o n H o m e l a n d S e c u r i t y

H o u s e C o m m i t t e e o n H o m e l a n d S e c u r i t y I n t e l l i g e n c e G a t h e r i n g R e f o r m D i r e c t o r : M a r i n a S h u t y

2008 Institute for Domestic & International Affairs, Inc. (IDIA) This document is solely for use in preparation for Rutgers Model Congress 2008. Use for other purposes is not permitted without the express written consent of IDIA. For more information, please write us at idiainfo@idia.net

Policy Dilemma 1 Chronology 3 1882-1908 3 1942 3 1946 3 1947 4 1952 4 1976 4 1995 5 2002 5 2004 5 2005 6 2007 6 Actors and Interests 6 Intelligence Community 6 Local Law Enforcement Authorities 7 American Civil Liberties Union 8 9/11 Commission Panel 9 Congressional Appropriations 10 Possible Causes 12 Insufficient Funding 12 Disorganized Agencies 13 Poor Communication with Local Law Enforcement 14 Explanation and Analysis of Causes 15 Issue Linkages 15 Projections and Implications 16 Conclusion 17 Discussion Questions 19 For Further Reading 20 Works Cited 22 Works Consulted 25

R u t g e r s Mo d e l C o n g r e s s 1 Policy Dilemma After the attacks of terror on 11 September 2001, the 9/11 Commission, formally titled the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, was established. The purpose of this task force was to examine what mistakes took place that allowed the attacks to occur, as well as what could be done to prevent them in the future. The task force examined and made recommendations in reference to the operations of government agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), Central Government Agency (CIA). It also examined what information was actually available to the U.S. government prior to the 11 September 2001 attacks, and how the government utilized the information. The commission published a report with its findings on what led to the events, as well as preventative measures for the future. Specifically, the commission recommended significant reforms for the intelligence community. The publishing of this report resulted in backlash from various government officials as well as the media and individuals. Many cited inconsistencies and inaccuracies in the report. In addition, numerous people have stated that some recommendations made by the Commission would not be beneficial in preventing future acts of terror, and that a different body should supervise those tasks. Others maintain that while the suggestions made by the 9/11 Commission are beneficial, however because the federal government has not enacted them, they still render the Commission ineffective. Still, proponents of the 9/11 Commission maintain that the Commission as well as its findings in reference to intel were crucial to the safety and homeland security of the United States. The effectiveness of 9/11 Commission report on intelligence impacts several actors. First, it affects the general population and United States community, as it directly influences their safety and security on a daily basis. It also influences government agencies such as the FBI and the CIA, since the Commission recommended several changes to their organization and structure. The 9/11 Commission recommendation on intelligence reform affects the foreign policy of the United States, and the relationship between the U.S. and the international community as well. The 9/11 Commission report

R u t g e r s Mo d e l C o n g r e s s 2 also made recommendation on the relationship between intelligence and states such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran and others played in the attacks on 11 September 2001. As such, it could negatively affect relations with those countries. Determining the effectiveness of the 9/11 Commission recommendations on intelligence reform is important for the security of the United States. If it is determined that the 9/11 Commission findings were accurate and the recommendations are sound, then a question forms as to how to implement these findings. It has been debated that the U.S. government currently does not have enough funding to re-organize government bodies such as the FBI and CIA, as well as some of the other recommendations by the 9/11 Commission. On the other hand, if the report is deemed inaccurate and the recommendations unnecessary, then policy-makers would need to decide what actions should in fact be taken in order to prevent acts of terror within the United States, and to determine what occurred in the steps leading up to the attacks on 11 September 2001. While many conspiracy theories and other documents have been published trying to answer many of the mysteries surrounding the 11 September 2001 attacks, the 9/11 Commission Report has thus far been the primary U.S. document in reference to this event. Of the solutions discussed, the first, which is to disregard the 9/11 Commission report, is pushed forth by opponents to the task force and the report. Instead, they recommend utilizing other task forces and evidence in order to determine the proper course of action. Proponents of the 9/11 Commission report suggest that its recommendations be followed and implemented. These recommendations include the appointment of a director for the intelligence community, the creation of information networking systems, the strengthening of Congressional oversight, as well as other more broad recommendations.

R u t g e r s Mo d e l C o n g r e s s 3 Chronology 1882-1908 The first spy service in the U.S. was the Office of Naval Intelligence, established in 1882. 1 Then, in 1908, the government officially christened a force of Special Agents as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) after President Theodore Roosevelt spoke to a Commission who boasted successful law reform. The purpose of this organization was to conduct criminal investigations. 2 These events were significant, as they set forth foundation for the establishment of an intelligence community in the U.S. 1942 In June of 1942, President Roosevelt established the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) to gather intelligence for policymaking. 3 Many organizations, such as Army and Navy intelligence and the FBI, argued against the permanent establishment of such an agency. 4 This was an example of the federal government and intelligence agencies not seeing eye-to-eye on organizational structure, an issue that continues to exist. 1946 In January 1946, Truman established the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), giving it the authority to coordinate intelligence gathered by existing departments and agencies. The National Intelligence Authority supervised CIG, which consisted of the president and the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy. 5 This was significant because it was one of the precedents to the director of national intelligence, a controversial position established as a result of the 9/11 Commission recommendations. 1 Mary H. Cooper, Reforming the CIA. CQ Researcher, 6, 2 February 1996. 2 History of the FBI http://www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/history/origins.htm 3 Ibid 4 Ibid 5 United States Intelligence, History. http://www.espionageinfo.com/ul-vo/united-states-intelligence- History.html

