Journal of Advanced Managemen Science Vol. 1, No. 4, December 2013 Does Enerprise Risk Managemen Creae Value Norlida Abdul Manab Deparmen of Banking and Risk Managemen, School of Economics, Finance and Banking, Universii Uara Malaysia, Malaysia E-mail: norlida@uum.edu.my Zahiruddin Ghazali Deparmen of Finance, School of Economics Finance and Banking, Universii Uara Malaysia, Malaysia E-mail: uddin@uum.edu.my Absrac This research paper examines wheher he enerprise risk managemen (ERM) pracices can creae value o Malaysian public lised companies (PLCs) in Malaysia. The sample consiss of 417 PLCs in Malaysia. The analysis focuses on he companies financial characerisics by using sepwise muliple regressions. This research venures ino undersanding he influence of financial raios and risk managemen on shareholders wealh. The findings show ha reurn on equiy, opaciy, deb over asse, operaing margin, cos of financing and axaion, and financial slack are significan for financial companies. While, only reurn on asse is significan for financial companies. This is could be due o he naure of financial companies ha are highly regulaed. Index Terms enerprise risk managemen, shareholder value, corporae governance, public lised companies, Malaysia I. INTRODUCTION The disinegraion of radiional risk managemen (TRM) and also he influences of exernal and inernal facors o business risks, as well as he rapid growh of economies, have riggered more demand and enforcemen of effecive risk managemen by mos counries. I is widely acceped ha effecive risk managemen is he core of successful companies, regardless of size or indusry secor. A series of company failures, corporae scandals, and frauds are oher reasons for companies o effecively implemen risk managemen. In Malaysia, he 1997 Asian financial crisis had affeced one enh of he 800 public-lised companies on he Bursa Malaysia and poor risk managemen was cied as a major facor of he companies failure [1]. This has caused more severe corporae governance problems in publicly lised companies. The problems include ineffecive board of direcors, and lack of awareness and responsibiliies among members of he boards. Subsequenly, afer he crisis, he issue of corporae governance has received much aenion in Malaysia where he governmen direcly emphasized he lised companies Manuscrip received July 10, 2013; revised Sepember 28, 2013. doi: 10.12720/joams.1.4.358-362 358 o be more proacive in conrolling risk and mainaining good reporing. In he Malaysian Code on corporae governance 2000, risk managemen iniiaive has been inegraed as one of he imporan par of corporae governance code and has been cied as a key responsibiliy of he board of direcors. The Code is incorporaed ino he new Bursa Lising Requiremens and i is applied o all PLCs in Malaysia. The PLCs are required o disclose heir Risk Managemen, Inernal Conrol and Corporae Governance Guidelines in he annual repor o ensure he ransparency in delivering informaion o heir shareholders, sakeholders, and oher relaed bodies. However, financial companies are highly regulaed compared o oher ypes of companies [2], [3]. This is because hey are exposed o financial risk, which is more complex and requires a broad skill and knowledge wih specific ools o manage risks. Corporae governance compliance has been cied as he mos moivaion facor for non-financial companies o implemen ERM [4]. Effecively managing or conrolling he facors ha cause risk can resul in marke leadership, increasing a company s growh and invesor confidence [5]. Corporae eniies believe ha he successful operaion of any business depends on risk managemen [6]. This has been highlighed as in [7], ha here is evidence in erms of heories ha show how value can be creaed from he adopion and applicaion of risk managemen and how risk can also desroy corporae value. Shareholder value is a financial indicaor ha has been used as a measuremen of reference o he successful implemenaion of ERM pracices. Reference [8] (p.38) noed ha ERM mus be measurable and he value proposiion will assis companies o creae compeiive advanage, improve business performance and reduce cos. Several research findings agreed ha ERM implemenaion can reduce he overall risk profile by reducing he cos of capial and increasing he company s performance, and hese will lead o maximise shareholder value [9]. Reference [10] found ha ERM helps companies o manage he boom line and increases shareholder value by increasing earnings growh, revenue growh, reurn on capial, earning consisency, and reducing expenses.
