Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security

Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security 2009 Edition Direction Générale de l Armement

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strategic plan for research & technology in defence and security (PS R&T) 2009 edition Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security DGA 2009 1

1 Preface Blandine Vinson Rouchon - Director of the Research and Technology in Defence and Security Division (DGA/DS/SRTS) DGAcom -F. Vrignaud Recent events are a reminder of how much the world as we know it has changed and continues to change ever more rapidly. A year ago, the White Paper on Defence and National Security outlined our new priorities. The Strategic Plan for Research & Technology outlines the way forward and the investments needed for our defence system and future procurement programmes. In order to meet future defence and national security challenges, we collectively (i.e. all stakeholders) must be in a position to make the most of technological breakthroughs, whether we initiated them or not. I therefore hope this Strategic Plan will stimulate substantial interest from our current and future partners leading to an increase in cooperation allowing us to achieve the initiatives highlighted in this plan. It is intended that this document will serve as a clear open reference for men and women in the Ministry of Defence, be they officers, engineers or researchers in their dealings with those who help us on a daily basis to prepare future systems for our Forces. Special attention has been given to the type of contracts which are best suited to deliver fast joint work. I also believe that this plan provides our current R&T partners, whether in industry, academia or other organisations, with a clear understanding of what they have been sharing with DGA for a number of years. This English version will promote the DGA R&T vision which will facilitate exchanges with our partners abroad. As we are particularly keen to share the majority of our R&T projects in Europe and with our partners, we have made a special effort to identify priority areas suitable for cooperation. As a matter of fact, the question now is not Can I find a way to cooperate? but rather Is there anything that stand in the way of cooperation? The Strategic Pan describes the implications for R&T following the publication of the 2009 30-Year Plan (Plan prospectif à 30 ans, or PP30 ). The 30-Year Plan prepares and recommends the choices to be made to procure and maintain operational capabilities for our forces now and in the future. With that in mind, we have undertaken an exhaustive yet synthetic appraisal of all technical areas related to defence and security. Priorities were identified and are listed according to technical domains to ensure successful implementation by DGA Technical Team Leaders. The Strategic Plan also complements the document entitled Basic Research Policy (POS) which serves as a reference for DGA and focuses on low TRL (1) technologies from basic research to initial lab tests. As this is a live document, we encourage you to add to it by sending us your views and observations, preferably via our DGA web site ixarm.com, and by completing the attached questionnaire. I now invite you to read on and familiarise yourselves with this Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in Defence and Security. (1) Technology Readiness Level 2 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security DGA 2009

Table of contents 1 Foreword 1.1. INTRODUCTION 5 1.2. FUNCTIONS OF R&T IN DEFENCE AND SECURITY 6 1.3. SCOPE & INTERFACE OF THE PS R&T WITH OTHER STRATEGIES AND PRIORITIES 7 2 Issues 7 at strake indefence R&T 2.1. ISSUES CONCERNING THE WHITE PAPER AND THE LPM (MILITARY PLANNING LAW) 11 2.2. CAPABILITY ISSUES 11 2.3. SECURITY 14 2.4. PREPARATION FOR AND ADAPTATION TO REGULATORY CHANGES 14 2.5. REDUCTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 15 2.6. ECONOMIC ISSUES 17 2.7. SPACE 18 2.8. EVOLUTION OF CIVILIAN TECHNOLOGIES 19 2.9. TECHNOLOGIES OF SOVEREIGNTY (TSV) 20 2.10. R&T COOPERATION 20 2.11. INDUSTRIAL STAKES 21 3 3.1. INTERNAL ORGANISATION 25 3.2. IMPROVEMENT OF R&T SPIN-OFF 27 3.3. RELATIONS BETWEEN DGA AND OTHER R&T INVESTORS 30 3.4. RELATIONS WITH R&T PROVIDERS 32 3.5. FUNDING 37 4 PS R&T implementation strategy Technological analysis 4.1. GENERAL ASPECTS 39 4.2. SYSTEMS OF SYSTEMS 40 4.3. ARCHITECTURE AND TECHNIQUES FOR AERONAUTICAL SYSTEMS 44 4.4. ARCHITECTURE AND TECHNIQUES FOR NAVAL SYSTEMS 53 4.5. ARCHITECTURE AND TECHNIQUES FOR LAND SYSTEMS 59 4.6. ARCHITECTURE AND TECHNIQUES FOR C3I SYSTEMS 65 4.7. MISSILES, WEAPONS AND NUCLEAR DEFENCE TECHNIQUES 76 4.8. SENSORS, GUIDANCE AND NAVIGATION (CGN) 84 4.9. TELECOMMUNICATIONS 95 4.10. INFORMATION SYSTEM SECURITY 99 4.11. HUMAN SCIENCES AND PROTECTION 101 4.12. MATERIALS AND COMPONENTS 106 4.13. TESTING METHODS 112 5 Appendices APPENDIX I: TRL SCALE (TECHNOLOGY READINESS LEVEL) 115 APPENDIX II: GLOBAL PROJECTS 119 APPENDIX III: TECHNOLOGICAL BASIS 121 APPENDIX IV: TECHNICAL AERAS AND ITS R&T ACTIVITIES 122 APPENDIX V: GLOSSARY 124 APPENDIX VI: DIFFERENT DGA LOCATIONS 132 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security DGA 2009 3

