The role of government in financial institutions pros and cons. Bjørn Skogstad Aamo, Kredittilsynet, Norway



Similar documents
Morgan Stanley European Financials Conference

The 1990 s Financial Crises in Nordic Countries

Further focus on retail banking

Interim report 1st quarter 2016

Financial Stability Report Reports from the Central Bank of Norway No NORGES BANK FINANCIAL STABILITY Report

About Komplett Bank ASA. Outlook. Developments to date

About Komplett Bank ASA. Outlook. Developments to date

The recovery of the Spanish economy XVI Congreso Nacional de la Empresa Familiar/Instituto de la Empresa Familiar Luis M.

Danske Markets Nordic Insurance Conference 21 September by Poul Almlund Chief Executive Officer

Financial Stability 2/12. Charts

Managing Systemic Banking Crises. David S. Hoelscher Assistant Director Money and Credit Markets Department

1. The financial crisis of 2007/2008 and its impact on the UK and other economies

FITCH AFFIRMS NORWEGIAN SAVINGS BANKS

Tables. Standard symbols:. Category not applicable.. Data not available... Data not yet available Nil 0 Less than half the 0.0 final digit shown

Second Quarter Results 2014 Investor presentation

FINANCIAL CRISES AND ITS IMPACT ON THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM. Lecturer Oleg Deev

Government backed insurance of extreme systemic risk

Closing of Sparebanken Hedmark s acquisition of Bank 1 Oslo Akershus AS. Investor information, 29 June 2016

DNB The Norwegian bank

Interim Report 2 nd quarter 2014 Nordea Eiendomskreditt AS

THE GREAT DEPRESSION OF FINLAND : causes and consequences. Jaakko Kiander Labour Institute for Economic Research

Econ 330 Exam 1 Name ID Section Number

First quarter Positive volume and spread development during the past 12 months. Negative mark-to-market adjustment of basis swaps

Update on 2014 and strategic priorities. Morgan Stanley 11 th Annual European Financials Conference Torsten Hagen Jørgensen, Group CFO

The U.S. Financial Crisis: Lessons From Sweden

Lecture 16: Financial Crisis

Equity per share (NOK) Equity ratio 39 % 38 % 36 % Non-current net asset value per share (NOK) (EPRA NNNAV) 2)

Asset Management Companies Observed best practices

Words from the President and CEO 3 Financial highlights 4 Highlights 5 Export lending 5 Local government lending 6 Funding 6 Results 6 Balance sheet

Danica Pension. Chief Executive Officer Henrik Ramlau-Hansen Danica. Capital Markets Day 4 December 2002

The Global Banking Crisis: an African banker's response

Creation of the Norwegian Financial Champion. Geir Bergvoll, Executive Vice President and Head of Capital Markets and Investor Relations DnB NOR ASA

FINNISH BANKING 2014

Specifics of national debt management and its consequences for the Ukrainian economy

Economic commentaries

Improvements across the board

The Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global

ABG Sundal Collier. Preliminary 2009 results. Press Release

MINUTES OF THE EXTRAORDINARY GENERAL MEETING PAN FISH ASA

BANKS IN SWEDEN Crisis of the 1990's and the Situation 2003

VAN LANSCHOT REINFORCES ITS CAPITAL POSITION

AUDIT REPORT, SUMMARY. Summary. Vattenfall a competitive leader in energy transition? (RiR 2015:6) SWEDISH NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE

Government Programs to Assist Banks in Crisis: Creating an Early Warning System

Check against delivery. Hans Dieter Pötsch Speech at the Annual Media Conference and Investor Conference on March 13, 2014.

2012 Interim Results

Wealth Management presentation. Gunn Wærsted, Head of Wealth Management

VISUAL 1 TERMS OF MODERN FINANCIAL MARKETS

Contents. CEO letter Page 6

BAD DEBT SETTLEMENT - CRITICAL ISSUES IN BANK RESTRUCTURING IN VIETNAM I. Analytical framework overview 1. Theoretical consideration 1.1.

