risk the global banking perspective Speech given by Andrew Gracie, Executive Director, Resolution, Bank of England British Bankers Association Cyber Conference, London 10 June 2014 2 I
NEBRASKA STATE HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGY
NEBRASKA STATE HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGY 2014-2016 Nebraska Homeland Security Policy Group/Senior Advisory Council This document provides an overall framework for what the State of Nebraska hopes to achieve
THE WHITE HOUSE. Office of the Press Secretary. For Immediate Release February 12, 2013. February 12, 2013
THE WHITE HOUSE Office of the Press Secretary For Immediate Release February 12, 2013 February 12, 2013 PRESIDENTIAL POLICY DIRECTIVE/PPD-21 SUBJECT: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience The
A Risk Assessment Methodology (RAM) for Physical Security
A Risk Assessment Methodology (RAM) for Physical Security Violence, vandalism, and terrorism are prevalent in the world today. Managers and decision-makers must have a reliable way of estimating risk to
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council FFIEC BCP. Business Continuity Planning FEBRUARY 2015 IT EXAMINATION H ANDBOOK
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council FFIEC Business Continuity Planning BCP FEBRUARY 2015 IT EXAMINATION H ANDBOOK Table of Contents Introduction 1 Board and Senior Management Responsibilities
Enterprise Security Tactical Plan
Enterprise Security Tactical Plan Fiscal Years 2011 2012 (July 1, 2010 to June 30, 2012) Prepared By: State Chief Information Security Officer The Information Security Council State of Minnesota Enterprise
Aon Risk Solutions Aon Crisis Management. Crisis Management Consulting Terrorism Probable Maximum Loss (PML) Studies
Aon Risk Solutions Crisis Management Consulting Terrorism Probable Maximum Loss (PML) Studies A terrorist incident at or near your operations, could result in human casualties, property damage, business
Purpose of the Governor s strategy. Guiding Principles
Purpose of the Governor s strategy The Governor s initiative to develop and implement a State of Tennessee program to counter terrorism within the State is outlined in this document. The primary purpose
DEVELOPMENT OF A RISK ASSESSMENT PROGRAM AGAINST TERRORISM IN REPUBLIC KOREA
DEVELOPMENT OF A RISK ASSESSMENT PROGRAM AGAINST TERRORISM IN REPUBLIC KOREA Younghee Lee, Jinkyung Kim and Il Moon Department of Chemical Engineering, Yonsei University, 134 Sinchon-dong, Seodaemun-gu,
Protecting Organizations from Cyber Attack
Protecting Organizations from Cyber Attack Cliff Glantz and Guy Landine Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) PO Box 999 Richland, WA 99352 [email protected] [email protected] 1 Key Topics
Cyberspace Situational Awarness in National Security System
Cyberspace Situational Awarness in National Security System Rafał Piotrowski, Joanna Sliwa, Military Communication Institute C4I Systems Department Zegrze, Poland, [email protected], [email protected]
National Infrastructure Protection Center
National Infrastructure Protection Center Risk Management: An Essential Guide to Protecting Critical Assets November 2002 Summary As organizations increase security measures and attempt to identify vulnerabilities
Down the SCADA (security) Rabbit Hole. Alberto Volpatto
Down the SCADA (security) Rabbit Hole Alberto Volpatto Alberto Volpatto Security Engineer & Team Leader @ Secure Network Computer Engineer Application Security Specialist What is SCADA? Supervisory operators,
Security in Space: Intelsat Information Assurance
Security in Space: Intelsat Information Assurance 14/03/6997 Intelsat Information Assurance Intelsat maintains the highest standards of Information Assurance by assessing and building the Intelsat infrastructure,
SCADA Security: Challenges and Solutions
SCADA Security: Challenges and Solutions June 2011 / White paper by Metin Ozturk, Philip Aubin Make the most of your energy Summary Executive Summary... p 2 Protecting Critical Infrastructure Includes
BUSINESS CONTINUITY MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK
BUSINESS CONTINUITY MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK Document Author: Civil Contingencies Service - Authorised by the CCS Joint Management Board - Version 1.0. Issued December 2012 Page 1 FRAMEWORK STATEMENT Business
Solutions and IT services for Oil-Gas & Energy markets