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1 Foreword 1.1. INTRODUCTION Evolution of global requirements Our experience of recent military operations abroad, against a security context characterised by the struggle against a number of disparate organisations, has highlighted a number of new requirements, sometimes long term and often urgent. Societal changes in recent years have accelerated the development of the regulatory corpus (health and safety, safety at work and in using hardware, eco-design, case law, the precautionary principle, etc.) applicable to defence systems and their use. The challenge for DGA is to target its R&T efforts appropriately in order that its future systems meet the needs of this new context as fully as possible. The White Paper on Defence and National Security constitutes the new reference document for our medium and long term needs, the operational capacities we need to obtain and also the degree of sovereignty and autonomy we need to preserve and the international partnerships we need to develop for the planning, execution and implementation of each programme. Apart from areas falling under pure national sovereignty, a very large degree of European and NATO cooperation and sharing of the most costly know-how is necessary in order to reach our goals within the budget available. European cooperation must become the normal operating mode for defence and security research, which must only be abandoned in the case of a real, long-term incompatibility of interests. Targeted cooperations outside Europe can also provide interesting opportunities. Finally, an optimal use of civilian research is required. Consultation of civilian bodies and their awareness of defence and security needs must be deeply reinforced. These various elements require a rational, flexible and opportunist approach to defence research. It is through dialogue with the best research and development departments that technological breakthroughs will be made and their emergence may be encouraged by new funding at the expense, if necessary, of technologies at the end of their maturity cycle. 1 Foreword The Strategic Plan for Research and Technology In this context of new requirements and sometimes of a possible contradiction between shortterm and long-term interests, research priorities need to be define, to combine and rationalise the efforts of many more participants, but whose budgets are structurally decreasing. This Strategic Plan aims to present the results of this analysis in an educational format. It describes in detail the mechanism linking defence research to available technology, knowledge of the state-of-the-art abroad and in the civilian sector, and also to the capability and programmatic issues for Defence and National Security. It is a public document, providing DGA s partners with an overview of the issues in this domain. The document The Strategic Plan for Research and Technology constitutes a global framework for DGA s actions in anticipating and mastering the evolution of the technologies required for future defence and security systems. Based on the operational needs and key priorities described in the PP30, the aim of this document is to place the available R&T studies within an overall framework (future operational needs/technology priorities/partnerships) in order to respond to operational requirements foreseeable by 2012-2025. It complements the POS, which describes the basic research to promote in order to produce the Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security DGA 2009 5