R u t g e r s Mo d e l C o n g r e s s 4 1947 In 1947, Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947, which established the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Congress created the CIA to collect, analyze and distribute foreign intelligence to government officials. The director of the CIA also oversaw the agencies in the intelligence community. 6 The 1947 Act also set up the National Security Council (NSC) to oversee all intelligence activities. 7 This Act relates to the issue of who oversees whom within the intelligence community, a modern issue debated by both critics and members of the intelligence community. 1952 In November of 1952, President Truman signed a memorandum founding the National Security Agency (NSA). The NSA was to be an organization under the Department of Defense. 8 The intent of creating this organization was to protect information systems through electronic surveillance. One of the duties intended for the NSA was to coordinate and direct intelligence activities. This coordination, however, never occurred and the necessity of this coordination continues to plague the current Intel community. The NSA is a communication and technology body, which has grown to be one of the largest intelligence agencies in the U.S. 9 1976 In the 1975, Congress established several committees for the purpose of created CIA abuses after various accusations that the intelligence community was abusing its domestic police powers. More specifically, the Church Committee published a report in 1976, which showed inappropriate behavior in the CIA. As a result, Congress established oversight committees, which would monitor the CIA s budget and activities. 10 These developments in the legislature tie in with the issue of Congressional oversight, debating 6 Brian Hansen, Intelligence Reforms. CQ Researcher, 12, 25 January 2002. 7 Mary H. Cooper, Reforming the CIA. CQ Researcher, 6, 2 February 1996. 8 Introduction to history. http://www.nsa.gov/history/index.cfm 9 Introduction to NCA/CSS. http://www.nsa.gov/about/index.cfm 10 Brian Hansen, Intelligence Reforms. CQ Researcher, 12, 25 January 2002.

R u t g e r s Mo d e l C o n g r e s s 5 as to whom, if anyone should be monitoring the intelligence community, and to what degree. 1995 After the Cold War in 1989, the U.S. intelligence shifted its forces from containing communism to combating terrorism. 11 In 1995, President Clinton organized the Brown Commission to present recommendations on the intelligence community. 12 Due to a mid 1990s CIA scandal in Guatemala, Deutch, the new director of the CIA, set forth new rules known as the Deutch Guidelines. These guidelines required that field agents get permission from the CIA headquarters prior to hiring questionable sources. Civil-rights groups have complained that these guidelines prevent the type of intelligence-gathering necessary, and have had a chilling effect on the recruiting efforts of field agents. 13 This was also an example of distrust in the intelligence community, and a step towards reforming guidelines and procedures. 2002 In 2002, the 9/11 Commission began to look into what possibly led to the 11 September attacks, and what could be done to prevent this from happening in the future. It made several recommendations, including creating a position director of national intelligence, re-structuring of domestic intelligence agencies, review of the intelligencegathering standards and guidelines in reference to civil rights, a reformed budget, as well as several other recommendations. 14 2004 In December 2004, President Bush signed the Terrorism Prevention Act into law. This law made several intelligence reforms, including the creation of the director of 11 Brian Hansen, Intelligence Reforms. CQ Researcher, 12, 25January 2002. 12 Mary H. Cooper, Reforming the CIA. CQ Researcher, 6, 2 February 1996. 13 Brian Hansen, Intelligence Reforms. CQ Researcher, 12, 25 January 2002. 14 Mary Jacoby, Intelligence overhaul necessary, panel says. St. Petersburg Times, 12 December 2002.

R u t g e r s Mo d e l C o n g r e s s 6 national intelligence position, and a new national counter terrorism center to coordinate intelligence gathering and analyses. 15 2005 In 2005, the 9/11 Commission released an updated version of the report, with updates on progress made, grading the security of the U.S. as well as the intel community. This report card included five Fs, twelve Ds, as well as two incompletes. The report cited that there had been little progress in forcing federal agencies to share intelligence. 16 2007 In 2007, both the Director of National Intelligence and Deputy Director of National Intelligence announced their plans to move on to other positions. 17 The turnover of these positions has made it more difficult for the intelligence community to coordinate the gathering of information, the purpose of the two positions. Actors and Interests Intelligence Community Several organizations comprise the intelligence community These include the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), the National Security Agency (NSA), as well as several other organizations, which use intel in order to protect the U.S. and keep it secure. These organizations have all come forth with their own ideas on reform, as well as responses to recommended policies. The intelligence community has stated that they are in favor of some of the reforms suggested, however they worry about relinquishing power, and believe that doing so would impede on the intelligence gathering process. The intelligence community organizations have all appeared to be in favor of the already-implemented director of 15 Bush signs intelligence reform bill. Homeland Security & Defense, 22December 2004. 16 Dan Eggen, U.S. is given failing grades by 9/11 panel. Washington Post, 6 December 2005. 17 Mark Mazzetti and David E. Sanger, U.S. intelligence Chief asked for a new post. International Herald Tribune, 5 January 2007.

