Boeing Defense, Space & Security Ventures Utility-Scale Applications of Microgrids: Moving Beyond Pilots Cyber Security Tristan Glenwright - Boeing BOEING is a trademark of Boeing Management Company.
The Utility Microgrid EcoSystem RTO/ISO Power System Transmission Fault Tolerant Self Healing Distribution Network Scalable Substations Retail Energy Suppliers Industrial Community Microgrids Commercial / Campus Distribution Utility Secure Legacy Interoperability Local Planning and Control Enhanced Forecast Reliability and Economic Optimization Automated Islanding Fault Tolerant Self Healing Grid Distributed Agents Dynamic Modeling and Forecasting Distributed Control Metered Loads Enhanced Forecast Efficiency Distributed Energy Resources 2
Smart Grid Drivers Active Demand Response Ancillary Services Distributed Resource Control Customer Integration AMI Secure and Reliable Communications Distribution Automation Secure Communications is the backbone of Smart Grid 3
Electric Grid Cybersecurity Risks (NIST) Greater communications complexity increases exposure to potential attackers and unintentional errors Networks linked to other networks may introduce common vulnerabilities spanning multiple domains More interconnections present increased opportunities for legacy and new cybersecurity attacks More network nodes means more entry points and vectors that t potential ti adversaries might exploit Extensive data gathering and two-way information flows may broaden potential for compromises of data confidentiality and breaches of customer privacy
Defense in Depth Cybersecurity Model Model created by US National Security Agency (NSA) Balanced Best Practices strategy NISTIR 7628 guidelines support this model Impede the attacker while learning how to thwart further intrusion Should be integral to Smart Grid deployment platforms
Evolution of Cybersecurity Requirements Currently: DHS? NERC CIP 002-009 is applied to Bulk Generation and Transmission asset owners Various input sources including industry participants Basic cybersecurity controls and processes Over next 2 years?: NERC CIP may be applied to Distribution critical assets Input sources to future NERC CIP may include NISTIR 7628, which is partially sourced on various DHS cybersecurity standards with more advanced controls Future NERC CIP With NISTIR 7628? Beyond?: Legislation like S.3414 or an Executive Order will push for more critical infrastructure protection re cybersecurity where DHS may actually be responsible for enforcing cybersecurity with an even larger set of controls NERC CIP today (Bulk Generation e ato and Transmission) 6
Path Forward Risk Assessment and prioritized security control implementation is the best practice 100% Solution doesn t exist at any cost Behavioral detection, advanced analytics, and correlation provide protection against the latest cyber threats Accurate situational awareness and highly integrated security monitoring systems provide rapid incident resolution Fusion of cyber and physical security events with power system alerts is key to understanding attack vectors Securing communications to end devices (Gens, Switch Gear, etc) is critical Role level protection at the end device versus traditional user interface roles is a critical capability We must solve the communications bridge between advance technology cyber secure microgrids and legacy distribution networks 7
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Abstract for Panel Utility-Scale Applications of Microgrids: Moving Beyond Pilots This session focuses on utility microgrid projects and what it takes to move beyond pilots. The panel will review the Danish Cell Controller o microgrid, FortZED RDSI, and Borrego Springs, and discuss the technical and business/regulatory challenges to moving forward on a larger scale. Technology challenges include scalability, standardization and cybersecurity. The non-technical challenges to be discussed include regulatory frameworks that restrict flexibility and complicate business models. Solving these challenges becomes necessary to enabling microgrids id in meaningful volume. 9