DoD Software Assurance (SwA) Overview



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DoD Software Assurance (SwA) Overview Tom Hurt Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Engineering NDIA Program Protection Summit / Workshop McLean, VA May 19, 2014 May 19, 2014 1

Outline Current Assurance Outlook DoD Trusted Defense Systems & Networks Strategy What is Software Assurance? SwA integrated into the DoD System Lifecycle SwA as a Systems Engineering Discipline SwA Analysis and Test Resources DoD SwA R&D Strategy Proposed DoD Enterprise Assurance Approach Challenge to Industry May 19, 2014 2

Current Assurance Outlook Threat: Nation-state, terrorist, criminal, or rogue developer who: Exploits vulnerabilities remotely Gains control of systems through supply chain opportunities Vulnerabilities All systems, networks, and applications (Hardware & Software) Intentionally implanted (i.e. malicious code insertion) Unintentional vulnerabilities maliciously exploited (e.g., poor quality or fragile software) Traditional Consequences: Loss of critical data and technology Emerging Consequences: Exploitation of manufacturing and supply chain, and of software vulnerabilities in sustainment Either can result in corruption; loss of confidence in critical warfighting capability Today s acquisition environment drives the increased emphasis: Then Stand-alone systems >>> Some software functions >>> Known supply base >>> CPI (technologies) >>> Now Networked systems Software-intensive and critical functions in Software Prime Integrator, hundreds of suppliers CPI and critical components May 19, 2014 3

Trusted Defense Systems and Networks Strategy Program Protection Plan Drivers/Enablers National Cybersecurity Strategies Globalization Challenges Prioritize by Mission Dependence Comprehensi ve Program Protection Planning USD(AT&L) Download: http://www.acq.osd.mil/se/pg/guidance.html Increasing System Complexity Pervasive Networks & SW-intensive Systems Enhance R&D for Vulnerability Detection and Response Partner with Industry Report on Trusted Defense Systems Intellectual Property Protection Delivering Trusted Systems USD(AT&L) ASD(NII)/DoD CIO Executive Summary: http://www.acq.osd.mil/se/pg/spec-studies.html May 19, 2014 4

What is Software Assurance? Software Assurance. The level of confidence that software functions as intended and is free of vulnerabilities, either intentionally or unintentionally designed or inserted as part of the software throughout the lifecycle. Reference: DoD Instruction 5200.44, Protection of Mission Critical Functions to Achieve Trusted Systems and Networks (TSN) Our objective is to establish software assurance as an accepted SE discipline within the Department. May 19, 2014 5

Software Assurance Integrated into the DoD System Lifecycle MS A Dev t RFP Release Decision MS B MS C FRP Decision or FDD Review Strategic Guidance (OSD/JCS) Joint Concepts (COCOMs) CBA ICD MDD Materiel Solution Analysis Tech Maturation & Risk Reduction CDD Engineering & Manufacturing Development CPD Production and Deployment O&S Tailorable RFP Language is Available AoA Focus Scope of Protection Identify & mitigate sources of software vulnerabilities COTS known vulnerabilities Secure coding practices & automated code analysis tools Secure development environment and toolset SEP ASR SRR SFR PDR CDR PPP Software Assurance Assessment at SE Technical Reviews SEP PPP SEP PPP SwA blends into Engineering Process Processes, Tools, Techniques Requirements & Metrics System Architecture, SW Design, Coding Practice Test and Evaluation Prevent, Detect, Respond SEP PPP PPP SwA in each part of the lifecycle Chain of custody of knowledge, risks and products Engineering level traceability from MDD through disposal Pre-EMD Review Emphasizing Use of Affordable, Risk-based Countermeasures May 19, 2014 6

Software Assurance as a Systems Engineering Discipline: Countermeasure Selection Development Process Apply assurance activities to the procedures and structure imposed on software development Operational System Incorporate countermeasures in the requirements, architecture, design, and acquisition of end-item software products and their interfaces Development Environment Apply assurance activities to the environment and tools for developing, testing, and integrating software code and interfaces Trends Increased use of automated tools for detection, analysis, and remediation Requirement to use SwA tools and methodology across DoD system life cycle Monitor and assess application of software assurance countermeasures Additional Guidance: http://www.acq.osd.mil/se/docs/swa-cm-in-ppp.pdf May 19, 2014 7

SwA Analysis and Test Resources State-of-the-Art Resources (SOAR) for Software Vulnerability Detection, Test, and Evaluation, August 2013 Approach SwA objectives (e.g., countering weaknesses) were organized and consolidated into categories that the DoD acquisition community can use State-of-the-art of SW analysis and test tools and techniques were organized into families SwA objectives were mapped to tools and techniques, providing a sound basis for a tool selection and use methodology by DoD programs Findings There is utility in grouping SwA tools and techniques into families Some tools are costly, and use of any tool or technique incurs program cost Policy, guidance and resources must evolve at pace with constantly changing threats No silver bullet tool or technique exists May 19, 2014 8

DoD SwA R&D Strategy: Focus Areas Near and Long Term Goals Malicious Code Detection Measures of Effectiveness Designed-in Security Near Term Technical Goals Existing and evolutionary: Advanced passive monitoring Data collection across all system layers Near real-time detection and isolation of zero days Workforce education and training Method and Baseline: Effectiveness and cost Across the DoD lifecycle Across Government agencies and industry Advance security in design as early as possible: Reduction of costs and risk for development and sustainment Automated processes, dataintensive design and development Assurance result composability Revolutionary: Automated MoE Assessment and Reporting System: Co-develop System and Evidence for Assurance: Long Term Technical Goals Automated enterprise-wide detection coordination and correlation Threat vector prediction from behaviors, signatures and information external to code Automated trend analysis Community acceptance and standards that drive contracts Simultaneous development of systems and attestation evidence Fully integrated supply chain considerations Verification and Assurance scalable across system size, complexity and criticality Feedback across entire lifecycle May 19, 2014 9

Proposed DoD Enterprise Assurance Approach Identify participating parties AT&L, CIO, Services, Agencies, Parties agree to: Establish a federation of SW and HW assurance capabilities to support DoD programs Bring to bear SW and HW assurance expertise, and capabilities in support of DoD needs Identify capability needs for SwA and HwA R&D program Identify needed improvements in SW and HW assurance tools and methodoligies Procure, manage, and distribute enterprise licenses for SW and HW assurance tools Enhance DoD SW and HW Assurance Infrastructure May 19, 2014 10

System Security Engineering (SSE); Software Assurance Is a cross-cutting, multi-disciplinary area of interest Impacts not only security, but SW development, test, deployment, and operation techniques and practices Has tools and techniques that support cyber security, software design, software development techniques and practices, software test, and supply chain risk management Is a growing area of importance in industry Requires cooperative research, participation, innovation, and engagement Challenges are: Translating systems engineering requirements into SwA contract language Identifying effective contract language and verifying results Specifying metrics for security risks, vulnerability detection, and validated mitigation Training and educating the workforce Building efficacy/scalability of tools and techniques Integrating SwA capability into engineering disciplines May 19, 2014 11