TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SELECT COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF LAW INTERIM REPORT TO THE 77TH TEXAS LEGISLATURE

TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SELECT COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF LAW INTERIM REPORT TO THE 77TH TEXAS LEGISLATURE FRED M. BOSSE Chairman Committee Clerk CRAIG P. CHICK

Committee On Select Committee on Judicial Interpretations of Law December 5, 2000 Fred M. Bosse P.O. Box 2910 Chairman Austin, Texas 78768-2910 The Honorable James E. "Pete" Laney Speaker, Texas House of Representatives Members of the Texas House of Representatives Texas State Capitol, Rm. 2W.13 Austin, Texas 78701 Dear Mr. Speaker and Fellow Members: The Select Committee on Judicial Interpretations of Law of the Seventy-Sixth Legislature hereby submits its interim report including recommendations for consideration by the Seventy-Seventh Legislature. Respectfully submitted, Fred M. Bosse, Chairman Jim Dunnam Toby Goodman Patricia Gray Peggy Hamric Juan Hinojosa Todd Smith Members: Jim Dunnam; Toby Goodman; Patricia Gray; Peggy Hamric; Juan Hinojosa; Todd Smith; and Burt Solomons

Burt Solomons TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction...ii Review of Identified Appellate Court Decisions...2 I. Decisions Clearly Failing to Properly Implement Legislative Purposed... 3 II. Decisions Finding Two or More Statutes to be in Conflict... 5 III. Decisions Holding a Statute Unconstitutional... 15 IV. Decisions Expressly Finding a Statute to be Ambiguous... 19 V. Decisions Expressly Suggesting Legislative Action... 34 Findings...40 Appendix A.................................................................. 44 i

INTRODUCTION HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF LAW INTERIM CHARGES After the 76th Legislative Session, the Honorable James E. Pete Laney, Speaker of the House of Representatives, appointed eight members to the Select Committee on Judicial Interpretations of Law. The committee membership includes the following: Fred M. Bosse, Chair; Jim Dunnam; Toby Goodman; Patricia Gray; Peggy Hamric; Juan Hinojosa; Todd Smith; and Burt Solomons During the interim, Speaker Laney charged the Select Committee on Judicial Interpretations of Law with examining the decisions of Texas appellate courts over the last five years to identify those decisions that: (1) clearly failed to properly implement legislative purposes; (2) found two or more statutes to be in conflict; (3) held a statute to be unconstitutional; (4) expressly found a statute to be ambiguous; or (5) expressly suggested legislative action. The Committee was directed to make recommendations for corrective legislation in response to the Committee's findings. To the extent possible, corrective legislation proposed by the Committee should have the purpose of effectuating the original legislative intent of the statutes considered by the court and should not recommend other substantive changes. The Committee has completed their hearings and investigations and has issued the following findings. Each member approved all sections of the report. The Chairman wishes to express appreciation to the Committee members and their staffs; Jonathan Davis, Texas Legislative Council; and any other Texas Legislative Council staff members who provided valuable information for this report. ii

Select Committee on Judicial Interpretations of Law Interim Report to the 77th Legislature

Review of Identified Appellate Court Decisions

I. DECISIONS CLEARLY FAILING TO PROPERLY IMPLEMENT LEGISLATIVE PURPOSES FLEMING FOODS OF TEXAS, INC., v. RYLANDER, 6 S.W.3d 278 (Tex. 1999). Issue: Can a taxpayer who pays sales tax to a vendor, not directly to the state, request a tax refund from the state under a provision in the Tax Code drafted by the Texas Legislative Council as part of the statutory revision program if the codified provision is phrased differently from the prior law, which did not permit the taxpayer to request such a refund? Holding: A taxpayer is entitled to request a tax refund under the law as drafted by the legislative council and enacted by the legislature, notwithstanding departure from prior law. Where specific provisions of a "nonsubstantive" codification prepared by the Texas Legislative Council pursuant to Section 323.007, Government Code, and the code as a whole are direct, unambiguous, and cannot be reconciled with prior law, the codification, rather than the prior, repealed statute must be given effect, even if a mistake is made in the nonsubstantive codification and the codification process results in a substantive change to the prior law. In the final analysis, it is the Legislature that adopts codifications, not the Legislative Council, and it is the Legislature that specifically repeals prior enactments. The codifications enacted by the Legislature are the law of this State, not the prior, repealed law. When there is no room to interpret or construe the current law as embodying the old, we must give full effect to the current law. General statements of the Legislature's intent cannot revive repealed statutes or override the clear meaning of a new, more specific statute. JOYNER v. STATE, 921 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); RAY v. STATE, 919 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Issue: Whether the failure of a trial judge to admonish a defendant of the consequences of a violation of deferred adjudication probation as specifically required by Section 5(a), Article 42.12, Code of Criminal Procedure [as that section existed at the time of trial and before amendment], rendered involuntary a defendant's guilty plea. Section 5(a) specifically required a trial judge to "inform the defendant orally or in writing of the possible consequences under Subsection (b) of this section of a violation of probation." Holding: In RAY, the court opined that the order of proceedings in a criminal case supports the 3

