Non-Proprietary Security Policy for the FIPS 140-2 Level 1 Validated Fortress Secure Client Software Version 3.1



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Non-Proprietary Security Policy for the FIPS 140-2 Level 1 Validated Fortress Secure Client Software Version 3.1 (Document Version 1.01) June 2007 Prepared by the Fortress Technologies, Inc., Government Technology Group 4023 Tampa Rd. Suite 2000. Oldsmar, FL 34677 Page 1 of 1919 Copyright 2007 Fortress Technologies, Inc., 4023Tampa Rd., Suite 2000 Oldsmar, FL 34677

Page 2 of 1919 Copyright 2007 Fortress Technologies, Inc., 4023Tampa Rd., Suite 2000 Oldsmar, FL 34677

Contents 1.0 INTRODUCTION... 5 2.0 CLIENT SECURITY FEATURES... 7 2.1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE... 7 2.2 MODULE INTERFACES... 7 2.3 FIPS MODE... 8 3.0 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION POLICY... 10 3.1 ROLES... 10 3.1.1 The... 10 3.1.2 The Administrator - Cryptographic Officer... 10 3.2 SERVICES... 11 4.0 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MANAGEMENT... 13 4.1 KEY GENERATION... 13 4.2 KEY STORAGE... 13 4.3 ZEROIZATION OF KEYS... 13 4.4 PROTOCOL SUPPORT... 13 4.5 CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS... 14 5.0 ACCESS CONTROL POLICY... 15 6.0 PHYSICAL SECURITY POLICY... 16 7.0 SOFTWARE SECURITY... 18 8.0 OPERATING SYSTEM SECURITY... 18 9.0 MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS POLICY... 19 10.0 EMI/EMC... ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED. 11.0 CUSTOMER SECURITY POLICY ISSUES ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED. 12.0 MAINTENANCE ISSUES... ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED. List of Figures Figure 1: Example Configuration of Fortress Client Deployment... 6 Figure 2: Information Flow Through the Client... 9 Page 3 of 1919

List of Tables Table 1: Services... 11 Table 2: Algorithms Supported by the Client... 14 Table 3: Some PCs and NICs that are Compatible with Client... 16 Table 4: Some PDA and Handhelds Compatible with Client... 17 Page 4 of 1919

1.0 INTRODUCTION This security policy defines all security rules under which the Fortress Secure Client (Client) must operate and enforce, including rules from relevant standards such as FIPS 140-2. The Client complies with all FIPS 140-2 level 1 requirements. The Client is a cryptographic software application that operates as a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module. The cryptographic boundary of the module is the compiled application executable. The physical boundary is the hardware platform, such as a typical PC or a PDA, on which the Client is installed. The Client identifies network devices and encrypts and decrypts traffic transmitted to and from those devices. The Client software and computer hardware combination operates as an electronic encryption application designed to prevent unauthorized access to data transferred across a wireless network. The Client encrypts and decrypts traffic transmitted on that network, protecting the user of the application on the hardware platform. Only authorized personnel, such as the administrator (cryptographic officer), can log into the module to configure profiles. The Client operates at the datalink layer of the OSI model and is installed as an application and an intermediate driver. Most of the security protocols are implemented without human intervention to prevent any chance of human error. The Client is designed to operate on the following operating systems and hardware platforms: Windows 2000 Professional, SP4 on an Intel/AMD Processor Windows XP Professional, SP2 on an Intel/AMD Processor Windows 2003 Server, SP2 on an Intel/AMD Processor Windows CE V3.0 on an ARM Processor Windows CE V4.0 on an ARM Processor Windows CE V5.0 on an ARM Processor The cryptographic officer role manages the cryptographic configuration of the Client. This role can configure user profiles. Both Cryptographic Officers and can review module status and change profiles where appropriate. The cryptographic setting can only be configured within profiles and only by the cryptographic officer when the modules are operating in FIPS mode. Because the Client automates cryptographic processing, end users do not have to actively initiate cryptographic processing; the Client encrypts and decrypts data sent or received by users operating authenticated devices connected to the Client. The Client offers point-to-point-encrypted communication between protected devices. Two or more Clients can communicate with each other directly or a Client can communicate to devices protected by a Fortress Wireless Security Gateway. The product encrypts outgoing data from a client device and decrypts incoming data from networked computers located at different sites. Page 5 of 1919

