The Relationship Between Pictures and Persuasion

This article was downloaded by: [Yale University Library] On: 31 March 2012, At: 06:09 Publisher: Psychology Press Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/pqje20 Seeing photos makes us read between the lines: The influence of photos on memory for inferences Linda A. Henkel a a Department of Psychology, Fairfield University, Fairfield, CT, USA Available online: 03 Oct 2011 To cite this article: Linda A. Henkel (2012): Seeing photos makes us read between the lines: The influence of photos on memory for inferences, The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 65:4, 773-795 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17470218.2011.628400 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 2012, 65 (4), 773 795 Seeing photos makes us read between the lines: The influence of photos on memory for inferences Linda A. Henkel Department of Psychology, Fairfield University, Fairfield, CT, USA Three studies examined how photos accompanying stories could contribute to people drawing inferences about outcomes from the stories and subsequently claiming that they had read what had actually only been inferred. Subjects read short stories designed to induce inferences about their conclusions (e.g., Sabrina dropped the delicate vase invites the inference that the vase broke) accompanied by a photo depicting the likely conclusion (the broken vase), a photo depicting a detail of the story but not the conclusion (the vase before it was dropped), or no photo. Results showed that seeing photographs consistent with inferred conclusions led people to falsely claim that they read those conclusions. Photo-boosted inferences were held with high confidence and were robust over time. Falsely recalled inferences were sometimes accompanied by false claims to have seen a photo depicting the inferred events when another photo or no photo had actually be seen. These findings support the source monitoring framework s prediction that people can mistakenly attribute their internally generated inferences about what occurred to externally derived sources when they have photographic evidence consistent with the inferred conclusions. Keywords: Source monitoring; False memory; Inferences and memory; Pictures and memory. Photographs and other graphics accompanying text can be a two-edged sword, having both positive and negative effects. Pictures can provide vivid and concrete details that aid comprehension and subsequent retention (Carney & Levin, 2002; Cherry, Dokey, Reese, & Brigman, 2003; Filippatou & Pumfrey, 1996; Glenberg & Grimes, 1995; Serra, 2010), but they also can draw attention away from text and place burdens on working memory (Liu, Kemper, & McDowd, 2009; Pike, Barnes, & Barron, 2010; Torcasio & Sweller, 2010), and depending on the content of the picture and its relation to the text, they can instead impair understanding and memory (Harp & Mayer, 1997; Mayer & Gallini, 1990; Waddill & McDaniel, 1992). Viewing photos can shape what one remembers in many settings. Seeing mug shots makes witnesses falsely identify innocent people in line-ups (Deffenbacher, Bornstein, & Penrod, 2006), viewing photos of new locations induces déjà vu like experiences and makes people claim they had been there (Brown & Marsh, Correspondence should be addressed to Linda A. Henkel, Department of Psychology, Fairfield University, Fairfield, CT, 06824, USA. E-mail: lhenkel@fairfield.edu Data from Experiments 1 and 2 were presented at the June 2011 meeting of the Society for Applied Research on Memory and Cognition (SARMAC) in New York City. Thanks to Elise Wilkinson for her work on early stages of this project. http://www.psypress.com/qjep # 2012 The Experimental Psychology Society 773 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17470218.2011.628400

HENKEL 2008), and looking at photos of objects and actions makes people claim the objects and actions were part of the actual event they witnessed (Schacter, Koutstaal, Johnson, Gross, & Angell, 1997). Some studies have outright altered existing photos. Doctored photos of fake childhood events have led to sizeable numbers of people falsely claiming they had experienced the depicted events (Strange, Hayne, & Garry, 2007; Wade, Garry, Read, & Lindsay, 2002). Doctored videos have led people to falsely confess to actions they did not do in the recent past (Nash & Wade, 2009; Nash, Wade, & Lindsay, 2009) and to bear false witness, claiming they saw a person commit the actions that in fact were only seen in the doctored video (Wade, Green, & Nash, 2010). Why is it that photos are so persuasive? In general, people appear to accept photos as veridical recordings of what happened, the photo s existence acting as evidence that the event occurred as depicted. Hence showing photos acts as a subtle form of persuasive suggestion, as seen in the photograph inflation effect in which viewing photos of completed actions led people to falsely claim to have performed those actions, with more false claims the more times the photos were viewed (Henkel, 2011; Henkel & Carbuto, 2008). It has been proposed that viewing photos can lead to the creation of erroneous beliefs and memories because photos provide a cognitive springboard from which people generate thoughts, feelings, and images in association with the presumed-to-beaccurate visual representation of the event, which creates mental representations that are subsequently difficult to distinguish from actual experience (Strange, Garry, Bernstein, & Lindsay, 2011; Strange et al., 2007; Wade et al., 2002). The source monitoring framework provides an overarching model for understanding the memorial features and the heuristic and strategic processes used in determining the source of mental representations originating from both the external world and the internally generated world of imagery, ideas, thoughts, and feelings (M. K. Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Lindsay, 2008). According to this model, the mental representations created by viewing photos have features typically associated with actually experienced events (e.g., vivid perceptual details that come to mind easily when later recollecting the event), and feature importation processes integrate these mental representations with those for similar actually experienced events, resulting in people erroneously attributing the mental representations for the photos to actual experience (Henkel, 2011; Henkel & Carbuto, 2008). In addition, exposure to photos or videos may foster false beliefs and memories by increasing the familiarity and perceived plausibility of the depicted event (Nash, Wade, & Brewer, 2009). What happens when photos accompany text? It has long been known that people draw inferences when reading and cannot always distinguish between what was explicitly said and what they inferred. For example, a sentence such as The man slipped and dropped the delicate glass pitcher is likely to be falsely remembered as The man broke the glass pitcher (M. K. Johnson, Bransford, & Solomon, 1973). People confuse the mental representation arising from what they inferred would happen with what was literally stated. Subsequent work has shown that misremembering inferences as stated is especially likely when the inferences contribute to text coherence and are highly predictable (Gras, Tardieu, Piolino, & Nicolas, 2011; McKoon & Ratcliff, 1986; Singer & Remillard, 2004; van den Broek, Lorch, Linderholm, & Gustafson, 2001). Falsely remembered inferences are held with high confidence and vivid recollective experience that they were actually said (Chan & McDermott, 2006), and they are persistent and hard to correct even in the face of counter information (Guillory & Geraci, 2010; H. M. Johnson & Seifert, 1994). Of course, such falsely remembered inferences are part of text comprehension processes, enabling people to integrate connections between sentences by using background knowledge and schemas to create a situation model through which readers understand what probably occurred though was not explicitly stated (Bransford & Franks, 1971; Marmolejo-Ramos, Juan, Gygax, Madden, & Roa, 2009; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). When people misremember the inference as stated, they are in essence correctly remembering the most apparent meaning of the text. This highlights the notion that many sins of 774 THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, 2012, 65 (4)