R u t g e r s Mo d e l C o n g r e s s 7 national intelligence. Representatives have stated though, that while such a director is necessary, it is crucial that this director not be directly responsible for the conduct of operations, and rather to ensure that appropriate activities and operations are conducted by the constituent elements of the intelligence community. 18 Ideally, the intelligence community would like to see intelligence reform, which provides transparency and examination of credible Intel sources. They also value an operational chain of command, and hope to protect the civil liberties of those in the United States. In addition, the intelligence community wants to enact methods, which provide the highest and most efficient amount of intel to protect the American people. 19 Motivation for the intelligence community derives from the desire to perform their job properly and as independently as possible while maintaining efficiency and urgency. Another source of motivation is the desire to receive funding and appropriations to their various programs in order to improve technologies, and as a result, improve intelligence. The general areas for compromise and negotiation for the intelligence has been in the leadership of the community. Since it has been agreed that a leader is necessary and one has been implemented, the discussion on the leaders role is the only issue with this reform matter that is still up for debate. The intelligence community is not willing to compromise on issues such as organizational autonomy. Local Law Enforcement Authorities Local police authorities in various districts, as well as police organizations and unions, which represent police officers, have come forth as an important actor in the intelligence reform debate. Intelligence reform affects police outfits across the country because they must now fill out an application process in order to access intelligence community files on local threats. Police authorities have complained that this process is too long and intrusive. As part of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, the intelligence community has 18 Statement of Robert S. Mueller III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation. United States Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. 4 September 2004. 19 Ibid

R u t g e r s Mo d e l C o n g r e s s 8 been reformed in order to streamline federal information to local authorities. In the past, local police issued statements, which said that they need access to intelligence community files in order to identify dangers in their community. While authorities have still gained access to intelligence through this application system, police authorities maintain that the process does not finish in a timely matter, and requires an unnecessarily large amount of information from applicants. 20 Optimally, local police authorities see intelligence reform as something that will help them efficiently and quickly receive information about those that pose potential threats in their individual communities. They hope to access this information from intelligence community organizations such as the FBI without long application processes. Local police authorities strive to protect the citizens and residents of their communities. They may compromise in areas, which allow this process to be undergone as quickly as possible, such as providing a large amount of information, if possible in an expedient manner. American Civil Liberties Union The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) is a liberal based interest group, which seeks to ensure individual rights and civil liberties. 21 The ACLU maintains various locations throughout the U.S. and is a vocal activist for intelligence reform, specifically in reference to civil rights. The ACLU has stated that they do not agree with the current methods of intelligence gathering and questioning used by organizations such as the FBI, CIA, and U.S. federal government. They believe that all intelligence gathering must take into consideration first and foremost the civil liberties and rights that each American citizen, as well as resident, guest, or others, have while present in the U.S. The policy preference 20 Kevin Johnson, Police Infuriated Over FBI Program. USA TODAY, August 2002. 21 About us. http://aclu.org/about/index.html

R u t g e r s Mo d e l C o n g r e s s 9 of the ACLU is the reformation of the intelligence community, as well as U.S. legislation, to follow certain rules and standards that ensure the protection of all civil liberties. 22 The ACLU, as well as other similar interest groups see an optimal outcome as one in which absolutely no civil rights or liberties of humans are violated in the questioning of suspects or through any other methods of intelligence gathering. Optimally, the ACLU would be in favor of stringent rules and punishment for those who violate them and who do not protect civil rights. 23 The ACLU works to get their interests accounted for in federal policy, as well as in individual cases and incidents. As previously mentioned its basic motivations are the protection of all civil liberties and rights. These include complete protection of all amendments in the U.S. constitution, right to equal protection under the law, right to due process, and the right to privacy. The ACLU is also motivated by the right to protect the minority voice, which they believe is often not represented. 24 Because of the way that the ACLU presents its goals, there is very little room for compromise and negotiations when it comes to intelligence reform. The ACLU has not stated that they will budge on the type of questioning suspects can undergo, and strongly oppose government listening to citizen communication for intelligence fathering. As such, the ACLU is one of the lesser flexible actors in the intelligence reform debate. 9/11 Commission Panel The 9/11 Commission was established in late 2002 by President George W. Bush in order to compile report on what led the to the attacks on 11 September 2001, as well as what measures need to be taken in order to prevent such an attack from ever occurring again. The Commission is a bi-partisan body, which published its initial report in 2004, and followed the report with several updates on progress as it has been made. 25 22 Testimony of ACLU Legislative Counsel Timothy Edgar, "Securing the Freedom of the Nation: Collecting Intelligence Under the Law. "House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 9 April 2003 23 About us. http://aclu.org/about/index.html 24 Ibid 25 About the Commission. http://www.9-11commission.gov/about/index.htm

