Altrusm, Foregn A an Humantaran ltary Interventon by Carlos Segle Department of Eonoms Rutgers nversty Newark, N.J. 7,.S.A.
ABSTRACT The state objetves for ountres n provng foregn a have been for strateg, eonom an for humantaran motves. The en of the Col War an the reent sntegraton of terrtoral states has nrease the promnene of the humantaran objetve. Therefore, the paper onentrates on the transfer of resoures from wealther an poltally stable ountres to poorer an poltally unstable ones. The amount of foregn a prove by governments an nternatonal relef agenes s etermne by the altrust esres of nvuals. Wthn a mean voter framework, t s foun that foregn a s nreasng n the egree of altrusm of the mean voter, ther nome, the smlarty the mean voter has wth the ethnty or relgon of the repent group an n the number of vlan asualtes resultng from arme onflts n the repent naton, an nversely relate to the sze of the repent ountry an the extent that nternatonal relef s beng plfere. Ths latter result explans foregn a fatgue. An mplaton of ths analyss s that onor natons may have an nentve to ntervene mltarly n vl onflts whh reue the welfare of ther altrust tzens n orer to establsh orer n the relef effort or stablze or establsh a government apable of ontrollng the omest unrest. Ths opton wll be hosen f the welfare of the mean voter s greater uner mltary nterventon than uner the status quo of ontnung to sen only a. Interventon wll our, the more effetve the mltary opton s n reung the unrest, the greater the egree of altrusm of the mean voter, the larger the sze of the onor ountry, the lower the ost of nterventon, the larger the extent an sze of the group beng vtmze, the lower the relatve valuaton plae on
alternatve omest uses of foregn a an the greater the sze of the transfer beng prove. 3
INTRODCTION The en of Worl War II an wth t the start of the Col War marks the begnnng of the use of foregn a as an nstrument to transfer resoures between eonomes (see Ruttan, 996 for an overvew). In the S, the frst government program was the arshall lan n 948 to help restore war-torn Western Europe. The number of programs an ther versty, along wth the number of natons partpatng n ths global restrbuton of resoures has sne then expane ramatally. The man objetves gven for provng foregn a, whether by publ or prvate (NGO) organzatons have been: ) strateg, ) eonom an 3) humantaran. The strateg objetve for provng a to foregn governments has been to enhane or mantan the natonal seurty of the onor ountry. For example, n the Col War pero the objetve was to ontan the expanson of the Sovet non s nfluene. Ths requre provng assstane to ountres to prevent them from fallng wthn the Sovet s sphere of nfluene. The eonom objetve of grantng a s ouhe n the rhetor of promotng the exports an also the employment of the onor ountry. Fnally, the humantaran objetve, unlke the prevous two objetves s not omnate by onorountry onerns, but more by the nees of the repent ountry. Examples nlue onern for eonom evelopment n the poorer ountres of the worl an by meetng the bas nees of many of these people. It s ffult to examne the state reasons gven by onor ountres for ther foregn assstane an ategorze the objetve nto one of these three. In fat, they are not neessarly mutually exlusve of eah other. The eonom an humantaran objetves of foregn a have been hstorally met by the use of mltary fore to 4
omplement the transfer of resoures when the a tself s not of mltary equpment an tranng. For example, n the ase of the S ths a took the form of ret mltary nvolvement n Vetnam, an more reently n Kuwat. Smlarly, eonom a may also serve strateg purposes. Also the onsttuenes for these fferent objetves of a vary. We may ategorze the groups broaly nto two types of onsttuenes. The frst are the onororente groups, e.g., groups who are solely ntereste or responsble for the poltal an strateg onerns an the eonom osts an benefts of assstane to nterest groups suh as nustry, shppng, agrulture an labor. The seon are repent-orente groups whose man onern les wth the eonom evelopment, humantaran an human rghts nees of the repent ountres. Examples n ths ategory are the fferent ethn ommuntes n the onor ountry an the human nees onsttueny suh as OXFA an other VO (prvate volunteer organzatons). The en of the Col War has seen foregn assstane for strateg purposes mnsh. In