Earnings growh and revenue growh are he op business issues [11]. Wih regard o he ERM pracices, here is almos no direc empirical evidence ha shows value o be creaed by ERM and he link is more heoreical raher han being proven by hard empirical fac [12]. This is aligned wih he saemen as in [13], where here is no prior sudy has considered he value relevance of ERM pracices. Reference [14] found ha only some firms ha adoped ERM experience a reducion in earnings volailiy and he overall sudy failed o find suppor ha ERM is value creaing. Oher prior sudies have only found empirical evidence of a posiive relaionship beween specific forms of risk managemen and firm s value. Thus, his sudy is inended o examine wheher ERM pracices and corporae governance compliance can influence shareholder value among Malaysian public lised companies. II. ERM CONCEPT AND VALUE CREATION There are four imporan issues in he ERM concep. Firsly, ERM views risk as being more complee, consisen, and collecive raher han focusing only on hazard or financial risk [15]. I engages wih all ypes of risk, which are currenly faced by business organisaions. The risks are commonly caegorised as hazard risk, financial risk, operaional risk, and sraegic risk [16]-[18]. Secondly, ERM is a process. Refer o he reference number, as in [19], ERM is a framework ha involves a process of idenifying, defining, quanifying, comparing, prioriising, and reaing all ypes of risks facing an organisaion. Reference [19] added ha he ERM process requires a wide range of ools and mehodologies, which helps o explain he relaionship beween risk profile and is impac on shareholder value. Thirdly, he ERM involves he overall human resource, ha is, people a all levels of he enire organisaion. The ERM programme is iniiaed by he board of direcors and hey are primarily responsible for risk managemen aciviies in order o safeguard a company s asse. The successful implemenaion of ERM highly depends on he efficiency and he effeciveness of he managemen, where i is required o idenify and evaluae he company s risks and o design, operae, and conrol an inernal conrol sysem o address hose risks [20]. The employees, as boom level saff, also play an imporan role in ERM implemenaion. They are responsible for he daily operaion of he inernal conrol sysem. In essence, ERM is no jus abou responsibiliies, bu i is he way how people work and he way hey relae o he sraegy and growh in order o achieve he company s objecive [21]. Finally, he ERM underlying concep is ha each ype of organisaion wheher profi, non-profi, or governmen agency, provides value for is sakeholders [22]. This had been sressed in he definiions of ERM and in he ERM concep iself. The ERM definiion as in [23] showed he imporan role of ERM in creaing shareholder value in an organisaion. This is agreed by oher reference number, as in [24] ha he funcion of ERM is o drive value creaion, eiher in erms of financial and non-financial aspecs. Even hough shareholder value has been sressed as he mos significan impac of ERM implemenaion by many auhors and researchers, he increase in shareholder value does no necessarily mean ha he organisaional risk managemen programme has been successfully implemened and has achieved he objecives. According o he reference number, as in [25], he conribuion of risk managemen o shareholder value has been discussed widely, especially in financial risk managemen. Reference [25] analysed he heoreical argumen beween financial risk managemen and value creaion and proved i in erms of empirical evidence. The sudy had showed ha risk managemen a he company level represens a means o increase shareholder value. Reference [26] also discovered ha invesors valued company specific risk managemen aciviies. However, here is only a lile empirical suppor o heories ha showed risk managemen as a means o maximise shareholder value. III. METHODOLOGY The public lised companies (PLCs) were seleced as he populaion of his sudy for he reason ha normally ERM is adoped by he larger organisaions, such as he PLCs and mulinaional companies. Furhermore, he PLCs would have o exercise he bes pracice of corporae governance under he Malaysian Code of Corporae Governance and