R u t g e r s Mo d e l C o n g r e s s 10 The 9/11 Commission has stated that its policy preference is a significant reform of the intelligence community. This includes a complete reorganization of the intelligence community, with a director of National Intelligence to coordinate the activities of each intelligence organization. It also includes a better system of information sharing between the agencies, as well as between the agencies and local governments. A better information system means one that is transparent and is able to share information most quickly and efficiently. 26 Ideally, the 9/11 Commission would like to create an efficient intelligence community, in which all organizations can work with one another, compare data and information, and bolster the national and international community confidence in the U.S intelligence. In an optimal setting, the 9/11 Commission would prefer if each one of its recommendations were implemented, and done so in a timely matter. The 9/11 Commission is motivated by the desire to understand what cause the attacks of 11 September 2001, and to prevent these attacks from ever occurring again. This is the purpose for which this body was assembled, and as such it is motivated by the need to complete its goals. The 9/11 Commission was purposely not overly specific in its recommendations in its report. As time has gone on, however, the Commission has examined the implementation of its recommendations, and seen that many of them have not been taken into consideration or implemented properly. As such, while the Commission was originally more flexible in what it would compromise, because of the Commissions dissatisfaction with the implementation of its recommendations, it has become more hesitant to negotiate its original recommendations. Congressional Appropriations Many members of Congress have proposed various pieces of legislations on intelligence reform, in addition and in conjunction with the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. However, funding for many of these reforms comes from the 26 Recommendations, The 9/11 Commission Report. http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/index.htm

R u t g e r s Mo d e l C o n g r e s s 11 Appropriations Committee on Congress. As the name indicates, the Appropriations Committee in Congress appropriates monies to various programs. 27 As such, the Appropriations Committee is an important actor in the debate over intelligence reform. Members of Congress have been very vocal both orally and through the form of legislation when it comes to appropriating to the intelligence community. Although individual members of Congress each have different views as to how the intelligence community should be reformed, if at all, in terms of appropriations they all have the policy preference that whatever funds are allocated to the intelligence community are used appropriately and efficiently. Members of Congress have thus far been very displeased with the way that the intelligence community has used funds allocated to them, and as such prefer a policy in which money appropriated to in the intelligence community is carefully monitored and assed. 28 Optimally, the Appropriations Committee would like to appropriate the least amount of funds possible in order for the intelligence community to be able to complete all projects necessary, function smoothly and efficiently, and for it not to be necessary that the Appropriations committee constantly monitors and has to re-evaluate the budget of the intelligence community and intelligence organizations. 29 The Appropriations Committee in Congress wants to fund government programs and legislation. Each individual member of Congress wants public approval for their work in order to stay as a member on the Appropriations Committee, as well as to be reelected within their own district or state. As such, when intelligence organizations misuse funds, this prohibits the Appropriations Committee from completing the task they actively want to complete. 30 27 Sandy Streeter, The Congressional Appropriations Process: An Introduction. Committee on Appropriations. 8 September 2006 28 Alan Levin and Kevin Johnson, 9/11 panel chiefs: FBI lags on promised improvements. USA Today, 18 August 2006. 29 Resolution to Create an Select Intelligence Oversight Panel of the Committee on Appropriations, as passed by the House.110th CONGRESS, 1st Session, 5 January 2007 30 Sandy Streeter, The Congressional Appropriations Process: An Introduction. Committee on Appropriations. 8 September 2006

R u t g e r s Mo d e l C o n g r e s s 12 As an actor, the Appropriations Committee may be willing to compromise on the amount of funding given to intelligence organizations, pending the access they have to monitor the whereabouts of these funds, and are able to change the budget if they see fit. They may also be willing to compromise on the amount of monitoring and transparency that goes on in reference to finance, pending the good behavior and efficiency of intelligence organizations over time. Possible Causes There may be several possible causes for the inability of the intelligence community to gather and coordinate Intel in a sufficient manner. This inability to gather intel has led to various crimes, acts of terror, and disrespect by the international community. Different actors including the 9/11 commission, Members of Congress, and government agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and other organizations have attributed various factors to the causes of this poor intelligence gathering and coordination. Insufficient Funding Organizations such as the CIA, FBI, NSA and others have attributed much of the inability to gather information failure to insufficient funding. Representatives from these organizations claim that poor federal funding has stunted the growth of any programs, advanced technologies and intelligence gathering initiatives proposed. Insufficient funding is also a cause for the need for the inability to gather information as cited by the 9/11 Commission. The 9/11 Commission however, holds a different view as to why insufficient funding has caused failure in the intelligence community. According to the 9/11 commission, whereas funding has been provided to agencies to improve certain programs and intelligence gathering, often times these monies go to inappropriate areas, and are wasted rather than being spent on the allocated areas. One report provides evidence, citing that CIA officials moved counter-terrorism money to other parts of the