technologies which our future defence systems will require. It sets forth the areas where work is needed in order to meet the challenges facing us in the next few years but the effective funding of these studies will be reviewed in accordance with the resources available at the time. It implicitly includes all research priorities that DGA intends to finance, including those outside the strictly defence domain on which future systems may depend. It is presented according to areas of application, corresponding to DGA s weapon systems architectural areas and joint technology and components areas, and could provide a useful reference tool for annual technical policy discussions between defence and security industries and DGA technology areas leaders. It will also structure dialogue with our international partners, encouraging the mutual understanding of our goals and actions, and will provide a key tool for building efficient cooperation. 1.2. FUNCTIONS OF R&T IN DEFENCE AND SECURITY The main functions of R&T in defence and security, its beneficiaries and uses are presented below. The different issues associated with its various functions will be set forth in details in Chapter 2: Functions Possess the scientific and technical skills in order to advise decision makers. Meet medium and long-term capability requirements (PP30) with new technical solutions in order to achieve autonomy and supremacy of our means of action (on our own or in coalition) while minimising costs and time. Master defence system technologies corresponding to the technical solutions envisaged with the good degree of autonomy, both at the national and European level. Contribute to the construction of a European Defence by federating efforts around the launching of ambitious technological demonstrators. Build a competitive defence and security industry by: Communication of the sector based (product), industrial and technological priorities of each DGA technical expertise division; Support of the technological research effort; Support of innovation by SMEs and research laboratories. Beneficiaries The Defence Ministry and its key staff, who validates the major policy areas for preparing the future (LPM); Military staffs, directorates and departments of the Ministry in charge of preparing the future. The military staff who evaluates the possibilities of their integration into equipment; DGA, which integrates the results in the preparation of armament operations and the enhancement of coherency between military systems. The defence industry of the target DTIB (2), which uses the skills acquired or maintained to produce the required equipment; DGA, which draws up the technical specifications for future weapon systems while taking into account regulatory and environmental considerations. Military staff, DGA and the defence industry of the DTIB, to evaluate whether a specified performance level is achievable in operational conditions of use; The defence industry, to motivate and federate teams around major large-scale projects; European states, to focus and develop cooperation on major projects; DGA and the defence industry of the DTIB, to reduce the risks, costs and delivery times of future armament programs DGA, which identifies the products, industries and technologies to be used for armament operations; The defence industry and laboratories, which carry out research work; The SMEs and research laboratories concerned, which will be able to maintain or develop their skills (2) DTIB: Defence Technological and Industrial Base 6 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security DGA 2009

1.3. SCOPE & INTERFACE OF THE PS R&T WITH OTHER STRATEGIES AND PRIORITIES 1.3.1. scope of the ps r&t Defence R&T is part of the global process of preparation of the future. It covers a large range of activities. Apart from supporting the preparatory phases of armament programs, it also includes many applications resulting from the life cycle of programs, such as qualification of equipment, improvement of operational maintenance, dismantling, and reduction of renewal costs and maintenance of the skills of the industrial and state-operated teams. The purpose of this document is to present R&T priorities according to technical division, with time to application ranging from 2 to 15 years, as well as the key potential areas for coherency within the ministry regarding Research and Technology and ways of achieving them. R&T covers: - Research and technology responding to identified operational needs - Demonstrators in characterised environments. The PS R&T covers all defence and security technological needs regardless of the various forms of financing the associated work. We can therefore find, for example: - Contracted research studies including exploratory research and innovations (unsolicited proposals) - Subsidies to and contracts with public agencies (3) and Engineering Colleges under the supervision of the Ministry of Defence. Civilian funding will be considered for some of the priorities mentioned, in particular for security R&T for the technologies concerned (i.e. Biometry). 1 Foreword 1.3.2. interfacing BEtWEEn the ps r&t and other documents and priorities The PS R&T corresponds to the priorities set forth in the White Paper on Defence and National Security and draws from preparatory work undertaken for the Military Planning Law. It also provides the Ministry s r&t programming process with the major trends in R&T. This programming process takes place once a year and consists of two complementary approaches for the use of R&T study resources: 30 years: A long-terme vision (PP30) 12 years: (2 LPMs) Priority Review of needs: October Choice of objectives: March Scientific policy R&T strategy Industrial strategy Cooperation strategy Technical expertise 3 to 5 years: Plan of engagement R&T study frame of work corresponding to objectives: March Planning: June 1 year: Execution Plan (3) ONERA, ISL, CNES, CEA Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security DGA 2009 7