Server AirFortress TM Gateway (Boundary Protection) Laptop with Secure Client Installed Access Point AirFortress TM Gateway (Boundary Protection) Workstation Access Point Central Server with Internet access Access Point AirFortress TM Gateway (Boundary Protection) Laptop Handheld device with Secure client installed Server Figure 1: Example Configuration of Fortress Secure Client Deployment Page 6 of 1919

2.0 CLIENT SECURITY FEATURES The Client provides true datalink layer (OSI Layer 2) security. To accomplish this, it was designed with the minimum-security features described in the following sections. 2.1 Cryptographic Module The following security design concepts guide the development of the Client: 1. Use strong, proven encryption solutions such as Triple DES (TDES), and AES. 2. Protect data at or below the level of vulnerability, by protecting a packet starting at the datalink level, meaning not just the customer s data, but also the IP network layer is protected. 3. Minimize the human intervention to the module operation with a high degree of automation to prevent human error and to ease the use and management of a security solution. 4. Secure all points where a LAN, WLAN, or WAN can be accessed by using a unique company Access ID, defined by the customer, to identify authorized devices as belonging to the protected wireless network The Wireless Link Layer Security (wlls) architecture of the cryptographic engine ensures that cryptographic processing is secure on a wireless network and automates most security operations to prevent any chance of human error. Because wlls operates at the datalink layer, header information is less likely to be intercepted. In addition to applying standard strong encryption algorithms, wlls also compresses data, disguising the length of the data to prevent analytical attacks and yielding a significant performance gain on network throughput. The Client requires no special configuration to operate once correctly installed by the cryptographic officer, although cryptographic officers are encouraged to change certain security settings, such as the Access ID for the device, to ensure that each customer has unique parameters that must be met for access. The Client allows role-based access to user interfaces that access to the appropriate set of management and status monitoring tools. 2.2 Module Interfaces The Client provides logical interfaces for input and output; it does not support separate ports for cryptographic key management or data authentication. Inbound and outbound traffic is received through the communication port of the hardware device on which the Client is installed. The information is processed by the Microsoft NDIS Intermediate protocol and then to the packet capture component, which identifies packets as incoming or outgoing and encrypts or decrypts the packets accordingly. This NDIS interface interacts with third-party applications installed on the computer that receives packets and with the device communication port (NIC, RJ-45 port, serial port, or other option). Data sent and received through the NDIS interface to a connected access point are always encrypted; the Client does not allow plaintext transmission of data, cryptographic keys, or critical security parameters across a LAN or WLAN. Figure 2 shows this information flow in relation to a standard set of computer components that will be present on any platform on which the Client is installed. Page 7 of 1919

The module has one logical interface for information flow, which handles all communication into and out of the module. When in FIPS Mode data is transmitted to the network as ciphertext unless a trusted device is configured. The Client does not require physically separate entry and exit ports. The device communications port serves as both a data entry and exit port for secured network communications, as the data streams are bidirectional and conform to the real-time information exchange over the network. 2.3 FIPS Mode The approved mode of operation (FIPS mode) is enabled during installation of the Secure Client on a workstation, laptop or handheld. The FIPS Mode is only activated if a Profile is used that has the following: Encryption Enabled AES or Triple-DES Selected A Diffie-Hellman key of 1024 or greater No Trusted Devices configured 802.1x traffic set to none Refer to the Guide [1] for installation procedures. Each Client can be configured to accept and send packets as ciphertext or cleartext, but as stated above, to be in FIPS approved mode, the client must be configured to send packets in ciphertext. Only a connection using ciphertext can the client communicate with other secured Fortress modules. The Client is a software application designed to be installed on a range of hardware devices that access a secured LAN or WLAN. According to FIPS 140-2 terminology, the Client is a multichip standalone cryptographic module, whose cryptographic boundary is the self-contained compiled executable. The Client offers point-to-point-encrypted communication for the wireless electronic device it protects. It encrypts outgoing messages (data) from the device to the wired network where a Fortress Wireless Security Gateway is installed and decrypts incoming messages (data) to the host device from other devices within the Fortress Gatewayprotected network. Two devices with Client installed and configured appropriately can also communicate with each other directly. The Client units designed for government use apply FIPS-approved encryption algorithms, Triple Data Encryption Standard and Advanced Encryption Standard. These algorithms operate on text blocks of 64 bits and 128 bits, respectively, to encrypt and decrypt plaintext into ciphertext and ciphertext into plaintext. Page 8 of 1919