R u t g e r s Mo d e l C o n g r e s s 13 agency to cover other needs that had little or nothing to do with combating terrorism. 31 The report continued to state that counter-terrorism managers still did not spend all of the funding provided to them, even after diverting funding to other programs. According to the findings of the 9/11 commission, because of this wasteful spending, Congress sees the funds provided to these agencies as unnecessary and pork barreling. Because funding provided to agencies by homeland security is not allocated wisely, funds instead spread to similar revenue-sharing projects. This creates a scenario for the inefficient and wasteful spending of already scarce funding. 32 The commission adds that Congress has not designated funding for many of the costly initiatives, and has instead provided finances for impractical projects. 33 As such, when it comes time to appropriate monies, Congress does not provide a large amount for the intelligence community. This leads to a cycle in which organizations in the intelligence community issues complaints of receiving inadequate funding for their projects and improvements, which may contribute to why they may not be able to gather intelligence to the best of their ability. Disorganized Agencies As cited by the 9/11 Commission as well as Members of Congress, the inability of intelligence agencies to work with one another and share information has led to a lot of failure of properly gathering and coordinating intel, and contributed to the attacks on 11 September 2001. Because of the large amount of bureaucracy within organizations such as the FBI, it becomes difficult for them to share the intelligence they have gathered with other agencies. This leads to a lack of comprehensive information and fact gathering, and can lead to acts of terror and other instances of crime. In addition, the chairmen of the 9/11 Commission have stated that the FBI has failed in preventing terrorist attacks because of its incompatibility with other agencies, and the high rate of employee 31 Greg Miller and Josh Meyer, Systemic breakdown at CIA before Sept 11. Los Angeles Times, 22 August 2007. 32 Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton, Unfinished Job of Safety. The Boston Globe, 1 September 2006. 33 Alan Levin and Kevin Johnson, 9/11 panel chiefs: FBI lags on promised improvements. USA Today, 18 August 2006.

R u t g e r s Mo d e l C o n g r e s s 14 turnover, particularly among senior staff. A staff that is not cohesive and constantly learning from each other and building on existing knowledge is one that cannot provide a stable and efficient intelligence system. This prohibits the FBI, and other agencies with similar problems to obtain the ability to develop sources to fight terrorism and improve intel. Despite criticisms of the FBI in the past, the organization has not made an effort to take to the suggestions that were made to improve its disorganization. 34 Disorganization and poor information sharing between agencies also creates inter-agency disagreements that can prove disastrous for efficiency. An example of this is the dispute between the CIA and the NSA in reference to their respective responsibilities in targeting Al Qaeda. 35 Because it was not clear which agency should take on which task, a poor job was done, and this contributed the attacks on 11 September 2001. Poor Communication with Local Law Enforcement Another potential cause for the poor ability to gather and analyze intelligence information is the poor communication and information sharing between federal intelligence agencies and local law enforcement such as police authorities in individual states and towns. According to Thomas Kean, chairperson of the 9/11 Commission, police and firefighters lack communicate systems, which would allow them to share information efficiently during an emergency. 36 Such an issue was the exact problem during the 11 September 2001 attacks, when New York Public Safety Workers were attempting to put together an emergency plan of action. Because of poor communication systems and inefficient information sharing with federal agencies, states and localities do not have adequate emergency response plans. In addition to the attacks on 11 September 2001, the reaction of local authorities during the events of Hurricane Katrina. 37 34 Alan Levin and Kevin Johnson, 9/11 panel chiefs: FBI lags on promised improvements. USA Today, 18 August 2006. 35 Greg Miller and Josh Meyer, Systemic breakdown at CIA before Sept 11. Los Angeles Times, 22 August 2007. 36 Chris Mondics, 9/11 panel assails scandalous failure of the nation s antiterrorism efforts. The Philadelphia Inquirer, 6 December 2005. 37 Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton, Unfinished Job of Safety. The Boston Globe, 1 September 2006.

R u t g e r s Mo d e l C o n g r e s s 15 Explanation and Analysis of Causes While all of the causes, which may all lead to the inability of the intelligence community to sufficiently gather, coordinate, and analyze intel, are unique in their contributions, they also all impact and influence one another. The most similarities exist in the causes of disorganized agencies and poor communication with local law enforcement. In addition to each of these causes leading to intelligence gathering failure, one also leads to another. Because federal agencies are heavily bureaucratic and disorganized in intelligence sharing with one another, this leads to poor intelligence sharing with local law enforcement authorities as well. As a result, these local authorities have a difficult time establishing their own intelligence bases and proper emergency plans. In addition, insufficient funding to federal agencies may contribute to the reason why these organizations cannot organize themselves better, and cannot complete the reform promises they made because of previous criticisms. Insufficient funding also trickles to local law enforcement agencies. Many state and municipal authorities also receive limited funds, and as such, they cannot expand their communication systems and intelligence gathering methods. These three causes are also similar because the same actors are involved in each cause. The 9/11 Commission, Congress, as well as the individual agencies have all been extremely vocal on intelligence reform, and the causes, which have led to it, and continue to contribute to its need. Issue Linkages Intelligence reform connects to various issues including homeland security, foreign relations in the Middle East and with counter-proliferation, immigration policy, civil rights, and the War in Iraq. Intelligence reform is linked to homeland security because any reforms impact the level of safety within the U.S. If intel on an important matter is missed, this can lead to an act of terror or crimes. 38 In terms of foreign relations with the Middle East, intelligence mistakes can affect relations in the long-term. For 38 Mark Mazzetti, Report Faults Pace of Intelligence Overhaul. The New York Times, 28 July 2006.

