Development and implementation of the state export control system in Ukraine

AARMS Vol. 5, No. 4 (2006) 539 555 ECONOMICS Development and implementation of the state export control system in Ukraine KATALIN ZSOLDOS Miklós Zrínyi National Defence University, Budapest, Hungary One of the security challenges emerging after the collapse of Soviet Union is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and illegal trade of advanced conventional military technology from the newly independent states. The non-controlled or illegal export of these goods poses threats to the international security. The newly independent states tried to join to international non-proliferation community. Ukraine country this study focused on is at the head of this venture. As for the licensing process Ukraine goes all for keeping of international guidelines and recommendations. Technically the system itself lives up to the international expectations. On the other hand organized crime, governmental corruption and difficult economic situation cause problems in the practical export control process. This paper examines the new export control challenges for the international community, the ambitious strategies of Ukraine in developing its state export control system as well as the characteristic of it. Received: July 4, 2006 Address for correspondence: KATALIN ZSOLDOS Gazdagréti tér 3. H 1117 Budapest, Hungary E-mail: zsoldosk@chello.hu Introduction After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 new suppliers merged both on conventional military technology export and weapons of mass destruction transfer. Very soon some of the successor states performed their tasks: they managed to break into the international market of weapons with their advanced technology and expertise. Soon they indicated serious challenges to non-proliferation regimes. Ukraine provided some of these new challenges. When it became an independent state in 1991 Ukraine inherited a significant amount of nuclear weapons, about 15 percent of the Soviet total arsenal with developed nuclear research infrastructure, highly enriched uranium, uranium mines, nuclear related dualuse goods and technologies. Although most of the former Soviet Union s ballistic missile military industrial bases are located in Russia now, the largest, Yuzhnoye (Southern Machine Building Plant Association) in Dnipropetrovsk now belongs to Ukraine. Yuzhnoye is reported to be the world s largest missile manufacturing enterprise. Ukraine also produced solid rocket engines in Pavlohrad and ICBM control

systems in Kharkiv. Ukraine s military industrial base extended well beyond the nuclear and missile sectors. At the time of its independency it was estimated with reference to a 1993 report of the CIA Intelligence Directorate to have had about 15 percent of the former Soviet defence plants and military research. As rich in defence-related production capabilities Ukraine had an interest in developing and applying an effective export control system to avoid accusations of being source and supplier for proliferators counries and terrorist groups. As Ukraine declared its intention to join the Euro-Atlantic Community non-proliferation became one of the most important ambitions of the Ukrainian government. Over the past decade Ukraine created a well-developed export control system with government bodies, experts, legislation and licensing process to prevent illicit transfers of conventional weapons and related technologies as well as weapons of mass destruction and component parts. This paper examines the new export control challenges for the international community as well as the ambitious strategies of Ukraine in developing its state export control system and the characteristic of it. The paper also raises problems emerged in the operation of the state export control system and informs on Ukraine s methods in export cases. The study concludes with experiences and observations on the practical operating of the Ukrainian export control system and Ukraine s endeavours on nonproliferation. Export control challenges It is clearly known that Ukraine has material and technology that entities and states involved in proliferation seek and that terrorist groups want to have in their hands. A question for an effective state export control regime is: how to safeguard these materials, but also how to allow their legal sales. Globalization presents several challenges to export control systems. Although the list below is not intended to be exhaustive the next items obviously cannot be left out of consideration if we would like to create a modern view of the problems of state export control systems. Increased number of suppliers Some years ago only limited number of countries had the ability and possibility to export war materials, special goods and technologies. Now the palette is much more colourful. Several dozen of states are able and ready to export their advanced technology and expertise to others if they meet with solvent demand. If a purchaser with 540 AARMS 5(4) (2006)

