Network Monitoring Using Traffic Dispersion Graphs (TDGs)



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Network Monitoring Using Traffic Dispersion Graphs (TDGs) Marios Iliofotou Joint work with: Prashanth Pappu (Cisco), Michalis Faloutsos (UCR), M. Mitzenmacher (Harvard), Sumeet Singh(Cisco) and George Varghese (UCSD) UC Riverside, Computer Science and Engineering Department 2006-2007

Introduction 2 Task of Network Monitoring/Management: know your network. Detect attacks, spot abnormalities Get informed about changes in traffic trends Adjust bandwidth allocation (rate limit or block flows etc.) Network traffic as seen at a router Finer granularity: Packets Bytes/sec, pkts/sec, etc. Flows, aggregating a set of packets Flow records summaries (Cisco NetFlow) Flows/second Heavy Hitters (Top 10 Flows) Individual Hosts that send packets Top hosts in number of pkts, flows etc. Payload inspection (Packet or Flow Level) New Dimension: What we also see? Set of interacting hosts (Graph) (who is talking to whom?) Gives new source of information. bps Traditional Network Data time AutoFocus (CAIDA) Monitoring Point

Introduction 3 From a Monitoring Level Perspective Flows: aggregate a set of related packets Hosts: aggregate a set of related flows (belong to the host) TDGs: aggregate a set of related hosts Contribution: In this work, we propose TDGs as a way to Monitor/Analyze and Visualize Network Traffic

Related Work 4 Related work using host interactions Ellis et al. in ACM WORM 2004. Try to detect the tree-like structure of a self propagating code (worm detection). Complicated link predicates (worm spread signature) Spread of communication, depth, fan-out (*) Only on worm detection, enterprise networks Xie et al. in ICNP 2006. Internet Forensic Analysis. Backward random walk Post-mortem analysis identify patient zero (origin of the attack) Aiello et al. in PAM 2005.Communities of Interest in Data Networks. Grouping of hosts based on their interaction patterns Popularity and Frequency Karagianis et al. in ACM SIGCOMM 2006. BLINC. Operates at the Host aggregation Level Profile the users, and subsequently classify their flows E.g., a host with many longed lived connections that carry large amount of data and uses different ports for each flow is labeled as p2p

Outline 5 Introduction Related Work Defining TDGs Exploration using TDG Visualizations Quantifying TDGs using graph metrics Translate visual intuition into quantitative measures Future Work and Conclusions

Traffic Dispersion Graphs (TDGs) 6 Example of a TDG Formation Process B-1 F-1 The Links: F-1 D-2 D-1 B-1 D-2 A D-1 A Generated TDG B-2 B-2 D-1 D-2 A D-1 Questions that arise: When do we add a link? How long do we monitor? How do we characterize a TDG?

Generating a TDG 7 What are the steps for generating a TDG? 1. Select a monitoring point (e.g., central router, backbone link) 2. Select an edge filter. Very important operation! Edge Filter = What constitutes an edge in the graph? E.g., TCP SYN Dst. Port 80 3. For a packet that satisfies the edge filter, derive the link srcip dstip 4. Collect the set of produced links within a time interval E.g., 300 seconds (5 minutes) 5. Gather all the links and generate a Graph. This is the TDG for the particular edge filter and observation interval selected Observation: TDGs are formed by the online addition of links Dynamic Graphs Why do we use edge filters? Try to isolate specific communities of interacting hosts (filter out noise ) E.g., a part of a peer-to-peer overlay (filter-out everything else) Ask questions (query) the network E.g., how does the graph of all the nodes that send packets having the payload signature BitTorrent looks like?

Edge Filtering Operation 8 We can have many TDGs depending on the edge filter Examples of Edge Filters: a) number of pkts/bytes exchanged b) any combination of L3 and L4 header features TCP with SYN flag set and dst port 25 c) sequence of packets (e.g., TCP 3-way handshake) d) Payload properties DPI e.g., use as edges all the packets that match a particular content signature In this work we focus on studying port-based TDGs UDP ports we generate an edge based on the first matching packet e.g., on UDP packet with destination port 53 to get the DNS TDG TCP we add a directed edge on a TCP SYN packet for the corresponding destination port number (thus, we know the initiator) e.g., port 80 for the HTTP TDG, port 25 for SMTP TDG etc.