R u t g e r s Mo d e l C o n g r e s s 16 instance, when the intelligence community made a false assessment on the Pakistani nuclear test, this made foreign relations with the Middle East more difficult. 39 Keeping this example in mind, if intelligence was improved, counter-proliferation would not be as large of a problem, as the U.S. could more easily prevent the spread of nuclear weapons with knowledge as to who possesses them. Intelligence reform also impacts immigration policy, because when the intelligence community finds or does not find certain information about regions or countries, it makes recommendations about immigration to and from them to the federal government. Civil rights are also connected to intelligence reform. Interest groups and Members of Congress have claimed that methods of intelligence gathering such as phone or e-mail monitoring are a violation of civil rights. 40 Many have also questioned the ethics and legitimacy of detaining suspects at Guantanamo Bay without granting them basic rights. 41 Intelligence reform also links to the war in Iraq. A 2002 National Intelligence Estimate was given that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. These findings, which provided the incentive to begin the War in Iraq, turned out to be false, and the intelligence community deemed the reports as a monumental failure. 42 According to State Department Intelligence official, the war in Iraq has damaged the perception of reliability of U.S. intelligence. 43 Projections and Implications If the issue of intelligence reform is not dealt with, and none of the 9/11 Commissions are met with, they may be several implications. According to Colin Powell, a potential projection of lack of action is difficulty in gathering intel on foreign countries on various issues such as internal and external conflicts, oil issues, and the War on Terrorism. As such, this will potentially sour foreign relations. In addition, if the 39 Ron Marks. Of Systems and Security: Intelligence Reform Needed Now. Washington Times, 13 May 2004. 41 Intelligence and Civil Rights. The New York Times, 14 December 2004. 42 Karen DeYoung, Spy Agencies Say Iraq war Hurting U.S. Terror Fight. The Washington Post, 24 September 2006. 43 Stephen Fidler and Demestri Sevastopulo, The spies who lost it. Financial Times (London) 12 May 2006,

R u t g e r s Mo d e l C o n g r e s s 17 intelligence community is not able share information between agencies, parts of the government such as the Department of Defense, will not be able to do their jobs properly. 44 Representatives from the 9/11 Commission have projected that if the intelligence community is not reformed to more efficiently and quickly gather intel, there could potentially be another terrorist attack. They continue to say that crime rates may also go up, endangering the welfare of the citizens of the United States. 45 Members of the intelligence community believe that budget cuts for intelligence will come if no the government does not institute any reform. These budget cuts would impede the types of procedures and technologies that are necessary for safety of U.S. citizens. Various interest groups also support intelligence reform, but for other reasons such as civil rights violations. For instance, groups such as the ACLU state that if the intelligence community does not reform the way that it currently operates and gathers intelligence, human civil rights will continue be violated on an escalated level. Civil rights and government watchdog groups maintain that intelligence gathering methods in that hold interrogated persons for an undetermined period are unacceptable. 46 The ACLU also claims that without reform to make the intelligence community more transparent in its information sharing will lead to a government that is secretive and elitist, not looking for the best interest of its people. 47 Conclusion The issue of intelligence reform as recommended by the 9/11 Commission is an important one, because it poses a paradoxical question between what is necessary in order to keep an effective and safe system, and violations of civil rights and misused funding. From the history of conflict in the U.S., the government has continuously amended and 44 Secretary Colin L. Powell. Intelligence Reform. Opening Remarks before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Washington, DC, 13 September 2004 45 Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton, Unfinished Job of Safety. The Boston Globe, 1 September 2006. 46 Intelligence Reform: Oppose Repressive Measures Promoted as "Reform http://www.aclu.org/natsec/gen/14494res20030530.html, 30 May 2003. 47 ACLU s Top Lobbyist Urges Congress to Protect Freedom of Information Act, Says Government Transparency Vital to American Democracy http://www.aclu.org/natsec/foia/28365prs20070214.html, 14 February 2007

R u t g e r s Mo d e l C o n g r e s s 18 reformed laws in order to create an effective intelligence system, both in war and peacetime. This issue has involved several actors, including individual intelligence organizations such as the FBI and CIA, local police authorities, interest groups such as the ACLU, Members of Congress, and several others. These actors each define possible causes for the need for intelligence reform, such as poor funding, ineffective communication, high turnover rates, and disorganization within agencies. It has been projected by several actors that if the intelligence reform issue is not addressed, there will be dire consequences in the safety of the citizens of the U.S. as well as civil rights violations of various people in the U.S. Moreover, addressing intelligence reform impacts other issues such as the War in Iraq, civil rights, foreign relations and immigration policy. As such, it must be addressed quickly and efficiently.