Bursa Malaysia Lising Requiremens where risk managemen is par of i. The selecion of he companies was based on random alphabeical of lised companies in he 2010 Bursa Lised Companies Schedule. Noneheless, all financial companies (49 companies) are included in his sudy, in which hey are reaed as placebo (conrol) samples. The primary reason for employing hese companies as conrol samples is because hey are highly regulaed as compared o oher ypes of companies. Table I shows he overall number of companies in his sudy (417) which is roughly 43.81 percen of he whole populaion. I comprises of 49 financial companies or 11.8 percen from he oal sample of his sudy. TABLE I. SAMPLES BY SECTOR Secor Frequency Percen Cumulaive Percen Consrucion 19 4.6 4.6 Consumer 44 10.6 15.1 Finance (Placebo) 49 11.8 26.9 Hoels 3 0.7 27.6 Ind-Pod 102 24.5 52.0 IPC 2 0.5 52.5 Planaion 22 5.3 57.8 Properies 79 18.9 76.7 Reis 16 3.8 80.6 Technology 9 2.2 82.7 Trade and Services 72 17.3 100.0 Toal 417 100.0 359
For he purpose of his sudy, sepwise muliple regressions are considered he mos appropriae analysis. The analysis focuses on he companies financial characerisics which include leverage, ne profi margin, reurns on asse, reurns on equiy, financial slacks, and inangible asses and cos of financing and axaion (CFT). The model can be wrien as follows: EPS a0 b1 D/ A b2cft b3 NPM b3roa b4roe b5slk b6opc where, EPS =earnings per share D/A = oal deb over oal asse CFT = cos of financing and axaion NPM = ne profi margin ROA = reurns on asse in curren year ROE = reurns on equiies in curren year SLK = cash and securiies in hand OPC = oal inangible asse e = error erms TABLE II. IV. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION SUMMARY OF RESULT FOR SHAREHOLDER WEALTH OVERALL SAMPLE MODEL Sandar d Error ificance Level (Consan).060 3.159.002 ROE +.126.039 6.258.000 ROA +.136.000 6.848.000 Opaciy -.125.286 6.283.000 Slack +/-.085.224 4.064.000 D/A - -.061.153-2.84 6.004 Adjused R 2 0.066 34.675 a Durbin-Wason 1.65 N 2872 Predicors: (Consan), Toal Deb upon Toal Asse (D/A), Cos of Financing and Taxaion (CFT), Ne Profi Margin (NPM), Reurn on Asse (ROA), Reurn on Equiy (ROE), Near Liquid Asse (SLK), Toal Inangible Asse (OPC) Table II illusraes he es resul for he overall sample for his sudy esing he relaionship beween several aspecs of risk managemen (in he financial raios form) and shareholders wealh. I is found ha several variables (5 ou of 7) having significan relaionships wih shareholders wealh (EPS). Based on he resuls, he sepwise regression equaion was as follows: EPS a b ROE b ROA b OPC b SLK b D/ A 0 1 2 The adjused r-square for his model is 6.6 percen and he F-value is 34.675. The F saisics which is significan a he one percen level implies collecively, he variables have significan impac on EPS. Noneheless, only 6.6 percen of variaion in shareholder wealh (EPS) could be 3 5 6 explained by variance of reurn on equiy (ROE), reurn on asse (ROA), opaciy, financial slack and deb over asse. The resul is in line and as mooed wih he previous sudy ha here is only a lile empirical suppor ha showed risk managemen influenced he shareholder wealh. As anicipaed, all variables have he exac signs as prediced excep for opaciy. I is expeced, higher opaciy (β=-0.125, p<0.05) o decrease EPS as opaciy is an invesmen ino inangible (opaque) asse. Opaque asses are known no o produce valuable asse during bankrupcy or financial disress. Noneheless, he resul does no suppor he above explanaion. Hence, invesmen in opaciy is in conras o asse risk managemen. TABLE III. SUMMARY OF RESULT FOR SHAREHOLDER WEALTH NON-FINANCIAL SAMPLE MODEL Sandard Error ifican ce Level (Consa.058 3.817.000 n) ROA + -.283.001-14.56.000 3 ROE +.108.038 5.187.000 Opaciy -.124.270 6.309.000 D/A - -.063.146-3.003.003 OPM +.092.113 3.724.000 CFnTax - -.061.045-2.530.011 Slack +/-.050.239 2.406.016 Adjused R 2 0.134 51.764 a Durbin-Wason 1.813 N 2499 Predicors: (Consan), Toal Deb upon Toal Asse (D/A), Cos Resul for Non-financial companies sub-sample model (Table III) produces an adjused r-square of 13.4% wih F-value a 51.764 and significan a p=0.001. I is found ha all variables esed are significan and he sepwise