view that a defendant need not be informed of the Section 5(b) consequences until after the defendant is placed on probation and that there is no policy reason to require a trial court to inform every defendant who pleads guilty of the possible consequences of a violation of deferred adjudication, because unless the trial court decides to defer adjudication, there is no reason to tell the defendant what might happen if the defendant violates the terms and conditions of probation. In JOYNER, the court affirmed the defendant's adjudication of guilt and sentence following revocation of probation "based on this Court's recent ruling in Ray." We conclude that Sec. 5(a) does not require, either in felonies or misdemeanors, that the defendant entering an open plea of guilty or nolo contendere be informed prior to his plea of the possible consequences under Sec. 5(b) of a probation violation. Therefore, the failure to provide the information does not render such a plea involuntary. 919 S.W.2d 125, 127 4

II. DECISIONS FINDING TWO OR MORE STATUTES TO BE IN CONFLICT NIXSON v. MOBIL OIL CORPORATION, 928 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ). Statutes found in conflict: Article 6432, Revised Statutes, imposing liability on railroad companies for injuries to their employees, and Section 406.034(b), Labor Code, a provision in the Workers' Compensation Act, requiring an election by an injured employee to preserve a cause of action at common law or under a statute. Holding: Looking at the object sought to be obtained by the statutes, the circumstances under which the statutes were enacted, the legislative history of the statutes, and the consequences of the alternative constructions, the court held that Section 406.034(b), Labor Code, controls over Article 6432, Revised Statutes. EVANS v. C. WOODS, INC., 1999 WL 787399 (Tex. App.--Tyler 1999, no pet.). Statutes found in conflict: Subsection (b), Section 51.014, Civil Practice and Remedies Code, "Appeal From Interlocutory Order," and a portion of Rule 683, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, "Form and Scope of Injunction or Restraining Order." Section 51.014(b) provides that "[a]n interlocutory appeal under Subsection (a) shall have the effect of staying the commencement of a trial in the trial court pending resolution of the appeal." In pertinent part, Rule 683 provides that "[t]he appeal of a temporary injunction shall constitute no cause for delay of the trial." Holding: The conflict between these two provisions lies in whether the trial date is to be stayed pending an interlocutory appeal. Both provisions, however, presuppose that a trial date has been set in the temporary injunction order as required by Rule 683. Thus, the court held that Section 51.014(b) does not absolve a trial court from its Rule 683 duty to include in a temporary injunction order an order setting the cause for trial on the merits. The court did not address whether the trial date is to be stayed pending an interlocutory appeal. LEDERMAN v. ROWE, 3 S.W.3d 254 (Tex. App.--Waco 1999, no pet.); GASKILL v. SNEAKY ENTERPRISES, INC., 997 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1999, rev. denied); DAVIS v. COVERT, 983 S.W.2d 301 (Tex. App.--Hous. [1st Dist.] 1998, rev. dism'd w.o.j.). Statutes found in conflict: Subsection (d), Section 28.053, Government Code, "Hearing on 5

