Mobile network security report: Germany



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Transcription:

Mobile network security report: Germany GSM Map Project gsmmap@srlabs.de Security Research Labs, Berlin December 2014 Abstract. Mobile networks differ widely in their protection capabilities against common attacks. This report details the protection capabilities of four mobile networks in Germany. All 3G networks in Germany implement sufficient 3G intercept protection. Some popular passive 2G intercept devices will not work against T-Mobile. T-Mobile 2G users are predominantly using latest encryption technology. Users of E-Plus and O2 are not sufficiently protected from 2G intercept. Impersonating 2G users of E-Plus, O2, and Vodafone is possible with simple tools.

Contents 1 Overview 2 2 Protection measures 3 3 Attack scenarios 4 3.1 Passive intercept.................................. 4 3.2 Active intercept.................................. 5 3.3 Impersonation................................... 6 3.4 User tracking................................... 6 4 Conclusion 7 1 Overview Protection dimension (higher means better) Operator Intercept Impersonation Tracking E-Plus 2G 48% 59% 3G 100% O2 2G 33% 27% 3G 90% T-Mobile 2G 76% 72% 3G 96% Vodafone 2G 52% 46% 3G 96% 58% 50% 88% 90% Table 1: Implemented protection features relative to 2014 best practices (according to SRLabs GSM metric v2.5) Disclaimer. This report was automatically generated using data submitted to gsmmap.org by volunteers. (Thank you!) The analysis does not claim accuracy. Please do not base far-reaching decisions on the conclusions provided herein, but instead verify them independently. If you detect inaccuracies, we are looking forward to hearing from you. This document provides a security analysis of Germany s four mobile networks, based on data collected between January 2011 and December 2014. The analysis is based on data samples submitted to the GSM Map project 1. It compares implemented protection features across networks. 1 GSM Map Project: https://gsmmap.org Mobile network security report: Germany Page 2

C The SRLabs network security metric condenses a7ack vectors and mi9ga9ons Risk category Risks Components Mitigations Intercept (2G) Impersonation (2G) Tracking Intercept voice Intercept SMS Make calls illegitimately Receive victim s calls Local tracking Global tracking Predict freq s Crack keys in real time Crack keys offline Reuse cracked keys Track IMSI/ TMSI HLR location finding SRLabs Metric v2.0 Hopping entropy A5/3 Padding randomization A5/3 Padding randomization SI randomization Update key in each transaction Update TMSI in each transaction Encrypt location updates (preferably with A5/3) Always encrypt IMSI Hide MSC and IMSI in HLR responses Figure 1: Best practice protection measures can mitigate three attack scenarios. 0 The GSM Map website reports protection features condensed into three dimensions as shown in Table 1. This report details the logic behind the analysis results, lists some of the implemented protection features, and maps the protection capabilities to popular attack tools. 2 Protection measures The SRLabs GSM security metric is built on the understanding that mobile network subscribers are exposed to three main risks: Intercept. An adversary records calls and SMS from the air interface. Decryption can be done in real time or as a batch process after recording transactions in bulk. Impersonation. Calls or SMS are either spoofed or received using a stolen mobile identity. Tracking. Mobile subscribers are traced either globally using Internet-leaked information or locally by repeated TMSI pagings. The SRLabs metric traces these three risks to an extensive list of protection measures, some of which are listed in Figure 1. For 3G networks, GSMmap currently assesses intercept protection only. We understand that that the mandatory integrity checking in 3G protects from simple impersonation attacks. Table 2 details the implementation depth of some of the mitigation measures present in Germany s mobile networks. Mobile network security report: Germany Page 3

Attack vector Networks E-Plus O2 T-Mobile Vodafone 2G Over-the-air protection - Encryption algorithm A5/1 66% 100% 36% 51% A5/3 34% 0% 64% 49% - Padding randomization - SI randomization - Require IMEI in CMC - Hopping entropy - Authenticate calls (MO) 85% 15% 16% 7% - Authenticate SMS (MO) 91% 20% 98% 66% - Authenticate paging (MT) 8% 8% 58% 26% - Authenticate LURs 37% 9% 52% 45% - Encrypt LURs 100% 100% 100% 100% - Update TMSI 58% 21% 38% 33% 3G Over-the-air protection - Ecryption - Update TMSI 100% 0% 58% 62% HLR/VLR configuration - Mask MSC - Mask IMSI Table 2: Protection measures implemented in analyzed networks, compared to best practice references observed in 2014. 3 Attack scenarios The protection measures impact the effectiveness of various common mobile network attack tools. 3.1 Passive intercept Passive 2G intercept requires two steps: First, all relevant data needs to be intercepted. This step cannot be prevented completely, but aggravated significantly by using less predictable frequency hopping sequences. O2, T-Mobile, and Vodafone use such less predictable hopping sequences. In 3G networks, regular totation of the TMSI makes it harder to target a phone for intercept (Update TMSI). E-Plus has implemented a particularly high TMSI rotation rate. Mobile network security report: Germany Page 4

