"Cash on Hand" and Consumption: Evidence from Mortgage Refinancing [PRELIMINARY AND INCOMPLETE] Atif Mian Princeton University and NBER



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"Cash on Hand" and Consumption: Evidence from Mortgage Refinancing [PRELIMINARY AND INCOMPLETE] Atif Mian Princeton University and NBER Amir Sufi University of Chicago Booth School of Business and NBER February 2014 Abstract We investigate how house price and interest rate movements affect household spending through mortgage refinancing Aggregate movements in house prices and interest rates generate sizable mortgage refinancing waves with a large amount of cross-sectional variation across US zip codes in the share of mortgages that are refinanced We use this cross-sectional variation across zip codes to examine the effect of refinancing--or "cash-on-hand" shocks--on household spending from 2000 to 2012 Cash-out refinancing in response to house price growth has a very large effect on household spending, particularly among low credit score, poorer zip codes The effects of interest-rate driven mortgage refinancing are mixed For the full sample, we find almost no effect of interest-rate driven mortgage refinancing on spending However, we find a positive effect on spending during the 2008 to 2012 period House-price growth-driven and interest-rate driven refinancing generate cash on hand shocks for different households, which is crucial for understanding these results * This research was supported by funding from the Initiative on Global Markets at Chicago Booth, the Fama-Miller Center at Chicago Booth, and the Global Markets Institute at Goldman Sachs Any opinions, findings, or conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the view of Goldman Sachs or the Global Markets Institute We are very grateful to Doug McManus and his team at Freddie Mac for providing us with data We thank Sydney Ludvigson, Jonathan Parker, and Luigi Pistaferri for helpful comments Mian: (609) 258-6718, atif@princetonedu; Sufi: (773) 702 6148, amirsufi@chicagoboothedu

Figure 1 Interest Rates and House Prices, 2000-2012 This figure plots interest rates and house prices from 1998 to 2012 Interest rate data are from FRED, and house price data is from CoreLogic Interest rates 3 5 7 9 Interest rates 1998m1 2000m1 2002m1 2004m1 2006m1 2008m1 2010m1 2012m1 House prices indexed to 2000 100 120 140 160 180 200 House prices 30-year fixed mortgage rate 10-year treasury rate 1998m1 2000m1 2002m1 2004m1 2006m1 2008m1 2010m1 2012m1

Figure 2 Aggregate Mortgage Refinancing This figure plots quarterly cash-out and no-cash-out mortgage refinancing, where the quarterly volume is scaled by the previous quarter's outstanding balance Percentage of total outstanding loans 0 2 4 6 8 2000q1 2002q1 2004q1 2006q1 2008q1 2010q1 2012q1 Cash-out Refinancing No-cash-out Refinancing

Figure 3 House Prices in Low Credit Score Zip Codes Elastic and Inelastic Housing Supply Cities This figure plots house price growth in low credit score zip codes, which are defined to be zip codes in the top population-weighted quartile of the low credit score fraction distribution We split the sample of low credit score zip codes into top and bottom population-weighted quartiles based on their cities' housing supply elasticity House prices, indexed to 2000 100 150 200 250 2000q1 2002q1 2004q1 2006q1 2008q1 2010q1 2012q1 Elastic cities, low credit score zips only Inelastic cities, low credit score zips only

Figure 4 Refinancing in Low Credit Score Zip Codes Elastic and Inelastic Housing Supply Cities This figure plots refinancing activity in low credit score zip codes, which are defined to be zip codes in the top population-weighted quartile of the low credit score fraction distribution We split the sample of low credit score zip codes into top and bottom population-weighted quartiles based on their cities' housing supply elasticity Cash-out refinancing No cash-out refinancing Cash-out refinancing 0 1 2 3 4 5 No-cash-out refinancing 0 2 4 6 2000q1 2002q1 2004q1 2006q1 2008q1 2010q1 2012q1 2000q1 2002q1 2004q1 2006q1 2008q1 2010q1 2012q1 Elastic cities, low credit score zips only Inelastic cities, low credit score zips only