- The capability approach, based on equipment plans, which determines the demonstrations, the risk reduction operations and the technological developments to be carried out before launching the programs, - The technological approach, which identifies promising technological work to be supported, without any precise timeline The PS R&T sets forth the Defence R&T priorities contained in the Thirty-Year Plan (PP30). The PP30 is written by military staffers and DGA engineers and aims to constitute a long-term forwardplanning document, setting goals up to 30 years in advance in terms of defence and security needs. The Basic Research Policy (POS) is the DGA reference document in terms of scientific priorities (available at http://www.ixarm.com/politique-et-objectifs). The POS is a document similar to the PS R&T, but focused on technology with very low TRLs, from the basic research to its first experiments performed in laboratories. Along with the PP30 and the POS, the PS R&T presents the key areas of coherence in terms of R&T.n 8 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security DGA 2009

1 Foreword Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security DGA 2009 9

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2 Issues at stake in defence R&T 2.1. issues concerning the WhitE paper and the lpm (Military planning law) The White Paper on Defence and Security set forth a new defence and security policy for the years to come. The resulting military strategy is based on three key principles: Nuclear deterrence; Autonomous situation awareness; The decision to retain full military power. The operational goals set for the Armed Forces correspond to five strategic functions (knowledge and awareness, prevention, deterrence, protection and intervention) and their associated means of implementation. The White Paper also defines the main technological and industrial priorities resulting from the strategic goals for National Security to 2025. It details a few domains where expertise could, or should, be acquired and developed through European cooperation. Alongside the long-term stakes exposed hereafter, overseas interventions have provided feedback on experience and short-term technological solutions. Those various inputs enable the identification of general characteristics that proper planning and execution of defence and security research must possess: Enable sustained effort on sovereign technologies with long term objectives and slow maturation, Allow major changes in priorities such as those suggested in the White Paper, while controlling their pace and consequences, For shorter-term applications, provide enough flexibility and reactivity in order to maintain operational control in overseas theatres facing an ever-moving and everevolving threat. The confrontation between these various issues and the technological state of the art within the defence and civilian sector, in France, in Europe and worldwide, enables the definition of a research policy as well as long term and short term planning of the corresponding actions. 2 Issues at stake in defence R&T 2.2. CAPABILITY ISSUES The aim of defence R&T is to satisfy the capability requirements identified within the armed forces. These requirements have been segmented within defence into five main so-called systems of force described in detail in this chapter. White paper C.Fiard - Dicod Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security DGA 2009 11

