The role of special operations in the combating terrorism

AARMS Vol. 7, No. 1 (2008) 47 53 SECURITY The role of special operations in the combating terrorism CSABA KOVÁCS Miklós Zrínyi National Defence University, Budapest, Hungary The Special Operations Forces (SOF) are strategic assets for strategic effect. They are playing an increasingly important role in the asymmetric environment and are highly appropriate forces to help tackle diffuse threats to NATO such as the multiple forms of Terrorism. Recent combat operations by NATO members have demonstrated the synergetic effects of integrated conventional and Special Operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels across the operational continuum. Combating terrorism (CBT) is a highly specialized, resource-intensive mission. Certain SOF units maintain a high state of readiness to conduct counter-terrorist operations and possess a full range of CBT capabilities. CBT activities include: anti-terrorism (AT), counterterrorism (CT), recovery of hostages or sensitive material from terrorist organizations, attack of terrorist infrastructure, and the reduction of vulnerability to terrorism. Fighting soldiers from the sky Fearless men who jump and die Introduction After the end of Cold War, new challenges such as migration, organized crimes, and terrorism etc. appeared. From the political side, bipolar opposition disappeared as the result of the states having been kept together by force fell into pieces. The world has changed, just like bipolar opposition changed into multi-polar regions according to cultural differences, raw materials, regional dominating powers (due the weapons of mass destructions). The risk of conventional wars is getting lower. After 11/09/2001, the typical conflict is a low-intensity regional conflict. As a result of this factor, an asymmetric environment has appeared. In order to handle problems mentioned above, problems that include terrorist attacks, specially trained and equipped troops are needed. Received: November 14, 2007 Address for correspondence: CSABA KOVÁCS E-mail: kovacscs@freemail.hu

21st century, the asymmetric environment According to LIND et al. (1989), the warfare (and war itself) has different ages which are divided into four different generations. So-called first-generation warfare reflects tactics of the era of the smoothbore musket, the tactics of line and column. These tactics were developed partially in response to technological factors the line maximized firepower, rigid drill was necessary to generate a high rate of fire, etc. and partially in response to social conditions and ideas, e.g., the columns of the French revolutionary armies reflected both the élan of the revolution and the low training level of conscripted troops. Although rendered obsolete with the replacement of the smoothbore by the rifled musket, vestiges of first-generation tactics survive today, especially in a frequently encountered desire for linearity on the battlefield. Operational art in the first generation did not exist as a concept, although it was practiced by certain commanders, most prominently by Napoleon. Second-generation warfare was a response to the rifled musket, breechloaders, barbed wire, the machinegun, and indirect fire. Tactics were based on fire and movement, and they remained essentially linear. The defense still attempted to prevent all penetrations, and in the attack, a laterally dispersed line advanced by rushes in small groups. Perhaps, the principal change from first-generation tactics was heavily related to indirect fire; second-generation tactics was summed up in the French maxim, artillery conquers, infantry occupies. Massed firepower replaced massed manpower. Second-generation tactics remained the basis of U.S. doctrine until the 1980s, and it is still practiced by most American units in the field. Third-generation warfare was also a response to the increase in battlefield firepower. However, the driving force was primarily ideas. Realizing that they could not prevail in a war of attrition due to their weaker industrial sources in World War I, the Germans developed radically new tactics. Based on maneuver rather than attrition, thirdgeneration tactics was the first truly nonlinear tactics. The attack relied on infiltration to bypass the enemy s combat forces and to make them collapse, rather to close in on and destroy them. The defense was in depth and often invited penetration, which set the enemy up for a counterattack. Due to the changes of political circumstances and activities (asymmetric environment), the profile of warfare has changed. This is the fourth-generation warfare which seems likely to be widely dispersed and largely undefined; the distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts. The distinction between civilian and military may disappear. Actions will occur concurrently 48 AARMS 7(1) (2008)