READING BETWEEN THE LINES memory are both vices and virtues, the by-product of otherwise adaptive systems that here enable people to extract the gist of what was communicated rather than retain a verbatim record (Schacter, 2001). What then might occur when stories that naturally invite inferences to be drawn are accompanied by photos depicting the inferred event? That is the central question the present studies address, and there are two prior studies on photos in the media that are especially relevant. One study showed that people were more likely to falsely remember reading about injuries and deaths in a newspaper article about a hurricane when they saw a photo of the devastated town after the hurricane hit with the story then when they saw a photo of the town prior to the hurricane (Garry, Strange, Bernstein, & Kinzett, 2007). The other found that when people read news stories about prior well-known public events that were now accompanied by a doctored photo (e.g., showing the crowd at Tiananmen Square as being larger than it actually was), they gave higher estimates of the number of people reported being at the event and rated the remembered violence of the event as higher than when they saw the original, undoctored photo (Sacchi, Agnoli, & Loftus, 2007). Taken together, these studies show that people s memory for what was said to have happened is shaped by photos they saw and that viewing photos suggestive of an outcome can lead to biases in memory consistent with the photographed outcome. The photos provide evidence that things happened a certain way, and people cannot always tell what information arose from photos or from what they read. The present studies seek to expand such work by ascertaining whether people are especially likely to draw inferences from stories when photos consistent with those inferences are viewed. Do inference-consistent photos make it especially hard to differentiate between what was said explicitly and what was inferred? EXPERIMENT 1 Experiment 1 builds off Garry et al. s (2007) study in which the broad conclusion was an explicit part of the story (i.e., the hurricane hit the town and caused damage), and the memory biases people showed about the amount of damage and personal injury were consistent with that outcome. In the present study, however, the conclusion is not stated explicitly in the stories, but is itself an inference that participants are likely to draw. For instance, suppose a story described a hurricane moving closer to a town but never directly stating that it hit. Would people falsely claim to remember reading that the hurricane did in fact hit if the story were accompanied by a photo consistent with that inference (houses ripped apart, streets flooded)? Rather than rely on a single story as in Garry et al., here participants read a series of short stories designed to induce inferences about the conclusions (e.g., Sabrina dropped the delicate vase invited the inference that Sabrina broke the vase ). Some were accompanied by a photo depicting the likely conclusion (the broken vase), some were accompanied by a photo depicting a detail of the story but not the conclusion (the vase prior to it being dropping), and some were not accompanied by a photo. It was hypothesized that seeing photos consistent with inferred conclusions would lead people to falsely claim that those conclusions were explicitly stated as having happened. The photos should produce memory representations that vividly depict the conclusion, and if the memory representations for the photos come to mind easily and vividly, they should be especially likely to be mistaken as having actually occurred, according to the source monitoring framework (Henkel, 2011). Such findings would be consistent with work showing the role of feature importation processes in source attributions (Henkel & Franklin, 1998; Henkel, Franklin, & Johnson, 2000; Lyle & Johnson, 2006) and with work showing that people often spontaneously read with a goal of understanding the implied meaning of the text rather than retaining a verbatim record of what literally was stated (M. K. Johnson et al., 1973). Experiment 1 also examined whether people would falsely claim they saw a photo depicting the inferred outcome. Prior research has found that sizeable numbers of people claim they THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, 2012, 65 (4) 775

HENKEL remember seeing video footage of high-profile public events covered in the media that does not in fact exist (Ost, Granhag, Udell, & Roos af Hjelmsäter, 2008; Ost, Vrij, Costall, & Bull, 2002; Porter, Taylor, & Brinke, 2008; Smeets et al., 2006). It was expected here that the use of strong inference-inducing verbal materials might produce a similar false I saw it effect. Lastly, people s memory for actually stated details was also tested to determine whether the presence or type of photo would impact memory. Photos may make stories seem more comprehensible and hence boost retention for nondepicted details (see Serra, 2010). However, photos that are essentially decorative and not essential for understanding can draw attention away from the text and lead to impaired retention (Waddill & McDaniel, 1992). Method Participants Participants were 41 undergraduates (9 men, 32 women) from Fairfield University in southwestern Connecticut, aged 18 to 21 years (M = 19.20 years, SD = 0.90). Participation was for credit or extra credit for a class requirement. Materials and design Stories and inferences. Twenty-four short stories were created, each consisting of 3 5 sentences (50 80 words). Each described a unique scenario in which an inference could be drawn but was not stated explicitly. For example, the story The Auction describes Sabrina as dropping a vase after she won it, inviting the inference that the vase broke. In the story Fight With Father, Dan punches his bedroom wall after an argument, inviting the inference that he punched a hole in the wall. The Appendix provides the full text and the likely inference for all stories. All of the inferences were logical, pragmatic consequences of the actions and scenarios described. Some of the stories were created based on sentences used in prior research on pragmatic inferences (M. K. Johnson et al., 1973; McDermott & Chan, 2006), and others were created specifically for this study. In developing the stories, a pilot group of judges indicated what inference was most likely after reading each story, and only stories rated with over 80% consistency in the most likely inference were used. Photos accompanying stories. For each story, two colour photos were obtained. The inference-consistent photo depicted the inferred outcome, and the noninference photo depicted another detail about the story. Some noninference photos showed the same object as that in the inferenceconsistent photo (like a before and after theme), and some showed a different object from that in the story. For example, in The Auction, the inference-consistent photo showed a broken vase shattered on the floor, and the noninference photo showed an unbroken vase standing upright. In Fight With Father, the inference-consistent photo showed a wall with a fist-sized hole, and the noninference photo showed an angry boy yelling with his fist raised. The Appendix lists all photos used. Eight stories were presented with a photo depicting the inferred outcome, eight with a photo depicting another detail, and eight with no photo. Three sets were created to counterbalance the photos across stories, with the stories and conditions randomly ordered in each set. Photos were displayed to the left, right, or below the story, with the placement counterbalanced across the three sets and across photo type. Across the 24 stories, there were variations of font style and text colour used, to go along with the cover story that the study was about people s opinions about graphic designs and layouts. Story memory test. The story memory test consisted of 48 questions, with 2 questions per story. Critical inference questions asked about the likely-to-beinferred detail and had four response options. For example, in The Auction, the critical inference question asked, What happened after Sabrina won the vase at the auction?, and response options were: She tripped on the rug; she broke the vase; she realized she forgot her wallet; none of the above. One of the options was always correct, one was the likely inference, one was plausible but incorrect, and none of the above was always incorrect. The other question concerned an explicitly mentioned 776 THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, 2012, 65 (4)

READING BETWEEN THE LINES detail, such as What did Sabrina say after getting the vase? Four response options included the correct response, two plausible but incorrect responses, and the option of none of the above. These questions were never directly about what was depicted in the inference-consistent or noninference photos. Because participants were told they could circle more than one response, 5 of the questions for explicitly stated details had more than one correct answer. Photo memory test. The photo memory test consisted of 24 probes, one for each story, naming the high-probability inference object or action used for the inference-consistent photos (Did you see a photo of a broken vase? Did you see a photo of a hole punched in a wall?). Eight questions corresponded to an inference photo that participants did actually see, 8 named the inferred actions when participants had actually seen the noninference photo, and 8 named the inferred actions when participants had seen no photo. Procedure Subjects were told that the study examined people s opinions of graphic layouts and that they would read a series of short stories appearing in different fonts, colours, and arrangements, sometimes with a photo accompanying the story. Their task was to read the story and rate its pleasantness (1 = very unpleasant, 2= somewhat unpleasant, 3= neutral, 4= somewhat pleasant, 5= very pleasant). The 24 stories were then presented one at a time for 25 seconds each, followed by the pleasantness rating scale and a prompt to record their rating. They were given 5 seconds to make their rating before the next story appeared. They returned 1 week later for a surprise memory task. They were first given the story memory test, for which instructions emphasized that their responses should be based exclusively on what they actually read in the stories and that they would be asked about the accompanying photos later. They were told to circle as many response options for each question as were correct. The title of the story was provided, followed by the inference and stated detail questions for that story (with the order counterbalanced). Next they were given the photo memory test in which they had to indicate yes or no whether a photo with a specified content accompanied the story. Results An alpha level of.05 was used for all analyses, and all follow-up comparisons were post hoc Scheffé tests. Recognition of inferred and stated details from the stories The proportion of critical questions answered by falsely remembering the inference was examined in a one-way repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA), with type of photo accompanying the story as the independent variable (inference-consistent photo, noninference photo, no photo). Any time participants selected the inference answer, regardless of whether they circled it alone, with the correct response, or with the other wrong response, counted as an instance of falsely remembering the inference. A significant main effect was found, F(2, 80) = 4.70, MSE = 0.03, p =.01 (see Figure 1, left), and pairwise Scheffé tests showed that participants remembered significantly more inferences as being stated when the inference-consistent photo accompanied the story than when either no photo or the noninference photo accompanied the story. No significant difference was found between the no photo and noninference photo conditions. The proportion of correct responses to the questions about stated details in the stories as a function of type of photo accompanying the story was examined in a separate one-way ANOVA (see Figure 1, right). The main effect of photo condition was not significant, F(2, 80) = 0.38, MSE = 0.03, p =.68. Thus accuracy rates in recalling stated details were similar for stories accompanied by inference-consistent photos, noninference photos, or no photos. Memory for photos People s memory for the photos was also assessed. The proportion of times participants indicated that they remembered seeing the photo that THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, 2012, 65 (4) 777