deterrence system This system requires from R&T in defence and security the possibility to master the technological capabilities rendering it possible to design and execute, with full national autonomy, the essential elements of all the weapon systems necessary to exert a credible deterrence on a potential attacker in order to: - Ensure the technical credibility of weapons, their carriers and strategic transmissions: reliability of complex systems often integrating non dual-use technologies and making it possible to maintain the upper hand; resistance of weapon propellants and explosives to various categories of attack; nuclear safety of weapons and nuclear steam supply systems, up to and including their dismantling phase; stealth technology; efficiency, reliability and safety of weapons through simulation, without nuclear testing; - Implement nuclear forces: reliable and safe transmission of orders and information to nuclear weapons carriers for the command and control of nuclear operations; sustainable invulnerability of ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) with regard to the current and future threats, minimum dependency on external means, improvement of certain ballistic missile performances; range, precision, penetration and stealth for the airborne component; capability to identify the attacker. command and information superiority system The objective is to acquire or improve a broad set of features and capabilities: - command and control: information sharing, improvement of operations tempo, real-time mission reconfiguration, optimisation of the human factor in the Command and Control chain (C2); use of aerospace vectors and weapon systems optimisation offered in the operational command general architecture ; transparency of the combined battle-space and capacities of autonomous analysis of the environment for the situation awareness; - communicate: global network offering the forces a groupware and the inter-agency and international interoperability necessary for network operations; processing and operating capability compatible with foreseeable increases in volume of data and accessible information; - supervise, acquire, recognise, inform: availability of long mission radar sensors to be integrated onto Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) for surveillance, accelerated information up-dating, multisensor capability, use of Earth observation from space, use of electromagnetic signal intelligence at all levels in the command chain, all weather national and/or European air/ground surveillance capability, disposal of a global and reactive airspace surveillance network, space surveillance (detection, recognition and identification of objects in space). projection - Mobility - support system Defence strongly relies on technology from the civilian transport sector, but requires security and defence R&T to master technological capabilities for specific military needs and adapt civilian equipment and concepts for military use, in order: - to project forces: architecture of innovative air and naval platforms to project forces, in-flight refuelling systems; - to ensure mobility: architecture of innovative land, air and sea platforms in order to provide in-theatre mobility, complementary to projection, self protection systems for such platforms against proliferating threats; UAV SIDM (EADS) Demonstrator Catamaran (CNIM) DR DGA Flight Testing 12 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security DGA 2009

- to maintain and restore on-the-ground support to operations: improvement of logistics and of equipment availability, reduction of ownership costs, improvement of soldiers living conditions, energy sources at a controlled cost and reduction of fuel consumption and optimisation of transport flows for a global improvement of the service from beginning to end. Engagement and combat system The aim of R&T is to prepare the evolution of the forces equipment so that they dispose of the best possible systems for asymmetric conflict, while maintaining the capacity to design equipment required to face the most serious threats. Adaptation to asymmetric conflicts requires: - Precision of armaments (ammunition and missiles) and control of their effects; - Observation and identification capabilities; - Protection of platforms and soldiers against threats which are no longer frontal but from all sides. The low density of forces in such conflicts needs long range, precise and fast support. Apart from work to control the effects of the weapons, the role of technology in the observation/decision/action loop is essential to maintain freedom of action. Improved collaborative action on land, in the air and at sea is the key to superiority in both asymmetrical and symmetrical conflicts. Longer-term actions are necessary to prepare the systems of 2030. Robotics, artificial intelligence, will make it possible to design systems with enough autonomy to avoid unnecessary exposure of soldiers to danger. Deep area interventions will use cruise missiles, combat drones and stealth planes. 2 Caesar (NEXTER) DGAcom - F. Vrignaud Issues at stake in defence R&T protection and safeguard system This system is particularly well adapted to the exploitation of dualities between civilian and military projects and corresponds to the defence/security synergy recommended in the White Paper. The main capabilities put forward are as follows: - protect approaches and national territory by means of five military capabilities: air defence (ground to air, air to air, air policing) surveillance and intervention at sea based on sensor networks and means of action (patrol boats, surveillance planes, etc.), control of space in order to ensure continuity of services based at first on radar surveillance, advanced alert with detection and identification of missile firings, anti ballistic missile defence with their interception in a given zone; - Ensure protection of armed forces and sites: protection of sites and physical networks, protection of operations on the ground, protection in coastal waters; as well as capacity to limit or prevent the acquisition of intelligence by the enemy; - Ensure protection of personnel: health support for personnel in operations, improved rehabilitation of wounded personnel, protection against the CBRN threat, capability to establish evidence of attack and identification of the attacker in order to engage criminal proceedings (charges, inquiries, etc); - Ensure security of the civil environment: participation in the inter-ministry crisis and major event management, participation in population security, search and rescue, assistance Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security DGA 2009 13

