Secure Remote Substation Access Solutions
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- Willis Bradley
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1 Secure Remote Substation Access Solutions Supplemental Project - Introduction Webcast October 16, 2013 Scott Sternfeld, Project Manager Smart Grid Substation & Cyber Security Research Labs [email protected] (843)
2 Agenda What is a Secure Remote Substation Access System? History of EPRI s Remote Substation Access Research 2012 project and workshop Interest Group Supplemental project Review of Top Challenges/Proposed Tasks - Penetration Testing - Device compatibility testing - Password Vault Integration How YOU can get involved! 2
3 What is a Remote Substation (IED) Access System? 3
4 Remote Substation Access System What is it? Provides for remote engineering (manual) access to all substation (or field) devices (IEDs) in a secure fashion. Optional: Integrated file extraction (automated) as part of an overall data integration solution. Replaces a Terminal Server / Jump Host solution. Can be used as a tool to aid in NERC CIP compliance. Provides technical controls Reporting capabilities May also include: Password management Configuration (change) management for IEDs Asset management 4
5 Cyber Security and Privacy 2012 Project: Assessment of Remote Access Solutions Purpose: Work with vendors and utilities to assess several products providing Interactive Remote Substation Access. Approach: Develop comprehensive list of requirements Develop use cases/scenarios Vendor deployment in Smart Grid Substation Lab Some configuration/development required Vendor demonstrations of scenarios Presenting utility requirements with a unified voice 5
6 Cyber Security and Privacy 2012 Project: Assessment of Remote Access Solutions Requirements workshops: May 23rd and June 13th, 2012 Product demonstration: Oct th, 2012 Knoxville, TN Wide range of audience Technical update: Document ID: Dec 2012 Substation Security and Remote Access Implementation Strategies Utility Value: Awareness of available products Common demonstration platform Vendor products improved Vendors and utility collaboration for accelerated technology transfer 6
7 EPRI s Cyber Security Research Lab Knoxville, TN Five vendors installed in the lab: EnterpriseSERVER.NET by Subnet Solutions CrossBow by Ruggedcom, a Siemens Business SEL-3620 by Schweitzer Engineering Labs ConsoleWorks by TDi Technologies IED Manager Suite (IMS) by Cooper Power Systems Potentially others Installation in a Common Demonstration Environment 7
8 Assessment of Remote Access Solutions: 2012 Remote Substation Access Scenarios 1 2,
9 EnterpriseSERVER.NET - Subnet Solutions 9
10 CrossBow Secure Access Manager - Ruggedcom 10
11 SEL-3620 Secure Ethernet Gateway - SEL 11
12 ConsoleWorks TDi Technologies 12
13 IED Manager Suite - Cooper Power Systems 13
14 Remote Access Timeline project: Oct Workshop 14
15 Interest Group (Free!) 15
16 Secure Remote Substation Access Interest Group Interest Group open to all utilities! Webcasts to develop additional scenarios for testing Identify top challenging, unusual or difficult IEDs, protocols or implementation challenges Can be discussion topics or working sessions Ex. Mapping NERC CIP v5 requirements to Remote Access System capabilities or RFP requirements Discussions amongst peers Develop community of users 16
17 Secure Remote Substation Interest Group Discussion topics with both EPRI and utility guest presenters: Implementation Challenges/Proposed Tasks Unique IED vendor integration challenges IED Compatibility Matrix Password management issues and concepts Integration with Password Vault NERC CIP v3 and v5 mapping Requirements review (one-on-one effort) Identifying top Remote IED Access issues 17
18 Review of Top Challenges/ Proposed Tasks 18
19 List of Remote Access Challenges/Tasks 1. Penetration Testing 2. Remote Access Vendor IED interoperability / compatibility tests 3. Integration with a Password Vault Others: Password, Configuration, Change Management Alarm Correlation / Incident Management Coordination with Operations These top items are planned to be addressed in our supplemental project, with additional items as time and funding permit. 19
20 Scenario 1: Penetration Testing Remote Substation Access Systems can manage our IED passwords, with role based access control and supporting CIP compliance...but are they SECURE? Utilities have requested through the Interest Group for independent penetration tests to be performed on remote access systems. We are now planning on including this task for
21 Scenario 1: Penetration Testing Vulnerability Identification Databases CVSS CVE Configuration CCE CPE A search on SQL and passwords in the NIST NVD CVSS produces 472 matches. These matches range from 1998 to NESCOR Testing Guides Guide to Penetration Testing Guide to Vulnerability Scanning Tools Scanning Exploitation 21
22 Scenario 2: Remote Access Vendor IED interoperability / compatibility tests RA system / IEDs SEL relay GE UR relay ABB Relay Siemens Relay PQ meter DFR Other Crossbow ESNET Cooper SEL-3620 TDI Vendor X (example) Tests would be broken down into specific tasks such as: Intelligent vs. Passive proxy Ability to manage passwords File/Event retrieval Could include gateway products (RTAC, SMP, 2020, D20, SSNET) 22