HENKEL Figure 1. Mean proportion of inferred and stated details recognized as a function of type of photo accompanying the story in Experiment 1. Error bars indicate standard error. depicted the inferred event was calculated as a function of type of photo shown with the story, and a significant main effect was found, F(2, 80) = 74.44, MSE = 0.03, p,.001. As seen in Table 1 (Column A), participants were significantly more likely to claim to have seen the inference-consistent photo when they did in fact see it than when they saw the noninference photo or saw no photo. In addition, they were significantly more likely to incorrectly say that they had seen a photo depicting Table 1. Experiment 1: Proportion of photos (A) depicting inferred events remembered as accompanying stories across the three photo types, and (B) as a function of whether the inferred events were falsely remembered as being stated in the story or were correctly remembered A. Claim saw photo depicting inferred events B. Claim saw photo of inferred event Falsely remember inference Correctly remember story Type of photo accompanying story M SD M SD M SD Inference-consistent photo.68.18.55.21.38.16 Noninference photo.34.17.22.16.20.16 No photo.23.16.17.14.13.13 778 THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, 2012, 65 (4)

READING BETWEEN THE LINES the inferred events when they had seen the noninference photo than when they saw no photo. Additional analyses examined memory for the photos in conjunction with memory for what was stated in the story (see Table 1, Column B). When participants viewed the inference-consistent photo and correctly remembered seeing the photo, they were significantly more likely to falsely remember the inference than to correctly remember what the story stated, t(40) = 4.98, p,.001. Similarly, when participants did not see a photo but falsely remembered seeing the inference-consistent photo, they were significantly more likely to falsely remember the inference than to correctly remember what was stated, t(40) = 2.81, p =.007. In contrast, when participants had seen the noninference photo but falsely remembered seeing the inference-consistent photo, they were just as likely to falsely remember the inference as to correctly remember what was stated, t(40), 1. Discussion These results confirm that people readily draw inferences from stories and often remember them as being stated (Chan & McDermott, 2006; M. K. Johnson et al., 1973). In building a situation model as part of text comprehension processes (Marmolejo-Ramos et al., 2009), people confuse the mental representation arising from what they inferred would happen with what was literally stated. The novel finding is that people were significantly more likely to remember reading inferences when the stories were accompanied by a photo depicting the inferred action than when a photo showing some other detail or no photo was shown. The photos did not simply pull attention away from the story, because memory for stated details did not differ across the three photo conditions. These photo-boosted inferences were predicted by the source monitoring framework, which purports that the mental representations arising from viewing photos depicting an outcome (e.g., the vivid perceptual details; the ongoing thoughts and feelings while viewing the photo) are likely to be mistakenly attributed to that outcome as actually happening. Just as photographic evidence makes people susceptible to falsely claiming to have performed actions they did not do (Henkel, 2011; Nash & Wade, 2009), here we see that photographic evidence makes people especially likely to falsely remember that an inferred action was explicitly stated as having occurred. Of course, drawing inferences is often a more important goal in reading and comprehension than retaining a verbatim record of the exact words used, and in situations where photos accompanying text further drive home the intended meaning, this error of falsely remembering an inference as having been stated represents successful comprehension of what was likely to have occurred. The tendency to draw inferences is strong enough to produce false claims of seeing photos consistent with those inferences. People falsely claimed to have seen the inference photo accompanying the story 25% of the time when they had seen no photo and 34% of the time when they had seen the noninference photo. People apparently can manufacture their own photographic evidence to support the mental representations indicating that an event happened the way they remember. This is consistent with the finding that when people remembered seeing the inference-consistent photo, they were especially likely to falsely remember the inference as having been stated in the story, both when they did in fact see the inferenceconsistent photo and when they actually saw no photo. Interestingly though, it is not necessary to remember seeing the inference-consistent photo (correctly or falsely) to remember reading the inference: When people mistakenly recognized the inference-consistent photo instead of the photo they actually saw, they were not more likely to falsely recognize the inference as having appeared in the story. EXPERIMENT 2 Experiment 2 further explores photo-boosted inferences using a recall test. It is important to establish that photo-boosted inferences are not unduly driven by the use of recognition tests, which can be somewhat suggestive by asking THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, 2012, 65 (4) 779

HENKEL point blank Is this what you read? Is this what you saw a photo of? and might encourage reliance on familiarity when making such judgements. In addition, memory was tested after only a 2-day rather than a 1-week delay, and participants were asked to rate how confident they were in the details from the stories they remembered. These changes allow us to determine whether photoboosted inferences might depend in part on how well the stories and the photos themselves are remembered and to determine whether the memories are subjectively experienced as high-confidence recollections or perhaps instead feel more like guesses. Method Participants Participants were 32 different undergraduates (12 men, 20 women) drawn from the same subject population as that in Experiment 1, ranging in age from 17 to 22 years (M = 18.77 years, SD = 1.30). One participant failed to return for the second session, leaving data from 31 subjects for analysis. Materials and procedure A similar set of 24 stories and photos as that in Experiment 1 was used. However, participants returned 2 days later rather than 1 week later and took a series of cued-recall rather than recognition tests. The story memory test had similar questions to those in Experiment 1, though worded to be open ended for both inferred conclusions (e.g., What happened after Sabrina tripped while carrying the vase she won at the auction? What did Dan do to his bedroom wall after he had a fight with his father?) and stated details (How often did the auction occur? What was Dan s fight with his father about?). Instructions again emphasized that answers should be based on what was stated explicitly in the stories and that they would answer questions about the photos themselves later. No response options were given. Following each question was a scale to rate how confident they were in their recall of that detail (1 = not at all confident,, 7= very confident). The two questions for a given story were presented one right after the other, with the order of the type of question (inferred detail, additional detail) counterbalanced. After completing the story memory test, a photo memory test was given. For each story, the story title was given, and participants indicated whether there had been a photo accompanying the story (yes or no) and described the photo if they answered yes. Results Participants responses to the open-ended recall questions on the story and photo memory tests were coded by two independent judges, and any disagreements as to the categorization (i.e., correct, inference, other) were resolved through consensus. For example, in the story The Auction, responses to What happened after Sabrina tripped while carrying the vase she won at the auction?, such as she dropped it or the vase slipped from her hands, were scored as correct, and responses such as the vase broke or it got smashed were scored as indicating that the inference was falsely remembered. In the story Fight With Father, responses to What did Dan do to his bedroom wall after he had a fight with his father?, such as he punched it or he hit it, were scored as correct, and responses such as he punched a hole in it were scored as falsely remembering the inference as read. Recall of inferred and stated details from the stories The proportion of critical questions answered with a response clearly indicating that the inference was falsely remembered as having been stated was examined in a one-way repeated measures ANOVA, with type of photo that accompanied the story (inference-consistent photo, noninference photo, no photo) as the independent variable. As seen in Figure 2 (left), a significant main effect was found, F(2, 60) = 5.00, MSE = 0.04, p =.01. Scheffé tests showed that participants falsely remembered significantly more inferences as being stated when the inference-consistent photo accompanied the story than when either no photo or the noninference photo accompanied the story, 780 THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, 2012, 65 (4)