2.3. SECURITY The strategic plan of the Ministry of Defence as regards security R&T is to have civilian ministries benefit from its know-how and skills, to use as efficiently as possible the R&T carried out by civilians and to actively participate in work aimed at ensuring the coherence of R&T in defence and security, from an inter-ministry point of view aimed at providing optimal protection of our interests and of the population through defence and national security policy. Synergies exist to meet the needs of the armed forces and security forces, successfully using many important dual technologies in several fields: Medical evacuation intelligence, sensors, surveillance, UAV, reduced lethality weapons, etc. 15% of defence R&T, nearly 100M, directly concerns security, making the Ministry of Defence the largest investor in security technologies. Thus, civilian ministries (Interior, Transport, etc.) are involved in the studies on dualuse topics and they also benefit from defence R&T. Defence also seeks to ensure coherence between its research and that financed by the civilian sector. The European Union, the National Research Agency (Agence Nationale pour la Recherche, or ANR) and the single inter-ministry fund (Fond Unique Interministériel, or FUI) for competitive clusters finance research projects on dual topics (maritime surveillance, software radio, simulation, etc.), fields in which DGA also invests. Inter-ministry cooperation on the technology needs for defence and security makes it possible to orient security R&T towards technological themes of common interest. DGA provides its expertise and knowledge of R&T management and prioritisation. Under the coordination of the National Defence Secretariat (Secrétariat Général de la Défense Nationale, or SGDN), DGA chairs the national thematic group which brings together the public and private R&T communities, maintains the list of national R&T priorities and the security R&T program database. DGA participates to the ANR program concepts, systems and tools for global security, launched in 2006 and takes an active part in its executive board (composed of members of the Ministries of Defence, Research and Interior At the inter-ministry and European level, this board is in charge of chairing and managing the security part (European Security Research Programme ESRP) of the European R&T Programme (7th Framework Programme) and represents France on the ESRP programme committee. This strategy exists within a national and international context undergoing significant changes, with an increasing emphasis on the use of technology to address new security issues (terrorism, organised crime, pandemics, etc.) and on synergies between defence and security. The use of civilian R&T enables early detection of technological advances while ensuring a permanent knowledge of the industry structures and key skills availability. DR 2.4. PREPARATION FOR AND ADAPTATION TO REGULATORY CHANGES Defence and security R&T provides the technological knowledge and needs necessary, in the best possible economic conditions, to ensure the observance of existing regulations, adapt to regulatory change and to control the establishment of new regulations. For example, in the area of arms control, the adhesion by France on 11 April 2001 to the first additional protocol to the Geneva Conventions requires its observance of Article 36 thereof, which commands that the State systematically determines the compliance of weapons or methods of warfare it plans to design or acquire with the relevant rules according to the law of armed conflict. In other words, each State must assess the lawful nature of any new weapon, means or method of warfare that it decides to study, develop, and acquire or adopt. 14 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security DGA 2009