proliferating intentions could not get the technology needed it would easily find alternative sources. From the viewpoint of the international security a loophole in a sole state export control system makes the whole structure damaged. Private companies In the past not so far away in Central-Eastern-Europe only state companies were authorised by the governments to produce weapons and military technology and to implement export of the products of military industry. Nowadays after privatization more and more private companies enter into the military technology business and make it more difficult for countries to regulate their deals. Competition and profit Increased competition among suppliers and among the advanced technologies accompanied with the extra profit can be realized in this kind of deals mean difficulties for countries, governments or export control authorities that want to hold back companies to sell their goods. Civilian research Technologies needed for weapons and other military goods no longer come from only the military research but also from the civil sector. There are numerous companies producing and exporting civilian technology that can be used for military purposes too. These companies often are not aware of the fact that their products are to be used for e.g. weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. Intangible technology transfer Intangible technology transfer is one of the brand-new challenges emerged with the development of information exchange. Years ago it was easier to control technology transfer that happened on paper, in the mail or was delivered personally. With evolution of computer technology and Internet data can be exchanged almost without a trace via e-mail anywhere you want. Export control challenges for Ukraine Development of an effective state export control system is one of the most important tasks and challenges for the successor states of the former Soviet Union on the field of their counter-proliferation efforts. Ukraine (with Russia and Kazakhstan) is thought to have the most developed export control system among the newly independent states. 1 AARMS 5(4) (2006) 541

Ukraine has joined three non-proliferation multilateral export control regimes from the four (Nuclear Suppliers Group, Wassenaar Arrangement, Missile Technology Control Regime), the exception is the Australia Group. Ukraine (with Russia and Kazakhstan again) inherited the advanced nuclear and missile technology industry, so it needed effective export control to fulfil the obligations of the international regimes it had joined. Export control is crucial even for countries without production capacity of goods and technologies that could be used for WMD programs, but Ukraine do have the aforesaid production and export capacity. Ukraine has been building its export control system since the early 1990s. It has managed to create a well-developed system (containing a comprehensive law on state export control introduced in February 2003). Certain elements are common to any national export control system. These basic elements are: Legal basis State policy Licensing system Executive mechanism Control lists Catch-all clause Border and custom authorities Punitive sanctions * This paper shall follow the methodology of this categorization in the review of the Ukrainian export control system. The legal basis for Ukrainian export control Shortly after its independence Ukraine had to create and apply a system that provides an effective state control over conventional weapons, military goods and technologies as well as dual-use goods and any other products that can be used for weapons of mass destruction programs. Of great importance it was as Ukraine committed itself to * Obviously there are other categorizations such as the methodology developed the Center for International Trade and Security, University of Georgia, USA. The methodology lists the elements of an effective export control system are: licensing system, legal framework; control lists; interagency process; customs authority; regime adherence; catch-all clause; information gathering and sharing; verification; training; penalties. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Export Control Project the elements are: legal basis; policy making mechanism; executive mechanism; list of items subject to control; licensing system; compliance mechanism. According to Nuclear Status Report (2001 June, No. 6.) the three basic components of an export control system: legal framework; export licensing process; participation in multilateral export control agreements. 542 AARMS 5(4) (2006)

integrate into the Euro-Atlantic community on condition, among others, that it fulfils its international obligations on non-proliferation. The legal basis for state export control is formed by the Constitution of Ukraine, Laws of Ukraine, acts by the President of Ukraine and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, other regulatory-legal acts as well as international treaties Ukraine joined. 2 The affairs that control export between exporters and state authorities have to be established by state legislation primary and secondary legislation too. Primary legislation means an export control law that establishes the main rules of export and import deals. Main rules contain responsibilities of different state authorities and agencies, restrictions for countries under international embargos, general rules of starting and executing an export deal to mention but a few. Secondary legislation provides more specific and detailed rules for exporters and export control authorities. This may include control lists, documents needed, restricted destinations and end-users, permission categories and samples, details for interagency cooperation, judicial and administrative sanctions against exporters that violate the state control regime etc. In Ukraine the comprehensive law on export control is Law of Ukraine On state control of international transfers of goods designated for military purposes and dual-use goods introduced in February 20, 2003. The document has become the core of Ukraine s state export control system. Although the system had been functioning since the early 1990 s with the legal basis of several decrees, the law increased the transparency, clarity and consistency of the system. State policy Main principles of Ukrainian state policy in the export control sphere are as follows. 1 Priority of national interests, which means all political, economical and military interests whose protection, is necessary for providing national security of Ukraine. Protection of political, economic and military interests of the state. Obligatory observation of international commitments of Ukraine on nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, means of there delivery and setting up state control of international transfers of dual-use goods and goods designated for military purposes, as well as countering use of them by terrorists and for other illegal purposes. Lawfulness. Realization of export control only if it needed to ensure achievement of its goals. Harmonisation of procedures and rules of national export control system with international legal norms and practice. AARMS 5(4) (2006) 543