READING BETWEEN THE LINES Figure 2. Mean proportion of inferred and stated details recalled as a function of type of photo accompanying the story in Experiment 2. Error bars indicate standard error. with no significant difference between the latter two conditions. The proportion of correct responses to questions about stated details in the stories was calculated as a function of type of photo accompanying the story and was examined separately in a one-way ANOVA (see Figure 2, right). As in Experiment 1, accuracy in recalling stated details was similar for stories accompanied by inference-consistent photos, noninference photos, or no photos, with no significant main effect, F(2, 60) = 1.03, p =.36. Confidence in recall for inferred and stated details Average confidence ratings as a function of photo type (inference-consistent photo, noninference photo, no photo) and detail type (falsely recalled inference, correctly recalled stated detail) were analysed in a 3 2 repeated measures ANOVA (see Figure 3). The main effect for detail type was significant, F(1, 34) = 25.08, MSE = 0.89, p,.001, with confidence ratings significantly higher overall for inferred details (M = 4.73) than for actually stated details (M = 3.51). The main effect for photo type was also significant, F(2, 60) = 12.37, MSE = 0.41, p,.001, with no significant interaction with detail type, F(2, 60) = 1.36, p =.26. Follow-up comparisons showed that confidence ratings were significantly higher when the remembered details were accompanied by either an inference-consistent photo (M = 4.37) or a noninference photo (M = 4.17) than when there was no photo (M = 3.81), with no significant difference in confidence for either of the photo conditions. THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, 2012, 65 (4) 781

HENKEL Figure 3. Confidence ratings for falsely recalled inferences and correctly recalled details as a function of photo accompanying story in Experiment 2. Confidence was rated on a 7-point scale where 1 = not at all confident and 7 = very confident. Error bars indicate standard error. Memory for photos The proportion of times that participants claimed to remember a photo accompanying a story was examined, and a significant main effect of photo type was found, F(2, 60) = 30.50, MSE = 0.06, p,.001. As seen in Table 2 (Column A), there was no significant difference in rates of correctly remembering that a photo appeared for the Table 2. Experiment 2: (A) Proportion of photos remembered as accompanying stories across the three photo types, (B) proportion of photos correctly described, and (C) proportion of inferred events falsely recalled as being stated in the story as a function of whether a photo was recalled or not C. Inferences falsely recalled A. Claim saw photo B. Correctly describe photo Recalled photo Did not recall photo Type of photo accompanying story M SD M SD M SD M SD Inference-consistent photo.65.24.57.28.51.23.18.16 Noninference photo.62.27.47.25.31.20.20.20 No photo.24.23.11.13.40.20 782 THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, 2012, 65 (4)

READING BETWEEN THE LINES inference-consistent and noninference photos, both of which were higher than rates of falsely remembering a photo appearing when in fact no photo had been presented. Accuracy in recalling the content of the photo was also examined (see Table 2, Column B). Of the photos recalled, the proportion that were correctly described was significantly higher for inference-consistent than for noninference photos, t (30) = 3.12, p =.004. As in Experiment 1, when participants viewed the inference-consistent photo and correctly remembered the content of that photo, they had significantly higher rates of falsely recalling that the inference had appeared in the story (M =.45, SD =.25) than of correctly recalling what was stated in the story (M =.07, SD =.09), t (30) = 8.59, p,.001. The rates at which participants falsely recalled seeing a photo consistent with inferred events when they had seen the noninference photo or no photo were relatively low overall. On average, participants made this error 7% of the time after seeing the noninference photo and 5% after seeing no photo, with no significant difference between these two conditions, t(30) = 1.22, p =.23. Twelve of the 31 participants (39%) made this error at least once when they had seen the noninference photo, and 10 of the 31 (32%) did so when they had seen no photo. An additional analysis examined the rates of falsely recalled inferences as a function of whether participants remembered seeing a photo, regardless of the claimed content of the photo. A 3 (photo type: inference-consistent photo, noninference photo, no photo) 2 (photo claim: claimed to see photo, claimed not to see photo) ANOVA was conducted on the proportion of critical questions answered by falsely recalling the inference, with a significant main effect for photo type, F(2, 60) = 11.77, MSE = 0.01, p,.001, qualified by a significant interaction between photo type and photo claim, F(2, 60) = 27.57, MSE = 0.05, p,.001 (see Table 2, Column C). Scheffé tests showed that participants recalled significantly more inferences when they correctly remembered seeing an inference-consistent photo than when they did not remember seeing the photo. They showed the opposite pattern when no photo had been presented: They recalled more inferences when they correctly said that no photo accompanied the story than when they claimed to have seen a photo with the story. Hence, in both cases, they were more likely to recall the inference when they correctly remembered whether a photo had accompanied the story or not. However, when the noninference photo had been shown, they were just as likely to falsely recall the inference regardless of whether they correctly claimed that a photo had been shown or incorrectly claimed that it had not been shown. Discussion These findings replicated and extended those of Experiment 1, using a recall rather than a recognition test. Memory accuracy for stated details was not impacted by type of photo, showing that photos did not themselves serve as a distraction. However, as expected, the presence of photos consistent with likely-to-be inferred conclusions led to higher rates of falsely recalled inferences, and these errors were made with high confidence. Participants were most confident in their memories when a photo accompanied the story, regardless of whether it was an inference-consistent photo or another photo, perhaps because their memory for the story was more vivid overall. Prior work has shown that pictures facilitate learning from text because they make the text appear more focused, concrete, and coherent (Carney & Levin, 2002), and coherence is an important part of inference making in comprehension processes (van den Broek et al., 2001). The relative rates of falsely remembered inferences across the two studies attest to the difficulty in differentiating between what one thought about happening and what was actually stated as happening, especially when provided with photographic evidence that it happened that way. When memory was tested with a recognition test following a 1-week delay (Experiment 1), people falsely recognized inferences almost 75% of the time after seeing inference-consistent photos, and when memory was tested with recall after a 2-day delay (Experiment 2), people falsely recalled THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, 2012, 65 (4) 783