Experiments 9 We will show that even these simple edge filters work They can isolate various communities of nodes Specific interactions corresponding to known application Those applications that operate on the monitored port (e.g., port 53 DNS) We conducted experiments using various real traffic traces Typical duration = 1 hour OC48 from CAIDA (22 million flows, 3.5 million IPs) Abilene Backbone for NLANR (23.5 million flows, 6 million IPs) WIDE Backbone (5 million flows, 1 million IPs) Access links traces (University of Auckland) + UCR traces were studied but not shown here (future work)

Outline 10 Introduction Related Work Defining TDGs Exploration using TDG Visualizations Quantifying TDGs using graph metrics Degree Distribution, Component Sizes, etc. Future Work and Conclusions

TDG Visualization (DNS) 11 DNS TDG UDP Dst. Port 53 5 seconds In- and Outdegree nodes Very common in DNS, presence of few very high degree node One large Connected Component! (even in such small interval)

TDG Visualization (HTTP) 12 HTTP TDG TCP SYN Dst. Port 80 30 seconds A busy web server? Observations There is not a large connected component as in DNS Clear roles very few nodes with inand-out degrees) Web proxies? Many disconnected components

TDG Visualization (Slammer Worm) 13 Slammer Worm UDP Dst. port 1434 10 seconds About: Jan 25, 2003. MS-SQL-Server 2000 exploit Trace: April 24th Observations (Scanning Activity) Many high out-degree nodes Many disconnected components The majority of nodes have only in-degree Nodes being scanned

TDG Visualizations (Peer-to-Peer) 14 WinMX P2P App UDP Dst. Port 6257 15 sec Observations Many nodes with inand-out degree (InO) One large connected component Long chains InO degree Bidirectional Zoom

How can we Visualize compare TDGs? 15 Web: https Web: port 8080

How can we Visualize compare TDGs? 16 Random IP range scanning activity? Slammer: port 1434 NetBIOS: port 137

How can we Visualize compare TDGs? 17 SMTP (email) DNS Today none of the current monitoring tools provide this dimension of traffic monitoring

Outline 18 Introduction Related Work Defining TDGs Exploration using TDG Visualizations Quantifying TDGs using Graph Metrics Future Work and Conclusions

Graph Metrics on TDGs 19 What we have seen so far: Visualization is useful by itself However, it requires a human operator Next Step? It is important to translate visual intuition into quantitative measures To achieve this, we use a series of graph metrics Goal: Quantitatively characterize TDG properties. Average Degree, degree distribution, component size distribution etc. For evaluating and testing our metrics we used real network traffic traces Backbone (OC48 @ CAIDA, WIDE Backbone, Abilene Network) All traces are 1 hour long and monitor millions of hosts. Methodology: Each TDG is generated within a 300 sec interval Presented values are averaged over the 12 disjoint 300 sec intervals of the 1h trace Note: We can always choose to ignore directivity for metrics such as the popularity (distinct IPs with which a node is connected) component distribution etc.

Graph Metrics on TDGs 20 Average Degree: On average how many neighbors each node has. High average degree in TDG usually indicates collaboration e.g., p2p apps, online gaming overlays Stability of TDG metrics over time! Small Std Div. 9.8 8.8 HTTP SMTP DNS 8.619 7.8 Average Degree 6.8 5.8 4.8 3.8 2.8 1.8 4.733 2.536 2.835 2.367 2.389 2.732 1.993 OC48 Abilene WIDE 3.825

Graph Metrics on TDGs 21 Average Degree: On average how many neighbors each node has. High average degree in TDG usually indicates collaboration e.g., p2p apps, online gaming overlays Stability of TDG metrics over time! 21.8 HTTP SMTP DNS P2P 19.667 Small Std Div. 19.8 17.8 Average Degree 15.8 13.8 11.8 9.8 7.8 5.8 3.8 1.8 7.56 WinMX 8.619 Blubster 4.733 3.825 2.536 2.367 2.389 2.835 2.732 1.993 OC48 Abilene WIDE

Graph Metrics on TDGs 22 Directionality: The percentage of nodes with only in-edges (sinks), only out-edges (sources) OR both in-and-out edges (InO). Very useful metric: Collaborating communities have High InO Act both as clients and server Heavy scanning activity High % of only-in in-edges (?) IPs being scanned Client server TDGs have very low InO, and balanced percentages only in-degree (~%20) OR only out-degree nodes (~80%) Usually we have more clients than servers.