23 Scenario 2: Specific Task function examples General Type IED Remote Access Protocol Data Acquisition Protocol Priority Advanced/ Automated Functions Login and Logout Passwords Configurations Change Get Automated Automated Device Change Backup Restore Config login logout Password in Password config Config summary gateway Advanced/ Automated Functions Firmware Events SOE Logs Discover Faceplate Data Retrieve firmware version Compare firmware Update firmware Retrieve new event files Retrieve SOE files Retrieve device logs Discover Connected devices Refresh Faceplate LEDs Retrieve device data 23
24 BYOD! (Bring your own device!!) 24
25 Scenario 3: Integration with a Password Vault What is a Password Vault? Benefits of a password management solution: - Regular password changes improve security and compliance - Control which users have access to passwords - Allow detailed auditing of each use of these passwords Some solutions offer advanced functionality including: - Password Changes - Password Verification - Password Reconciliation Automatic password management of service accounts either through push or pull approach 25
26 Scenario 3: Integration with a Password Vault Problem statement: Multiple password vaults, different security or logging levels for various systems, makes difficult for auditing/compliance Current IT Enterprise password vault products do not interact with substation IEDs Ideal end state: Single integrated password vault to manage all shared/service account passwords. Remote Access solution would connect to IEDs using passwords stored in Password Vault solution Potential solutions: Integrate products via API 26
27 NERC CIP considerations: How do we be achieve remote access and remain compliant without being intrusive to the operational and maintenance activities?? 27
28 Remote Access to CIP v5 mapping exercise: Guide to Medium Substation Assets Credit: MidAmerican Energy and FirstEnergy DRAFT standards as of November 2012 Recirculation ballot Std R Full Text Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems (MIBCS) Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems (MIBCS) with Routable Connectivity Remote Access Tool? Have a method(s) to enforce authentication of interactive user access, where technically feasible. - Yes + PCA n Identify and inventory all known enabled default or other generic account types, either by system, by groups of systems, by location, or by system type(s). Yes Yes + PCA y Identify individuals who have authorized access to shared accounts. - Yes + PCA y Change known default passwords, per Cyber Asset capability Yes Yes + PCA y For password-only authentication for interactive user access, either technically or procedurally enforce the following password parameters: Password length that is, at least, the lesser of eight characters or the maximum length supported by the Cyber Asset; and Minimum password complexity that is the lesser of three or more different types of characters (e.g., uppercase Yes Yes + PCA y alphabetic, lowercase alphabetic, numeric, non-alphanumeric) or the maximum complexity supported by the Cyber Asset Where technically feasible, for password-only authentication for interactive user access, either technically or procedurally enforce password changes or an obligation to change the password at least once every 15 calendar months. - Yes + PCA y 5.7 Limit unsuccessful attempts or generate alerts of unsuccessfull authentication attempts control centers only y 28
29 Remote Access Timeline project: Oct Workshop June 2013 Secure Remote Access Interest Group Discussions Develop Test Scenarios 29
30 Exciting Supplemental Plans! 30
31 Secure Remote Substation Access Solutions Supplemental Project This project will investigate and address implementation challenges for secure remote substation access security solutions, including: Hands-on workshop allows system familiarization and understanding of implementation challenges, best practices, and technology gaps Areas of focus may include: Specific devices not easily integrated with existing solutions Vendor proprietary IED tools/protocols Use of multiple authentication devices/gateways Remote Access System Management of IEDs Management and tracking of configurations Patch management Password management 31
32 Secure Remote Substation Access Solutions Research Drivers Remote Access products are still maturing Require support for legacy, current and future devices Products must provide features to support changing cyber security and compliance requirements. Remote access to substations can provide new opportunities for data integration solutions such as fault location, asset optimization, and power quality monitoring. Leads to improved asset monitoring Remote access can also reduce windshield time to reach field IEDs Leads to improved restoration time Value: This project is valuable to any utility that has or desires to implement secure remote access to substations, IEDs, and field equipment. The topics covered can be applied to both transmission and distribution substations. 32
33 Secure Remote Substation Access Solutions Expected Key Results Through participation in this supplemental, members will be able to : Learn about emerging technologies and solutions while gaining visibility into existing best practices Identify challenges unique to Remote Access systems Study implementation options, best practices and capabilities/limitations regarding the challenge. Share challenges, solutions and lessons learned with peers 33