Some new weapons require regulations to be modified. For example, the development of drones requires the regulatory adaptation and/or new regulations for their integration into airspace shared with civil aviation. For other topics (frequency management, technical authority, reliability of equipment, lifespan of systems, costs of maintaining in operational condition), standardisation is an indispensable tool. Having the security of the civilian world as its ultimate objective, and being mindful of the efficiency of its equipment under any circumstances, defence has an active role in the regulatory and normative environment, in particular in the following fields: - Maintain State skills necessary for future programmes, - Secure sources of technology, - Reduce national dependency on foreign technologies, - Eco-design, - Deconstruction, - Capacity to exert technical authority, - Legal protection of the State and its agents. 2.5. REDUCTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT Society expects eco-responsible behaviour from the military forces even during conflict. There are many areas of application: waste sorting, in metropolitan area military sites as well as during home or overseas operations, energy management, hazardous substance management, noise pollution management around airbases and recycling of equipment are examples of topics which defence has been taking into consideration for several years. 2 Issues at stake in defence R&T This is illustrated, for example, by the joint directive on environmental protection in operations (4) and the manual on the law of armed conflicts (5), referring to several texts and international law agreements concerning environmental protection. compliance with legislative and regulatory provisions The applicable regulatory corpus is a notion which varies both in time and in space. Regulations evolve and equipment, in the vast majority of cases, is mobile. While European and national regulations are generally respected, local regulations must not be neglected, which may limit the mobility and operation of equipment and compromise the export of defence equipment. technological and industrial impact of these regulations Even if some regulations include exemption clauses for defence and security activities, they nevertheless strongly influence the domain. Defence is increasingly less certain to benefit from exemptions in its favour, as all these regulations will have an increasingly significant (4) Directive interarmées sur la protection de l environnement en opération PIA 05-302 N 514/DEF/EMA/EMP.5/NP as of 17 May 2004. (5) Manuel de droit des conflits armés, DAJ, 22 October 2004, available on the Internet http://www.defense.gouv.fr/defense/ enjeux_defense/defense_et_droit/droit_ des_conflits_armes/manuel_de_droit_des_ conflits_armes No exception for defence electronics DGA/Comm Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security DGA 2009 15

impact on the market and thus on technologies available in the long term. The market is generally driven by civilian demand, and a standardisation of the least polluting technologies is taking place making certain components whose only user remains defence obsolescent or over-priced. The directive known as RoHS (6) is a revealing example: it severely regulates the use of certain hazardous substances, including lead, in electrical and electronic equipment. Defence equipment is excluded from the scope of this regulation. However, in practice, defence electronics is not significant enough on the electronics component market to preserve such components for its own specific needs. Similarly, the new European regulation on the registration, evaluation, authorisation and restriction of chemical products will entail the disappearance from the market of some substances critical for defence equipment. Precautionary principle The prevention and precautionary principles are written in the French Constitution since 2005. Applying them requires the actors concerned to establish concrete provisions in order to prevent risk (known risk in the case of the prevention principle, suspected risk in case of the precautionary principle). The provisions must be adapted to the risks, use the best technologies available and take into account proportionality imperatives. The case of nanotechnology is interesting. In a 2006 report, the prevention committee of French Ministry of Ecology and Sustainable Development advocated to balance public research funding on nanotechnology between the evaluation of their risk on tho one hand and their development on the other hand. Public incentives for research and investment in this domain must systematically include safety and traceability provisions. In general, the identification of health and environmental risk is becoming a necessity for research and equipment programmes, in order to manage risk and be able to prove its proper management. A pragmatic and progressive process The procedure lies on a combination of two criteria, giving priority, on the one hand, to advances easy to carry out providing immediate progress, and, on the other hand, actions that might be more difficult but are motivated by more important risks. Corresponding action must be determined in general according to two approaches: - Curative: manage the heritage of the past (dismantling, maintenance in operational condition of the existing systems, palliative solutions, etc.), - Preventive: be able to develop future operational capabilities in satisfying conditions (substitution of disappearing technologies, command tools including better control of effects, development of sustainable and appropriate dismantling procedures, etc.). Corresponding industrial and technological efforts Future research programmes and demonstrators will include the following key priorities: - Limit energy consumption and harness alternative sources of energy: consumption reduction of existing platforms; research and validation of alternative sources of energy for defence applications; increased use of simulation. - Develop less polluting technologies and processes research alternatives to critical substances used by defence and on the verge of disappearing from the market (impact of REACH regulations); (6) Restriction of hazardous substances Directive 2002/95 January 2003 by European Union, came into force as of 1 July 2006 16 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security DGA 2009

