IPV6 FRAGMENTATION. The Case For Deprecation. Ron Bonica NANOG58



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Transcription:

IPV6 FRAGMENTATION The Case For Deprecation Ron Bonica NANOG58

BACKGROUND 2 Copyright 2013 Juniper Networks, Inc. www.juniper.net

STATUS QUO In order to send a packet larger than the PMTU, an IPv6 node may fragment a packet at the source and have it reassembled at the destination In IPv6, only hosts can fragment In IPv4, both hosts and routers can fragment IPv6 Fragmentation has always been discouraged Reassembly is computationally expensive and inefficient Security concerns 3 Copyright 2013 Juniper Networks, Inc. www.juniper.net

SECURITY CONCERNS DoS attacks Attacker sends fragmented packets to victim Attack flow is optimized to consume resources on victim platform Attacker spoofs PTB message to victim s legitimate communication partners Causes legitimate communication partners to fragment packets that don t need to be fragmented Evasion of stateless firewall filters Stateless firewall selects packets based upon fields drawn from both the IP and TCP headers Attacker fragments packets so that IP header is in first fragment and TCP header is in second fragment All fragments evade selection by firewall draft-ietf-6man-oversized-header-chain 4 Copyright 2013 Juniper Networks, Inc. www.juniper.net

EXPOSING BUGS IN RARELY EXERCISED BRANCHES OF REASSEMBLY CODE Implementations occasionally deal badly with the following Fragment overlap Fragment overwrite Fragment overrun Too many fragments being reassembled simultaneously Too many packets that cannot be reassembled due to missing fragments The best implementations deal with these effectively But sometimes they don t Rarely exercised code on the OS should concern everyone 5 Copyright 2013 Juniper Networks, Inc. www.juniper.net

A (BAD) ALTERNATIVE TO IPV6 FRAGMENTATION All upper layers send packets smaller that 1280 bytes all of the time Works in the vast majority of cases Exception: In response to an IPv6 packet that is sent to an IPv4 destination, the originating IPv6 node may receive an ICMP Packet Too Big message reporting a Next-Hop MTU less than 1280 Hammer is way too big 6 Copyright 2013 Juniper Networks, Inc. www.juniper.net

A BETTER ALTERNATIVE IPV6 FRAGMENTATION An upper layer executes PMTUD [RFC 1981] or PLMTUD [RFC 4821] procedures Moves problems of fragmentation and reassembly from the IP layer to an upper layer There is no free lunch! Many TCP implementations support PMTUD and/or PLMTUD According to RFC 5405, a UDP-based application SHOULD NOT send UDP datagrams that result in IP packets exceeding the PMTU. The application should do one of the following: Use the path MTU information provided by the IP layer Implement PMTUD/PLMTUD itself Send only packets known not to exceed the PMTUD 7 Copyright 2013 Juniper Networks, Inc. www.juniper.net

THE BENEFIT OF PMTU/PLMTUD DISCOVERY Moves the problems of fragmentation and reassembly from the IP layer to an upper layer Either the transport or application layer Called a packetization layer Localizes risk Allows for layer specific optimizations Example: A particular packetization layer knows that it will never send a packet longer than 1280 bytes 8 Copyright 2013 Juniper Networks, Inc. www.juniper.net

OPERATIONAL REALITY 9 Copyright 2013 Juniper Networks, Inc. www.juniper.net

FRAGMENTED IPV6 TRAFFIC IS RARE Most popular TCP implementation perform PMTUD or PLMTUD procedures So, applications that ride over TCP rarely cause fragments to be sent Many UDP-based applications abide by the recommendations of RFC 5405 A few important UDP-based applications do not abide by the recommendations of RFC 5405 Example: DNSSEC can send large UDP packets. TCP alternative available 10 Copyright 2013 Juniper Networks, Inc. www.juniper.net

THE BITTER TRUTH Many operators discard fragmented IPv6 packets An NLnet Labs Study* reveals that IPv4 fragments were discarded along ~ 12% of observed paths IPv6 fragments were discarded along ~ 40% of observed paths So, if you are sending IPv4 and/or IPv6 fragments, they may not make it to their destination! * http://www.nlnetlabs.nl/downloads/publications/pmtu-blackholes-msc-thesis.pdf 11 Copyright 2013 Juniper Networks, Inc. www.juniper.net

RECOMMENDATION 12 Copyright 2013 Juniper Networks, Inc. www.juniper.net

A STANDARDS TRACK RFC (UPDATES RFC 2460) Deprecates the IPv6 Fragment Header Please, don t write any new applications that fragment packets Existing applications will continue to work As well or poorly as the do today States that operators MAY discard packets containing the IPv6 Fragment Header As, in fact, they already do 13 Copyright 2013 Juniper Networks, Inc. www.juniper.net