Army Cyber Command Security Cooperation: Building Partner Capacity (BPC) in Cyberspace

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Army Cyber Command Security Cooperation: Building Partner Capacity (BPC) in Cyberspace Mr. Jim Wasson This briefing is /APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Transforming Cyberspace While at War Can t Afford Not To! 1

Army Security Cooperation Army Security Cooperation = Army engagements with foreign defense establishments to build relationships, develop partner nation capabilities, and provide US access in pursuit of national level goals. Helping partners help themselves solve internal and regional problems Develops capable partners for coalition operations Army Engagement objectives are described in the Army Campaign Support Plan (ACSP) ACSP is a GEF/JSCP requirement to describe support for Combatant Command campaign plans Focused on the Army s shape activities ACSP Relationship to Other Campaign Plans Army contributions to Engagement have been significant Support to security assistance (e.g., FMF, Int l Military Education & Training program) National Guard State Partnership Program and multinational exercises Army Foreign Area Officers Supporting the building of International Security Assistance Force Including Cyberspace in Army Security Cooperation is relatively new 2

Win SHAPE Prevent Army Cyber Command/2 nd ARMY Shape in DOD Guidance Prevent Maintain credibility based on capacity, readiness and modernization. Shape Sustain strong relationships with other Armies, building their capacity, and facilitating strategic access. Win If prevention fails, apply combined arms capabilities to dominate the environment and win decisively. Maintain a Safe, Secure and Effective Nuclear Deterrent Deter Aggression Provide a Stabilizing Presence Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations Project Power Despite A2/AD Challenges Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster Relief, and other Operations Counter Terrorism and Irregular Warfare Counter WMD Operate effectively in Cyberspace and Space Defend the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil Authorities Deter and Defeat Aggression 3

Why Cyberspace Security Cooperation Global nature of the threat - potential shared threats in cyberspace Growing reliance upon cyberspace for key defense systems Our desire for partners that are interoperable and that can be fully integrated with us in combined/coalition operations We desire partners that can defend themselves and operate effectively with us in cyberspace 4

Cyber Security Cooperation Acknowledging that cybersecurity is a global issue that must be addressed with national efforts on the part of all countries, we will expand and regularize initiatives focused on cybersecurity capacity building President s International Strategy for Cyberspace, May 2012 Multiple lens for viewing security cooperation in Cyberspace Cyber security cooperation with partners who have cyber capabilities to offer Cyber BPC with emerging partners and countries of interest Cyber security cooperation as a tool for achievement of non-cyber specific goals Cyber security cooperation in pursuit of National/Trans-Regional objectives Cyber security cooperation in pursuit of regional goals and objectives Myriad of issues in cyberspace when dealing with our partners and potential partners Software, Processes, Hardware, Infrastructure, Training, Leader Development How can we get updates and security patches for pirated/unlicensed software? - Comment following Information Assurance engagement with partner nation 5

Army Cyber Command Security Cooperation Our Mission Army Cyber Command/2 nd Army plans, coordinates, integrates, synchronizes, directs, and conducts network operations and defense of all Army networks; when directed, conducts cyberspace operations in support of full spectrum operations to ensure U.S./Allied freedom of action in cyberspace, and to deny the same to our adversaries. Serve as Cyber Proponent Conduct Information Operations 2 nd Army / Army Cyber Command 6

A Global Command Fort Belvoir, VA/ Fort Meade, MD HQ s Army Cyber Cmd/2 nd Army HQ s INSCOM 1 st IO CMD 780 th MI BDE (Cyber) Army Cyberspace Operation and Integration Center (ACOIC) Cyberspace Proponent Germany 5 th Signal Command (T) Regional Cyber Center (Europe) Fort Huachuca, AZ NETCOM/9 th Signal Command Regional Cyber Center (CONUS) KOREA 1 st Signal Brigade Regional Cyber Center (Korea) Fort Shafter, HI 311th Signal Command (T) Regional Cyber Center (Pacific) Fort Gordon, GA 7 th Signal Command (T) Regional Cyber Center (South) 335 th Signal Command (FWD) Regional Cyber Center (SWA) 335 th Signal Command (T) Uniquely Organized Geographically Well-Positioned 7

Commander s Intent Purpose: Army Cyber Cmd/2d Army conducts security cooperation with US Allies and International Partners in support of Army, Joint, and National interests, by building partner capacity, strengthening collective cyber security, and improving interoperability, in order to enhance U.S. Cyber Security and achieve national security objectives. Key Tasks: 1. Provide cyber and IO Security Cooperation support by, with, and thru supported ASCCs 2. Support USCC Theater Campaign Plan (TBP), the Army Campaign Plan and Army Campaign Support Plan 3. Focus on Building Partner Capacity, shared awareness, coordinating partner cyberspace and IO activities 4. Cyberspace becomes integral part of Security Cooperation Vision Robust influence and relationship with key allies and partners Strengthening collective Cyber Security and Interoperability Provide increased Cyber and IO capacity to regional commanders US allies and international partners enhance US security through effective contributions to collective cyber security and interoperability with US forces, and can effectively use information operations to integrate functions within the information environment. 8

