International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Study Guide

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Study Guide

CONTENTS HISTORY OF THE COMMITTEE... 3 A message from your directors:... 5 Topic A: Enforcing a security framework to access nuclear technology... 6 Introduction... 6 History... 6 Safeguards... 7 Non- Proliferation Treaty... 9 Non- Compliance and the Loophole in the NPT:... 9 Additional Protocols... 10 Nuclear trade... 10 Current Situation and Challenges... 11 Lack of resources... 11 Adherence and enforcement... 11 Transparency... 12 Conclusion... 12 Delegates should think about:... 14 Delegate positions... 14 Topic B: nuclear situation in Iran.... 16 History of the problem:... 16 Current situation:... 17 Executive summaries of past relevant resolutions:... 20 Stances of different countries:... 24 Iran:... 24 The P5 + 1:... 24 Israel:... 24 Qatar:... 25 An introduction to the science of uranium enrichment:... 25 Questions to consider:... 25 Bibliography:... 26

HISTORY OF THE COMMITTEE In 1952, United States President Eisenhower envisioned an organization that would support the peaceful use of nuclear technology in his famous Atoms for Peace speech1. Eisenhower wanted the creation of such institution in response to the deep fears and great expectations resulting from the discovery of nuclear energy since 1945. When the negotiations were held on October 23rd 1956, President Eisenhower s vision of solving the nuclear dilemma became a reality. Diplomats and lawyers, advised by scientists, and drawing on the precedents set by other organizations, developed the main ideas of the organization into a charter of an international agency. The IAEA Statute was approved unanimously by 81 nations on that date. The IAEA Statute entered into force, thus officially creating the IAEA, on July 29th 1957 and in October of the same year, delegates from 59 states convened in Vienna, Austria for the first General Conference which lasted three weeks. Since that initial meeting, IAEA membership has expanded to over 150 states and the agency s mission has evolved alongside advancements in nuclear science. The Statute lays down the three primary goals of the agency as: 1. Promoting Science and Technology 2. Developing nuclear safety standards to protect human health and the environment against any form of nuclear threat (radiations, nuclear wastes etc.) 3. The safeguard and application of the three pillars expressed in the Treaty on the Non- proliferation of nuclear weapons (Non- proliferation, disarmament and the right to peacefully use nuclear technology) As an independent international organization related to the United Nations system, the IAEA s relationship with the UN is regulated by special agreement. For example, the General Conference s annual reports are submitted to the UN General Assembly Plenary and, if related to issues of international security, to the Security Council. The IAEA s work is closely linked to the Security Council (SC), which can request the Agency to take actions on issues concerning peace and security. The IAEA currently has 162 Member States (as of February 2014), which are all represented in the General Conference (GC) where they each have one vote. Only the Democratic People s Republic of Korea withdrew its membership from the IAEA in 1994. The IAEA consists of three policy making bodies: the General Conference, the Board of Governors and the Member States. The General Conference is the highest policymaking body of the IAEA. It is composed of representatives of all Member States of the Agency. The General Conference meets annually to consider and approve the Agency's program and

budget. The Board of Governors, to which 35 members of the IAEA are elected, is the main executive organ of the IAEA. The Board generally consists of experts and meets five times a year. Relationship with the UN From the beginning, the IAEA has stressed its mission to be under the umbrella of the UN and in line with the principles of the Charter of the UN. Still, the IAEA is somewhat unique within the UN system as it is the only agency focusing on issues specifically related to nuclear technology. The General Conference s annual reports are submitted to the UN General Assembly Plenary and, if related to issues of international security, to the Security Council. The IAEA s work is closely linked to the Security Council (SC), which can request the Agency to take actions on issues concerning peace and security. SC Resolutions regarding safeguards and the proliferation of nuclear weapons such as SC Resolutions 1373 and 1540 are examples of this cooperation and have become integral parts of the Agency s legal framework. Both Resolutions call for close cooperation with the IAEA to counter nuclear terrorism and the possession of nuclear material by non- state actors. The IAEA has established programs to support Member States in taking effective measures of that concern 2 Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons In 1968, UN Member States signed the Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which declared that only a state which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967 shall be considered a legal nuclear weapon state. The Treaty commits all other states to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons and requests states holding nuclear technology to contribute to its peaceful use by providing material, knowledge, and assistance. The NPT, which entered into force in 1970, is often referred to as a system of the three pillars: non- proliferation, disarmament, and the right to peacefully use nuclear technology. While the NPT was not negotiated within the IAEA, it assigned the IAEA to the surveillance of its treaty provisions and for the first time endorsed the effective establishment of safeguards under the responsibility of the Agency. Safeguards are agreements between an IAEA Member State and the Agency, which grant IAEA inspectors access to the state s nuclear program; Safeguards include inspections of locations, facilities, and reviewing materials are only used as declared by Member States. Thus, the IAEA and the NPT are closely connected and the mandate of the NPT has become a focus of the Agency s work.