aton, the sntegraton of natons an the ensung vl wars has le to a promnene n the humantaran objetve an wth t the role of the S mltary an that of other ountres has been presse to hange. Several reent mltary nvolvements are ffult to justfy as beng emane by purely natonal seurty nterest. For example, the state objetve of the S mltary msson n Somala was to faltate the transfer of foregn a, mostly n foo an mene, beng onute through prvate as well as governmental agenes. Ths more effent transfer was expete to reue the starvaton of the populaton. oltal unrest n Hat an the aompanyng eteroraton of eonom ontons le to a mass exous of people towars the S. Ths prompte 5
the use of the mltary by the S to restore orer an stem the flow of refugees. In Bosna, the mltary has alreay been eploye to elver foo an mene an now s beng eploye n a peaekeepng role to reue the lkelhoo of further asualtes to the populaton. Smlar roles for the mltary may be seen n the future n suh areas as the Suan where a vl war pttng Chrstans an uslms has resulte n famne, n Rwana whh experene a vl war, or n other areas of the worl experenng vl unrest. The stanar arms rae moels motvatng mltary bulup an ther potental use were preate on the exstene of an aversary that threatene natonal seurty, a stuaton whh exste urng the Col War (see e.g., Brto, 97; Brto an Intrlgator, 977, 985; Intrlgator, 975; Intrlgator an Brto, 984; Isar, 988; Gure, 965; Segle, 988). But what of the urrent use of the mltary for goals that o not seem to serve the natonal seurty nterest of a ountry? Ths paper aresses ths ssue by presentng a postve theory of humantaran mltary nterventon,.e., the use of fore when natonal seurty s not at rsk to omplement the use of a for humantaran objetves. The results are base on a moel groune n the ratonalty of altrust nvuals. If nvuals seekng to transfer resoures to the populaton of a ountry on the brnk of starvaton or annhlaton, ether through prvate (NGOs) or publ hannels, fn that ther esres are not beng aheve satsfatorly they may opt to support mltary nterventon to mprove the strbuton of ths a f the outome of ths strategy nreases ther welfare. ore spefally, a poltal equlbrum exsts wth humantaran mltary nterventon as the optmal strategy f the welfare of the mean voter s greater when ths strategy s employe then when a more natve one s utlze. 6
Ths paper shoul also be vewe as provng a theoretal framework for muh of the empral work on the etermnants of foregn a to evelopng ountres. These papers have poste possble poltal objetves of foregn a an then teste these hypotheses. For example, stues have analyze whether foregn a s te to the human rghts reor of the regme n power, amongst other fators (see for example, Abrams an Lews, 993; Ball an Ball, 99; azels an Nssanke, 984; Knlay an Lttle, 979; ala, 993). In aton, ths paper flls a vauum n the lterature on humantaran mltary nterventon by presentng a formal moel, n ontrast to the exstng lterature where analyss of the top tens to be normatve n sope an empral work relegate to ase methos (see e.g., Gorenker an Wess, 99; Wess an near, 993). The next seton of ths paper evelops the moel more formally. In seton III, an analyss of the poltal equlbrum propertes of the theory s presente. In the fnal seton the results are summarze an some onlusons rawn. THE HANITARIAN AID ODEL We assume two ountres whh we enote by an. Country s assume to be n a state of anarhy or a state where the entral government s unable to ontrol ts arme fores or paramltary groups that are onfsatng some fraton,, of the resoures avalable to the representatve househol or nvual n the ountry. We assume that nvuals n Country, ether through prvate groups (NGOs) or through ther government (whh represents the esre of the mean voter) are transferrng resoures to Country at the rate T per househol n that ountry. If we enote the enowment of resoures of the representatve househol n Country by e, then after 7