Appeal," which provides that the judgment of the county court or county court at law on the appeal from a small claims court is final, and Section 51.012, Civil Practice and Remedies Code, "Appeal or Writ of Error to Court of Appeals," which gives a court of appeals jurisdiction over cases in which the amount in controversy exceeds $100. Holding: When statutes conflict, the specific statute controls. In this instance, the specific provisions of Section 28.053(d), Government Code, prevail over the general provisions of Section 51.012, Civil Practice and Remedies Code. BURKE v. STATE, 6 S.W.3d 312 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1999, pet. filed). Statutes found in conflict: Section 22.02(a)(1), Penal Code, "Aggravated Assault," a felony of the second degree, and Section 49.07, Penal Code, "Intoxication Assault," a felony of the third degree. Holding: In cases where a special statute provides for the prosecution of conduct otherwise punishable under a general statute, an "irreconcilable conflict" exists and due process and due course of law dictate that the accused be prosecuted under the special provision, in keeping with presumed legislative intent. The court held that in circumstances as before the court, Section 49.07, the specific intoxication assault statute, prevails over Section 22.02(a)(1), the general aggravated assault statute. STATE v. SALINAS, 982 S.W.2d 9 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. ref'd). Statutes found in conflict: Section 37.02, Penal Code, "Perjury," a Class A misdemeanor, and Section 254.041, Election Code, "Criminal Penalty for Untimely or Incomplete Report," a Class C misdemeanor. Holding: Section 254.041 supersedes the perjury statute in the Penal Code. Where, as here, the narrow provision (Section 254.041) provides for a lesser range of punishment than the general (Section 37.02), an irreconcilable conflict exists and due process and due course of law dictate that the accused be prosecuted under the special provision. The special provision prevails as an exception to the general provision. STATE ex rel. O'CONNELL, 976 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1998, no pet.). Statutes found in conflict: In only one particular and only to the extent they both relate to a defendant's waiver of trial by jury, Article 1.13(a), Code of Criminal Procedure, which requires that a defendant's waiver be made "in person by the defendant in writing in open court" and Article 27.14(a), 6

Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides that in a misdemeanor case a jury may be waived and a plea of guilty made either by "the defendant or his counsel." Holding: Because the defendant personally signed a jury waiver and personally appeared, the issue was not before the court, and the court expressly did not decide which statute would control. DAVILA v. STATE, 961 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1997, no pet.). Statutes found in conflict: Section 481.106, Health and Safety Code (Controlled Substances Act), at the time the case was decided and before repeal in 1993, providing that delivery of the amount of cocaine specified in indictment punishable by imprisonment and by fine not to exceed $20,000, and Section 12.32, Penal Code, providing that first degree felony punishable by imprisonment and by fine not to exceed $10,000. Holding: The general rule is that the specific statute controls over the general statute. Since there was an irreconcilable conflict as to the possible fine, the special provision of Section 481.106, Health and Safety Code, prevailed over the general provision of Section 12.32, Penal Code. STATE ex rel. CURRY v. GILFEATHER, 937 S.W.2d 46 (Tex. App.-- Fort Worth 1996, no writ). Statutes found in conflict: Section 25.0012, Government Code, "Exchange of Judges in Certain County Courts at Law and County Criminal Courts," and Section 74.121, Government Code (Texas Court Administration Act), "Transfer of Cases; Exchange of Benches." Holding: Because Section 74.121 was enacted later in time than Section 25.0012, Section 74.121 prevails. Section 311.025(a), Government Code (Code Construction Act). GREENWOOD v. STATE, 948 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1997, no pet.); DITTOE v. STATE, 935 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. App.--Eastland 1996, no pet.). Statutes found in conflict: Section 2(a), Article 42.03, Code of Criminal Procedure, and Sections 15(h)(2) and (3), Article 42.12, Code of Criminal Procedure, relating to credit for jail time between arrest on revocation warrant and revocation of community supervision. Holding: Following the instructions in Section 311.026, Government Code (Code Construction Act), the court held that Sections 15(h)(2) and (3), Article 42.12, the specific statute, control over Section 7