A MESSAGE FROM YOUR DIRECTORS: DIRECTOR: BASEM ZAMAN Hello Delegates. Welcome the IAEA simulation at LIMUN. This is my 5 th consecutive LIMUN and frankly speaking it gets better every year. As we go near towards the conference I am sure you all have many questions and I am here to answer them. You can contact me on the committee email or on the Facebook group. I look forward to seeing you all in a couple of weeks. ASSISTANT DIRECTOR: ALFIE FINLAY JENKINS Hey guys! My names Alfie and this will be my 12 th MUN conference that I have done, and the 4 th one that I have chaired so I am very excited! LIMUN has proven to be an amazing conference and an awarding experience for me each year and so I am positive that you will all have a fantastic time. Looking forward to seeing you all!

TOPIC A: ENFORCING A SECURITY FRAMEWORK TO ACCESS NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY INTRODUCTION Nuclear technology is technology that involves the reactions of atomic nuclei. Among the notable nuclear technologies are nuclear reactors, nuclear medicine and nuclear weapons. It is also used, for example, in smoke detectors and gun sights. The IAEA is primarily concerned with two main aspects: Atomic energy and Atomic Weapons. When Atomic technology goes wrong the result can be catastrophic. Fukushima and Chernobyl are examples of what went wrong. Similarly destruction on a catastrophic level have been observed when the atomic weapons have been used in war: notably Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As developing nations grow the prospect of atomic energy becomes much more appealing. Given the high risk associated with nuclear development it is in the best interest of the world that only nation s states which demonstrate political stability and technical competency should be given the right to work with such technology. The IAEA contains a wealth of knowledge and enforcing a security framework can assist nations in achieving their peaceful ambitions as well as discouraging nation s states that wish to abuse it. Article 4 of the NPT emphasizes the inalienable right of all states to be able to use nuclear power for peaceful purposes: Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty. Given these principles the IAEA cannot be biased towards nations, rather the IAEA has a duty to ensure that these states carryout all development safely and in accordance to international law. The Aim of this IAEA Session topic is to devise a fair method of enforcing a security framework which controls the development of nuclear technology. This means that it supports peaceful use of the technology and supports nations in reaching their ambitions while preventing development of weapons. HISTORY The statute of the IAEA, created and signed in 1956 gives it responsibility to overlook safeguards, but only in the role of an administrator as requested by Member States 3. As found in the IAEA statute in Article 3, clause 5:

To establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy 4 Therefore the IAEA s status did not provide it room to manage the issue of nuclear proliferation as a policeman, for submission to safeguards was not mandatory and done on a bilateral basis between donor and recipient states for nuclear installations. Enforcement was only possible with an agreement present between two states 5. After the Cuban Missile Crisis, concerns grew of more states acquiring nuclear technology and the capability to create weapons. Through the creation of treaties such as the 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the 1968 NPT, safeguards for the purpose of nuclear security became an assigned duty to the IAEA, especially as the NPT found strong support and subsequently became a permanent treaty in 1995. At the moment the IAEA uses NPT safeguards and a nuclear suppliers group to extensively to manage the issue. Following section looks at the history behind each of the methods that are currently employed. The Nuclear Suppliers group (NSG) is a multinational body which regulates all sales, movement and export of anything relating to nuclear weaponry. SAFEGUARDS Safeguards, first and foremost, are tools that track if nuclear material such as enriched uranium, plutonium and uranium- 223 is being diverted to the creation of weapons. Natural and depleted uranium may also be subject to safeguards. Agreements and negotiations with states are the responsibility of the Director General s Office of Policy, and the IAEA Department of Safeguards takes over upon implementation 6 Safeguards primarily require states to send annual declarations and reports of its nuclear materials and activities. Then the IAEA may seek to verify the report and conduct an inspection of a state s nuclear facilities.17 It then provides an evaluation and assurance on the absence and non- diversion of nuclear material by the corresponding state.18 In the case of a state not allowing access to facilities, or if there is evidence of concealment, the IAEA may report noncompliance to the Board of Governors, who then report to the Security Council; reporting in the case of noncompliance is under the IAEA Statute. The safeguards regime has 3 types:

1. Traditional safeguards the traditional measures set up with the NPT, these safeguards are ones implemented on open and declared nuclear programs in reported facilities. 2. Strengthening measures this includes Additional Protocols and other measures that involve the IAEA's ability to inspect outside of openly declared areas. 3. Integrated safeguards an optimum combination of the above two. Such an optimum combination is determined on a state- by- state basis in coordination with the IAEA on a non- discriminatory basis. Furthermore, states can have the following types of agreements with the IAEA, all of which have different variations of the above three safeguards implemented: Comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs) All NNWS party to the NPT are required to conclude CSAs with the IAEA; Article 3 of the treaty applies to this agreement. In concluding this agreement, states agree to subject to safeguards all activities related to the production of nuclear energy. Furthermore, all parties to CSA agree to implement domestic measures to ensure non- proliferation, including the creation of a State system of accounting and control of nuclear material (SSAC), which serve as the State authority on all nuclear material and activities. The creation of SSACs thus effectively makes a two- tiered system for the management of nuclear material. The IAEA Department of Safeguards provides technical assistance and personnel training for states that need aid in developing SSACs. It is also of note that all regional nuclear- weapon free zone treaties require that states conclude a CSA with the IAEA. Voluntary offer agreements (VOAs) The term for agreements concluded between the five NPT nuclear states: United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France and China, and the IAEA. It attempts to even the field by having these states subject to safeguards as well. Item- specific safeguards agreements These are the agreements the IAEA has concluded with the 3 states not party to the NPT; with these agreements only specific facilities and material are placed, with voluntary acceptance by the state, under safeguards. Some have seen these types of agreements as an important compromising tool to integrate the non- NPT states into the overall non- proliferation regime. Small quantities protocol (SQP)

Agreements with NNWS that have little to no nuclear material in their respective territories. The SQP was added to the system to improve its efficiency; states keep their SQP agreements with the IAEA until their quota of nuclear material exceeds the maximum indicated. A state is no longer allowed to attain an SQP if it makes plans to create a nuclear facility. NON- PROLIFERATION TREATY In 1961, the General Assembly adopts Resolution 1665 and Resolution 1576, both of which spearheaded the global movement towards the creation of a nuclear non- proliferation regime. Resolution 1665, in particular, called upon nuclear- weapon states to work together towards a multilateral agreement for the non- dissemination of nuclear weapons. Resolution 1576 further expands this to both nuclear and non- weapon states to prevent further proliferation.7 The two aforementioned resolutions paved the way for the creation of the NPT, which was opened for signing by UN Member States in July 1968. 8 Safeguards are mentioned specifically in Article 3, Paragraph 1: Each non- nuclear- weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. [ ] The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere. 7 The NPT creates a stronger role for the IAEA in non- proliferation, as well as stronger safeguards. Unlike before, safeguards under the NPT are implemented for all uses of nuclear energy. 25 years after official enforcement began in 1970, the treaty and the regime were extended indefinitely after the 1995 Review Conference. A Review Conference takes place every 5 years, serving as a multilateral forum for discussions on the non- proliferation regime, including successes and possible improvements. The last review took place in 2010 NON- COMPLIANCE AND THE LOOPHOLE IN THE NPT: Article X of the NPT establishes that any states party to the treaty have the right to withdraw from it with three months notice. This occurred when the Democratic People s Republic of Korea announced in 2003 that it was withdrawing from the treaty. The question then becomes one of how to ensure effective safeguards when the NPT allows for withdrawal and does not specify if the nuclear material acquired

should be returned. This issue will be one of the topics debated at the 2015 NPT Review Conference. Likewise, the situation in Iran poses the question of what to do when a country is in non- compliance with its safeguards agreements. Findlay explains that the meaning of non- compliance is not always interpreted the same way, and that it is unclear whether all breaches of a safeguards agreement should be declared non- compliance. In addition, it is not specified whether refusal to cooperate with the IAEA when there is a suspicion of non- compliance is considered non- compliance as well. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS The introduction of the NPT is said to have led to the rise of clandestine weapons programs, such as the one discovered in Iraq during the Gulf War. This is further ameliorated by the fact that safeguards were only applied to a state's declared nuclear program. After the findings in Iraq, a model of Additional Protocols (APs) was added to further strengthen the safeguards regime and the verification process. With Additional Protocols, the IAEA is able to perform inspections for possible undeclared nuclear operations, including ones that may not have been reported under the general safeguards regime; this new tool is called complementary access. It requires that states not only report nuclear material, but where all nuclear activities take place. Even mere research related to nuclear fuel cycle development must be reported. However, as a universal agreement was not established, states are responsible for bilaterally negotiating an AP agreement with the IAEA, and further integrating it on a national level 8. 143 states have signed AP agreements with the IAEA, but only 122 have made the final step to put it in force. An important note is that APs are designed for non- nuclear weapon states (NNWS); most nuclear weapon states (NWS) have corresponding agreements with the IAEA, but they do not necessarily follow the AP model. NUCLEAR TRADE Article 3 of the IAEA statute forbids the export of nuclear materials unless the importing state abides to a CSA or such safeguards regime with the IAEA. The Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG), created in 1978, ensuring that nuclear trade abides by current non- proliferation standards. In the current system, states that wish to be supplied with nuclear material must have an existing agreement with the IAEA for safeguards on all its nuclear activities. The NSG agrees on export guidelines, which specific items to control and have become an important diplomatic group in negotiations. Export controls have proven to be effective in slowing and impeding the nuclear production process for new nuclear states, thus making room for more diplomatic manoeuvres. This aspect of Article 3 has led to an increased use of item- specific agreements by the 3 non- NPT states: India, Pakistan and Israel.