the arme groups onfsate ther porton the famly has ( ) e Tgresoures avalable for ther onsumpton. Ther preferenes are represente by the followng utlty funton: b, ( ) h, () o where o enotes own onsumpton, enotes the onsumpton of one's hlren or other famly members, an enotes the level of utlty of one's hlren whh s assume to epen upon the onsumpton mae avalable by parent's transfers. We assume that o an,.e., that parent's welfare s nreasng n own an hlren's onsumpton. onstrant The onsumpton hoes avalable to the househol are boune by the buget o + = ( ) e T b ġ () axmzaton of equaton () subjet to () yels the optmum levels of own an hlren's onsumpton gven the ntal househol enowment e, the amount of foregn a T, an the rate of onfsaton. It s easy to show that onsumpton falls as the rate of onfsaton rses. Very hgh rates woul lea to famne an eath. Wthn ths framework we oul efne = as the atual starvaton of the tzenry wth, () h. 3 (3) 8
We assume that Country possesses the mltary power,, neessary to reue the rate of onfsaton by arme groups n Country,.e., () wth. (4) Ths eployment s fnane by a lump-sum tax on househols n Country at the rate m, where f there are N househols =mn. Househol's preferenes n Country are haraterze by the followng utlty funton: 4 where o W o, ( ) h, (5), enote own an hlren's onsumpton of the th househol n Country, an, enote the utlty of one's hlren or other fellow tzens an the maxmum attanable level of utlty of a representatve househol n Country, respetvely. Sne, for smplty, t s assume that utlty s separable, the egree of altrusm towars the tzens of Country s represente by where we assume. For example, f =, then no altrusm exsts towars tzens of Country sne the seon term n the utlty funton s zero. Conversely, f = then foregner s well-beng enters symmetrally as that of the part of total utlty erve from spenng on oneself. In general, ths spefaton mples that as nreases, so oes the egree of altrusm towars those experenng famne or vl unrest. The hoes avalable to ths househol are boune by one of the followng buget onstrants: 9
T = e, (6) o T = e m. (7) o The onstrant gven by (6) s relevant when the ountry s not ntervenng mltarly an therefore, gven an enowment of e t alloates ths amongst own, hlren s, an foregner's onsumpton. Alternatvely, f the ountry ntervenes mltarly t osts the th househol m n taxes to fnane ths nterventon leavng (e -m) n sposable nome to fnane the alternatve hoes n spenng an equaton (7) s applable. To restate, whh buget onstrant s operatonal epens upon whether Country ees to ntervene to reue the rate of onfsaton. Denote the number of househols n Country whh are beng subjete to onfsaton by K. If all foregn a s prove through prvate organzatons whh reeve hartable onatons from househols n Country, then the amount of the transfer reeve per househol subjete to onfsaton n Country s: 5 N T T. (8) K Conversely, f we assume a s prove through the government then T = T N K where T s the amount of a esre by the househol ontanng the mean voter. 6 Suppose the ountry s ntally aoptng a strategy of non-nterventon. Then maxmzaton of equaton (5) subjet to (6) yels the optmum levels of own an hlren's onsumpton, as well as the amount of transfers househol esres to be mae to Country. ore formally, eah househol solves
AX L =, ( o ) e o h T, (9) o,, T, yelng the followng frst-orer ontons:, () o, () T. () Sne, AX e o, (- )(e + T) -o j, (3) o by the envelope theorem an takng nto onseraton equaton (8), equaton () an be rewrtten as h ( ), (') K or equvalently by the frst-orer onton to (3), o ( ). ('') K Note above that a transfer of a ollar to foregners by an nvual only nreases the former's onsumpton by (-)/K sne a part of the transfer,, s onfsate an the remaner has to be sprea amongst K househols. The amount of the transfer that s atually realze nreases the utlty of the repents at the rate o an t yels
the omest househol only some fraton of that n utlty,, ther rate of altrusm towars foregners. From equatons (), () an ('), we an see that the optmal alloaton of resoures n househol requres o o ( ), (4) K.e., they alloate ther resoures suh that the margnal utlty erve from onsumng an atonal unt s equal to the beneft they erve from nreasng ther hlren s or fellow tzen s onsumpton or from nreasng the onsumpton of a tzen of Country. By totally fferentatng equatons (6), (), () an (') we an establsh the relatonshp between nreases n the rate of onfsaton, the sze of the repent populaton of the foregn ountry K, the egree of altrusm towars foregners, an the amount of resoures whh omest househols wsh to transfer to them, T. In matrx notaton, the total fferentaton of the frst orer ontons yels L N o o L F - o H I O N K Q ( ) o K O o L O T Q N Q
