2011 4 * 201204 F124. 3 A 1005-1309 2011 4-0079 - 010 Day et al. 2000 OECD R&D R&D 1994 OECD 10 22 7. 1% 2. 7% ~ 7. 1% 2011-03 - 01 * 06CJL011 11692101200 celap2010 - YBA - 04 79
2011 4 2. 7% 2001 OECD 13 1991 ~ 1997 R&D R&D 4% 3. 5% 2002 2010 2010 10 2020 20 2030 Intellectual Property Rights IPR 80
2011 4 Winter 1984 21 2007 Krechmer 2005 2009 1 Patent Length Patent Breadth Patent Height Nordhaus 1972 Scherer 1972 Cornelli Schankerman 1999 patent renewal system Scope of Coverage Merges and Nelson 1 81
2011 4 1990 Gilbert Shapiro 1990 Klemperer 1990 Dijk 1996 2003 1 1997 patent thicket Shapiro 2001 Shapiro 2001 questionable patents sleeping patents 2009 1 82
2011 4 2009 The tragedy of the anti - commons Heller 1998 Heller 1 9 1 2008 Shapiro 2001 Complements Problem Hold - up Problem Heller and Eisenberg 1998 20 80 Bayh - Dole Act 2 2005 20 80 PTO 3 CAFC + = Patent Pool 1 Hardin 1968 2 1980 2. 8 5% 3 83
2011 4 Ebersole 2005 2009 Legal Standards de facto Standard 2005 2009 DVD 6C JVC 1997 MPEG MPEG2 MPEG2 822 25 57 1000 MPEG 5% ~ 10% MPEG 2009 2009 Fair Reasonable and Nondiscriminatory 1 1 2007 84
2011 4 CPU 85
2011 4 5% DVD 20 DVD 6C 4 3C 3. 5 DVD 5% DVD DVD 1 TRIPS Shapiro and Varian 1999 lock in 13 86
2011 4 IEC 1. Abramovitz Moses. 1956 Resource and Output Trends in the United States Since 1870 American Economic Review 46 5-23. 2. Cornelli Francesca and Schankerman Mark A. Patent Renewals and R&D Incentives. RAND Journal of Economics 1999. Vol. 30 2 197-213. 3. Day George S. Paul Schoemaker Robert Gunther 2000. Wharton on Managing Emerging. Technologies. John Wiley & Sons. 4. Dijk V T. Patent height and competition in product improvements J. Journal of Industrial Economics 1996 44 151-167. 5. Ebersole T. J. Patent Pools as a Solution to the Licensing Problems of Diagnostic Genetics. Intellectual Property & Technology Law Journal. 2005 17 1 6-13. 6. Gilbert R Shapiro C. Optimalpatent length and breadth J. RAND Journal of Economics 1990 21 1 106-112. 7. Heller Michael A. 1998. The Tragedy of the Anticommons Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets. Harvard Law Review 111 3 621-88. 8. Heller Michael A. Rebecca S Eisenberg. Can Patents Deter Innovation The Anticommons in Biomedical Research J. Science 1998 1 698-701. 9. Klemperer Paul. How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be J. The RAND Journal of Economics. 1990. Vol. 21 1 113-130. 10. Krechmer K. Communications standards and patent rights Conflict or coordination C. Economics of the Software and Internet Industries Conference Toulouse France 2005. 11. Merges R P Nelson R R. On the complex economics of patent scope J. Columbia Law Review of Economic Studies 1990 90 4 839-916. 12. Nordhaus W. D. The Optimal Life of a Patent Reply J. The American Economic Review. 1972. Vol. 62 3 428-431. 13. Scherer F M. Nordhaus theory of optimal patent life A geometric reinterpretation J. American Economic Review 1972 62 422-427. 14. Shapiro C. Navigating the patent thicket Cross licenses patent pools and standard setting J. Innovation policy and the Econnony. 2001. 87
2011 4 15. Shapiro Carl and Hal Varian 1999. Information Rules A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy. Boston Harvard Business School Press. 16. Solow Robert M. Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function Review of Economics and Statistics August 1957 pp. 312-20. 17. Winter S G. Schumpeterian competition in alternative technological regimes J. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 1984 5 287-320. 18.. J. 2008 01. 19.. J. 2009 03 20.. J. 2010 17. 21.. J. 2009 05. 22.. J. 2009 10. 23.. J. 1997 08 24.. J. 2006 04 25.. J. 2005 07 26.. J. 2007 4. 27.. J. 2003 1 52-56. 28... M. 2007. 29.. J. 2009 06 30.. J. 2009 08 31.. J. 2007 01. 32.. J. 2010 03. A Study on Intellectual Property Right and Technical Standard Competition Strategy during Nurturing of Strategic Emerging Industries Zhu Ruibo China Executive Leadership Academy Pudong Shanghai Abstract Being the commanding point of the global industrial competition intellectual property rights and technical standards based on patent pool is vital to the development of strategic emerging industries. The intensifying of social labor division and the prevalence of patent network strategy directly leads to the emergence of patent thicket and the tragedy of the anti - commons. Late comers who are engaged in standard competition should take advantage of its users installed base and local market privilege and construct front - controlled patent pool with the support of standards greatly enhancing corporate technical capability and self innovation capability. While core technology and peripheral technology being planned out and discourse power during patent pool construction and standard stipulation to be gradually improved legal system should be established and perfected to protect patent pool and technical standard rights against being monopolized and abused. Keywords patent pool patent thicket Intellectual Property Right standard competition patent standardization 88