AF Secure Client / Front end GUI Control Data (input in GUI) Status Data (output in GUI) Secure Client GUI: ParseCommand FtiGina GUI: Primary Win Logon And Authentication Kernel IOCTL IOR Dispatch Crypto Module (wlls) FSDrvr Config DB Packet Capture NFS (Partner) Microsoft NDIS Intermediate Protocol Application Applications interacting with the AF Secure Client Plaintext NDIS Driver Communications Port (NIC, RJ-45, etc.) Encrypted Data Figure 2: Information Flow Through the Client Page 9 of 1919

3.0 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION POLICY 3.1 Roles The Client supports two roles, the user role and the cryptographic officer role. Role based authentication of the cryptographic officer is supported. 3.1.1 The The user role is the default, unauthenticated role of the module. It can monitor system status and perform the following tasks: Use Profile Set Default Profile View Statistics Enable Auth Prompt Restart Sessions Partner Tracking Restart the Client AES/Triple DES Encryption Self Test 3.1.2 The Administrator - Cryptographic Officer The Cryptographic Officer role requires a password of 8-16 characters for authentication. The password can contain upper and lowercase letters, special characters, numbers, and spaces, for a total of 64 possible characters. Therefore the odds of a random attempt of guessing the password succeeding are 1 in 64 8. As the module takes 8 seconds to process an incorrect password entry, there could be up to 7.5 authentication attempts within one minute. Therefore, the probability of a random attempt succeeding within one minute is 7.5 in 64 8. The role is assumed to perform a set of cryptographic initialization or management functions (e.g., module initialization, input/output of cryptographic keys and CSPs, and audit functions). The cryptographic officer performs the following tasks in particular: Install the Client Configure, Edit and Delete Profiles o Name Profile o Select Binding o Enable or Disable Encryption o Select the type of encryption o Select the Diffie-Hellman Key Size Page 10 of 1919

o Configure Access IP o Configure Trusted Devices o Allow 802.1x Traffic o Enable and Configure Submit roaming Use Profile Set Default Profile Enable Auth Prompt Restart Sessions Partner Tracking Restart the Client AES Encryption Change Administration Password Self Test 3.2 Services Table 1: Services Services For the Role Required To use Service Service Input Service Output Security Relevant Data Use Profile Set Default Profile Select on GUI Select on GUI Edit Profile Password Configuration Add Profile Password Configuration Activate Profile Sets Default Profile Changed Profile Creates new Profile Delete Profile Password Deletes Profile Administration Password Old Password New Password New Password set System Settings Password Activates New System Settings Enable Auth Prompts GUI Selection Enables Auth Prompts none none AES 128, 192, 256, Triple DES 2 key AES 128, 192, 256, Triple DES 2 key none crypto officer password crypto officer password none Page 11 of 1919

Restart Sessions GUI Selection Restarts and Reset Session none View Partner Tracking GUI Selection Shows Partners Information none Triple DES Encryption (2 key) Triple DES-CBC AES Encryption (128 bits) AES-CBC AES Encryption (192 bits) AES-CBC AES Encryption (256 bits) AES-CBC Self Test Power Up Reset Log Message Crypto Algorithm Tests SHA1 Hash and HMAC Test SHA256 Hash and HMAC Test X9.31 Known Answer Test File Integrity Check FIPS.SYS Seed Test Diffie-Hellman Monte Carlo Test Page 12 of 1919

4.0 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MANAGEMENT The Client itself automatically performs all cryptographic processing and key management functions. 4.1 Key Generation The Client uses six cryptographic keys, generated by FIPS-approved processes: Static Private Key Static Public Key Static Secret Encryption Key (Symmetric, Triple-DES and AES) Dynamic Private Key Dynamic Public Key Dynamic Session Key (Symmetric, Triple-DES and AES) In addition to the above cryptographic keys, the module also relies on the following critical security parameters (CSPs): Access ID Password Module s Secret Key (Symmetric, Triple-DES and AES; derived from the Access ID) The public and private keys above are those used in the Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol. The Module Secret Key is not generated in an Approved manner; therefore, the Static Diffie-Hellman key agreement, in which the Module Secret Key encrypts the Static Public Key, is considered to be a plaintext transmission. An ANSI X9.31 A.2.4 pseudo-random number generator generates random numbers used for generating the module private keys. 4.2 Key Storage No encryption keys are stored permanently in the module hardware. In accordance with FIPS 140-2 standard, the Access ID and Password are considered to be stored in plaintext, as the method used to encrypt does not use an Approved key. 4.3 Zeroization of Keys The session keys of the Client are automatically zeroized when the system is turned off and regenerated at every boot-up of the host hardware. On a PC, Zeroization of the Access ID and Password can be accomplished by formatting the hard drive, on a pocket PC, they can be zeroized by performing a hard reset (wiping the NVRAM) of the device. 4.4 Protocol Support The Client supports the Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol. Page 13 of 1919