3 = K o ( ) L N O Q K + K o L N O Q + K L N O Q o ( ). (5) Cramer's Rule yels the followng soluton: o T K o o F H G I K J R S T V W, (6) o T K K o o F H G I K J R S T V W ( ), (7) o T K o o F H G I K J R S T V W ( ), (8) o K o o F H G I K J R S T V W, (9) o K o o R S T V W, () where s the etermnant of the matrx n equaton (5) an s negatve by the seon orer onton for a maxmum. We assume that mnshng margnal utlty n own, hlren's, an foregner's onsumpton exsts wthn the relevant ranges an that own onsumpton an hlren's onsumpton are omplementary or more spefally that
>. () o Ths last assumpton states that nvual s valuaton of ther own onsumpton s nrease f ther hlren or other members of ther soety are better off. These assumptons are suffent, although not neessary, to establsh the sgns of equatons (6)-() as follows: T, T K, T, o,. (6') (7') (8') (9') (') The nterpretatons of these sgns are straghtforwar. The result gven by equaton (6') s that an nrease n the rate of onfsaton wll reue the amount of foregn a that househols n Country esre to prove to Country. Sne proportonally less of the foregn a s reeve by the general populaton as the rate of loss nreases, t beomes optmal to ret greater resoures towars omest uses. Ths foregn a fatgue s ontrary to the belef that greater humantaran sasters wll be met by greater nternatonal support. Large-sale genoes, famnes an vl wars are more lkely to elt smaller foregn a per apta. The nterpretaton of equaton (7') omplements ths result, namely that ountres experenng omest unrest wth larger 4
populatons requrng a (K) wll ten to reeve less foregn assstane. Alternatvely, f we nterpret a erease n K (a elne n the populaton) as resultng from an nrease n the number of vlans klle, then a nreases when suh ours. We also fn the expete result gven by (8') that the more altrust an nvual s (measure by ) the greater the amount of transfers they are wllng to prove foregn ountres. If the egree of altrusm nreases when the repent s from the same ethn group or relgon, then we shoul expet that the foregn a of a onor ountry s postvely orrelate to the egree of smlarty t has wth the ethnty or relgon of the repent group. For example, the S proves large amounts of foregn a to Israel an Greee sne members of these ethn groups are poltally atve n lobbyng for a. Sne ths a serves to omplement the strateg nterests of the S as n the ase of Israel, t leas to a greater amount beng prove. Smlarly, the largest repent of foregn a from Frane are ts former olones. As for the effets of the rate of onfsaton on own onsumpton ( o ) an on the other omest soures for altrust transfers ( ), both are nreasng n ths rate as gven by the sgns of equatons (9') an ('). In other wors, as the rate of onfsaton n Country nreases, tzens of Country nrease spenng on themselves, ther famles, an on omest hartes, an reue ther hartable assstane to foregners (or ther government oes so sne we assume t respons to the preferenes of the mean voter who esres that foregn assstane be reue). Smlarly, the welfare of nvuals n Country s elnng n. Ths s establshe by fferentatng equaton (9) wth respet to, yelng 5
W L N o L N o O Q ( ) K o + L N o O T Q O Q o ( e T). () Sne the frst three brakete terms are equal to zero by the frst-orer ontons, we get W ( e T). (') THE ILITARY OTION WITHIN A OLITICAL EQILIBRI We now explore when the government of Country wll fn t optmal to ntervene mltarly nstea of just provng foregn a. We post that ths eson s governe wthn a poltal equlbrum framework by the esres of the mean voter whose preferenes are sngle-peake. To smplfy matters we have assume that all nvuals have smlar enowments n the moel but that ther preferenes vary. ore spefally, fferent nvuals are more altrust then others as measure by the sze of. In the prevous seton, we formulate the moel so that househol transfers to foregn tzens oul be nterprete as beng realze solely through onatons to nternatonal relef agenes. Sne equaton (8) establshes that T s monotonally nreasng n we an etermne the total amount prove n foregn a through prvate relef agenes. We know that T T (,, K,e). (3) 6