processes for cleaning up polluted soil and for dismantling defence equipments in a more environmentally friendly manner; Waste disposal during operations. - Reduce noise pollution: Apart from the physical and chemical risks, limitation of noise pollution must be taken into account by research projects for local inhabitants, those operating the equipment and even for animals (impact of active sonar on sea mammals). - Acquire and integrate environmental footprint assessment tools: In an operational context In a systems engineering context for the preparation and design of armament programmes. DGA Missiles Testing / Isle du Levant: environmental protection DGAcom -F. Vrignaud 2 Issues at stake in defence R&T European coordination These recommendations may be reinforced by coordinated action with our European partners. The European Defence Agency might be the appropriate framework to ensure this coordination; in particular in the following areas: - Monitoring of norms and regulations and active participation in their evolution; - Joint technology research efforts; - Harmonisation of procurement policies in terms of sustainable development requirements. 2.6. ECONOMIC ISSUES 2.6.1. reduction of ownership costs Two major causes of economic and budgetary constraints that defence must face are: - The raising costs to maintain some increasingly complex armaments in operational condition, - The work needed to dismantle equipment at the end of its life cycle that new concerns regarding sustainable development tend to develop. The rather recent concept of the sustainability of a system integrates its financial cost throughout its entire life cycle: it involves making sure that beyond its development, acquisition and commissioning, the forces will have enough financial resources to implement it, maintain it, modernise it and finally dismantle it. The French equivalent of the cost concepts found in partner countries (7) is the concept of overall ownership cost (coût global de possession - CGP), i.e. the calculation of costs over the whole lifespan of the system, or the cost of the life cycle. The overall cost is now a decisive criterion in the decision to launch a program. It has consequently become a major performance aspect of a system and is paid full attention, in particular in terms of technological studies chosen according to their capacity to decrease the CGP of existing or future systems. Cost reduction issues enter constantly into the preparation of programmes. They appear in all areas of defence. R&T will enable, for example, to reduce the costs of air surveillance missions through the use of UAVs, to increase the time between programmed maintenance periods of naval vessels, (7) Life Cycle Cost (LCC), Whole Life Cost (WLC), Cost of Ownership (COO), Total Ownership Cost (TOC) Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security DGA 2009 17

in particular submarines, to reduce the size of crews, or, through systems architectures, to allow the easy replacement of obsolete components or equipment. The associated trade-off studies make it possible to present decisive arguments during the selection of R&T projects. 2.6.2. curtailing EnErgy consumption Apart from the operational advantage it presents (autonomy, discretion, reduction of logistics in particular), mastering the energy consumed by weapon systems is a strategic issue. Energy consumption by the Ministry of Defence was reduced by 30% between 1995 and 2005. This consumption is 80% dependent on fossil fuels and in particular on oil. In addition, the volatility of the cost of oil and the prospect of exhausted energy reserves in the long term have an obvious impact on the contribution of energy to the budget of the Ministry of Defence. Moreover, France has laid down an ambitious policy for sustainable Photovoltaic energy development, requiring even more control over energy consumption by weapon systems. One should also adapt to other European and international legislative and normative changes in the field of energy and ensure that equipments operate with the fuel available in operation. For the majority of platforms, the fundamental long-term purpose is to reduce dependency by using other energy sources to replace conventional fuel. The use of synthetic fuels is under consideration, according to their availability in the civilian sector and/or possible NATO type standardisations. The evolution of other forms of energy (thermoelectric, fuel cells, high-efficiency solar, hydrogen, etc.) is also being carefully observed. They may be considered for targeted operational applications (generators, soldiers, UAVs, etc.). DGAcom -F. Vrignaud 2.7. SPACE In this field, synergies between defence and civilian research are fundamental and the National Space Centre (Centre National d Etudes Spatiales, or CNES) is the key institution. Conducted in close cooperation with CNES, space related defence R&T aims to satisfy users needs by: Reinforcing the robustness, precision and autonomy of satellite positioning and synchronisation information, with the support of the governmental department of the European program Galileo; Developing dual and cooperative aspects of the expansion of future network systems via satellite to a global network (communication and shared services) in order to offer the military a groupware as well as the necessary inter-ministry and international interoperability; Extending the use of Earth imaging from space and signal intelligence at all command chain levels. Galileo system EADS-Astrium 18 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security DGA 2009