Secondly, the intercepted call and SMS traces need to be decrypted. In 2G networks, this can be prevented by hardening the A5/1 cipher or by upgrading to modern encryption algorithms. Currently, there is no publicly known cryptanalytic attack against the common 3G encryption algorithm, A5/3. All 3G networks in Germany in Germany use this encryption algorithm. Hardening the A5/1 cipher. The A5/1 cipher was developed in 1987 and is still the most common encryption algorithm for 2G calls. First weaknesses of this cipher were discussed in 1994 2, but it took until the mid-2000 s until successfull attacks on 2G were demonstrated publicly. These attacks exploit (partially) known plaintexts of the encrypted GSM messages to derive the encryption key. Consequently, countermeasures need to reduce the number of predictable bits in 2G frames. Nowadays, several generations of passive A5/1 decipher units exist, that attack different parts of the transaction. Early generation boxes attack the Cipher Mode Complete message. T-Mobile and Vodafone generally protect from these boxes. E-Plus and O2 are fully vulnerable (Require IMEI in CMC). More modern decipher units leverage predictable Null frames. These Null frames contain little to no relevant information and are filled up with a fixed uniform padding, facilitating known-plaintext attacks. E-Plus and O2 are particularly prone to this type of attack. Recently updated intercept boxes further leverage System Information (SI) messages. These messages can be randomized, or not sent at all during encrypted transactions (SI randomization). None of the networks in Germany are protected against this type of attack. Upgrading to modern encryption algorithms. With the introduction of 3G mobile telecommunications technology, the A5/3 cipher was introduced to 2G standards. Only theroretical attacks on this cipher were so far presented publicly, none of which have practical significance. Modern phones can use this cipher for 2G communication, if the network supports it. With passive intercept being prevented, attackers must use active intercept equipment, e.g. fake base stations, as described in Section 3.2. E-Plus, T-Mobile, and Vodafone have begun rolling out A5/3. To intercept subscribers of E-Plus, T-Mobile, and Vodafone in A5/3-enabled areas, attackers will need to use active equipment. In Germany, O2 continues to mostly rely on outdated encryption. 3.2 Active intercept Attacks through fake 2G base stations can be prevented to different degrees, based on what the fake base station is used for: Location finding: In this attack scenario, a phone is lured onto a fake station so that the phone s exact location can be determined. This scenario occurs independent of the phone network and hence cannot be prevented through network protection measures. Outgoing call/sms intercept: A fake base station can proxy outgoing connections. In this 2 See https://groups.google.com/forum/#!msg/uk.telecom/tkdcaytoeu4/mroy719hdroj Mobile network security report: Germany Page 5

attack, connectivity to the real network is not necessarily required, so no protection can be achieved from outside the phone. Encrypted call/sms intercept: Modern fake base stations execute full man-in-the-middle attacks in which connections are maintained with both the phone and the real network. Networks can make such active attacks more difficult with a combination of two measures: First, by not allowing unencrypted calls. Secondly, by decreasing the authentication time given to an attacker to break the encrytion key. This timeout can be as much as 12 seconds according to common standards. The GSM Map database currently lacks reliable data on authentication times in Germany. All 2G networks in Germany use encryption in all 2G call and SMS transactions. All 3G networks in Germany encrypt relevant 3G transactions. However, the GSMmap currently lacks data to decide whether the networks would accept subscriber-originated unencrypted transactions as well. 3.3 Impersonation Mobile identities can (temporarily) be hijacked using specific attack phones. These phones require the authentication key deciphered from one transaction. They use this key to start a subsequent transaction. The obvious way to prevent this attack scenario is by requiring a new key in each transaction (Authenticate calls/sms). In Germany, 2G call impersonation is possible against O2, T-Mobile, and Vodafone. The same is possible for SMS messages from O2 and Vodafone. 3G networks are generally protected against this type of impersonation attacks. 3.4 User tracking Mobile networks are regularly used to track people s whereabouts. Such tracking occurs at two different granularities: Global tracking: Internet-accessible services disclose the general location of GSM customers with granularity typically on a city level. The data is leaked to attackers as part of SMS delivery protocols in form of the MSC address (Mask MSC). T-Mobile and Vodafone suppress MSC information for their customers in Germany. E-Plus and O2 allow MSCbased tracking. In addition, users IMSI s can leak in HLR requests. All 2G networks in Germany protect this information. All 2G networks in Germany blocked the queries for IMSI in HLR responses from the test service used for this report, but may still disclose more information to requesters not on the black list. Local tracking: Based on TMSI identifiers, users association with location areas and specific cells can be tracked, providing a finer granularity than MSC-based tracking, but a less fine granularity than location finding with the help of fake base stations. IMSI-based tracking is made more difficult by changing the TMSI in each transaction (Update TMSI). Mobile network security report: Germany Page 6

E-Plus has implemented this feature. O2, T-Mobile, and Vodafone have not addressed this threat thoroughly. 4 Conclusion The mobile networks in Germany implement only few of the protection measures observed in other networks. E-Plus, T-Mobile, and Vodafone have begun upgrading their network to the more secure A5/3 encryption algorithm. T-Mobile and Vodafone are protecting their subscribers particularly well against tracking. The evolution of mobile network attack and defense techniques is meanwhile progressing further: Modern A5/1 deciphering units are harvesting the remaining non-randomized frames and thanks to faster computers are achieving high intercept rates again. The 3GPP, on the other hand, already completed standard extensions to reduce A5/1 attack surface to a minimum. These standards from 2009 are only hesitantly implemented by equipment manufacturers, leaving users exposed to phone intercept risks. The available protection methods even when implemented in full are barely enough to protect users sufficiently. A stronger push for implementing modern protection measures is needed to revert this erosion of mobile network security. Mobile network security report: Germany Page 7