Equity per share (NOK) Equity ratio 37 % 39 % 36 % Non-current net asset value per share (NOK) (EPRA NNNAV) 2)

Basel II. Tamer Bakiciol Nicolas Cojocaru-Durand Dongxu Lu

Building the strongest IT service provider in the Nordics

Presentation April 2007, Lars Nilsen, CEO. Block Watne Gruppen Private Placement

INVESTOR CONFERENCE CALL EUROPEAN STABILITY MECHANISM TUESDAY 25 TH SEPTEMBER 11AM

SEB s Swedish Residential Mortgage Lending and Covered Bonds. Stockholm September, 2013

Final Assessment 1 of Spain's eligibility for an EFSF/ESM loan to recapitalize certain financial institutions

Oslo Børs Holding ASA 4 th quarter 2001

2013 Annual Results. D. Francisco Gómez Martín CEO. Madrid, January 31 st, 2014

SBERBANK GROUP S IFRS RESULTS. March 2015

Announcement of Financial Results for. Den Danske Bank Group

DANMARKS NATIONALBANK Key Legal Aspects of Bank Resolution Danish experiences

INTERIM REPORT Q PROTECTOR FORSIKRING ASA

Interim report for the 3rd quarter of Glitnir Bank ASA

Interim report January September October, 2010

Global Crisis Testing Financial Strength of Banks and Life Insurance Firms

n Economic Commentaries

Oslo Børs Holding ASA second quarter 2004

available from MøllerGruppen AS Coverage. Guarantors: NOK 400,000,000 3 months NIBOR % p.a. Act/360 Modified Following 26 February,

Welcoming Remarks. Financial Interdependence in the World s Post-Crisis Capital Markets. Charles I. Plosser

Ownership of Australian Equities and Corporate Bonds

Term Sheet ISIN: NO FRN Marine Harvest ASA Senior Unsecured Open Bond Issue 2013/2018 (the Bonds or the Loan )

The value based Credit Union model. the alternative to consumer banking in the 21 st Century

Lecture 4: The Aftermath of the Crisis

Should banks be allowed to go into bankruptcy

How To Value A Bank In Nok 1000

Equity Story. 29 October 2015

Value added tax on financial services 1

One year with the new macroprudential policy

Fiscal consolidation: the Greek case. Dionysios A. Lalountas Directorate of Macroeconomic Policy & Forecasts Ministry of Finance

Sberbank Group s IFRS Results for 6 Months August 2013

2015 Article IV Consultation with Sweden Concluding Statement of the IMF Mission

Chapter 2. Practice Problems. MULTIPLE CHOICE. Choose the one alternative that best completes the statement or answers the question.

Prof Kevin Davis Melbourne Centre for Financial Studies. Current Issues in Bank Capital Planning. Session 4.4

Irish Life & Permanent PCAR PLAR Announcement 31 March 2011

Quarter presentation. 13 May 2009 Lars Nilsen, CEO and Arnt Eriksen, CFO

Financial Status, Operating Results and Risk Management

Report of the Board of Directors

CNP Assurances signs a longterm strategic partnership in insurance in Europe with Banco Santander. 10 th July 2014

Citi Global Financial Conference Hong Kong, 19 November 2013

Pohjola Group. 31 March 2008

The Danish mortgage system: Advantages, challenges, and lessons learned

The EMU and the debt crisis

The History of Crisis. Background Information: The Financial Crisis and Fair Value

Gjensidige Bank Investor Presentation Q November 2015

Magda Salarich Head of Santander Consumer Finance

CEO Terje Mjøs. Oslo, 16 July Q Presentation

Overview of the new Danish covered bond legislation addressing refinancing risk. Prepared as a joint effort of the Danish mortgage banks

Link Mobility Group ASA

Eighth UNCTAD Debt Management Conference

Tackle for the Dream. April 2013

Transcription:

The role of government in financial institutions pros and cons Bjørn Skogstad Aamo, Kredittilsynet, Norway