HENKEL having read the inference 65% of the time on average after seeing the inference-consistent photo. These are not negligible error rates, though of course the stories were designed to induce people to draw the obvious inference, and thus these errors represent the extraction of gist rather than verbatim memory, which is ordinarily a goal of text comprehension and therefore could be viewed as a desirable outcome indicating that people understood and successfully remembered the implied meaning of the text. In Experiment 1, a number of people falsely claimed to have seen the inference-consistent photo when directly probed with questions asking Did you see a photo of X?. In the present study, rates were more modest, which would be expected given the use of free recall rather than recognition to assess memory. When participants did not in fact see the inference-consistent photo, nonetheless roughly 6% of the time they described a photo matching that inference, with almost 40% of the subjects doing this at least once. Interestingly, accuracy in describing the photos was higher for inference-consistent than for noninference photos, which may be due in part to reconstructive processes: People recall the inference and hence believe they saw a photo showing that inferred action, sometimes recalling the photo correctly but sometimes perhaps assuming that it must have been there and basing their description on that assumption rather than an actual memory. Along these lines, it was found that seeing the inference-consistent photo had a strong impact on their tendency to falsely recall having read the inference in the story. Importantly, falsely recalling inferences is not dependent on either correctly or falsely recalling seeing a photo of that inference, because people falsely recalled the inferences as having been stated in the story in both the noninference and the no photo conditions as well. EXPERIMENT 3 Experiment 3 further explores photo-boosted inferences using a single session design, where people s memory overall should be higher, especially for the photos. In addition, to test the generality of the effects obtained, Experiment 3 used an orienting task that did not have as strong an affective aspect, and the presentation of the photos and stories was altered, with the photos presented after reading the story rather than simultaneously with the story. Method Participants Participants were 42 new undergraduates (15 men, 27 women) from the same subject pool as that in Experiment 1. Ages ranged from 18 to 22 years (M = 19.42 years, SD = 1.20). Materials and design The materials and procedure were the same as those in Experiment 2, with the following exceptions. Six additional stories of similar length and style were created as fillers. Each described a unique scenario but did not have an obvious pragmatic inference to be drawn (see The Telescope in the Appendix as an example), and each had a misspelled word for the purposes of the orienting task. Participants were told that they would read short stories and that after each one they would rate how attractive they thought the text was, how easy it was to read the text, or whether there were any spelling errors in the story. They were told to pay attention because they would not know until after reading the story which of the three questions would appear. They were also told that sometimes a photo would appear after certain stories, and they were to look at the photo and think about the story. If no photo appeared, they were to simply think about the story until the next slide was shown. Following the instructions, the 30 stories were presented one at a time for 15 s, followed by the title of the story and either a photo corresponding to that story or a blank area for 7 s, and then a prompt to rate the attractiveness of the text, the ease of reading the text, or the spelling accuracy of the text. After 5 s, a bell sound warned participants that the next story was to appear. All 30 stories were presented in this manner. Subjects 784 THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, 2012, 65 (4)

READING BETWEEN THE LINES were then told that the study would assess whether their opinions about the media format were related to the visuospatial skills. They were given two mazes to complete in 5 min. After this filler task, they were given the story memory test followed by the photo memory test. Results Recall of inferred and stated details from the stories Scoring of open-ended responses was done in the same way as in Experiment 2. The proportion of questions answered by falsely recalling the inference was examined in a one-way ANOVA, with type of photo as the independent variable. As seen in Figure 4 (left), a significant main effect was found, F(2, 82) = 15.07, MSE = 0.02, p,.001, and pairwise Scheffé tests showed that the proportion of times that participants remembered the inferences as being stated was significantly higher when the inference-consistent photo accompanied the story than when either no photo or the noninference photo accompanied the story. Inference rates were slightly though not significantly higher when no photo accompanied the story than when the noninference photo did (p =.09). The proportion of correct responses to the questions about stated details in the stories was separately examined as a function of type of photo accompanying the story (see Figure 4, right). As in Experiments 1 and 2, the main effect of photo condition was not significant, F (2, 82), 1. Figure 4. Mean proportion of inferred and stated details recalled as a function of type of photo accompanying the story in Experiment 3. Error bars indicate standard error. THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, 2012, 65 (4) 785

HENKEL Figure 5. Confidence ratings for falsely recalled inferences and correctly recalled details as a function of photo accompanying story in Experiment 3. Confidence was rated on a 7-point scale where 1 = not at all confident and 7 = very confident. Error bars indicate standard error. Confidence in recall for inferred and stated details Average confidence ratings as a function of type of photo (inference-consistent photo, other photo, no photo) and type of detail remembered (falsely recalled inference, correctly recalled stated detail) were analysed in a 3 2 repeated measures ANOVA. Only the main effect for type of detail was significant, F(1, 34) = 25.08, MSE = 0.89, p,.001. As seen in Figure 5, participants were moderately to highly confident in their responses, and confidence ratings were significantly higher overall for inferred details (M = 6.05) than for actually stated details (M = 5.39). Confidence did not differ as a function of type of photo accompanying the story, F(2, 68), 1. Memory for photos The proportion of times that participants indicated that they remembered a photo accompanying a story was examined for the three types of photo (see Table 3, Column A), and a significant main effect was found, F(2, 82) = 367.10, MSE = 0.02, p,.001. As in Experiment 2, participants were more likely to correctly claim to have seen a photo when either the inference-consistent or the noninference photo had been seen than to falsely claim to have seen a photo when no photo was presented, with no significant difference for the two photo conditions. Accuracy in describing the photos was relatively high and did not differ for inference photos or noninference photos, t(41), 1 (see Table 3, Column B). 786 THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, 2012, 65 (4)

READING BETWEEN THE LINES Table 3. Experiment 3: (A) Proportion of photos remembered as accompanying stories across the three photo types, (B) proportion of photos correctly described, and (C) proportion of inferred events falsely recalled as being stated in the story as a function of whether a photo was recalled or not C. Inferences falsely recalled A. Claim saw photo B. Correctly describe photo Recalled photo Did not recall photo Type of photo accompanying story M SD M SD M SD M SD Inference-consistent photo.78.17.77.17.50.21.13.14 Noninference photo.77.16.75.18.31.17.11.10 No photo.07.12.03.08.47.18 Given the short retention interval, there were few instances of people falsely claiming to have seen inference-consistent photos, and hence these errors were not analysed. Instead, falsely recalled inferences were examined as a function of whether participants recalled seeing a photo accompanying the given story or not, regardless of the claimed content of the photo. A 3 (photo type: inference-consistent photo, noninference photo, no photo) 2 (photo claim: claimed to see photo, claimed not to see photo) ANOVA was conducted on the proportion of critical questions answered by falsely recalling the inference. Both main effects were significant and were qualified by a significant interaction between photo type and photo claim, F(2, 82) = 136.76, MSE = 0.03, p,.001. As seen in Table 3 (Column C), participants falsely recalled significantly more inferences when they correctly remembered seeing an inference-consistent photo than when they did not remember seeing the photo. Likewise, when the noninference photo had been shown, they falsely recalled the inference more often when they recalled seeing a photo than when they did not recall seeing a photo. They showed the opposite pattern when no photo had been presented: They falsely recalled more inferences when they correctly said that no photo accompanied the story than when they claimed to have seen a photo with the story. Thus, overall, they were more likely to falsely recall the inference when they correctly remembered whether a photo had accompanied the story or not. Discussion These results attest to the strength of the photoboosted inference effect seen in Experiments 1 and 2. Even with relatively high memory for stated details in the stories ( 70% accuracy) and for the photos ( 77% accuracy), people nonetheless had difficulty discriminating what they inferred had happened from what was stated as happening, with higher rates of falsely recalled inferences when an inference-consistent photo was presented. The rates of falsely recalled inferences for stories accompanied by the inference-consistent photo or by no photos after a 5-minute delay were similar to those in Experiment 2, with a 2-day delay. There was a slight but not significant drop in false recall when the noninference photos accompanied the story with the short delay but not the long delay, suggesting that participants ability to remember the photo may have helped them remember better what was stated rather than what was implied. Given the short delay, it is not surprising that confidence for both stated and inferred details was relatively high. Nor is it surprising, given the relatively high accuracy in remembering photos with this short delay, that overall confidence was not impacted by the presence of or type of photo, in contrast to Experiment 2, which showed higher confidence when a photo accompanied the story. Overall, people were more likely to falsely recall the inference when they correctly remembered that a photo had accompanied the story THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, 2012, 65 (4) 787