In April 2004, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1540, where it expressed its concern over the illicit trafficking of nuclear material by non- state actors. In the resolution, the Council acted under Chapter VII of the Charter and decided that all Member States were to establish export control guidelines, so as to ensure the protection of nuclear material that could be used for the production of a nuclear weapon. It also created the 1540 Committee, which now monitors the implementation of the resolution and provides advising and technical support. The threat of non- state actors acquiring a nuclear weapon remains real, as evidenced by the ongoing actions and concern of both the SC and the 1540 Committee. Yet, while export controls seem to be a widely accepted approach, some developing countries are concerned that these measures will limit their access to peaceful nuclear energy. CURRENT SITUATION AND CHALLENGES At the moment the combination of the three systems is being used to deter weapons development. However the three systems operate independently while being strongly interrelated. This causes unnecessary paperwork and more importantly slows down the response time of the international community. LACK OF RESOURCES Like most organizations, the IAEA suffers from a flat budget. This is particularly detrimental for such a technology- and development- based organization. The increasing lack of resources, both in human resources and in capital, have led to outdated safeguards technologies. A new generation of technologies for inspection: measurement, monitoring, data integration, and general inspection is needed if the IAEA is expected to continue upholding the non- proliferation regime in the long term. Medium- and long- term plans for R&D, and with the contribution of Member States, is needed. Detection and inspection technology must continuously be on par with nuclear production technology. ADHERENCE AND ENFORCEMENT Though the IAEA is given the ability to inspect undeclared areas and facilities, it is still unable to do this without the consent of the host state, as the conclusion of the AP that makes such surprise inspections possible must be an initiative of the state. Considering that APs is one of few tools that strengthen safeguards, this creates a dilemma between state sovereignty and nuclear security. With not all states enforcing both CSAs and APs, the safeguards regime is not able to reach its full potential as a policing mechanism

TRANSPARENCY Aside from detection, the IAEA has also been criticized by Member States for its lack of disclosure. While the IAEA can be commended for its efforts in keeping confidential information safe, some Member States argue that too much confidentiality in the Agency s procedures prevents them from verifying the effectiveness of the safeguards system, and provides less opportunity for input from other countries and civil society. Some argue that more public exposure of a state s level of compliance with Safeguards would exert more pressure on that country to abide by the Agency s regulations. In a Working Paper for the 2012 Preparatory Committee, the Vienna Group of Ten (Vienna Group), composed by Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden, expressed its opinion on the matter. The Vienna Group noted that hundreds of kilograms of highly enriched material is used for civilian peaceful purposes and is thus not reported publicly. Conversely, the Group of Non- Aligned States in the 2012 NPT Preparatory Committee stated that confidentiality is a crucial aspect of the IAEA s work and that it must be upheld above all. CONCLUSION Ultimately IAEA fully supports all nations right to peaceful nuclear access and attempts to remove barriers. The map below illustrates the global ambitions for nuclear energy. Any decisions made on the day have to take this into account. It is the IAEA s businesses to promote Nuclear energy as a solution. The Map below represents the current situation with regards to nuclear power on a global map. The IAEA cannot be used to stop nations from developing peaceful nuclear programmes.

At the moment all three methods that are used to ensure peaceful research: NPT, Safeguards and membership of the NSG are managed separately. One Solution is to create union in which nations which have demonstrated political, economic stability and technical competencies which grants them access to the NSG and reduces the safeguards placed on that nations. However the challenges with this is making it fair and accessible and not contradictory to the aims of IAEA While it is true that the current safeguards regime has substantially lengthened the time a state needs to produce a nuclear weapon, the regime remains imperfect. It may seem that arguments about the NPT and the safeguards regime is a seemingly fruitless one, however it proves to be important as the global community continuously faces the threat of proliferation. Furthermore, with the renewed interest in fostering nuclear energy, it is more vital than ever before to foster a safeguards culture, and ensure that all Member States have the tools and resources needed to keep the use of nuclear power solely for energy purposes. Delegates are encouraged to find innovative ways in addressing the issue and its varied challenges in order to strengthen the existing safeguards regime, especially in providing IAEA ability to conduct inspections nuclear facilities for undeclared nuclear material and activities.