Ensuring interaction with international organizations and foreign countries on state export control to strengthen international security and stability. Basic legal acts on export control The aforesaid Law defines the state bodies of export control system (see Figure 1), first of all the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine that establishes legislative basis of state policy on export control and the President of Ukraine who directs it generally. The National Security and Defence Council coordinates the activities of state bodies on the sphere of state export control. The Cabinet of Ministries is responsible for implementation of the state policy of export control. Not only the Cabinet but also ministries and other state bodies are authorized to act in the field of export control. The state export control body (State Service on Export Control, SSEC) directly promotes activities related to international transfers of military products and dual-use goods and technologies. The Law takes SSEC into the centre of the interagency information exchange system on goods and technologies objects for export control. Figure 1. The state bodies of export control system Law of Ukraine is not the only element of the legal infrastructure of Ukrainian export control. The Law did not withdraw other laws on export control or non- 544 AARMS 5(4) (2006)

proliferation had been adopted before this law. These laws shall be effective inasmuch as they do not contradict this new Law. Acts on Foreign Economic Activity, on Entrepreneurship, on National Defence of Ukraine, on the Security Service, on Operational Investigatory Activity and on Civil Code, on Customs Code and on Criminal Code of Ukraine all contains regulations on international trade of sensitive goods and technologies. After adopting the Law of Ukraine relevant changes were made in the Criminal Code that provide a higher level of responsibility for violating export control regulations. The Criminal Code Article 228-6 defines the penalties (imprisonment up to eight years) for violating export control rules of international trade of military technology and dual-use goods. Numerous articles cover other infractions of export control rules of weapons and dual-use goods, specifically 221, 221-1, 222, 228-2, 228-4, 228-5, 229 and 70 (which concerns radioactive sources). Additional decrees and resolutions on state export control system are Verkhovna Rada Decrees (2728-XII, 2471-KhP); Presidential Decrees (like 1279, 423, 117 etc.) as well as Cabinet of Ministers Resolutions (like 563, 302, 1005 etc.). In 1999 2000 Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma reorganized the national export control executive branch. In Presidential decree 1573 (15 December 1999) deprived the State Service on Export Control (SSEC) of the ministerial status and merging it into the Ministry of Economy. Previously he SSEC had been an independent agency, after the reorganization although it lost its independence retained the same licensing responsibilities it had before. Presidential decree 121 (4 February 1999) transformed the Commission on Export Control Policy into the Commission on Export Control Policy and Technical Cooperation with Foreign Countries. The Commission now is subordinate to the Council of National Security and Defence (which is a council for the President). The commission is made up of the following individuals: * First Deputy Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council Deputy Minister of Finance Head of the State Service on Export Control Deputy Minister of Defence Deputy Head of the State Customs Service First Deputy Head of the State Security Service Deputy Minister of Industrial Policy First Deputy General Director of the National Space Agency * According to Presidential decree 121 in Status on Export Controls 1 AARMS 5(4) (2006) 545

General Director of Ukrspetsexport First Deputy Minister of Industrial Policy Head of the Department of International Aspects of National Security (from National Security and Defence Council) Head of the Department of Strategic Military Security Policy (from National Security and Defence Council) First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Deputy Minister of the Economy The text of this decree has not been made public. 1 Another important edict of the reorganization was Presidential decree 868 (8 July 2000) that liquidates the Commission on Export Control Policy and Military-Technical Cooperation with Foreign Countries and replaces it with the Committee for Policy on Military-Technical Cooperation and Export Control. The committee s responsibilities include submitting recommendations and proposals to improve export control system, creating bans on export-import of military and dual-use goods and technologies, helping military-technology cooperation with foreign countries. Controlled goods and technologies Items not allowed to be exported without authorisation need to be listed in a public source practically in laws that the prospective exporters have easy access to. Control lists need to include all goods and technologies that have been designed and produced for military purposes. Other goods developed for civil purposes but can be used for both civilian and military purposes also need to be listed, these are the so-called dual-use goods and technologies. A control list may specify the technical specifications or/and performance capabilities of the good in point (the former solution is more frequent in state export control systems in Europe). In Ukraine names and descriptions of goods that are subjects to export control are included in lists defined in different laws. The state export control body creates these lists with participation of ministries and other bodies concerned. The Cabinet of Ministers approves the lists see Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 563, 302, 1005, 384 in Appendix 1 according to the regulations of international non-proliferation regimes Ukraine joined or intends to join (NSG, WA, MTCR, AG). The Ukrainian state control list is divided into the five categories of conventional weapons, military technology, dual-use goods and technologies, 546 AARMS 5(4) (2006)