HENKEL than when they incorrectly claimed that there had been no photo. They also were more likely to falsely recall the inference when they correctly remembered that no photo had been presented than when they falsely claimed to have seen a photo. Thus the tendency to draw inferences is not dependent on whether one remembers a photo accompanying the story or not. An inference-consistent photo boosts the rates of falsely recalled inferences, but falsely recalled inferences occur on their own with or without photos. GENERAL DISCUSSION Past research has established the strong tendency for people to draw inferences while reading and later to have difficulty differentiating what they inferred happened from what was actually stated (M. K. Johnson et al., 1973). The present studies showed that photos depicting the likely-to-beinferred conclusion made people especially likely to remember the inferred actions and events as having been stated in the story. Such inferences were made with high confidence, were persistent over time, and occurred when readers focused on either their emotional response to the story or on more perceptual aspects of the stories appearance. The photo-boosted inference effect is not a byproduct of the mere familiarity that might be aroused on a recognition test because similar patterns were obtained using recall tests. In addition, the type of photo did not systematically impact memory for stated details; thus it was not the case that photos simply drew attention away from the stories and forced people to rely more on reconstructions based on gist. Rather, the photo-boosted inference effect appears to occur as a result of source misattribution processes. According to the source monitoring framework, the mental representations created by viewing photos (e.g., the perceptual details, the ongoing thoughts, feelings, and reactions) can be mistakenly judged as having arisen from another perceptually derived source. In prior studies, photos and videos have elicited false claims of performing actions that the individuals did not in fact do (Henkel, 2011; Nash & Wade, 2009), of witnessing someone else perform actions that they did not do (Wade et al., 2010), and of experiencing childhood events that did not actually occur (Wade et al., 2002). Here in the present studies, photos heightened the number of false claims that something really happened as described in a story about the event in which the conclusion was not directly stated. People appear to take photos as evidence that things happened a certain way and subsequently cannot always tell what information arose from photos or from what they read about or experienced. This is an important finding, given the prevalence of photos in the variety of materials that people read in their everyday lives, from news articles and online resources that we read to learn about what is happening in the world, to magazine articles and blogs we read for entertainment, to textbooks we study from. The studies also investigated whether the use of strong inference-inducing verbal materials might produce a similar false I saw it effect as in studies where people claim they remember seeing nonexistent video footage of high-profile public events covered in the media (e.g., Ost et al., 2002). Support for this was found in Experiment 1, where on a quarter to a third of the trials, on average, people falsely claimed to have seen a photo depicting the inferred events accompanying the story when they had in fact seen no photo or had seen the noninference photo. In Experiments 2 and 3, rates were more modest, which would be expected given that they used recall rather than recognition to assess memory. Interestingly, accuracy in describing the photos was higher for inference than for noninference photos when tested after 2 days, which may be due in part to reconstructive processes people falsely recalled the inference and hence believed they saw a photo showing that inferred action, sometimes recalling the photo correctly but sometimes perhaps inferring that it must have been there and basing their description on that inference rather than on an actual memory. In addition, the studies examined whether photo-boosted inferences were dependent on participants remembering the photos appearing with the stories. In general, inferred events were more 788 THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, 2012, 65 (4)

READING BETWEEN THE LINES likely to be remembered when people remembered seeing photos depicting the inferred events. This occurred both when people correctly remembered seeing the inference-consistent photo and when they falsely claimed to have seen the photo depicting the inferred events when in fact they had seen no photo accompanying the stories. Thus falsely recalled inferences from the story are often accompanied by recollection (true or false) of photographic evidence of that conclusion. People apparently support their beliefs about what happened by relying in part on the vividness that comes from remembering a photo, but this is a two-way street because without such actual photographic evidence, people sometimes create memories for photos to support the conclusions that they drew. However, remembering a photo as appearing with the story is not a necessary component of falsely remembering inferred events as having occurred. In Experiment 1, participants were just as likely to falsely remember inferences from the stories as to correctly remember details from the story when they had seen the noninference photos, yet falsely claimed to have seen photos depicting the inferred events. Furthermore, similar patterns of photo-boosted inferences were seen regardless of whether memory for the presence or content of a photo was relatively high or not across the different retention intervals and memory tests in the three studies. In addition, in Experiments 2 and 3, people falsely recalled more inferences as appearing in the stories when they correctly remembered that no photo appeared with the story than when they falsely claimed that a photo had appeared. Thus, falsely recalling inferences can occur both when people correctly remember seeing a photo and when people correctly remember that they did not see a photo. The presence and recollection of photos serves to boost the rates of falsely recalled inferences. Overall, the present results are consistent with the long-established view that inferences occur as part of ordinary reading comprehension processes in adults. Falsely remembering inferences in many situations is a desirable goal indicating that people successfully understood and remembered the intended meaning and likely outcome described in a story. People here who read and focused on the meaning of the text are not bad readers with faulty memories. They are displaying what Schacter (2001) calls the costs and benefits of otherwise adaptive memory systems that enable people to extract the gist and use their prior world knowledge to understand the world around them. Of course, it is important to note that the materials were specifically designed to invoke inferences, with the text alone producing inferences quite successfully and the accompanying photos boosting them even further. Future research should consider how photos might boost people s tendency to draw inferences when the inferences are not high-probability ones, as used here, or are less obvious inferences that require more elaborative processing (see, e.g., Singer & Remillard, 2004). Whether people would give more weight to seemingly objective evidence such as photos than to potentially more subjective renditions such as a person s description of an event would also be important to establish. The stories were written in a factual manner, as many news stories are. In other contexts, people may give written or verbal descriptions of an event (e.g., a report by a less than confident eyewitness) less weight, and the inclusion of a photo that presumably provides details about the reported event a photo that may be accurate or may be inadvertently inaccurate, or even doctored may lead people to rely more heavily on what they assume to be the hard facts shown in the photo rather than the reports of potentially unreliable individuals. Furthermore, the extent to which the photo is perceived as an integral part of the story should be explored. Would similar effects be seen if the photos were viewed later in time after reading the story or in conjunction with a different story? Past work suggests that even in those circumstances, photoboosted inferences might be seen (Henkel, 2011). Lastly, the generalizability of these results to other populations and settings should be explored, given that inferences, text comprehension, and recall can vary widely due to individual differences in factors such as skill level of the reader (Waddill THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, 2012, 65 (4) 789