R u t g e r s Mo d e l C o n g r e s s 19 Discussion Questions Are all of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission feasible? If no, which ones are not? Why? Why is the international perception of American intelligence reform important? What are the advantages to having a director of national intelligence? What are the disadvantages? How can inter-agency communication on intelligence be improved? How can communication between federal and local authorities be improved? Is there a compromise for providing funding to intelligence agencies and the issue of monitoring? What precautions can be taken to prevent civil rights violations in intelligence gathering? Which intelligence reforms throughout history have been effective and ineffective? Why or why not?

R u t g e r s Mo d e l C o n g r e s s 20 For Further Reading Theoharis, Athan G., The quest for absolute security: the failed relations among U.S. intelligence agencies, Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2007. This book begins with the origins of U.S. intelligence, and examines issues historical events in the intelligence such as the Cold War, through modern day. It analyzes the sources of problems within U.S. intelligence agencies, discussing national security, and domestic, military, and foreign intelligence. It also deals with issues organization of agencies as well as future goals. It can be useful in examining the chronology of the intelligence community and reform and focuses in detail on many of the events mentioned in the brief. On the trail of military intelligence history: a guide to the Washington, DC, and area. History Office, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, 2007. http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/inscom/trail.pdf This a pamphlet released by the U.S. Army intelligence, which goes through different locations in Washington D.C. which have impacted and influenced U.S. intelligence, particularly having to do with the Military throughout historical events, including the First and Second World War. This pamphlet can be helpful in understand the structure in Washington D.C., and how the agencies in the government work with one another. Bruneau, Thomas C. and Boraz, Steven C. Reforming intelligence: obstacles to democratic control and effectiveness. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007. This book focuses on case studies from the intelligence community. It discusses investigations made by the 9/11 commission, civil rights issues, and domestic and foreign policy. It also contains a section called Reforming Intelligence, which is several case studies on various reforms that have and have not been effective. It also compares U.S. intel with that of other countries including the U.K., France, Russia, and others. It can be helpful in application of actual reform by examining specific cases and for thinking of ideas by examining the programs of other countries.

R u t g e r s Mo d e l C o n g r e s s 21 Tenet, George, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA. New York: Harper Collins, 2007. The former director of the CIA, George Tenet, wrote this book. He discusses both mistakes that he made personally in the CIA, as well as mistakes he saw others make. Specifically, Tenet references the War in Iraq and War on Terror. It may be useful as it is a personal account of an experienced official, which also discusses many of the issues linked with intelligence reform.

R u t g e r s Mo d e l C o n g r e s s 22 Works Cited About the Commission. The 9-11 Commission. http://www.9-11commission.gov/about/index.htm About us. American Civil Liberties Union. http://aclu.org/about/index.html ACLU s Top Lobbyist Urges Congress to Protect Freedom of Information Act, Says Government Transparency Vital to American Democracy. American Civil Liberties Union. http://www.aclu.org/natsec/foia/28365prs20070214.html. 14 February 2007 Bush signs intelligence reform bill. Homeland Security & Defense. 22 December 2004. Cooper, Mary H. Reforming the CIA. CQ Researcher. 2 February 1996. DeYoung, Karen. Spy Agencies Say Iraq war Hurting U.S. Terror Fight. The Washington Post. 24 September 2006. Eggen, Dan. U.S. is given failing grades by 9/11 panel. Washington Post. 6 December 2005. Fidler, Stephen and Sevastopulo, Demestri. The spies who lost it. Financial Times (London) 12 May 2006, Hansen, Brian Intelligence Reforms. CQ Researcher. 25 January 2002. History of the FBI http://www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/history/origins.htm Intelligence Reform: Oppose Repressive Measures Promoted as "Reform http://www.aclu.org/natsec/gen/14494res20030530.html. 30 May 2003. Intelligence and Civil Rights. The New York Times. 14 December 2004. Introduction to history. http://www.nsa.gov/history/index.cfm Introduction to NCA/CSS. National Security Agency. http://www.nsa.gov/about/index.cfm Jacoby, Mary Intelligence overhaul necessary, panel says. St. Petersburg Times. 12 December 2002.