The Nordic banking crises a brief history Finland, Norway and Sweden had severe banking crises in the early 1990 s The crises were mainly caused by boom-bust cycles in credit markets following deregulations in the 1980 s Together with other macro-economic problems the banking crises led to significant losses of production and employment The peak banking loss in Norway was 2.8 % of GDP (1991) while the peaks (1992) in Sweden and Finland were 3.8% and 4.4 % of GDP In Norway cumulative bank losses in 1990-93 were 13 % of outstanding loans in 1990, thus wiping out substantial parts of the banks own funds

Pragmatic solutions: The Government as owner of last resort (1) All three Nordic countries were able to resolve their crises within few years, using active government involvement when necessary The resolutions were based on broad political support - no typical socialist agenda When losses exploded, own funds were insufficient for banks to continue credit operations. No Private capital was available. The governments had to step in Sweden and Finland used state guarantees to secure the funding of the banks. Fearing moral hazard, Norway avoided such blanket guarantees In Norway two Government institutions were set up: 1. The Government Bank Insurance Fund 2. The State Bank Investment Fund

Pragmatic solutions: The Government as owner of last resort (2) The insurance fund recapitalised failed banks including the three largest - on the following conditions: Writing down of shareholders value according to the banks losses Change of boards of directors and management Restrictions on the banks activities Programmes for cutting operating costs and branch networks The investment fund strengthened banks own funds on a commercial basis, to increase their lending capacity The Government started privatising the state-owned banks in 1994 Nr. 3 (Fokus) was privatised in 1995 and later bought by Danske Bank The majority of shares in nr. 2 was sold to Nordea in 1999/2000 The Government has held on to 1/3 of nr. 1: DnB - now DnBNOR, after merging with the largest savings bank

Pragmatic solutions: The Government as owner of last resort (3) To secure continuous bank operations, the Government took a risk no private investor would take The two funds operated with own boards, on an arm s length from Government and ministries Once the framework was set, daily operations were left to Boards and management of individual banks. No board members represented the government Supervison was carried out on a normal basis, with improved credit and other bank practices as main goal Economic growth and credit expansion picked up fairly quickly in 1994-1995 - increasing profits to the banks Calculations made as of end 2001 show gross outlays of NOK 39.7 bn, income (and stock values) of 53.4 bn and net profits of NOK 13.7 bn for all government rescue operations in total

The present international financial crisis (1) Norwegian banks had no direct exposure to CDO s containing sub-prime loans, and small exposures to other financial instruments hit by the crisis They had limited exposures to Lehman Brothers, Icelandic banks, Madoff etc. The banks encountered significant liquidity challenges in October 2008. These problems have largely been solved by a state facility where preferential housing bonds issued by the banks are swapped with Government bonds and certificates on market terms - supplementet by general central bank liquidity measures Norway is moderately hit by the crisis of the real economy with GDP declining some 1 per cent this year and unemployment climbing towards 3 per cent

The present international financial crisis (2) Bank losses are so far moderate, some 0.4 % (annual basis) of outstanding loans in Q1 2009 Market requirements for banks own funds have been rising while access to private capital remains limited. The Government has thus set up a State Finance Fund of NOK 50 bn to support the credit functions of healthy banks - fulfilling minimum requirements with good margins Kredittilsynet has decided that banks with more than 6% tier 1 capital thus will ble eligible for capital from the Fund By Q1 all Norwegian banks passed this test The fund offers core tier 1 capital as preferantial shares issued by the banks and hybrid capital of tier 1 quality Only if the preferential shares are not paid back within 5 years or the banks are hit by severe losses, will the preferential shares be swapped into ordinary shares, giving the fund part ownership in the banks In addition a Government Bond Fund of NOK 50 bn has been set up to ease the access to long term credits for industry

Concluding remarks Government intervention as a owner of last resort seems to be necessary to secure continuous banking operations during severe crises Such ownership should avoid controlling the daily operations and credit functions of the banks Instruments used should be as close to market conditions as possible, thus making the banks return to marketbased ownership easier Transparency should be a leading principle for both the instruments and processes applied by governments Provided such guidelines are followed, it is clearly better to resolve banking crises quickly and thoroughly by Government intervention than to let crisis conditions drag on for longer periods