Solutions and IT services for The context Companies operating in the Oil-Gas & Energy sectors are facing radical changes that have a significant impact on their business processes. In this context, compliance
Risk Management Handbook
Risk Management Handbook 1999 Introduction Risk management is the process of selecting and implementing countermeasures to achieve an acceptable level of risk at an acceptable cost. The analytical risk
A HELPING HAND TO PROTECT YOUR REPUTATION
OVERVIEW SECURITY SOLUTIONS A HELPING HAND TO PROTECT YOUR REPUTATION CONTENTS INFORMATION SECURITY MATTERS 01 TAKE NOTE! 02 LAYERS OF PROTECTION 04 ON GUARD WITH OPTUS 05 THREE STEPS TO SECURITY PROTECTION
future data and infrastructure
White Paper Smart Grid Security: Preparing for the Standards-Based Future without Neglecting the Needs of Today Are you prepared for future data and infrastructure security challenges? Steve Chasko Principal
Business Continuity Management Policy and Plan
Business Continuity Management Policy and Plan 1 Page No: Contents 1.0 Introduction 3 2.0 Purpose 3 3.0 Definitions 4 4.0 Roles, Duties & Responsibilities 4 4.1 Legal And Statutory Duties, Responsibilities
Data Security Concerns for the Electric Grid
Data Security Concerns for the Electric Grid Data Security Concerns for the Electric Grid The U.S. power grid infrastructure is a vital component of modern society and commerce, and represents a critical
Final Draft/Pre-Decisional/Do Not Cite. Forging a Common Understanding for Critical Infrastructure. Shared Narrative
Final Draft/Pre-Decisional/Do Not Cite Forging a Common Understanding for Critical Infrastructure Shared Narrative March 2014 1 Forging a Common Understanding for Critical Infrastructure The following
Compliance Guide: ASD ISM OVERVIEW
Compliance Guide: ASD ISM OVERVIEW Australian Information Security Manual Mapping to the Principles using Huntsman INTRODUCTION In June 2010, The Australian Government Protective Security Policy Framework
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council FFIEC. Business Continuity Planning BCP MARCH 2003 MARCH 2008 IT EXAMINATION
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council FFIEC Business Continuity Planning MARCH 2003 MARCH 2008 BCP IT EXAMINATION H ANDBOOK TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION... 1 BOARD AND SENIOR MANAGEMENT
¼ããÀ ããè¾ã ¹ãÆãä ã¼ãîãä ã ããõà ãäìããä ã½ã¾ã ºããñ à Securities and Exchange Board of India
CIRCULAR CIR/MRD/DP/13/2015 July 06, 2015 To, All Stock Exchanges, Clearing Corporation and Depositories. Dear Sir / Madam, Subject: Cyber Security and Cyber Resilience framework of Stock Exchanges, Clearing
NORTH HAMPSHIRE CLINICAL COMMISSIONING GROUP BUSINESS CONTINUITY MANAGEMENT POLICY AND PLAN (COR/017/V1.00)
NORTH HAMPSHIRE CLINICAL COMMISSIONING GROUP BUSINESS CONTINUITY MANAGEMENT POLICY AND PLAN (COR/017/V1.00) Subject and version number of document: Serial Number: Business Continuity Management Policy
GLOBAL BUSINESS DIALOGUE ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE CYBER SECURITY AND CYBER CRIME SEPTEMBER 26, 2000. CEO EDS Corporation
GLOBAL BUSINESS DIALOGUE ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE CYBER SECURITY AND CYBER CRIME SEPTEMBER 26, 2000 Issue Chair: Issue Sherpa: Dick Brown CEO EDS Corporation Bill Poulos EDS Corporation Tel: (202) 637-6708
for Critical Infrastructure Protection Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition SCADA SECURITY ADVICE FOR CEOs
for Critical Infrastructure Protection Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition SCADA SECURITY ADVICE FOR CEOs EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are used for remote
Preparedness in the Southwest
Preparedness in the Southwest Risk Assessment and Hazard Vulnerability Developed by The Arizona Center for Public Health Preparedness Cover Art www.azcphp.publichealth.arizona.edu Chapter 1 Importance
GOOD PRACTICE GUIDE PROCESS CONTROL AND SCADA SECURITY GUIDE 1. UNDERSTAND THE BUSINESS RISK
GOOD PRACTICE GUIDE PROCESS CONTROL AND SCADA SECURITY GUIDE 1. UNDERSTAND THE BUSINESS RISK This guide is designed to impart good practice for securing industrial control systems such as: process control,
Risk-Based Assessment and Scoping of IV&V Work Related to Information Assurance Presented by Joelle Spagnuolo-Loretta, Richard Brockway, John C.
Risk-Based Assessment and Scoping of IV&V Work Related to Information Assurance Presented by Joelle Spagnuolo-Loretta, Richard Brockway, John C. Burget September 14, 2014 1 Agenda Information Assurance