While it is important to pass a resolution the directors would urge the delegates not to compromise too much on the official stance. A watered down resolution will first of all yield now results and in reality you cannot please everyone. While safeguards are an important aspect of any framework that is all an improvement of the tools that are already available. The Directors are looking to hear realistic ideas which go beyond modifying safeguards and introduce innovative ways of enforcing a security framework. We would like delegates to think outside the box. DELEGATES SHOULD THINK ABOUT: 1. Which UN bodies can help in enforcing a security framework and how can they achieve that? 2. What role do bodies like the IMF and the World Bank play, if any? 3. What holes are there in the current system and how can it be improved to suit your nation and your bloc? 4. What aspects of the current safeguards are the most harmful? 5. Is there a realistic baseline the majority of the countries of the world can agree on? 6. If compromise is not possible, what is the price the world should expect to pay for this lack of compromise? Some nations may be categorically opposed to a security framework being implemented and that is also acceptable. In those cases the Dias would appreciate that delegates would then devise a plan which protects them and their fellow nations from a security framework rather than lobbying to change topic. DELEGATE POSITIONS In order to understand what the position is of your state, delegates are encouraged to answer the following questions in their research: 1. What is your nation s official stance to nuclear power and weaponry? 2. Does your nation have a history with nuclear power or weaponry? 3. What are the barriers to your nation becoming a nuclear state? (Power or Weaponry) 4. How does nuclear power or weaponry effect your economic or political partners?

1 Address by Mr. Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States of America, to the 470th Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, Tuesday, 8 December 1953. 2 International Atomic Energy Agency, Department of Nuclear Safety and Security, Nuclear Achievements, p. 11. 3 Ben Sanders, "A Short History of Nuclear Non- Proliferation," International Atomic Energy Agency Articles and Studies: p. 5. 4 International Atomic Energy Agency, "IAEA Statue." Accessed January 6, 2015. http://www.iaea.org/about/statute.html. 5 Sanders, "A Short History of Nuclear Non- Proliferation," p. 5. 6 IAEA, "IAEA Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols: Verifying Compliance with Nuclear Non- Proliferation Undertakings, p. 12. 7 IAEA. Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 8 George Bunn. Arms Control Association, "The Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty: History and Current Problems." Accessed January 7, 2015. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_12/bunn

TOPIC B: NUCLEAR SITUATION IN IRAN. INTRODUCTION: The nuclear situation in Iran has been an ongoing problem for some time now. Iran has had a nuclear programme as early back as the 1950s but it only became public in recent years, which sparked international criticism. Iran has consistently claimed that its nuclear programme is for peaceful purposes, and that it has a right to nuclear energy. However, the USA and its allies, including Germany and Israel, are sceptical of these claims. They believe that Iran might be developing plans to construct a nuclear weapon and are all in agreement that its programme does at the very least need to be slowed down, with some hard liners such as Israel demanding a complete dismantling of the programme altogether, threatening with military action if this is not carried out. Sanctions have been passed on numerous occasions against Iran, most of these being economic, in order to try and deter the country from continuing to enriching uranium. These resolutions have also made various demands against Iran, and to other countries, such as requesting that they cease all trade with Iran that involves military gear, as well as any technology that could potentially help the country in further developing its nuclear programme. Requests have also been made by the IAEA to inspect Iran s nuclear facilities. Iran has granted access to some of its facilities, while denying access for others. This has heightened suspicions against the country. Major world powers have engaged in talks with Iran in recent years. Some progress has been made in this regard but many questions still loom over the future of Iran s nuclear programme, questions that this committee will need to consider. While many nations are in agreement that Iran has the right to produce nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, its behaviour is still a cause for concern. HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM: Iran s nuclear programme officially began in 1974, when the Shah had set a goal of producing 23,000 megawatts of electricity from multiple power stations within twenty years. To achieve this, Iran struck out various deals with nuclear providers in the United States and throughout Europe. A few examples included the following: a deal with Kraftwerk Union in former West Germany to build two 1,200 megawatt reactors at Bushehr, and with French company Framatome for an extra two 900 megawatt reactors. However, this work was briefly halted following the war with Iraq in 1980, which saw much of Iran s nuclear infrastructure crippled, and a lot of resources consumed. On top of this, the two power reactors that were going under construction at Bushehr were bombed multiple times. During the late 1980s, under the rule of President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Iran s nuclear programme recovered, and by the early 1990s, it was back in full swing and continuing to move forward, this time with