regression equaion was as follows: EPS a0 b1 ROA b2roe b3oopc b3d / A b4opm b5cft b6slk The findings showed ha reurn on asse (ROA) was he mos imporan facor in explaining he shareholder wealh, and his is followed by reurn on equiy (ROE), opaciy (OPC), deb over asse (D/A), operaing margin (OPM), cos of financing and axaion (CFT), and cash and securiy in hand (SLK). The value of R 2 = 0.134 indicaed ha hese wo EWRM criical success facors included in he regression equaion explained only 13.4 percen of he variaion of he shareholder value. This indicaed ha he ERM was no he main facor ha conribues o shareholder value. Neverheless, wo of he variables are no conforming o he prediced signs. Boh asse managemen raio (ROA and Opaciy) sugges ha non-financial companies shareholders wealh negaively relaed o efficien asse managemen. This implies ha companies o be less 360
efficien in asse managemen o enhance companies shareholder wealh. Moreover, i is found ha cash managemen (cos of financing and axaion (CFT) and cash equivalen asse (Slack) are significan conribuing variables in enhancing shareholder wealh. These wo variables pose a risk o shareholders wealh if no well managed. CFT is cash flow ha does no enhance companies value; and financial slacks are non-invesed companies cash. Noneheless, sepwise regression included hese variables o be he las and leas influenial variables in deermining shareholders wealh. From he researcher s poins of view, his resul is due o indifferen secorial classificaion causing he effec of cash managemen o subside as a srong deerminan o shareholders wealh. In ligh of companies riskiness measured by oal deb upon oal asse (D/A)(β=-0.063,p<0.05), es resul finds he variable o be influenial and align wih known knowledge o have a negaive impac o shareholders wealh. Lasly companies operaing margin (OPM) a measure of inernal operaional risk managemen, i is found ha i is esed significan and he impac i produces is as expeced as a subsanial influenial variable. The overall resuls indicaed ha he risk managemen pracices in non-financial companies are likely o be affeced by accouning raios and corporae governance compliances. The resuls suppored he previous finding as in [17] ha he MCCG compliance as a driven facor for non-financial companies o implemen ERM. TABLE IV. SUMMARY OF RESULT FOR SHAREHOLDER WEALTH FOR FINANCIAL SAMPLE MODEL Sandard Error (Consan).217 4.54 5 ROA +.503.000 4.84 0 Adjused R 2 0.243 23.423 a Durbin-Wason 2.023 N 373 ific a- nce Level.000.000 Predicors: (Consan), Toal Deb upon Toal Asse (D/A), Cos of Financing and Taxaion (CFT), Ne Profi Margin (NPM), Reurn on Asse (ROA), Reurn on Equiy (ROE), Near Liquid Asse (SLK), Toal Inangible Asse (OPC) Resul for financial companies sub-sample model (Table IV) produces an adjused r-squared of 24.3% wih F-value a 23.423 and significan a p=0.001. I is found ha only one variable (Reurn on Asse, ROA) esed o be significanly influencing shareholders wealh. As menioned before, ha financial companies are highly regulaed compared o oher ypes of companies, all financial lised companies in Bursa Malaysia are sricly governed by Bank Negara (Cenral Bank) and also by oher rules and regulaions. Thus i is no surprising ha ROA dicaes shareholders wealh in his sub sample. V. CONCLUSIONS The aim of his sudy is o examine wheher he enerprise risk managemen (ERM) pracices and corporae governance compliance can creae value o Malaysian public lised companies (PLCs). The risk managemen pracices and corporae governance compliance have an effec on shareholder value only on cerain aspec of risk managemen variables. The financial companies where heir risk managemen pracices are more advanced and are highly regulaed as compared o non-financial companies are found o be less affeced by he corporae governance compliance. This is due o he fac ha he ERM implemenaion in financial companies is no jus for compliance bu also for he bes pracice and survival. As for non-financial companies, almos all variables were found o have an impac on shareholder value. This indicaes ha he ERM implemenaion in non-financial companies is for he purpose of compliances. 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