nuclear weapons, materials and equipment, and nuclear related dual-use technologies, goods that can be used to develop chemical, bacteriological and toxic weapons, missiles or goods and technologies can be used to develop or produce missiles. Important and sensitive issues are goods and technologies not included in lists if there could be intentions or possibilities of use them by countries considered sensitive or use for proliferation. The universal catch-all clause is defined in almost all of the state export control systems in Europe so is in Ukraine. Article 10 of Law of Ukraine contains that when the central bodies of executive power that implement export control receive information about intentions or a possibility of use of whatever goods, that are not included in the lists, in countries that are their end-users, for designing, production, assembling, testing, repairing, technical servicing, modification, upgrading, operation, managing, storage, exposure, identification, or for proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or means of their delivery, the mentioned bodies are obliged to inform whereof the duly authorized state export control body which has a right in this connection to apply to such goods procedures of state export control. 2 Export licensing process All exports are prohibited to countries under UN Security Council arms embargo. In any other case the decision is made on case-by-case basis. Export of weapons and military technology can only managed by companies that have received the authorization from the Cabinet of Ministers. Only seven 1 companies are permitted to negotiate contracts independently, all the other must negotiate export contracts through Ukrspetsexport, state company for export and import of military and special products and services. (In 1996 the three major weapons exporters, Ukrinmash, Ukroboronservice and Progress, were merged to Ukrspetsexport. One of the reasons was to increase state control over military technology export.) Licensing authority is the State Service on Export Control (SSEC). Companies must first apply to SSEC for permission to negotiate a contract with a foreign partner. After signing a contract the exporter must apply to SSEC again, this time for the export licence and must attach documents like registration certificate, document that contains that the company has the right to export military goods, notarized copy of the contract, technical data on the purpose and possible use of the goods, documents that contains guarantees from the importer and end-user. AARMS 5(4) (2006) 547

The end-user certificate which must be provided by an authorized government body in the recipient country must contain reliable information on the end-user of the exported goods and technologies, intended use and destination of the goods, must assume an obligation that the goods are to import only the specified country and that the goods will not be re-exported into third country without written consent from Ukraine. The procedure for drawing up an end-user certificate is established by the legislation of the country of destination. The authenticity of the documents is verified by SSEC that is supported in its decisions by the MFA, the Security Service and other relevant ministries and authorized governmental agencies. After an interdepartmental examination where SSEC invites ministries and departments to participate SSEC takes the decision to give or refuse a permit. Ukraine issues two types of permissions: one-time and general licences. For weapons export only one-time licence can be issued, while both general and one-time licence can be issued for dual-use goods and technologies. The general licence does not contain the volume of the export, only the category of the goods in point and one or more destinations. This permit is used mainly for export deals to the countries of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The state export control system of Ukraine contains special order for critical items (goods related to weapons of mass destruction programs) and critical destinations (countries under UN or OSCE sanctions, states that threat Ukraine s national security or terrorism supporting countries). The Commission on Export Control Policy and Military and Technical Cooperation with Foreign Countries must approve the export of these goods and these countries before an export licence can be issued. * (For the time being Ukraine does not have a published list of sensitive destinations.) For transit when controlled goods travel through Ukraine without any use being made of them in its territory needed also the approval of SSEC as well as temporary export (exhibitions, fairs etc.). Customs authorities are responsible for checking export licences and custom declarations, which for Ukraine has the longest external borders in Europe is complicated and important task for the Ukrainian custom and border services. According to Law of Ukraine the violations of export control legislation are inter alia: export, import and other international transfer of goods subject to export control without appropriate licence, * Presidential decree 121 [1] 548 AARMS 5(4) (2006)