throughout all participants depth, including their society as a cultural, not just a physical, entity. Major military facilities, such as airfields, fixed communications sites, and large headquarters will become rarities due to their vulnerability; the same may be true of their civilian equivalents, such as seats of government, power plants, and industrial sites (including know-how as well as manufacturing industries). Success will depend heavily on effectiveness in joint operations as lines between responsibility and mission become very blurred. Again, all these elements are present in third-generation warfare; the fourth generation will merely accentuate them. Fourth-generation warfare is typical in conflicts of the 21st century. About Special Operations (SO) Special operations activities are conducted by specially selected, organized, trained and equipped military forces i to achieve military, political, economic and informational objectives by unconventional means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations often require covert, clandestine, or low-visibility capabilities. SO are applicable across the range of military operations. They can be conducted independently or in conjunction with operations of conventional forces or other government agencies and may include operations by, with or through indigenous or surrogate forces. SO differ from conventional operations in the degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. ii The role of NATO Special Operations A. Special Surveillance and Reconnaissance (SR) Special reconnaissance complements other components, intelligence collection assets, and systems by obtaining specific, well-defined, and time-sensitive information of strategic or operational significance. It may complement other collection methods where constraints are imposed by weather, terrain-masking, hostile countermeasures and/or the availability of other systems. Special reconnaissance is a human intelligence function that places eyes on target in hostile, denied or politically sensitive territory. SOF may conduct these tasks unilaterally or in support of conventional operations. i Special Operations Forces (SOF) ii AJP-01(B) Allied Joint Doctrine, NSA, 2002. AARMS 7(1) (2008) 49

They may use advanced reconnaissance and surveillance techniques and equipment and/or sophisticated collection methods, and may employ indigenous assets. B. Direct Action (DA) Direct action complements other components capabilities by attacking specific, welldefined targets of strategic and operational significance. In the conduct of direct action operations, units may employ raid, ambush, or direct assault tactics; place munitions and other devices; conduct stand-off attacks by fire from maritime, ground or air platforms; provide terminal guidance for precision-guided munitions, and conduct independent sabotage. Direct action operations are normally limited in scope and duration. SOF may conduct these tasks unilaterally or in support of conventional operations; and such operations frequently occur beyond the reach of tactical weapon systems and strike capabilities of conventional forces. C. Military Assistance (MA) MA is a broad spectrum of measures in support of friendly or allied forces in peace, crisis and conflict. Military assistance can be conducted by, with, or through indigenous or surrogate forces that are trained, equipped, supported, or employed in varying degrees by SOF. The range of MA is thus considerable, and may vary from providing low-level military training or material assistance to the active employment of indigenous force in the conduct of combat operations. The Role of Special Operations in Combating Terrorism Main facilities, infrastructures, activities and connections of terrorist organizations can be reconnaissance and surveillance by some of SOF units. They may conduct with long range devices, for example special telescopes, cameras and other sophisticated intelligence methods. Collected pieces of information could be analyzed for planning, supporting and conducting other special operation tasks. According to the analyzed pieces of information, direct actions are executed by SOF units. This means ambushes, raids and assaults on terrorist facilities, groups, and persons. These activities include capturing designated personnel or materials, recovering personnel and designating high-priority targets (with laser designators) for precision guided munitions (for example SMART bombs ). 50 AARMS 7(1) (2008)