Education Assistance Engagement Leader Development Training Exchanges Army Cyber Command/2 nd ARMY Pillars of Support ARCYBER Security Cooperation Program Tools and Capabilities 9

# 1 Build Relationships & Access: Lines of Effort & Categories of Support Lines Of Effort Engage w/ countries IOT enhance relationship; gain & maintain access; develop basic self-def capability #2 Develop Countries of Interest: Engage w/ countries with potential capabilities, influence, and/or regional/geo-political significance #3 Engage w/capable & Influential PNs: Engage w/ capable & influential Partners to achieve ASCC and ARCYBER Objectives Focus Areas ASCC driven by ASCC Objectives Global/Trans-regional driven by Global/Trans-regional Objectives Supported by Pillars 10

MEANS = Toolkit and Support Pillars Education Assistance Engagement Leader Development Training Exchanges Education Assistance Engagement Leader Development Training Exchanges Education Assistance Engagement Leader Development Training Exchanges Army Cyber Command/2 nd ARMY WAYS/LOEs Security Cooperation Plan (Linking Ends, Ways, Means) ENDS LOE #1 Build Relationships & Access LOE #2 Develop Countries of Interest Support Pillars Support Pillars LOE #3 Engage w/ Capable & Influential PNs Support Pillars ASCC Campaign Support Plan Objectives & End- States LOE Support Pillar Priority in red ARCYBER Strategic Goal & Op Objectives PNs influence Actors of Concern Collective Cyber Sec strengthened PN capable of combined ops with US PN able to defend themselves ASCCs are supported GEF ARCBER Toolkit: Staff; NETCOM; 1 st IO; Army Programs; Trng Courses; MTTs; Mil-Mil; Sr Ldrs; Exercise spt ARCYBER Toolkit PNs=Partner Nations 11

Army Cyber Command s Engagement Process with ASCC s Coordination of Support to ASCCs GEF Army Campaign Support Plan Start Army Cyber Command DOD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace International Strategy for Cyberspace 12

SC Tools/Capabilities Confidence Building / Info Sharing Cyber Organizational Briefs Best Practices Cyber & IO Senior Leader Visits Mil-to-Mil Staff and Assistance Visits Generic Threat Exchanges Assessments/Assistance Tailored to PN Needs and Security Concerns IO/IA/CNO Assessments Cyber Architecture Assessments Vulnerability Assessments Staff Assistance Visits ICW DASA(DEC) potential FMF/FMS cases Combined Training/Familiarization/Exercises Combined Exercises IO Fundamentals Course MTT IA Familiarization Classes: Leaders, Managers, Technicians Proposed: Basic CNO Planners Course Familiarization IO Fundamentals Familiarization All Courses will be cleared for use with allies and PNs All activities designed for specific PN requirements and capabilities ICW the responsible ASCC 13

FY 12 Activities Initiation of Army Cyber Command s Security Cooperation Program Initiated Security Cooperation Program, 4 th QTR FY 11 Draft Security Cooperation Plan, 2 nd QTR FY 12 Analyzing support requirements/opportunities with ASCCs - Ongoing Coordinating new CSA cyber Building Partner Capacity in Pacific initiative with USARPAC Engagements ARCENT USARSO/HQDA ARNORTH USAREUR Developing POM requirements with ASCCs 14

FY 13 Goals Bring Army Cyber Command s Security Cooperation Program to Maturity Complete ARCYBER security cooperation plan Support/execute new CSA/USARPAC cyberspace BPC initiative Expand support to ARCENT with designated countries Cyber seminars Assessments Staff assistance visits Development of potential FMS programs Further develop way ahead with ARNORTH Develop initial requirements for remaining ASCCs Develop Base Line resource/funding requirements 15

Conclusion Significant interest in cyberspace security cooperation activities In our interest to help partners and potential partners defend their own cyberspace Global nature of cyberspace A threat to one can become a threat to all Cyberspace security cooperation can be a powerful tool for Combatant Commands and Army Service Component Commands The nature of cyberspace security cooperation is determined by the partners with whom we are working and the objectives Cyberspace security cooperation is a key element in the Army s re-focus toward the Pacific 16

Questions Transforming Cyberspace While at War Can t Afford Not To! 17