34 Reasons to Participate Changes to NERC CIP may necessitate new features and new tests to be performed on remote access systems Previous discussions with members highlighted NERC CIP as major focus with remote access systems. Side-by-side comparison of Remote Access Vendors in common environment Unbiased visibility into vendor-based remote access solutions Demonstration and Workshop with individual presentations by remote substation access solution vendors. 34
35 Even More Reasons to Participate EPRI s Cyber Security Research Lab Take advantage of EPRI s lab as YOUR resource! Labs are difficult to maintain Variety of multi-vendor substation equipment Able to introduce other equipment as requested OR Bring your own device Utility labs may not include end-to-end architecture EPRI s reconfigurable lab allows modeling and testing with YOUR substation architecture. Try before you buy Remote access to EPRI lab for hands-on testing from your office! 35
36 Remote Access Timeline project: Oct Workshop June 2013 Secure Remote Access Interest Group Discussions Develop Test Scenarios Remote Access Solutions Supplemental Develop/Enhance Features Applying Test Scenarios Penetration Testing Solving Implementation Issues! 36
37 Key Take-Aways: Remote Substation Access products are still in their infancy. You are not the first one to implement these products or run into challenges. We need to build and strengthen a community of users now! Challenge: Users span multiple organizations Work together to share technical approaches to NERC CIP Developing unified utility requirements and test scenarios can improve the market offerings. Together, we can accelerate the maturation process! 37
38 Secure Remote Substation Access Solutions 2014 plans Interest Group Free to participate, open to all utilities: Remote Access Interest Group: Discussion of challenges Presentations on related topics by peers Utility only (no vendor) participation Supplemental Webcasts Presentation by vendors Development/Integration efforts Translate Interest Group challenges into testing scenarios On-site workshop with vendors at EPRI labs. Knoxville, TN Live demonstrations, interaction with vendors Share challenges, solutions and lessons learned by peers 38
39 Secure Remote Substation Access Solutions Objectives and Scope Address implementation challenges identified by the Secure Remote Access Interest Group such as: Scalability Management and tracking of IED configurations Use of multiple authentication devices/gateways Provide implementation options and best practices Conduct a Secure Remote Access Workshop Value Gain new knowledge and practical guidance on a variety remote access solutions and scenarios Coordinate with vendors to advance the capabilities of remote access solutions Details and Contact Price: $40,000 Qualifies for TC and SDF Scott Sternfeld [email protected] SPN Number: Advanced Implementation Guidance for Secure Remote Access Solutions 39
40 Key meeting reminders and links Secure Remote Substation Access Solutions Introductory Webcast October 16 th Webcast - NOW SPN Number: Remote Access Interest Group Calls Quarterly: Nov 2013; Feb, May, Aug, Nov 2014 NERC CIP Tools and Techniques - Introductory Webcast October 17 th Webcast 11-12pm EST Add to Calendar SPN Number: For questions, please contact: Scott Sternfeld [email protected]
41 NERC CIP Tools and Techniques Objectives and Scope Provide guidance for transitioning to NERC CIP Version 5 Project may focus on: Configuration change management Patch management Identity access management Determination of BES cyber assets and BES Cyber Systems Value Identify gaps in current tools that have been deployed to address the CIP requirements Provide guidance and techniques for complying with CIP requirements Details and Contact Qualifies for TC and SDF Scott Sternfeld [email protected] SPN Number: Guidance for Efficiently Meeting NERC CIP v5 Requirements 41
42 Together Shaping the Future of Electricity 42
43 Legal Notices Please observe these Antitrust Compliance Guidelines: Do not discuss pricing, production capacity, or cost information which is not publicly available; confidential market strategies or business plans; or other competitively sensitive information Be accurate, objective, and factual in any discussion of goods and services offered in the market by others. Do not agree with others to discriminate against or refuse to deal with a supplier; or to do business only on certain terms and conditions; or to divide markets, or allocate customers Do not try to influence or advise others on their business decisions and do not discuss yours except to the extent that they are already public 43
44 Architectures 44
45 45
46 46
47 Engineering Access and File Extraction 47
48 Remote Substation Access Interest Group homepage: 48
49 EPRI s Smart Grid Substation Lab Knoxville, TN Product testing and demonstration site: Common environment for all vendors 49
Secure Remote Substation Access Interest Group Part 3: Review of Top Challenges, CIPv5 mapping, and looking forward to 2014!
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