4.5 Cryptographic Algorithms The Client applies the following cryptographic algorithms: Table 2: Algorithms Supported by the Client FIPS Algorithms NIST-FIPS AES (ECB, CBC, encrypt/decrypt; 128, 192, 256) Certificate number 607 Triple-DES (CBC, encrypt/decrypt) 579 Non-FIPS Algorithms SHS 656 HMAC-SHA-1 313 RNG 346 Diffie-Hellman (Key Agreement; 512, 1024, and 2048 bit key sizes supported, but only 1024 bit or higher allowed in approved mode.), MD5 DES (ECB, CBC, encrypt/decrypt) Page 14 of 1919

5.0 ACCESS CONTROL POLICY The Client only allows role-based access for the role to operator interfaces that access to the appropriate set of management and status monitoring tools. Direct console access supports the majority of System Administrator (Cryptographic Officer) tasks. s can review module status and manage system settings where appropriate but not cryptographic settings when the modules are operating in FIPS mode. Because the Client automates cryptographic processing, operators do not have to actively initiate cryptographic processing; the Client encrypts and decrypts data sent or received by operators using authenticated devices connected to the Client The Crypto-Officer must use his/her password to access the system. The password can be defined with letters, numbers and special characters. It must be minimum eight (8) characters long. (The maximum length can be 16 characters.) The Tables 1 and 2, defined by Fortress Technologies Access Control Policy, show the authorized access and services supported and allowed to each role. As a user does not have any interaction with the module security relevant data items. Page 15 of 1919

6.0 PHYSICAL SECURITY POLICY The Client was designed to be installed on production quality devices as defined by the FIPS PUB 140-2 for security level 1. However, as the Client is delivered as a software cryptographic module only, the physical security requirements do not apply to the module. Table 3 and 4 show some of the hardware on which Fortress Technologies independently tested the Secure Client. This listing does not describe the hardware platforms on which FIPS validation conformance testing was performed. Table 3: Some PCs and NICs that are Compatible with Client MODEL Wired NIC Wireless NIC OS Optiplex GX150 Desktop Optiplex GX150 Desktop Optiplex GX150 Desktop Optiplex GX150 Desktop Optiplex GX150 Desktop Latitude C840 Laptop Fujitsu N6210 Laptop HP Proliant ML110 Server IBM 390X Laptop Compaq SFF Series Desktop Compaq Ipaq Agency Series PD1040 IMB ThinkPad T43 Laptop Compaq DeskPro Desktop Optiplex GX150 Desktop IBM 300 PL Desktop Compaq DeskPro Desktop 3Com Integrated (3C920) 3Com Integrated (3C920) 3Com Integrated (3C920) 3Com Integrated (3C920) 3Com Integrated (3C920) Vmware AMD PCNet adapter Compaq (NC3161) 3Com Integrated (3C920) Belkin 802.11G PCI (F5D7001) 3Com 802.11A/B/G PCI (3CRDAG675) Linksys 802.11G PCI (WMP54G) Cisco PCI 802.11A/B/G (AIR-PI21AG-A-K9) Netgear 802.11A/G PCI (WAG311) Dell TrueMobile 1150 Mini PCI IntelPro 802.11A/B/G (2915ABG) Orinoco 802.11A/B/G PCI (8480FC) Orinoco 802.11A/B/G USB Netgear USB 802.11B (MA111) IntelPro 802.11B/G Integrated (2200BG) Intel Integrated (8255) Compaq (NC3161) Proxim Orinoco 802.11B USB (8425-WD) Win2000 SP4 Win2000 SP4 Win2003 Standard Server Win2003 Enterprise Server Win2000 SP4 Page 16 of 1919