HENKEL & McDaniel, 1992) and working memory capacity (Pike et al., 2010). For example, it is not known whether people with low working memory capacity may focus more on photos than on text, or instead may devote more time to reading and not pay attention to the photos. Situational factors such as readers goals should also be considered (van den Broek et al., 2001). In conclusion, viewing photos can shape people s memories of their experiences what they saw, did, or read to be consistent with those photos. This can be a positive thing, as when the photos bring to life factual information that might otherwise be difficult to understand (Carney & Levin, 2002), or even here, when photos encourage people to understand the broader gist of what probably happened in the situation, rather than remembering verbatim what was stated. However, people cannot always easily discriminate between what they saw in a photo and what they learned from another source (Henkel, 2011), and when photos are selected to emphasize elements of a story in an exaggerated way or are doctored to invite conclusions that are not accurate (Garry et al., 2007; Sacchi et al., 2007), this can have serious consequences. Consider Farid s (2011) website Photo Tampering Throughout History, which compiles examples of doctored photos in the media. The use of photos and videos in media sources reporting important local and world events can invite people to remember events in ways consistent with photos that happen to be included with the story, though do not necessarily illustrate facts of the event. Memory errors can be readily produced when people try to understand situations by filling in the gaps (M. K. Johnson et al., 1993) and by being motivated to believe that events happened a certain way (Barber, Gordon, & Franklin, 2009; Benney & Henkel, 2006). Here we see that photos boost the rates at which people draw conclusions and claim that inferred events actually occurred. Photos provide us with seemingly believable evidence that this is the way something happened, when the truth of the situation may be quite different from what was depicted. REFERENCES Original manuscript received 19 July 2011 Accepted revision received 15 September 2011 First published online 23 December 2011 Barber, S. J., Gordon, R., & Franklin, N. (2009). Selfrelevance and wishful thinking: Facilitation and distortion in source monitoring. Memory & Cognition, 37, 434 446. Benney, K., & Henkel, L. A. (2006). The role of free choice in memory for past decisions. Memory, 14, 1001 1011. Bransford, J. D., & Franks, J. J. (1971). The abstraction of linguistic ideas. Cognitive Psychology, 2, 331 350. Brown, A. S., & Marsh, E. J. (2008). Evoking false beliefs about autobiographical experience. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 15, 186 190. Carney, R. N., & Levin, J. R. (2002). Pictorial illustrations still improve students learning from text. Educational Psychology Review, 14, 5 26. Chan, J. K., & McDermott, K. B. (2006). Remembering pragmatic inferences. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 20, 633 639. Cherry, K. E., Dokey, D. K., Reese, C. M., & Brigman, S. (2003). Pictorial illustrations enhance memory for sentences in younger and older adults. Experimental Aging Research, 29, 353 370. Deffenbacher, K., Bornstein, B., & Penrod, S. (2006). Mugshot exposure effects: Retroactive interference, mugshot commitment, source confusion, and unconscious transference. Law and Human Behavior, 30, 287 307. Farid, H. (2011). Photo tampering throughout history. Retrieved from http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/~ farid/hany_farid/phototampering0.html Filippatou, D., & Pumfrey, P. D. (1996). Pictures, titles, reading accuracy and reading comprehension: A research review (1973 95). Educational Research, 38, 259 291. Garry, M. Strange, Bernstein, D. M., & Kinzett, T. (2007). Photographs can distort memory for the news. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 21, 995 1004. Glenberg, A. M., & Grimes, T. (1995). Memory and faces: Pictures help you remember who said what. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21, 196 206. Gras, D., Tardieu, H., Piolino, P., & Nicolas, S. (2011). Presentation modality effect on false memories in 790 THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, 2012, 65 (4)

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HENKEL Singer, M., & Remillard, G. (2004). Retrieving text inferences: Controlled and automatic influences. Memory & Cognition, 32, 1223 1237. Smeets, T., Jelicic, M., Peters, M. V., Candel, I., Horselenberg, R., & Merckelbach, H. (2006). Of course I remember seeing that film How ambiguous questions generate crashing memories. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 20, 779 789. Strange, D., Garry, M., Bernstein, D. M., & Lindsay, D. (2011). Photographs cause false memories for the news. Acta Psychologica, 136, 90 94. Strange, D., Hayne, H., & Garry, M. (2007). A photo, a suggestion, a false memory. Applied Cognitive Psychology. 22, 587 603. Torcasio, S., & Sweller, J. (2010). The use of illustrations when learning to read: A cognitive load theory approach. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 24, 659 672. APPENDIX A Stories, key inferences, and photos from Experiment 1 The auction The annual auction was always a great success because there were many rich and generous donors. One item that was bid on was an old and expensive vase. Sabrina won the bid and went up to get the item, then tripped on the rug while carrying it away. Everyone gasped when she dropped the delicate vase. After she laughed, At least it s for charity!. Inference likely to be drawn: Sabrina dropped the vase and it broke.. Inference-consistent photo: Broken vase on floor.. Noninference photo: Intact vase standing upright. Fight with father Dan had just had a fight with his father about finding a job. He was an immature young guy who would rather spend his afternoons playing video games than working for minimum wage. After the fight, Dan lost his temper and screamed I hate you!, then punched his bedroom wall. His father was now even more furious at him.. Inference likely to be drawn: Dan punched a hole in the wall.. Inference-consistent photo: Hole in wall.. Noninference photo: Angry Dan shaking fist. Van den Broek, P., Lorch, R. F., Linderholm, T., & Gustafson, M. (2001). The effects of readers goals on inference generation and memory for text. Memory & Cognition, 29, 1081 1087. Waddill, P. J., & McDaniel, M. A. (1992). Pictorial enhancement of text memory: Limitations imposed by picture type and comprehension skill. Memory & Cognition, 20, 472 482. Wade, K., Garry, M., Read, J., & Lindsay, S. (2002). A picture is worth a thousand lies: Using false photographs to create false childhood memories. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 9, 597 603. Wade, K. A., Green, S. L., & Nash, R. A. (2010). Can fabricated evidence induce false eyewitness testimony? Applied Cognitive Psychology, 24, 899 908. Zwaan, R. A., & Radvansky, G. A. (1998). Situation models in language comprehension and memory. Psychological Bulletin, 123, 162 185. The wedding announcement Penny could hardly believe that her baby brother was getting married. As soon as she got the wedding invitation, she ran to her calendar with a red pen in hand so she could not possibly forget and schedule something else on that day. She filled out the RSVP card immediately, and then called her parents on the phone.. Inference likely to be drawn: Penny circled the date on calendar.. Inference-consistent photo: Calendar with date circled.. Noninference photo: Wedding invitation. New puppy The Owens family got a new puppy last month from the pound and have been trying to train him. Last week, he got out of the kennel and they were looking for him all over the house. They found him under the bed and cringed to see the puppy carrying one of Mrs. Owens brand new shoes in his mouth. My good high heels! she yelled.. Inference likely to be drawn: The puppy chewed up the highheeled shoe.. Inference-consistent photo: Chewed up high-heeled shoe.. Noninference photo: Puppy. Lunch at the park George decided to spend his lunch break at the park because it was a warm sunny day. He didn t realize how buggy it would be, and he was being bothered in particular by one mosquito. After he was bitten, George rolled up his newspaper to swat it away. 792 THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, 2012, 65 (4)