If F( ) enotes the proporton of the populaton of Country whose egree of altrusm s less then,.e., f F(.) s the umulatve strbuton funton of n the tzenry, then the average amount of prvate foregn a, T, s: z T = T ( ) F ( ). (4) We oul equally nterpret T as the amount that househol woul lke ther government to tax them an strbute to the tzens of Country n foregn a. The amount that the government of Country atually proves wll be governe by the esres of the mean voter. ore spefally, the poltal equlbrum governng the average amount of foregn assstane s etermne by T T (,, K,e) where s the egree of altrusm of the esve or mean voter. The esve voter s etermne by z F( ). (5) It s possble that ntervenng mltarly n Country oul nrease the welfare of altrust nvuals n Country. To examne ths, let us assume two stages n the poltal proess. In the frst stage, the amount of a Country sens to Country s etermne by the esres of the mean voter gven some rate of onfsaton,. 7 In the seon stage, the eson to ntervene s etermne by whether the welfare of the esve voter an be mprove by mltary nterventon gven that a has alreay been preommtte. 7
We frst assume that the extent of the mltary nvolvement,, s propose by the leaers of Country. The eson whether to proee wth ths opton s governe by whether the mean voter prefers ths opton whh reues the onfsaton rate to (), to the status quo of ontnung to sen a whh s onfsate at the hgher rate,. 8 Notng that the ost per househol of mltary nvolvement s m=/n, then gven T, the househol ontanng the mean voter supports nterventon f: W =, ( ) e + (e m N K nterventon o ( ) o ) W, ( ) e + (e ) N K, no-nterventon a f a fa f a o f a fa o f (6) where o, when t s supporte. are the amounts onsume when nterventon oes not our an, o The above onton mples that the mean voter s support of mltary nterventon s nreasng wth that nvual s level of altrusm. Smlarly, the greater the ost to the mean voter resultng from an nterventon of sze m, the less wll t be supporte. Fnally, the more proutve the mltary opton s n reung,.e., the more negatve s, the greater wll be the support for ths opton. Other smlar mplatons follow regarng the sze of Countres an, as well as the rate of onfsaton,. We oul permt the eson to ntervene mltarly an the amount of resoures ommtte to the mltary nvolvement be governe by the esres of the mean voter. In ths ase, the welfare aheve by ntervenng mltarly s etermne by maxmzng 8
W, as gven by equaton (5), subjet to the onstrant gven by equaton (7) together wth the onton that m. The Lagrangan s AX H =, ( o ) e m o h T. (7) o,, T, m, We get the Kuhn-Tuker ontons gven by equaton ()-() for the mean voter (assumng an nteror soluton for onsumpton) along wth or an m, (8) ( e T) N, (8') L N o O Q e T) N m (, (9) o sne = m N. sng equaton (4), onton (8') an be restate as: K e T) N ( ) (. (8'') Ths system of equatons etermnes whether the mean voter prefers mltary nvolvement, m >, an f so, the amount of resoures the mean voter woul lke ommtte to mltary nterventon takng nto onseraton that the rate of onfsaton,, s reue as resoures are verte towars mltary nterventon. The atual transfer ahevable after nterventon s ( m ) T = ( m ) h h T N K where T s the a preommtte to n the frst stage. If (8') hols wth strt nequalty, then m = an nterventon s not supporte by the mean voter. We an see from equaton (8') an 9
(8'') that ths s more lkely to be the ase: a) the smaller the amount of transfers T beng gven to Country, b) the smaller the margnal valuaton plae by the repent of these resoures o, ) the smaller the sze of the onor ountry N, ) the less s the egree of altrusm of the mean voter, e) the smaller the sze of the group beng vtmze K, f) the smaller the rate of onfsaton by bants, an g) the less proutve the nterventon s n reung,.e.,. These onlusons are smlar to those obtane above when we nstea assume that the leaers propose the sze of the mltary nvolvement. Fnally, another emprally testable mplaton from ths moel s that humantaran nterventons, as oppose to those motvate by other onerns, wll be nversely sorte by the nome or wealth of ountres,.e., rher ountres, those wth lower unemployment, nome nequalty or more generally lower omest nees for resoures wll ntervene n poorer, unstable ountres wthout any obvous geopoltal avantage. Interventons tate by natonal seurty or eonom onerns wll show no suh orrelaton. SARY The en of the Col War has seen an nrease n humantaran foregn assstane an wth t the eployment of mltary fore by the nternatonal ommunty to omplement t. Ths paper onentrates on evelopng a moel of humantaran a from wealther poltally stable ountres to poorer an poltally unstable ones to unerstan ths proess. The amount of foregn a prove s etermne by the altrust esres of nvuals usng nternatonal relef agenes or ther governments as vehles,.e., the