SOF activities contain military assistance, too. This means training, advising and assisting allied and/or other friendly forces. Such new capabilities as CIMIC iii and PSYOPS iv are not included in the core task of NATO special operations, despite them being capable of supporting counter-terrorism. Special Operations Forces in the Hungarian Defense Forces (HDF) Special Operations Forces play a significant role in international military missions led by NATO or the EU. Therefore, the improvement of special operations capabilities is highly emphasized. Hungary just like other NATO countries has recognized the importance of this segment and has established the necessary capabilities. After obtaining full operational capabilities, Hungarian special operations forces can be used effectively in future peace-support operations. This could be carried out within the ranks allies, as the result of bi- or multilateral treaties, or of national interest. Target regions could include the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and later on, Africa. The Balkans (NATO and EU) operations in the Balkans, on a general basis, do not include special operations action. If there is such a need in the future, soldiers of the Hungarian Special Forces may provide military assistance in the region, such as they could assist in the training of military forces and law enforcement agencies in Kosovo. (On the remarks: NATO is about to field and train the Kosovo Security Force/KSF, thus the training of the KSF could be done within the framework of military assistance.) Iraq In accordance with the executive resolution of the Hungarian administration, Hungary participates in the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) by providing drill personnel and staff officers. Soldiers of the Special Forces Battalion could act as drill personnel and advisors in the tasks, for example within the advisory and liaison group called MALT. v Afghanistan Hungarian soldiers have had several-year experience in Afghanistan, since a light infantry company used to serve there, and the Provincial Reconstruction Team has been performing its duty within the ranks of ISAF. Within the ranks of the PRT, special iii CIMIC = Civil-military Cooperation iv PSYOPS = Psychological operations v MALT = Military Advisor and Liaison Team AARMS 7(1) (2008) 51

operations soldiers could participate in providing security to very important persons (VIPs) or even in the training of military forces and law enforcement agencies, or performing tasks within OMLT. vi Conclusion A. After the end of bipolar rivalry, new-style security challenges and threat sources are perceived by the countries of the world, and coping with these challenges and threats is no easy task. In our day, the solution to a conflict requires, due to the nature of the asymmetric environment, new capabilities beside the use of conventional military forces. Civil-military cooperation, psychological warfare, information warfare and special operations are such capabilities. B. Lessons learned from recent conflicts (e.g., Afghanistan, Iraq) have made it clear the role of the aforementioned capabilities, especially those of special operations forces bears key importance. (It is rather typical that in theaters, in Afghanistan, or in the Iraqi conflict, the majority of tasks are executed by US special operations soldiers due to the complexity of the circumstances.) C. Special operations forces of modern armed forces will likely to play an important role in the future in the solution of various conflicts. The aspects of future military clashes will be so different that the use of conventionally trained forces could mean that the pre-set objective would be achieved via disproportionately high losses. While the majority of countries have decreased their conventional military forces, the number of special operations personnel is generally on the rise. D. Researchers of security policy and military science claim that the chance of a global war is rather low, however, regional crisis and armed conflicts will probably be perceived at a higher number. Soldiers of special operations units could be used with efficiency to cope with such conflicts. This should lead us to the conclusion that special operations units could be used with efficiency in the three segments of the strategic environment, such as in war, in operations other than war (peace operations, humanitarian operations, crisis management), and in solutions to asymmetric challenges (especially when considering the military segment of combating terrorism). These highly-trained, well-equipped and multitasking units could be deployed from air, sea and land. E. The development of special operations units and their related capabilities will be an important task for the military leaders of the future. One of the signs is the vi OMLT = Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team 52 AARMS 7(1) (2008)

foundation of special operations commands by various nations; in the United States Marine Corps, a new special operations command called MARSOC was established in February 2006. The task of the new command is, as a subordinate command to USSOCOM, to coordinate the training and activity of 1st and 2nd Marine Special Operations Battalions, the special operations forces of the Marine Corps. NATO established its own organization, the SOF Coordination Center (NSCC) in Stuttgart, Germany in January 2007, in order to coordinate special operations. Research and development play a vital role in the improvement of special operations capabilities. This could guarantee that the latest developments and high-level technology are always at the disposal of special operations forces. References AJP-01(B) Allied Joint Doctrine, NSA, 2002. AJP-3 Allied Joint Operations, NSA, 2002. FM 31-20-5 Special Reconnaissance TTP for Special Forces, Headquaters, Department of the Army, 1993. JP 3-07. 2 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism, Joint Staff, 1998. LIND, William S., NIGHTENGALE, Keith, SCHMITT, John F., SUTTON, Joseph W., WILSON, Gary I: The changing face of war: Into the fourth generation, Marine Corps Gazette, (October 1989) 22 26 MC 437 NATO Special Operations Policy, NATO Headquarters, 1999. MC 472 NATO Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism, NATO Headquarters, 2002. AARMS 7(1) (2008) 53