READING BETWEEN THE LINES. Inference likely to be drawn: George killed the bug with a rolled up newspaper.. Inference-consistent photo: Dead bug.. Noninference photo: Rolled up newspaper. Shortcut to school Jackie was hurrying to get to school on time. Ignoring that the ground was wet from the rain the night before, she cut across the field instead ofstayingonthepathandafewstepslater,sheslippedinthemudand hurt her ankle. The pain was excruciating. The next day at school everyone wanted to know what had happened.. Inference likely to be drawn: Jackie broke her leg.. Inference-consistent photo: Jackie in cast on crutches.. Noninference photo: Jackie sitting in mud puddle after falling. The surfer Max was just learning to surf, and his friends were worried because he was generally quite clumsy and uncoordinated. His friends went to watch him surf on the high waves one afternoon. They watched as he readied for a fairly big wave, and they looked on in horror as he lost his balance on the surfboard.. Inference likely to be drawn: Max fell off the surfboard in the big wave.. Inference-consistent photo: Max falling off surfboard in big wave.. Noninference photo: Surfboard standing upright in sand. Baseball game The group of kids met at Lynn s house to play a game of baseball. The backyard was small, but large enough to set up all the bases and have some space to run around. The kids were all shocked though after Lynn hit the baseball, and watched as it flew through the dining room window. Nobody wanted to get in any trouble.. Inference likely to be drawn: The baseball shattered the window.. Inference-consistent photo: Broken window.. Noninference photo: Baseball. The hunter The hunter was glad it was finally hunting season and the deer were overpopulated so that he could enjoy the sport. Sunday morning he went into the woods and soon saw a deer. He raised his rifle and carefully lined up the shot in his scope. An hour later while loading up his truck to head home, his mind was full of fabulous meals he would soon be eating.. Inference likely to be drawn: The hunter shot and killed the deer.. Inference-consistent photo: Dead deer in woods.. Noninference photo: Rifle. The snowman Marissa s kids decided to build a snowman on their snow day. They worked together to roll up each ball, and they found twigs for arms and black stones for buttons. Less than a day later though, the temperature started climbing up and they were sad when they woke up in the morning to see their creation.. Inference likely to be drawn: The snowman melted.. Inference-consistent photo: Melted snowman.. Noninference photo: Snowman fully built. Dana s apartment furniture Dana built most of the furniture in her apartment, but she used cheap, flimsy materials to keep costs low. She came home one day and realized that she should have used stronger wood for the bookshelf. With all the heavy textbooks on it, it was amazing that the flimsy shelf didn t bend sooner.. Inference likely to be drawn: The bookshelf broke under the weight of the books.. Inference-consistent photo: Broken bookshelf with books spilled onto floor.. Noninference photo: Stack of textbooks. Getting mail in December It was a cold, windy day in early December, and Brenda walked to the end of her long windy driveway to get to her mailbox. As she walked, bundled up, she was grateful that her husband had already brought in plenty of firewood, as she was now really looking forward to getting a fire started to warm herself up. Once she came in, Brenda immediately went over to the fireplace. A short while later she was relaxing with her feet up.. Inference likely to be drawn: Brenda lit a fire in the fireplace.. Inference-consistent photo: Fireplace with lit fire.. Noninference photo: Stack of firewood in metal rack. The painter The painter was hard at work the entire day finishing up painting a large house. It was getting late and he was exhausted. As he was finishing, he accidentally hit the can of red paint with his elbow when he reached up. He shouted an obscenity and was mortified that the owner heard him.. Inference likely to be drawn: The painter knocked over the paint can and spilled it.. Inference-consistent photo: Spilled can of paint.. Noninference photo: Upright can of paint. Katherine s roommate Katherine s roommate is a neat freak who can t stand any sort of mess in the apartment. Katherine tries hard to be clean because she doesn t want to upset her roommate of a year. One day she walked into the kitchen and wasn t surprised to see her THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, 2012, 65 (4) 793

HENKEL roommate put her dirty dishes in the sink. She thought to herself, Living with a neat freak has its advantages.. Inference likely to be drawn: Her roommate washed the dirty dishes.. Inference-consistent photo: Stack of cleaned dishes next to sink.. Noninference photo: Pile of dirty dishes in sink. Pulling an all nighter Jason had a big paper due in his sociology class and was up most of the night writing it. He drank coffee and iced tea to help stay awake as he worked on his laptop. The sun was already shining when he reached clumsily for his drink next to the computer and knocked it over. He couldn t believe what a klutz he was, but luckily he had emailed a copy to himself as a backup.. Inference likely to be drawn: Jason spilled his drink on his laptop.. Inference-consistent photo: Laptop with spilled drink on it.. Noninference photo: Laptop with full drink cup next to it. Hide and seek Mark and his friends were playing hide and seek in the park and he was it. Mark counted down from 50 with his eyes closed against a pole, and thought about where the boy he liked the least would hide. Jake always hides behind a tree he thought. After he yelled Ready or not, here I come, he set out to find Jake. It was not long before Mark was no longer it.. Inference likely to be drawn: Mark found Jake hidden behind a tree.. Inference-consistent photo: Mark finding Jake behind tree.. Noninference photo: Boy with head leaned against pole, eyes closed, apparently counting. The archer The highly skilled archer was demonstrating how to shoot a bow and arrow to a class of high school students. He wanted to show them how he could split an arrow with another through the bulls eye. For him, it was an easy shot that he could almost always hit. After his demonstration of 10 different shots, he told them how they could sign up to join their school s archery team.. Inference likely to be drawn: He shot an arrow through another arrow in the bulls eye.. Inference-consistent photo: Arrow in centre of bulls eye target.. Noninference photo: Bow and arrow. The karate master The karate master knew he had to impress the new students in his class. Three of them were there for a free class, and he hoped they would sign up for the full 8-week session. To draw them in, he always did some stunts that were very difficult. He showed them how to do a karate kick, and he showed off by hitting a cinderblock with his bare hands. The demo lasted 15 minutes and everyone was impressed.. Inference likely to be drawn: The karate master broke the cinderblock in half.. Inference-consistent photo: Broken cinderblock.. Noninference photo: Karate master doing high kick. The bicycle As Sasha rode her ten-speed bike to the park, she felt her pocket to make sure she had the key for the lock she always carried on her bike. She was glad to feel it in her pocket, because leaving a bike unlocked at the park was not a good idea. As soon as she got there, she leaned her bike against the fence, fumbled for a few minutes, and then ran to meet up with her friends.. Inference likely to be drawn: Sasha locked her bike to the fence.. Inference-consistent photo: Bicycle chained and locked to fence.. Noninference photo: Bicycle leaning against fence. Making dinner The frazzled mom saw that it was 5:30 and she hadn t even started dinner. She thought she could make a salad and some pasta and frozen meatballs. She pulled several vegetables out from the fridge, some of which were rotten and she threw away. She hurriedly grabbed the cutting board, got a knife from the drawer and got to work on the carrots.. Inference likely to be drawn: The woman chopped the carrots up.. Inference-consistent photo: Carrots being cut on cutting board.. Noninference photo: Bunch of whole carrots. Buying a new house After 4 months of searching, Jane found the perfect house. It was in a good area, was a good size, and was in her price range. She met with the realtor and lawyer, who had drawn up the contract. After dealing with the contract, she gave them the certified check she had picked up at the bank earlier. Now she could finally celebrate.. Inference likely to be drawn: Jane signed the contract.. Inference-consistent photo: Signed contract.. Noninference photo: Exterior of house with sold sign. The birthday party Andrea prepared for weeks for her daughter s 8th birthday party, hoping to impress all the other moms and children. After the magician performed some tricks, everyone watched her daughter open her presents. After that, Andrea was happy to see everyone enjoy the dessert she worked so hard to make. 794 THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, 2012, 65 (4)

READING BETWEEN THE LINES. Inference likely to be drawn: The kids ate birthday cake.. Inference-consistent photo: Birthday cake.. Noninference photo: Pile of presents. The new model Tina was new to modeling and wanted to do well for her first photo shoot. After arriving at the outdoor site and getting her hair and makeup done, she put on her first outfit. The photographer was hard at work as she posed, yelling out a lot of instructions about how to stand, how to tilt her head, and what expression she should make.. Inference likely to be drawn: The photographer took photos with his camera.. Inference-consistent photo: Photographer taking photos with camera.. Noninference photo: Tina posing in outdoor scene. Leaving the office It was almost 5:00 and after realizing she had forgotten her umbrella, Julie looked out the window and spotted her car in the parking lot. She did not want her new outfit toget ruined so she knew she would have to hurry to her car. She took the elevator from her 4th floor office to the lobby and exited the building, running to her car while cursing the weather.. Inference likely to be drawn: It rained when Julie ran to her car.. Inference-consistent photo: People running through rain in parking lot.. Noninference photo: Cars parked in lot. Example of filler story with no obvious pragmatic inference (used in Experiment 3) The telescope Bonnie had always been interested in astronomy and decided to buy a telescope of her own when she had enough money. She set it up right away and waited until after dinner to go outside and use it. Unfortunately, the sky was too cloudy and Bonnie couldn t see any stars that night. THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, 2012, 65 (4) 795