Figure 5 First Stage Coefficients: Cash-out Refinancing and Low Credit Score * Inelastic Housing Supply This figure plots the first stage coefficients of a regression relating the share of outstanding mortgages that are refinanced with cash out in a quarter to the interaction of low credit score fraction in a zip code and inelastic housing supply elasticity The exact equation estimated in is in Equation (3) of the text The dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals Cash-out first-stage coefficient (LCS X Inelastic housing supply) -10 0 10 20 30 2000q1 2002q1 2004q1 2006q1 2008q1 2010q1 2012q1

Figure 6 Cash-out Refinancing and Spending Second Stage Visualization The sample is limited to zip codes in the top quartile of the low credit score fraction distribution, and the sample is then split into the top and bottom quartile based on housing supply elasticity Quartiles are population-weighted Each dot represents a quarter in the sample On the x-axis is the difference in the cash-out refinancing share of outstanding mortgages for zip codes in inelastic versus elastic housing supply cities for that quarter On the y-axis is the natural logarithm difference of auto sales for zip codes in inelastic versus elastic housing supply cities for that quarter Log diff auto purchases, inelastic - elastic -6-5 -4-3 -2-1 2012q4 2001q4 2009q4 2010q4 2011q4 2008q4 2000q4 2007q4 2002q4 2003q4 2006q4 2005q4 2004q4 0 1 2 3 4 Diff cash-out refi share, inelastic - elastic

Figure 7 Differential Income Growth? This figure plots the coefficients of a regression relating the income growth since 2002 to the interaction of low credit score fraction in a zip code and inelastic housing supply elasticity The dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals Differential income growth (LCS X Inelastic housing supply) -1-8 -6-4 -2 0 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Figure 8 House Prices in High and Low No-Cash-Out Refinancing Zip Codes This figure plots house prices indexed to 2000 for the top and bottom population-weighted quartiles of the no-cash-out refinancing propensity distribution for zip codes House price 100 150 200 2000q1 2002q1 2004q1 2006q1 2008q1 2010q1 2012q1 Low No Cashout Average Propensity High No Cashout Average Propensity

Figure 9 Mortgage Refinancing in High and Low No-Cash-Out Refinancing Zip Codes This figure plots no-cash-out and cash-out mortgage refinancing for the top and bottom population-weighted quartiles of the no-cash-out refinancing propensity distribution of zip codes No-cash-out refinancing Cash-out refinancing No-cash-out refinancing share 0 5 10 15 Cash-out refinancing share 0 5 10 15 2000q1 2002q1 2004q1 2006q1 2008q1 2010q1 2012q1 2000q1 2002q1 2004q1 2006q1 2008q1 2010q1 2012q1 Low No Cashout Average Propensity High No Cashout Average Propensity Low No Cashout Average Propensity High No Cashout Average Propensity

Figure 10 Interest Rate-Driven Refinancing and Spending Second Stage Visualization The sample is split into the top and bottom quartile based on no-cash-out refinancing propensity Quartiles are population-weighted Each dot represents a quarter in the sample On the x-axis is the difference in the refinancing share of outstanding mortgages for zip codes in high and low no-cash-out propensity quartiles for that quarter On the y-axis is the natural logarithm difference of auto sales for zip codes in high and low no-cash-out propensity quartiles for that quarter Log diff auto purchases High - Low no-cash-out refi propensity -1 0 1 2 3 2009q4 2010q4 2011q4 2001q4 2012q4 2008q4 2007q4 2006q4 2003q4 2000q4 2004q4 2005q4 2002q4 0 5 10 15 Diff refi share, High - Low no-cash-out refi propensity

Figure 11 Interest-Rate Driven Refinancing and Spending, 2008-2012 This figure replicates the left panel of Figures 9 and Figure 10 (left and right panel, respectively) where the sample is isolated to 2008 through 2012 Mortgage refinancing 0 2 4 6 Mortgage refinancing 2008q1 2009q1 2010q1 2011q1 2012q1 2013q1 Log diff auto purchases High - Low no-cash-out refi propensity 05 1 15 2 25 Second stage visualization 2009q4 2009q2 2011q2 2011q3 2010q4 2009q1 2010q3 2011q4 2012q2 2010q1 2008q2 2009q3 2012q3 2010q2 2012q4 2012q1 2008q4 2011q1 2008q3 Low No Cashout Average Propensity High No Cashout Average Propensity 2008q1 0 1 2 3 4 Diff refi share, High - Low no-cash-out refi propensity