implementation of international transfers of goods on the basis of licence that was acquired via use of counterfeit documents or documents containing false information, signing agreements or contracts on international transfer of any goods whatsoever or participation in their implementation in any manner other than provided for by the Law of Ukraine, if entity engaged obtained information that the goods may be used for weapons of mass destruction programs by the foreign country or the foreign customer, deliberate concealment of information that could influence taking of decision as to granting of a permit, conclusion or international import certificate, performing international transfers of controlled goods irrespective of having obtained information that the goods are used for purposes other than declared in the contract or related documents, conduct of negotiations related to signing foreign agreements or contracts to export military technologies and dual-use goods, which are partially embargoed for import to a certain country without appropriate positive conclusion from the state export control body. SSEC prepares analysing reports in every three and six months for the President of Ukraine and for the Cabinet of Ministers on given and refused licenses, the quantities and types of goods and technologies exported and imported. These reports contain also every important data and tendencies in connection with functioning of the state export control system. Problems of implementation Ukraine itself admitted that the problems of its export control have been under increased attention of the international community. Several reports informed on illegal transfers of military or dual-use goods and technologies to destinations like China, Iraq, Syria and previously Libya. Probably the most well-known and ill-famed case was the possible delivery of Kolchuga radar system to Iraq. In 2002 a working group of UK and US experts invited by President Leonid Kuchma examined the case. From Ukraine s point of view the working group received quite exhaustive information to make a decision that there were no Kolchuga station deliveries from Ukraine to Iraq. 13 Whereas the British and American experts in their report stated that there were still remaining a number of issues unclear and open to question. Certainly Ukraine does not accept this conclusion but whatever facts will be revealed in the future the case has caused a lot of damage to the international judgement of the Ukrainian export control system. AARMS 5(4) (2006) 549

Conclusions One of the numerous security challenges emerging after the collapse of Soviet Union is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional military technology from the newly independent states. The non-controlled or illegal export of these military and dual-use goods and technologies poses serious risks to the international security. Once the chemical, biological or nuclear related advanced technology is available for terrorist groups, for contrary parties of conflict areas or for organized crime, it results in regional and in the worst case global instability. The development and implementation of an effective state export control system can be a powerful tool in the hands of governments to put a stop to illegal weapons transfer that considerably supports the global non-proliferation ambitions. After the collapse of the Soviet Union the problem aroused especially in the four socalled nuclear states Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine that inherited nuclear weapons and related technology from the former empire. This does not mean that only these newly independent states had been affected: almost all the successor states had problems with the illicit exports through their territory. For this reason easy to understand why NIS more or less tried to join to international non-proliferation community. Ukraine was at the head of this venture. Ukraine is a member of all the four major multilateral export control regimes but Australia Group. It is a founding member of the COCOM-successor Wassenaar Arrangement in which it joined in 1996 and the same year it was admitted to the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Formally it was admitted to the Missile Technology Control Regime only in 1998 although it complied with the guidelines of the regime since the Cabinet of Ministers Resolution 563 adopted in 1995. Ukraine is not a member of the Australia Group but does adhere to the regimes guidelines for exporting goods and technologies that can be used for chemical or biological weapons production. In the licensing process Ukraine goes all out for keeping of international guidelines and recommendations. National control lists are harmonized with international standards. Theoretically every elements of the state export control system from the legislation to the custom examination are adequate and proper. Technically the system itself is competent and lives up to the international expectations due to the international, especially US assistance in the elaboration and installation of the system. On the other hand organized crime, government corruption and difficult economic situation cause problems mainly in the practical export control process. Despite Ukraine s progress some proliferation risks remained. 550 AARMS 5(4) (2006)