Fujitsu N3510 Laptop IMB ThinkPad T42 Laptop Acer CL32 Aspire 2000 Laptop Generic Chassis Server Generic Chassis Server HP Compaq nc6220 Laptop Toshiba Satellite M30-S309 Compaq SFF Series Desktop Compaq Ipaq Agency Series PD1040 Dell Optiplex GX-150 Desktop Compaq Armada 7X Laptop Dell MP061 Laptop IBM T43 268DGLI Laptop Fujitsu LifeBook P Series Laptop Intel Pro/1000 MT 3Com 10/100 PCI (3C905B-TX) Intel Pro100+ PCI Broadcom 10/100/1000 NetXtreme Intel Pro/100 VE Intel 82559 Fast Ethernet 3Com Integrated (3C920) Socket EA Lower Power Credit Card Eth Adapter Broadcom 440x Integrated Broadcom NetXtreme Gigabit Ethernet Realtek TRL8139/810x IntelPro 802.11B/G Integrated (2200BG) Proxim Orinoco 802.11B USB (8425-WD) IntelPro 802.11B/G Integrated (2200BG) Proxim Orinoco 802.11B USB (8425-WD) IntePro 802.11B Mini PCI (LAN 2100 3B) Proxim Orinoco 802.11B USB (8425-WD) IntelPro 802.11A/B/G (2915ABG) Intel Pro/Wireless LAN 2100 3B Netgear USB 802.11B (MA111) Netgear USB 802.11B (MA111) Dell Wireless 1390 WLAN Mini Card Rev 3.6 Intell Pro/Wireless 2200BG Dell True Mobile 1300 802.11BG PC Card Proxim OriNOCO 11 ABG Combo Card Gold Win2003 SP2 Standard Server Win2000 Server SP4 Win2000 SP4 Win2000 SP4 Table 4: Some PDA and Handhelds Compatible with Client Type Make Model CE Build NIC(s) Tested Number PDA _TEMPLATE _TEMPLATE Integrated PDA HP ipaq hx2490 Build 14366.1.0.1 Integrated PDA HP ipaq h4355 Build 13252 Integrated PDA HP ipaq h5455 Build 11178 Integrated Page 17 of 1919

PDA HP ipaq h5555 Build 13100 Integrated PDA HP ipaq hx4700 Build 14132 Integrated PDA Dell Axim X3 Build 13349 Integrated Handheld Intermec 700 Series Build 13100 Embedded PDA Dell Axim X50 Build 14260.2.0.5 Integrated PDA HP ipaq h5450 Build 11178 Integrated PDA Dell Axim X30 Build 13349 Integrated Handheld Symbol MC9090 5.0 (bld 1400) Integrated - Symbol 802.11a/b/g PDA Dell Axim X51v Build 14957.2.3.1 Integrated Handheld Symbol MC70-7094 Build 14402.1.1.0 Integrated Handheld Handheld Dolphin 7900 v4.21.1088 (Build integrated 802.11b Products (HHP) 14235.2.0.0) Handheld Symbol MC3000-3090G Build 1400 The physical security of a deployed Client is determined by the customer s security policy. 7.0 SOFTWARE SECURITY The Client software is written in C and C++ and operates on most versions of the Windows operating system. The software is installed in the host hardware storage medium as a compiled executable. Self-tests validate the operational status of each product, including critical functions and files. If the software is compromised, the module enters an error state in which no cryptographic processing occurs, preventing a security breach through a malfunctioning device. 8.0 OPERATING SYSTEM SECURITY The Client operates on Microsoft Windows NT, 2000, XP, and CE. FIPS validation conformance testing was performed specifically on the Windows 2000 Professional (SP4), Windows XP Professional (SP2), Windows 2003 Server (SP2), Windows CE v3.0, Windows CE v4.0, and Windows CE v5.0 platforms. The operating system must be in single-user mode. The Client operates automatically after power-up. Page 18 of 1919

9.0 MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS POLICY No special mechanisms for the mitigation of other attacks are built into or claimed by the Secure Client. 10.0 EMI/EMC The Fortress Technologies, Inc. s engineer or the customer s cryptographic officer installs the Client on FCC-compliant (Part 15, Subpart J, Class A), Class B devices. 11.0 CUSTOMER SECURITY POLICY ISSUES FTI expects that after the module s installation, any potential customer (government organization or commercial entity or division) employs its own internal security policy covering all the rules under which the module(s) and the customer s network(s) must operate. In addition, the customer systems are expected to be upgraded as needed to contain appropriate security tools to enforce the internal security policy. 12.0 MAINTENANCE ISSUES All software installation and reinstallation for modules is performed by the cryptographic officer following the procedures defined by Fortress Technologies. Software troubleshooting to resolve an error state may require the product to be reinstalled by the cryptographic officer. - * - * - End of the Non-Proprietary Security Policy for the FIPS 140-2 Level 1Validated Fortress Secure Client document. Page 19 of 1919