help from Pakistan, Russia and China. Two nuclear cooperation protocols were signed with China in 1985 and 1990 and in 1995, Iran forged a protocol with Russia to complete construction of the reactor at Bushehr. Although some parts of the original deals were scrapped due to pressure from the USA, Iran continued to receive support throughout the 1990s from Russia and China, despite supposed pledges from these countries to clamp down on nuclear assistance. Also of importance was the fact that Iran was receiving enriched uranium technology (Enriched uranium is essential for nuclear weapons) via the black market. Iran s nuclear programme became public in 2002, when an exiled resistance group leaked information that the country had been constructing a uranium enrichment plant at Natanz, and a heavy water reactor at Arak (the fuel from which contains plutonium, ideal bomb material). After this revelation that Iran had been hiding nuclear work from the IAEA, the agency requested to inspect Iran s nuclear facilities in March 2003. The investigation concluded with the IAEA being unable to confirm that Iran s nuclear programme was purely for peaceful purposes, and that it had failed to report on all parts of its nuclear programme. This led to it being referred to the Security Council in 2005, after the US and its allies had pressed Iran to stop enriching uranium, with little success. Events from then on formed the contemporary issue that this committee will be looking at. CURRENT SITUATION: It is hard to say at what point in the timeline of events, the current situation begins. This is because the issue has been ongoing for some time now, with efforts up to this point to find a solution having had little success. The past two to three years are perhaps of the most current interest, as a lot has happened in these said years. The following are some of the highlights of the current problem, but you may wish to do additional research on anything else that may have happened in this time period. March 2012: Iran announces plan to build 3,000 uranium enrichment centrifuges at the plant in Natanz. The IAEA meanwhile, is still trying to gain access to the nuclear facility in Parchin, in order to determine whether nuclear bomb tests have been conducted. Satellite images show that the place has been cleansed. May 2012: Talks with the P5+Germany have no success in reaching an agreement. Iran wants current economic sanctions imposed to be eased, and for recognition of its right to enrich while the opposition wished to see a halt to Iranian production of Uranium. The countries agree to further talks in June. The IAEA has stated that Iran has still failed to allow for access to restricted sites that it believes are being used for testing possible triggers for nuclear weapons.

July 2012: The European Union enacts an oil embargo on Iran, hindering its ability to sell its biggest export. In response, Iran tests missiles in a manner intended to send a message to the United States and Israel. In January 2013, Iran s oil minister admits that the embargo reduces petroleum exports by 40%, costing the country up to $8 billion a month. 9 September 2012: The Prime Minister of Israel has said that Iran s ability to enrich uranium has to be stopped no later than summer, otherwise it will gain the ability to produce its first nuclear weapon in the blink of an eye. October 2012: US- led sanctions see Iran s currency lose half of its original value this year. A surge of inflation also grips the country. April 2013: The USA announces plans to deploy a laser weapon in the Persian Gulf, in which Iranian light attack boats have caused trouble for American warships. Iran s also president announces plans to expand the countries uranium production. In addition, the USA defence department finalises an arms deal with Israel, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. This includes the selling of missiles, planes and transportation for troops to the three nations, so that any threat from Iran can be countered. June 2013: Iran elects a new president, Hassan Rouhani. He was a key individual in bringing about Iran s voluntary halt of uranium enrichment. August 2013: IAEA inspectors have said that Iran is slowing down its gathering of enriched uranium. This holds great political significance as it slows down the time it will take for the country will cross Israel s so called red line, the point at which Iran will have enough uranium to rapidly make a nuclear bomb. September 2013: The leaders of both the United States of America and Iran have been in contact for the first time since 1979. President Obama has said that he believes a basis for an agreement can be reached. October 2013: Iran have engaged in more talks with the P5+Germany. Both sides have called the talks substantive and Forward looking. They plan on reconvening in November. November 2013: Iran states that it will grant managed access to the IAEA to two nuclear facilities. However, the agreement does not extend to granting access to the military site at Parchin, which IAEA inspectors have been trying to see for some time now. Talks between major powers have also failed to make any progress.

24 November 2013: (IMPORTANT!): An agreement is reached by the P5+Germany and Iran to temporarily freeze Iran s nuclear programme. This will last for 6 months, and is intended to give the negotiators time to find a long term solution that will guarantee to see that Iran s nuclear programme is only used for peaceful purposes. January 2014: Iran and the 6 world powers agree to a deal that sees most of Tehran s nuclear programme stopped (for a brief period of time) as of the 20 th of January, in return for some economic sanctions being lifted. This has faced much opposition from Iranian hardliners as well as leaders from Israel. July 2014: Iran s foreign minister, Mohammad Zarif, has said that the country might be willing to accept a temporary freeze on its current ability to produce nuclear fuel, providing that it would eventually being able to do so without any hindrance. This would add to the concessions Iran agreed to last November, which were made so that all countries involved could find a long term solution to the issue. If such concessions were to be added to, Iran would want to see gradual relief from the sanctions that have crippled its economy. 18 th July 2014: Iran and the P5+Germany have agreed to extend talks by four months. November 2014: Iran agrees to ship the majority of its uranium to Russia for conversion into specialised fuel rods for the nuclear power plant in Bushehr. This is seen as a major breakthrough after countless stalemates from previous talks. 24 th November 2014: The United States and its allies have agreed to extend the deadline for the talks by another 7 months, after huge differences between the different states have yet to be bridged. To summarise, the current status of the situation revolves around two important events. The first of these are the economic sanctions that have been imposed on Iran by the United States and its allies. These have had serious effects on the Iranian economy, the most notable of these being the reduction in value of Iran s currency, the riyal. The huge surge in inflation is also significant, as evident from the rush of citizens to purchase everyday goods such as cooking oil, meat and staples back in April 23, 2013. Secondly, the past couple of years has seen an increase in the number of talks between Iran and countries that share a concern about its nuclear programme. Although some progress has been made under the new president Hassan Rouhani, the constant extending of the deadline talks in recent months is an indicator that both sides may find it hard to reach an agreement anytime soon. In addition to this, there have been times in the past where world leaders have felt optimistic about the situation in one way or another, only