Table 1 Summary Statistics This table presents zip code level, quarter level, and zip code-quarter level summary statistics for our sample, which runs from 2000 to 2012 Low credit score fraction is the fraction of individuals in a zip code with a credit score below 620 as of 2000 Housing supply inelasticity is based on the Saiz (2010) measure Our measure is (5-elasticity)/5 in order to make it vary between 0 and 1The cash-out and no-cash-out refinancing shares are the quarterly flow of cash-out and nocash-out refinancing scaled by outstanding mortgages at the beginning of the period The last two columns present weighted means and standard deviations, where weights are given by the total number of households in the zip code N Mean SD 10th 90th Weighted Weighted SD mean Zip code level Cash-out refinancing share 5440 1594 0607 0845 2323 1558 0551 No-cash-out refinancing share 5440 1951 0788 1119 2885 1811 0659 House price growth, 2000 to 2007 5440 0430 0248 0114 0751 0445 0258 House price growth, 2007 to 2012 5440-0217 0176 0461 0004-0220 0176 Number of households, thousands 5244 112 59 44 189 144 68 Housing supply inelasticity 5440 0656 0181 0394 0851 0670 0181 Low credit score fraction 5361 0229 0119 0102 0381 0238 0109 Ln(median household income) 5163 10782 0326 10375 11205 10735 0319 Less than high school education fraction 5163 0161 0105 0052 0302 0173 0110 Quarter level Cash-out refinancing share 52 1621 1161 0470 2840 No-cash-out refinancing share 52 1876 1761 0606 3573 Interest rate on refinancings 52 6094 1411 4325 7449 Zip-code quarter level New auto purchases per capita 272676 0015 0092 0004 0022 0012 0033 Ln(New auto purchases per capita) 272667-4584 -0695-5422 3827-4714 0674 Total outstanding mortgages 282866 3242 2077 1103 6022 3850 2214 Total outstanding mortgage balance ($ millions) 282866 504 461 104 1090 591 512

Table 2 Cross-Sectional Determinants of Cash-out Refinancing Share This table presents regressions of the average cash-out refinancing share of outstanding mortgages on CBSA-level housing supply inelasticity, the low credit score fraction of a zip code, and the interaction of the two The observation is a zip code, and the refinancing share variables are zip code averages of quarterly observations from 2000 to 2012 In columns 5 and 6, the left hand side variable is the Bartik (1991) loading, or beta, of the zip code on cash-out refinancing aggregate shocks Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust, clustered at the CBSA-level All regressions are population-weighted (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Cash-out Cash-out Cash-out Cash-out refinancing refinancing refinancing refinancing share share share beta (Bartik) House price growth, 2002-2007 Cash-out refinancing beta (Bartik) Housing supply inelasticity 0524** 1218** 0037 0858** -0003 (0085) (0247) (0314) (0188) (0276) Low credit score fraction (LCS) -3467** -3084** (0722) (0597) LCS x inelasticity 4786** 3373** (1061) (0857) House price growth, 2002-2007 0559* (0259) Constant -0054 1392** 0742** 1603** 0376** 1155** (0046) (0087) (0153) (0195) (0115) (0183) Observations 5,244 5,244 5,244 5,243 5,244 5,243 R-squared 0221 0042 0160 0188 0108 0159 ** p<001, * p<005

Table 3 The Effect of House-Price Driven Refinancing on New Auto Purchases This table presents the second-stage estimates of log new auto purchases per capita on the cash-out refinancing share of outstanding mortgages The sample includes zip-code quarterly observations from 2000 to 2012, and all specifications include both zip code and quarter fixed effects All regressions are population-weighted In columns 2 and 3, we instrument for the cash-out refi share using housing supply inelasticity of the CBSA, low credit score share in the zip code, and the interaction of these two variables In column 4, the right hand side variable is average cash-out refinancing share of that zip code multiplied by the aggregate cash-out refinancing share in that quarter In columns 5 and 6, we instrument the cashout refi share with only the LCS*housing supply inelasticity interaction variable, using the levels of these two variables as controls In columns 3 through 6, we use the 2000 natural log of median household income and share with less than a high school education interacted with quarter fixed effects as controls Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust, clustered at the CBSA-level Dependent variable: Ln(new auto purchases per capita) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) IV, only LCS*inelastic as instrument OLS IV IV Bartik Ln(New auto purchases per capita) IV, only LCS*inelastic as instrument, Cash-out refinancing share 0046** 0049** 0037** 0059* 0062* (0005) (0010) (0012) (0024) (0026) Bartik cash-out refinancing share 0037** (0007) CBSA x quarter FE? No No No No No Yes Controls? No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Observations 272,667 272,604 268,393 268,456 268,393 268,393 R-squared 0849 0846 0850 0850 0852 0858 ** p<001, * p<005