References 1. Status of Export Controls in the Former Soviet Union. Nuclear Status Report No. 6 (June 2001), pp. 175 190. 2. Law of Ukraine on State Control of International Transfers of Goods Designated for Military Purposes and Dual-Use Goods in Export Control in the Context of Security Sector Reform, Razumkov Centre, Kiev, 2003, pp. 3 12. 3. PECZE, Z., DEÁK, L., KÖRÖMI, J., MÁTÉ, L., ZIMONYI, A.: Non-proliferációs ABC. Magyar Köztársaság Külügyminisztériuma, Budapest, 2000. 4. EPSTEIN, W.: Atomsorompó vagy nukleáris leszerelés. Fizikai Szemle, 1999/9. szám, p. 330-334. 5. BAKER, J. C.: Non-proliferation Incentives for Russia and Ukraine. International Institute for Strategic Studies Adelphi Paper 309, Oxford University Press Inc., New York, 1997. 6. ZABORSKY, V.: Ukraine Restructures Its Arms Export Controls. Jane s Intelligence Review, November 1999, p. 19-22. 7. SCOTT, J.: An Evaluation of Export Controls in Ukraine. Global Evaluation of Non-proliferation Export Controls: 1999 Report, Center for International Trade and Security, University of Georgia, 1999. 8. ZABORSKY, V.: Ukraine Arms Plant Struggles in Independence Experiment. Defense News, August 2000, p. 33-46. 9. ZABORSKY, V.: Ukrainian State Service on Export Control in Spotlight: Reporting Achievements, Denying Allegations of Illegal Sales. NIS Export Control Observer, April 2004, p. 2 3. 10. LAWYERS ALLIANCE FOR WORLD SECURITY: Model NIS Export Control Legislation. The Nonproliferation Review, Spring-Summer 1995, p. 58 63. 11. Export Control Challenges in a Global Era. Center for International Trade and Security, November 2001, p. 3 16. 12. Conventional arms export control systems. SIPRI Export Control Project, http://projects.sipri.se/expcon/expol.htm (2004.08.18.) 13. Aide Memoire 10 Dec 2002. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, http://projects.sipri.se/expcon/natexpcon/ukraine/ukr021210.htm (2004.09.02.) AARMS 5(4) (2006) 551

Appendix 1 The key decrees and resolutions on Ukrainian state export control system Law of Ukraine On state control of international transfers of goods designated for military purposes and dual-use goods (20 February 2003) Verkhovna Rada decrees Verkhovna Rada Decree 2728-XII (26 October 1992) On creation of a list of raw materials and materials not permitted for export This decree instructs the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine to develop a list of goods related weapons and military technologies that export required licence. The list should include raw materials, goods and technologies can be related to weapons of mass destruction production programs. Verkhovna Rada Decree 2471-KhP (17 June 1992) On the right of possession of certain materials This decree states that citizens and legal entities of foreign countries are not allowed to possess certain goods (like weapons, ammunition, military technology, explosives etc.) on the territory of Ukraine. Presidential decrees Presidential decree 1279 (28 December 1996) On further improving of state export control This decree made responsible the Government Commission for Export Control Policy for the interagency coordination of export control issue and the State Service for Export Control for developing and implementing export control procedures. Presidential decree 423 (13 May 1997) On the statue on the procedures for issuing permits for transfer of information constituting a state secret to another state and the material carriers of such information Presidential decree 117 (13 February 1998) On the statue on state export control in Ukraine With amendments of Presidential Decree 283 (1999) and 953 (1999) this decree regulates the procedures for Ukraine s export control. This was the first rule that contained negotiation permission (which means that exporters have to obtain permission before starting the preparation of a contract) and the so-called catch-all clause (see below). Presidential decree 121 (4 February 1999) This decree transformed the Commission on Export Control Policy into the Commission on Export Control Policy and Technical Cooperation with Foreign 552 AARMS 5(4) (2006)