state as a untary ator. In partular, when omest upheaval ramatally reues the stanar of lvng of a naton t s prove wth humantaran a. The amount whh s gven s etermne by the preferenes of the mean voter. Wthn ths framework, t s foun that foregn a s nreasng n the egree of altrusm an the level of nome of the mean voter, an n the number of vlan asualtes resultng from the unrest, an s nversely relate to the sze of the repent ountry (holng the level of a per househol onstant) an the extent to whh the nternatonal a s beng plfere. Donor natons may have an nentve to ntervene mltarly n vl onflts whh reue the welfare of ther tzens n orer to establsh orer n the relef effort or stablze or establsh a government apable of ontrollng the omest unrest. Ths opton wll be hosen f the welfare of the mean voter s greater uner mltary nterventon than uner the status quo of ontnung to sen only a. The egree of nterventon s greater the more effetve s the mltary opton n reung the unrest, the greater s the egree of altrusm of the esve nvual, the larger the sze of the onor naton, the lower the ost of nterventon, the larger the extent an sze of the group beng vtmze, the lower the relatve valuaton plae on alternatve omest uses of foregn a an the greater the sze of the transfer.
ACKNOWLEDGEENT I thank Steven Brams, hael Intrlgator, Walter Isar, ar Klgour, hael Gnns, three anonymous referees an the partpants at the Worl eae Sene Congress n Amsteram, The Netherlans for the omments prove. The fnanal support of the Ameran-Sannavan Founaton, the orrs Bek Fun an the Rutgers Researh Counl s gratefully appreate.
NOTES For the onvenene of exposton, we wll refer to the altrusm exstng wthn househols as beng rete towars hlren or other famly members. But we oul just as easly efne t to be rete towars other tzens of one s ountry. Ths broaer nterpretaton s useful for t ntroues a trae-off onfrontng government: whether to ret resoures ollete through taxaton on omest nome restrbuton programs or spen these on foregn a,.e., on the restrbuton of nome aross ountres. Therefore, throughout the paper when referene s mae to the altrusm of househols towars famly members t an be nterprete as altrusm towars fellow tzens. Throughout we assume that the pre of onsumpton s unty. 3 The problem an be haraterze n a fferent manner. Let S ( ) be the probablty of survvng, whh s assume to be ereasng n. Then a househol an be vewe as maxmzng expete utlty, E S ( ), S ( ) h, where S s the probablty o of one s offsprng survvng whh also s a funton of. Ths approah yels smlar results to our smpler moel at the expense of atonal notaton. 4 We oul assume that nvuals n Country have smlar preferenes,.e., they are altrust towars foregners but that ther low level of nome onstrans them to hoose zero transfers to Country. Over those levels of nome whh we are onserng, the results are ental to those aheve by usng the utlty funton nvuals n Country are assume to possess. 5 Assumng for smplty no amnstraton or transatons ost. 3
6 If we assume (J-K) of the populaton of Country s partpatng n the onfsaton then ths group's per apta nome s [e T( )]K / (J - K). We note that the total amount of humantaran a, T, s a funton of the rate of onfsaton,, an we assume that ths rate s hosen to maxmze the per apta nome of ths group. 7 We oul omplate the moel by ntroung strateg onseratons. For example, a more generalze moel of onflt has (, ) where now enotes the resoures expene by bants n the onfsaton of resoures. The bants payoff s now: B (, )[ e T( )] K J K. (A) The verson presente here shoul be vewe as the Stakelberg equlbrum of a game where the bants frst hoose an therefore,, an the onors then hoose T. In the seon stage, the onors ee whether to ntervene mltarly or not. A more general theory of war whh nlues natonal seurty onerns s attane by allowng the mltary resoures of ountry,, to aversely nfluene the level of enowments (or resoures) of nvuals n ountry ether by ret attaks or by threatenng ther eonom nterests (see Segle, 998 for a more general moel). 8 A more general nterpretaton of ths rule s that a ountry shoul ntervene when the expete utlty from onflt s postve (see Bueno e esquta, 98, 985). 4
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