Table 4 The Effect of House-Price Driven Refinancing on New Auto Purchases in First Difference Regressions This table presents cross-sectional first difference regressions of the growth in quarterly average per capita new auto purchases on the change in quarterly average cash-out refinancing share from the pre-treatment to the treatment period The pre-treatment period runs from 2000q1 to 2002q2 and the treatment period runs from 2002q3 to 2008q1 Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust, clustered at the CBSA-level All regressions are population-weighted Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) OLS Reduced Form Reduced Form, CBSA-FE Second stage Second stage, CBSA-FE (5) with control variables (5) with HP growth RHS variable Ln(Average auto purchases per capita) Cash-out refinancing share 0045** 0073** 0095** 0092** (0009) (0026) (0031) (0031) LCS x inelasticity 0790* 0836** (0327) (0295) Low credit score fraction (LCS) -0650** -0883** -0190** -0373** -0281** -0169* (0230) (0199) (0063) (0051) (0088) (0073) Housing supply inelasticity -0156-0128 (0080) (0066) Ln(median household income) 0111* 0195** (0046) (0033) Fraction with less than HS education 0216 0290* (0129) (0130) House price growth, 2002-2007 0849** (0238) Constant -0139** 0043-0013 -0038 0025-1097* -2160** (0015) (0056) (0012) (0033) (0014) (0514) (0378) Observations 5,244 5,240 5,240 5,240 5,240 5,159 5,159 R-squared 0031 0007 0207 0035 0177 0189 0160 ** p<001, * p<005

Table 5 Heterogeneity in Cash-Out Refinancing and Spending Response This table presents cross-sectional first difference regressions of the growth in quarterly average per capita new auto purchases and the change in quarterly average cash-out refinancing share from the pre-treatment to the treatment period on house price growth from 2002 to 2007 All columns report the second stage of an instrumental variables specification in which housing supply inelasticity and housing supply inelasticity interacted with the relevant measure of cash on hand are the instruments The pre-treatment period runs from 2000q1 to 2002q2 and the treatment period runs from 2002q3 to 2008q1 Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust, clustered at the CBSA-level All regressions are population-weighted (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Dependent variable Cash-out refinancing share Ln(Average auto purchases per capita) House price growth, 2002-2007 1676 27195** 13367** -0264 5953** 1358** (0954) (9130) (1945) (0198) (2246) (0392) LCS x HP growth, 2002-2007 9403** 1232* (3143) (0515) Low credit score fraction (LCS) -2728** -0479** (0862) (0144) Ln(median household income) x HP growth, 2002-2007 -2157* -0552* (0854) (0215) Ln(median household income) 0860** 0198** (0244) (0055) Ln(net worth per household) x HP growth, 2002-2007 -1543** -0231** (0292) (0070) Ln(net worth per household) 0311** 0112** (0092) (0018) Constant 0526* -9390** -2011** 0011-2233** -0749** (0233) (2626) (0544) (0049) (0581) (0100) Observations 5,240 5,163 5,102 5,240 5,163 5,102 R-squared 0331 0314 0280 0022 0023 0036 ** p<001, * p<005