Countries. The Commission now is subordinate to the Council of National Security and Defence (which is a council of the President). The commission is made up of the following individuals: First Deputy Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council Deputy Minister of Finance Head of the State Service on Export Control Deputy Minister of Defence Deputy Head of the State Customs Service First Deputy Head of the State Security Service Deputy Minister of Industrial Policy First Deputy General Director of the National Space Agency General Director of Ukrspetsexport First Deputy Minister of Industrial Policy Head of the Department of International Aspects of National Security (from National Security and Defence Council) Head of the Department of Strategic Military Security Policy (from National Security and Defence Council) First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Deputy Minister of the Economy The text of this decree has not been made public. 1 Presidential decree 422 (21 April 1999) On measures to perfect military and technical cooperation between Ukraine and other countries The decree contains the roles and responsibilities of the institutes involved in the military technology export control process. Presidential decree 861 (15 June 1999) On procedures of setting (withdrawing) restrictions on export of goods according to international obligations of Ukraine Presidential decree 1573 (15 December 1999) On changes to the structure of executive In 1999 Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma reorganized the structure of the executive branch, deprived the State Service on Export Control (SSEC) of the ministerial status and merging it into the Ministry of Economy. Previously he SSEC had been an independent agency, after the reorganization although it lost its independence retained the same licensing responsibilities it had before. Presidential decree 868 (8 July 2000) On measures to enhance the efficiency of military and technical cooperation between Ukraine and foreign countries 1 Status on Export Controls, 2001 [1] AARMS 5(4) (2006) 553

This edict liquidates the Commission on Export Control Policy and Military- Technical Cooperation with Foreign Countries and replaces it with the Committee for Policy on Military-Technical Cooperation and Export Control. The committee s responsibilities include submitting recommendations and proposals to improve export control system, creating bans on export-import of military and dual-use goods and technologies, helping military-technology cooperation with foreign countries. Presidential decree 1265 (27 December 2001) and 342 (17 April 2002) On State Service on Export Control and Issues of State Service on Export Control Decisions of the Cabinet of Ministers Cabinet of Ministers Resolution 563 (27 July 1995) On procedures of export, import and international transit of goods and technologies can be used in production of missile technologies The resolution contains both export control procedures and control lists for missile technologies according to the guidelines of the MTCR (on of the five national control lists). Cabinet of Ministers Resolution 302 (12 March 1996) On the procedures of control of export, import and transit of goods related to nuclear activities and can be used in construction of nuclear weapons The resolution contains both export control procedures and control lists for nuclear related goods and technologies according to the guidelines of the NSG (on of the five national control lists). Cabinet of Ministers Resolution 1005 (14 August 1996) On the procedures of control of export, import and transit of products, equipments, materials, software and technology that can be used in production of weapons, military and special purpose equipment and list of such goods The resolution establishes export control procedures and control list of the so-called dual-use goods and technologies according to the guidelines of the WA (on of the five national control lists). Cabinet of Ministers Resolution 1247 (9 October 1996) This decree created Ukrspetsexport state company for export-import of military and dual use goods, technologies, and related services. Cabinet of Ministers Resolution 384 (22 April 1997) On the procedures for the control of export, import and transit of goods that can be used in the production of chemical, biological and toxic weapons This resolution among others contains the control list of chemical and biological weapons related goods and technologies according to the guidelines of the AG (on of the five national control lists). 554 AARMS 5(4) (2006)

Cabinet of Ministers Resolution 767 (15 July 1997) On the procedures of review on in the sphere of export control The decree contains the procedure for obtaining an export licence like submitting an application and required documents by the exporter, consultation of the SSEC on the export licence application with other government bodies, decision on granting on export licence or not. Cabinet of Ministers Resolution 1358 (8 December 1997) On adoption of the provisions on the procedures of state control on international munitions transit and list of such goods This decree lists conventional weapons and related technologies that need licence for export (one of the five national control lists). Cabinet of Ministers Resolution 125 (8 February 1998) On the procedures for state monitoring of negotiations involving the conclusion of foreign economic agreements (contracts) on international transfers of military technology and dual-use goods This decree establishes measure for monitoring negotiations with foreign companies on contracts for the export of military or dual-use goods and technologies to countries under a partial embargo. Cabinet of Ministers Resolution 838 (8 June 1998) On the procedures of authorizing persons and organizations engaged in foreign trade to conduct export and import of munitions and sensitive goods Cabinet of Ministers Resolution 920 (27 May 1999) On the procedures for issuing guarantees and for state monitoring of international transfers of military technology and dual-use goods Cabinet of Ministers Resolution 651 (12 April 2000) On the statue on the State Service on Export Control This decree outlines responsibilities for the SSEC like among others issuing permits, reviewing export control documents, revocation or suspension of licences, registering companies involved in international transfer of controlled goods. AARMS 5(4) (2006) 555