Example (InO) 23 edonkey Vs HTTP TCP SYN pkts are used in Peer-to-peer OC48 Trace Client - Server both The presence of nodes with Proxies? both in- and out- degrees (InO). Can be used to discriminate between p2p and clientserver application. P2P If the % of nodes with InO increases for some port, it can be used as an indication that a p2p app is tunneling traffic under that port.

Component Size Distribution 24 In general TDGs can be disconnected graphs There is no (undirected) path between every pair on nodes in the graph The component size distribution captures the % of node that belong to a particular component size Giant Connected Component (GCC): Is the size of the largest connected subgraph in a TDG, measured as the % of nodes belonging to that component. Collaborative communities are found to have one large GCC The size of GCC & total # of disconnect components Has stability over time Captures intrinsic characteristics of the underlining application

Monitoring Example (Gcc) 25 Monitor the top 10 ports number in number of flows. Scatter Plot: GCC Vs number of connected components. Stability over Time! Peer-to-peer large GCC > 90% Ms-sql-s, NetBIOS OC48 Trace Number of Connected Components Suspicious activity Soribada edonkey Many disconnected Small GCC (we would have a large GCC if there was one large scanner) UDP port 22321 UDP port 7674 WinMX UDP port 6257 TCP port 4662 UDP port 4665 NetBIOS UDP port 137 MS-SQL-S TCP por 1433

Outline 26 Introduction Related Work Defining TDGs Exploration using TDG Visualizations Quantifying TDGs using Graph Metrics Scalar Metrics Non-scalar Metrics Future Work and Conclusions

Degree Distribution 27 P(X x) P(X x) P(X x) Degree Degree Degree The degree distributions show heavy tailed behavior Some distribution can be closely modeled with power-laws (HTTP, DNS). P2P communities tend to have many medium degree nodes (degree 4 to 30). HTTP and DNS have few nodes with very high degrees. High variability (stdv/avg): HTTP=16, DNS=6. WinMX=1.6, edonkey=1.8. NetBIOS: Scanning activity!! 98% of nodes have degree of one, few nodes with very high degree scanners

Joint Degree Distribution (JDD) 28 Note: Not all the links of the graph are shown! We collected the set of links 10 11 11 10 9 1 1 1 8 6 9 7 6 1 2 5 5 3 4 2 5 3 2 3 5 2 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 The matrix is Symmetric P(k1,k2), probability that a randomly selected edge connects nodes of degrees k1 and k2 Normalized by the total Number of links

Joint Degree Distribution (JDD) 29 HTTP (client-server) WinMX (peer-to-peer) DNS (c-s and p2p) Contour plots x-axis: Degree of the node on the one end of the link (logarithmic scale due to high variability) y-axis: Degree of the other node (logarithmic scale due to high variability) Observations: HTTP: low degree client to low to high degree servers One end of the link has low degree and the other has low-to-high WinMX: medium degree nodes are connected DNS: sings of both client server and peer-to-peer behavior Top degree nodes are not directly connected White regions at the top right corner

Outline 30 Introduction Related Work Defining TDGs Exploration using TDG Visualizations Quantifying TDGs using graph metrics Conclusions

Conclusions 31 New way of looking at traffic, that offers: Nice visualization that can enhance intuition We only used general graph visualizations (GraphViz) More application specific tools could be developed Graphs that have information Can be used to describe the interaction of the captured node P2P, client-server, scanning activity? Stability over time It can be used to trigger alarms Potentially, we can derive thresholds to classify TDGs

Future Directions 32 Develop of a s/w Monitoring Tool, which uses TDGs From TDGs can we reveal underline application? Which are the best metrics? Which are the thresholds for this metrics? How are TDG features change over time. E.g., within 24 period. A week? Months 107 days (WIDE Backbone trace) Years (historical traces, WIDE Backbone 7 years of trace collection) Can we capture features of the evolution of applications Effect of the observation point Backbone Vs Assess Link Vs Enterprise central router

TDG - Publication 33 Network Monitoring Using Traffic Dispersion Graphs Marios Iliofotou, P. Pappu, M. Faloutsos, M. Mitzenmacher, S. Singh, G. Varghese Internet Measurement Conference (IMC 2007)

Thank You! Questions/Discussion

Additional Monitoring Example 35 Spread of Blaster Worm Honeypot trace in a LAN (@ UCSD) Blaster Worm spread emulation Observations: Tree-like structure (Ellis et al.) High Depth Max = 8 Avg = 4.4 InO = 21%!