for such optimism to die away very quickly, an example of this being the talks in May 2012 which went from looking positive to simply seeing more sanctions imposed by the EU a week later. What is also causing this to be such a big problem, is that the P5 plus other nations involved feel as though Iran is being deceitful regarding its true intentions. The country has claimed that it is simply producing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and should have a right to do so. It could be argued that Iran is not helping its case by denying IAEA inspectors access to key nuclear facilities, such as the one in Parchin. Because of this, no one can know for sure as to what goes on in Iran s nuclear facilities, but the evidence would certainly seem to point towards the possibility at least, of plans to construct a nuclear weapon. A map of nuclear and military sites in Iran. EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES OF PAST RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS: Between 2006 and 2010, the Security Council passed 6 resolutions in response to the nuclear situation in Iran. The main themes of the resolutions included a demand that Iran put an immediate stop to its uranium enrichment programme, as well as undertaking several confidence building measures and reconsidering the construction of its heavy water reactor. Summaries of the past resolutions can be found below. If you wish to do additional research into each of these resolutions then that is up to you, but the following should give you a good idea of the content of each resolution.

RESOLUTION 1696: Resolution 1696 was passed in July 2006 by 14 votes, with only Qatar voting against it, and calls upon Iran to immediately halt its enrichment programme, as well as verifying its compliance with the IAEA. It also calls on states to exercise vigilance and prevent the transfer of any items, materials, good and technology that could contribute to Iran s enrichment- related and reprocessing activities and ballistic missile programmes. 10 It also warned Iran that failure to comply with the resolution by August could lead to economic sanctions and asked for the Director General of the IAEA to publish a report by the 31 st of August on whether Iran had complied with this resolution or not. It also stressed the need of negotiations and peace talks in order to find a solution that will allow for Iran to continue its nuclear programme with peaceful intentions, emphasising that entering such negotiations will be beneficial for Iran. RESOLUTION 1737: Resolution 1737 was passed unanimously in December 2006 in response to Iran s failure to comply with the previous resolution on the topic at hand. It reiterates much of the previous resolutions content, such as calling upon Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment programme, but also goes further in demanding that the country stop the construction of its heavy water reactor, as supposed to just considering it. With regards to sanctions, the resolution requires that all states prevent the sale of any nuclear or missile related materials to Iran, and not to import such items either. In addition to this, individuals are also targeted in three ways. First of all, states are urged to exercise caution in allowing individuals into their borders, who are affiliated with Iran s nuclear programme. Secondly, states must freeze the financial assets, funds and economic resources of individuals engaged in the nuclear programme. Finally, it must be ensured that Iranian nationals are not given any special training or teaching that will allow them to further Iran s nuclear goals. Once again, the Director General of the IAEA is required to publish a report within 60 days of the resolution being passed on whether or not Iran has halted its uranium enrichment programme and heavy water facility construction. Based on the findings of the report, the committee may or may not lift the previous sanctions imposed. RESOLUTION 1747: Resolution 1747 was passed in March 2007 as a result of Iran s failure to comply with the previous two resolutions. It calls on Iran to verify that its nuclear programme is for peaceful purposes and to consider the June 2006 proposal of reaching a long term agreement with the P5+1

The sanctions of this resolution repeat and add to the ones of previous resolutions. For example, resolution 1737 demanded for the freezing of financial assets to individuals linked to Iran s nuclear programme, resolution 1747 added 28 names to that list. This new resolution also adds to the list of items that are banned from being imported or exported from Iran, specifying that all arms or arms related material are added to the list. Some new sanctions are also added in, such as calling on states to not sell military weapons to Iran, as well as not providing any financial assistance related to the selling of these weapons. Second, resolution 1747 requests states to not to enter into new commitments for grants, financial assistance, and concessional loans 11 with the Iranian government unless they are for humanitarian or developmental purposes. As with the previous two resolutions, the Director General of the IAEA is required to report to the committee within 60 days of the resolutions issuing on whether Iran has complied with the resolution or not. RESOLUTION 1803: Resolution 1803 was passed in March 2008, with 14 votes in favour and Indonesia abstaining on the grounds that it was not convinced of the effectiveness of additional sanctions. Like with its predecessor, resolution 1803 adds to the list of people whose financial assets are to be frozen due to being a part of Iran s nuclear programme. In addition for this, it requires states to deny entry into their territories, designated individuals who are involved with Iran s nuclear programme. It also broadens the scope of missile and nuclear related materials that are prohibited from being imported or exported as established in resolution 1737. On top of all of this, the resolution also calls on states to inspect all air craft and vessels, bound either to or from Iran, where they have reason to suspect that said air craft or vessels might be carrying any equipment prohibited under resolutions 1737, 1747 and 1803. In addition to requesting that the Director General of the IAEA to ensure that Iran complies with the resolution within 60 days (As with other resolutions), resolution 1803 also requires all states to produce a report on any cargo or plane inspections carried out, detailing the reasons for the inspection, time and place etc. RESOLUTION 1835: Resolution 1835 was unanimously passed in September 2008. It reaffirms the content of the past resolutions relating to the matter but does not include anything new.

