Transformation Conference Commander s Welcome. Renaissance Seoul Hotel Seoul, Republic of Korea. April 5 th, 2010 General Walter L.

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Transformation Conference Commander s Welcome Renaissance Seoul Hotel Seoul, Republic of Korea April 5 th, 2010 General Walter L. Sharp Distinguished guests. Ladies and gentlemen; Good morning and welcome to the United States Forces Korea Transformation Conference. For those of you that journeyed from the United States, thank you for making the long trip. I appreciate your participation and assistance as we identify opportunities and address the challenges together this week. I also want to thank all those who are making Korea Transformation a reality and those who put this conference together, your hard work and dedication will 1

pay dividends over the next 60 years of our ROK - US alliance. I ve invited you to this conference to discuss the transformation of United States Forces in Korea. Transformation is essential to USFK because it strengthens our ROK - U.S. Alliance; makes our operations more efficient; provides a higher quality of life for Service-members, DoD civilians, and their families; and creates the basis for a New Strategic Alliance as outlined in Presidents Lee s and Obama s 2009 Joint Vision Statement. This is not, however, the first time that the alliance has transformed. In its sixtyyear history, the ROK - U.S. Alliance has changed its structure several times to adapt to the security environment and political realities. 2

After the June 1950 invasion, the Republic of Korea rapidly transformed its relationship with the U.S. from security assistance to an alliance. From 1950 to 1953, the ROK Armed Forces fought under the United Nations Command. This continued under the Armistice with select ROK forces remaining under the Operational Control of UNC. The first Armistice transformation of the Alliance took place in 1978 when Combined Forces Command was established. U.S. and select ROK forces were placed under a single combined headquarters to ensure unity of command. Another transformation milestone was reached in 1994, when an ever more capable ROK, gained Armistice OPCON of their forces, while Combined Forces Command retained OPCON of ROK and U.S. forces during wartime. The presence of US forces in Korea remains crucial today. Side by side with one of our closest allies, we deter aggression in Northeast Asia and ensure peace, stability and 3

prosperity in a region which accounts for over one-fifth of world trade. Our alliance is stronger than it has ever been. In June of last year, Presidents Lee and Obama signed a Joint Vision Statement which focused the alliance not only on deterrence on the Peninsula, but also on maintaining peace and spreading democratic values in the region and throughout the globe. Korea is already supporting those goals. It has made a substantial contribution to peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief operations off the Horn of Africa, in Lebanon, in Haiti and in many other locations. Our planned transformation efforts also help establish the new organization and force posture needed to meet the goals set out in the Joint Vision Statement. In order to fulfill the policy goals, we embarked upon four major Transformation initiatives. First, we are transitioning Wartime Operational control of ROK Forces 4

from the Combined Forces Command to the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff. Second, we are transforming the command structure to better support the Joint Vision Statement goals and our ROK allies after OPCON Transition. Third, we are consolidating all of our units and installations currently in the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area and north of the Han River into two enduring hubs. Finally, we are normalizing tour lengths and working to make Korea the Forward- Stationed Assignment of Choice. The first Transformation initiative is the transition of wartime Operational Control of all ROK Forces from the Combined Forces Command to the ROK JCS on 17 April 2012. Under OPCON Transition the ROK takes the lead in the number one obligation of any nation, the obligation to defend itself. The transition of Wartime Operational Control does not however, lessen our commitment to the Alliance or our commitment to maintain 28,500 Service-members stationed 5

on the Peninsula the US forces continue with a long-term and consistent presence on the peninsula. In preparation for OPCON transition the ROK and U.S. developed a Strategic Transition Plan which lays out the path to success. The STP captures the agreements made at the ministerial level regarding missions, tasks, forces, and command and control systems and capabilities required to maintain our ability to fight and win and to provide effective deterrence beyond 2012. The STP is a methodical approach that ensures that the C2 relationships between the ROK JCS and KORCOM are every bit as effective as those of the current CFC. Each one of the elements outlined in the STP is tested during our annual Ulchi Freedom Guardian exercise and will be validated in the 2012 Certification Exercise. The Security Military Consultative Meeting process, having been in place for the past 30 years, provides 6

the final review and remains intact after OPCON Transition to facilitate bilateral coordination. The STP stipulates one top-level bilateral operations plan, agreed to and signed by both the ROK and the U.S., which guides ROK - U.S. forces post-opcon Transition. It also details the missions, tasks, forces, and command and control relationships. The ROK and the U.S. have agreed upon which organizations will report to the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff and which will retain a U.S. headquarters. Some, like the Ground Operations Command will report to the ROK JCS. For some special mission capabilities, the U.S. will continue to serve as the lead headquarters in order to optimize capabilities. Additionally, appropriate boards, centers and cells will serve as coordination elements at all levels of Alliance military efforts. Interoperability between the ROK and U.S. communications 7