Table 6 Cross-Sectional Determinants of No-cash-out Refinancing Share This table presents regressions of the average no-cash-out refinancing share of outstanding mortgages on CBSA-level housing supply inelasticity, the low credit score fraction of a zip code, and the interaction of the two The observation is a zip code, and the refinancing share variables are zip code averages of quarterly observations from 2000 to 2012 In column 3, the left hand side variable is the Bartik (1991) loading, or beta, of the zip code on no-cash-out refinancing aggregate shocks Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust, clustered at the CBSA-level All regressions are population-weighted (1) (2) (3) (4) No-cash-out No-cash-out refinancing beta refinancing share (Bartik) No-cash-out refinancing share No-cash-out refinancing share, 2008-2012 Housing supply inelasticity -0007 0413-0270 (0262) (0569) (0377) Low credit score fraction (LCS) -3614** -2447** -2917** (0250) (0878) (0598) LCS x inelasticity -1720 0195 (1449) (0973) No-cash-out refi share, 2000-2003 0429** (0043) Constant 2678** 2390** 1799** 0086 (0117) (0319) (0213) (0148) Observations 5,243 5,243 5,243 5,244 R-squared 0356 0358 0462 0510 ** p<001, * p<005

Table 7 The Effect of Interest-Rate-Driven Refinancing on New Auto Purchases This table presents estimate of the effect of no-cash-out refinancing on new auto purchases The sample includes zip-code quarterly observations from 2000 to 2012, and all specifications include both zip code and quarter fixed effects All regressions are population-weighted Columns 1 through 3 present estimate from the first stage regression of refinancing share on the Bartik no-cash-out refinancing share The Bartik no-cash-out refinancing share is defined as the average cash-out refi share of the zip code from 2000 to 2012 interacted with the aggregate no-cash-out refinancing share in that quarter In column 5, we instrument for the total refinancing share of outstanding mortgages using the Bartik no-cash-out refinancing share Columns 1 through 5 focus on the full sample, columns 6 and 7 on 2000 to 2003, and columns 8 and 9 on 2008 to 2012 Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust, clustered at the CBSA-level Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) Ln(new Ln(new Ln(new auto auto auto Cash-out Total refi purchases purchases Total refi purchases Total refi refi share share per capita) per capita) share per capita) share No-cashout refi share Estimation type First stage First stage First stage 2000-2000- 2000- Time period 2012 2012 2012 Ln(new auto purchases per capita) Reduced form IV First stage IV First stage IV 2000-2000- 2000-2000- 2008-2008- 2012 2012 2003 2003 2012 2012 Bartik no-cash-out refi share 0635** 0264** 0900** 0000 0883** 0992** (0024) (0027) (0047) (0002) (0048) (0069) Total refi share 0000 0001 0029** (0003) (0003) (0007) Observations 272,678 272,678 272,678 272,667 272,667 83,904 83,903 104,870 104,860 R-squared 0905 0686 0856 0845 0845 0920 0888 0790 0884 ** p<001, * p<005

Table 8 The Effect of Interest-Rate-Driven Refinancing on New Auto Purchases, 2008-2012 Robustness This table replicates the instrumental variables specification of log new auto purchases per capital on total refinancing share of outstanding mortgages, where the latter is instrumented with the Bartik no-cash-out refinancing share, which is defined as the average cash-out refi share of the zip code from 2000 to 2012 interacted with the aggregate no-cash-out refinancing share in that quarter The baseline specification is reported in column 9 of Table 5 Column 1 uses only the average cash-out refi share of the zip code from 2000 to 2007 as an out-of-sample test Column 2 includes the 2000 natural log of median household income and share with less than a high school education interacted with quarter fixed effects as controls Column 3 includes the combined loan-to-value ratio of the zip code and house price growth from 2006 to 2009 interacted with the quarter fixed effects as controls Column 4 includes the interaction of zip code average cash-out refi share with quarter of year indicator variables Column 5 includes the interaction of zip code average cash-out refi share with a linear time trend and the interaction with GDP growth in each quarter In the last column, the left hand side variable is the natural logarithm of all other (non-mortgage) debt originations in a zip code, data we only have beginning in 2009q4 All specifications include both zip code and quarter fixed effects All regressions are population-weighted, standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust, clustered at the CBSA-level Dependent variable Out of sample Bartik sort Ln(other originations) Ln(new auto purchases per capita) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Allowing differential time trend Income and Housing Quarter of and GDP education market year growth All (1) - (5) controls controls interaction interaction controls Total refi share 0026** 0033** 0030** 0028** 0021** 0018** (0009) (0012) (0007) (0006) (0005) (0007) Bartik no-cash-out refi share 0002 (0004) Observations 104,860 103,241 99,627 104,860 104,860 98,088 68162 R-squared 0884 0887 0887 0884 0884 0890 0974 ** p<001, * p<005