RESOLUTION 1929: Resolution 1929 was passed in June 2010 with 12 votes in favour, Lebanon abstaining, and Brazil and Turkey voting against. As well as reiterating the councils wish to see Iran halt all uranium production, a fresh wave of sanctions were imposed, including the banning of investment in nuclear and missile technology abroad, as well as prohibiting investment in uranium mining. A complete arms embargo is also established and any technology relating to ballistic missiles is not allowed to reach Iran, with states having a responsibility to ensure that this is kept to. Additional inspection measures are also put in place to prevent Iranian smuggling. States are required to inspect vessels in their territory that they suspect are smuggling Iranian prohibited cargo. States are also called upon to deny service to any vessels that do not comply with the resolution. Finally, the resolution implements financial sanctions that aim to disrupt Iran s financing of proliferation activities. States are required to ensure that their citizens and corporations exercise caution when doing business either with Iran or Iranian entities, which contribute to its proliferation efforts. States must also limit their involvement with Iranian financial institutions. On top of all this, resolution 1929 makes a request to the secretary general to create a panel of experts that will oversee the implantation of the sanctions as well as assisting the committee in carrying out its mandate. States are urged to comply with the recommendations made by the panel and are asked to produce a report 60 days after the issuing of the resolution, stating how they plan on complying with the sanctions. A report is also requested to be presented by the IAEA after 90 days on whether Iran has complied with the resolution or not. Measures already taken to tackle the problem by the committee or another relevant committee: As previously mentioned, the IAEA has conducted several inspections of Iran s various nuclear power plants, which revealed that Iran had violated the nuclear non- proliferation treaty, hence its referral to the security council. In addition to this, access to all of the country s nuclear facilities has not been granted to this date, which gives other countries all the more reason to be suspicious. With this being said however, some progress has been made. The IAEA produced a report back on the 7 th of November 2014 which reviewed the progress Iran had made towards complying with the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA), which was signed by Iran and the P5+1 a year earlier. The report concluded that Iran was making progress towards cutting down on its nuclear programme, rolling back key proliferation concerns and had even converted 25kg of uranium that was enriched to 20% into fuel assemblies for the Tehran research reactor. Measures were also being taken to prevent stocks of uranium enriched at 20% from being enriched even further. 12

From this information, it can be argued that while there is still a lot that needs to be done regarding the nuclear situation in Iran, the IAEA so far has been an important factor in holding Iran s nuclear programme to account, as well as ensuring that it does at the very least take some steps to ensure that its programme is used for peaceful purposes only, as has been claimed by the country many times. And as looked at in the previous section, the Security Council has implemented multiple sanctions against Iran for failing to comply with its demands. The reasons for these sanctions have been to make Iran address the concerns of the international community as well as to stifle any additional progress it can make towards making a nuclear weapon, assuming of course that it does plan on doing so. However, these sanctions have been met with criticism due to the impact that they have on the Iranian citizens, such as through soaring inflations costs. They have also had little effect in deterring Iran from continuing its nuclear programme, despite such sanctions having started as early as 2006. And while countries such as the United States pursue a policy of adopting sanctions, other countries still show a willingness to trade with Iran, allowing it to avoid the full impact of these sanctions. STANCES OF DIFFERENT COUNTRIES: IRAN: The Islamic Republic of Iran is critical of opposition to its nuclear programme, stressing that it has a right to nuclear energy to provide electricity for its citizens and that its programme is not intended to build a weapon. It has nevertheless engaged in talks with the P5+1 to try and find a solution. It has agreed to slow down parts of its nuclear programme, such as the rate at which it enriches uranium, but many have argued that it needs to go further in order to gain back international confidence. THE P5 + 1: The original P5 nations of the Security Council plus Germany, have been the most prominent of nations in trying to negotiate a deal that ensures Iran s nuclear programme is for peaceful purposes. They have also been the main advocates of sanctions in order to try and deter Iran from continuing down the path of weapon construction while still trying to find a long term solution. ISRAEL: The Prime Minister of Israel, believes that the agreement that was reached in November 2013 is not a historic agreement, it is a historic mistake. 13 The country takes this stance as it believes the agreement will still allow Iran to produce nuclear weapons, only slowing down the speed at which they will be able to do so. Israel is fearful of this and has said many times before that it is ready at any time to launch a military offensive against Iran, asserting that it has a right to defend itself from possible nuclear attack.