systems will continue to be critical to our coordination efforts. Changing the USFK headquarters structure is the second part of Transformation. Later this year, USFK will officially become the United States Korea Command or U.S. KORCOM. In 2011, KORCOM reaches Full Operational Capability providing the manpower structure for the supporting relationship. On 17 April 2012, as part of OPCON transition, Combined Forces Command will be disestablished. There is some work left to be done on the exact command relationship of the United Nations Command, but KORCOM will be a supporting command to the ROK JCS in accordance with Joint doctrine. KORCOM will maintain OPCON over US Forces and be a force provider to the ROK JCS. KORCOM will also provide certain bridging and enduring capabilities to the ROK JCS to ensure that deterrence on the Peninsula is maintained. 8

In addition to the transformation of USFK to KORCOM, the Eighth United States Army is also transforming from an Army Service Component Command to an operational, war-fighting headquarters called a Field Army; this headquarters commands and controls U.S. and multinational corps-equivalent units. Our third major Transformation effort is the relocation of our forces on the peninsula. There are two major parts to the repositioning of forces. The first is the Yongsan Relocation Plan or YRP. With the ROK paying almost all expenses, YRP moves all of our forces out of the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area and consolidates them at Camp Humphreys. The second part of the relocation initiative is the Land Partnership Program. The LPP moves our forces from north of the Han River to Humphreys and other facilities. Costs for LPP are shared between the US and the ROK. 9

The major southward moves for units begin in 2012 and accomplish several goals. First, the relocation allows us to give land, including the Yongsan Garrison located in central Seoul, back to our Korean partners. Second, YRP and LPP allow us to consolidate our forces into two hubs and reduce our footprint from 110 installations to 48. Fewer installations create economies of scale and cut infrastructure, utility, and transportation costs, therefore enabling U.S. forces to streamline our operations and make us more efficient in the long run. Consolidation and build up at Camp Humphrey s also allows us to construct the facilities and infrastructure needed to support additional families and enables the next transformation initiative: Tour Normalization. Tour Normalization is the fourth of our Transformation initiatives. Tour Normalization puts USFK on the same footing as Europe and Japan, where most Service- 10

members with dependents can request command sponsorship and are accompanied by their families for three years. We are currently in Phase I of Tour Normalization. Since beginning two years ago, the number of families on the Peninsula has increased from 1,700 to in excess of 3900 with a final goal of almost 5,000 by the summer of 2011. In future phases, all Service-members in Korea will be on accompanied tours. Families will be assigned to Korea for three years, while single Service-members will serve here for two. Tour Normalization benefits the alliance in a number of ways. First, it reduces stress on families. Our Service-members are already deploying frequently on unaccompanied tours to Iraq and Afghanistan. By bringing the tour policy in Korea in line with the rest of the force, we eliminate one more family separation. Overall, tour normalization eliminates 10,000 unaccompanied tours every 11

year. Second, Tour Normalization enables a more proficient force as it eliminates unnecessary personnel turnover and the resulting training challenges. Third, we demonstrate our commitment to the ROK and Northeast Asia through a longterm presence. Finally, tour normalization enables adaptive force management. Never forgetting our number one responsibility is to deter north Korea and defend the ROK, Tour Normalization gives us the ability to look beyond the Peninsula and use our trained personnel to support other regional/global security issues. Even with all of the changes, the Alliance s stance towards north Korea remains unchanged. Our vision is of a north Korea that is denuclearizing, opening its economy to market reforms, and is negotiating a peace treaty in good faith to end this 60-year-old conflict. We remain undivided in our desire to realize a Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and conventional threats. 12

Our continued investment in Transformation and the other policy initiatives outlined in the Joint Vision Statement will result in a New Strategic Alliance between the U.S. and ROK. Our transformation efforts remain linked to ensure a strong Alliance that utilizes all of the elements of both nations power diplomatic, informational, military, and economic to bring peace and prosperity to the Peninsula and the region. The ROK - U.S. Alliance has always been the cornerstone of Northeast Asian peace and a New Strategic Alliance will be increasingly central to regional peace and stability. Thank you again for attending this Transformation Conference and helping us maximize opportunities and mitigate challenges. I hope I have provided some insight into why our transformation efforts are necessary; how the four transformation initiatives are linked to joint ROK - U.S. policy; and how they demonstrate our enduring commitment 13

to our ROK partners, to deterrence on the Peninsula, and to a New Strategic Alliance. The Republic of Korea and the United States continue to Go Together in a transformed Alliance fashioned to meet new security challenges. I hope that you are spending some of your free time touring this amazing city and meeting some of our Korean friends who work so hard with us to keep the peace. Katchi Kapshida and Gam sa ham nee dah! I now have time for a few questions. 14