R u t g e r s Mo d e l C o n g r e s s 23 Johnson, Kevin. Police Infuriated Over FBI Program. USA TODAY. August 2002. Kean, Thomas H. and Hamilton, Lee H. Unfinished Job of Safety. The Boston Globe. 1 September 2006. Levin, Alan and Johnson, Kevin. 9/11 panel chiefs: FBI lags on promised improvements. USA Today. 18 August 2006. Marks, Ron. Of Systems and Security: Intelligence Reform Needed Now. The Washington Times. 13 May 2004. Mazzetti, Mark Report Faults Pace of Intelligence Overhaul. The New York Times. 26 July 2007. Mazzetti, Mark and Sanger, David E. U.S. intelligence Chief asked for a new post. International Herald Tribune. 5 January 2007. Miller, Greg and Meyer, Josh. Systemic breakdown at CIA before Sept 11. Los Angeles Times. 22 August 2007. Mondics, Chris. 9/11 panel assails scandalous failure of the nation s antiterrorism efforts. The Philadelphia Inquirer. 6 December 2005. Recommendations, The 9/11 Commission Report. http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/index.htm Resolution to Create an Select Intelligence Oversight Panel of the Committee on Appropriations, as passed by the House.110th CONGRESS, 1st Session, 5 January 2007 Secretary Colin L. Powell. Intelligence Reform. Opening Remarks before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee. Washington, DC. 13 September 2004. Statement of Robert S. Mueller III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation. United States Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. 4 September 2004. Streeter, Sandy The Congressional Appropriations Process: An Introduction. Committee on Appropriations. 8 September 2006. Testimony of ACLU Legislative Counsel Timothy Edgar. Securing the Freedom of the Nation: Collecting Intelligence Under the Law. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. 9 April 2003.

R u t g e r s Mo d e l C o n g r e s s 24 United States Intelligence, History. http://www.espionageinfo.com/ul-vo/united- States-Intelligence-History.html

R u t g e r s Mo d e l C o n g r e s s 25 Works Consulted About the Commission. 9-11 Commission. http://www.9-11commission.gov/about/index.htm About us. American Civil Liberties Union. http://aclu.org/about/index.html ACLU s Top Lobbyist Urges Congress to Protect Freedom of Information Act, Says Government Transparency Vital to American Democracy. American Civil Liberties Union. http://www.aclu.org/natsec/foia/28365prs20070214.html. 14 February 2007 Bush signs intelligence reform bill. Homeland Security & Defense, December 22, 2004. Cooper, Mary H. Reforming the CIA. CQ Researcher, 6, February 2, 1996. DeYoung, Karen. Spy Agencies Say Iraq war Hurting U.S. Terror Fight. The Washington Post, 24 September 2006. Delivering operational intelligence Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment of the Committee on Homeland Security. 109 th Congress. 28 June 2007 Eggen, Dan. U.S. is given failing grades by 9/11 panel. Washington Post. 6 December2005. Fidler, Stephen and Sevastopulo, Demestri. The spies who lost it. Financial Times (London) 12 May 2006. Hansen, Brian Intelligence Reforms. CQ Researcher. 25 January 2002. History of the FBI http://www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/history/origins.htm Intelligence Reform: Oppose Repressive Measures Promoted as "Reform American Civil Liberties Union. http://www.aclu.org/natsec/gen/14494res20030530.html. 30 May 2003. Intelligence and Civil Rights. The New York Times. 14 December 2004. Introduction to history. National Security Agency. http://www.nsa.gov/history/index.cfm

R u t g e r s Mo d e l C o n g r e s s 26 Introduction to NCA/CSS. National Security Agency http://www.nsa.gov/about/index.cfm Jacoby, Mary Intelligence overhaul necessary, panel says. St. Petersburg Times, 12 December 2002. Johnson, Kevin. Police Infuriated Over FBI Program. USA TODAY. August 2002. Kean, Thomas H. and Hamilton, Lee H. Unfinished Job of Safety. The Boston Globe, 1 September 2006. Levin, Alan and Johnson, Kevin. 9/11 panel chiefs: FBI lags on promised improvements. USA Today. 18 August 2006. Marks, Ron. Of Systems and Security: Intelligence Reform Needed Now. The Washington Times. 13 May 2004. Mazzetti, Mark Report Faults Pace of Intelligence Overhaul. The New York Times, July 28, 2006. Mazzetti, Mark and Sanger, David E. U.S. intelligence Chief asked for a new post. International Herald Tribune. 5 January, 2007. Miller, Greg and Meyer, Josh. Systemic breakdown at CIA before Sept 11. Los Angeles Times. 22 August 2007. Mondics, Chris. 9/11 panel assails scandalous failure of the nation s antiterrorism efforts. The Philadelphia Inquirer. 6 December 2005. Resolution to Create an Select Intelligence Oversight Panel of the Committee on Appropriations, as passed by the House.110th CONGRESS, 1st Session, 5 January 2007 Secretary Colin L. Powell. Intelligence Reform. Opening Remarks before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Washington, DC, 13 September 2004 Statement of Robert S. Mueller III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation. United States Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. 4 September 2004. Streeter, Sandy The Congressional Appropriations Process: An Introduction. Committee on Appropriations. 8 September 2006

R u t g e r s Mo d e l C o n g r e s s 27 Terrorism threats and the insurance market. Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Financial Services and the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment of the Committee on Homeland Security. 109 th Congress. 25 July 2006. Testimony of ACLU Legislative Counsel Timothy Edgar, "Securing the Freedom of the Nation: Collecting Intelligence Under the Law. "House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. 9 April 2003. The Homeland Security Information Network: an update on DHS information-sharing efforts. Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment of the Committee on Homeland Security. 109 th Congress. 13 September 2006. United States Intelligence, History. http://www.espionageinfo.com/ul-vo/united- States-Intelligence-History.html