2(a), Article 42.03, the more general statute. STATE v. WARNER, 915 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, pet. ref'd), abrogated by SMITH v. STATE, 960 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. ref'd); STATE v. MANCUSO, 903 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, pet. granted), aff'd, 919 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Statutes found in conflict: Section 15, Article 42.12, Code of Criminal Procedure, the mandatory community supervision law, and Section 12.42(d), Penal Code, the habitual offender law. Holding: Both statutes were enacted in the same bill, Senate Bill No. 1067 (Chapter 900), Acts of the 73rd Legislature, Regular Session, 1993. Applying the canons of statutory construction cited, the court held that the specific provisions of the mandatory community supervision law control over the general provisions of the habitual offender law. MELTON v. STATE, 993 S.W.2d 95 (Tex. 1999). Statutes found in conflict: Subsection (a), Section 74.301, Property Code, "Delivery of Property to Comptroller," and Article 17.02, Code of Criminal Procedure, "Definition of 'Bail Bond'." Holding: Section 74.301(a), Property Code, which requires a holder of abandoned property to deliver the property to the comptroller, is a general provision. Article 17.02, Code of Criminal Procedure, on the other hand, specifically provides that cash bail bonds deposited in a court's registry may only be released on order of the court. The court held that because a specific statute will prevail over a general statute if the statutes conflict, Article 17.02 controls over Section 74.301 if the abandoned property in issue is an abandoned cash bail bond. SHARKEY v. STATE, 994 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1999, no pet.). Statutes found in conflict: Section 1, Article 42.01, Code of Criminal Procedure, "Judgment," and Subsection (a), Section 74.094, Government Code, "Hearing Cases." Holding: Section 1, Article 42.01, Code of Criminal Procedure, provides that "[a] judgment is the written declaration of the court signed by the trial judge...." Section 74.094(a), Government Code, provides that "[a] district or statutory county court judge may hear and determine a matter pending in any 8

district or statutory county court in the county..." and that "[t]he judge may sign a judgment or order in any of the courts...." The court held that Article 42.01 controls and it is necessary that at least one of the judges participating in a criminal trial hear all or part of the case as the trial judge. POLEDORE v. STATE, 8 S.W.3d 22 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. filed). Statutes found in conflict: Subsection (b), Section 311.031, Government Code (Code Construction Act), "Saving Provisions," and Section 1.18, Chapter 900, Acts of the 73rd Legislature, Regular Session, 1993. Chapter 900, the 1993 reenactment of the Penal Code, reclassified offenses similar to the appellant's as state jail felonies from third degree felonies. The sentences the defendant received were for third degree felonies. The issue before the court was whether the former law or the new Penal Code should be applied. Section 311.031(b) provides that "[i]f the penalty, forfeiture, or punishment for any offense is reduced by a reenactment, revision, or amendment of a statute, the penalty, forfeiture, or punishment, if not already imposed, shall be imposed according to the statute as amended." Section 1.18, Chapter 900, limits the applicability of the amended Penal Code to offenses committed on or after September 1, 1994, the effective date of that act; provides that "an offense is committed before the effective date if any element of the offense occurs before September 1, 1994"; and states that "an offense committed before the effective date is covered by the law in effect when the offense was committed, and the former law is continued in effect for that purpose." Holding: The court held that because the Court of Criminal Appeals has previously resolved conflicts between Section 311.031(b) and specific enabling legislation regarding changes to the Penal Code, the enabling legislation accompanying the new Penal Code controls, and the defendant was properly sentenced. McLENDON v. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, 985 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. App.--Waco 1998, pet. filed). Statutes found in conflict: Section 7, Article 42.12, Code of Criminal Procedure, and Section 1(4), Article 4413(29ee), V.A.C.S., before repeal and reenactment in 1997 as Section 411.171(4), Government Code. 9

Holding: Section 7, Article 42.12, Code of Criminal Procedure, provides that when a court has set aside a verdict and dismissed the indictment, the accused is "released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense or crime of which he has been convicted or to which he has pleaded guilty." Because the pertinent provisions of the community supervision law and the concealed handgun licensing statute address a similar subject matter, they are in pari materia and must be construed together. The court held that the specific provision, Section 7, Article 42.12, controls over the broad statutory definition of the term "convicted" found in Section 1(4), Article 4413(29ee). RAMOS v. STATE, 928 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, pet. ref'd). Statutes found in conflict: Section 481.112, Health and Safety Code, which proscribes delivery of a controlled substance by the offer to sell a controlled substance, and Section 482.002, Health and Safety Code, which proscribes the delivery of a simulated controlled substance accompanied by the representation that the simulated controlled substance is actually a controlled substance. The appellant was convicted under Section 481.112 for having offered to sell cocaine, which turned out to be dominoes packaged to look like cocaine. Holding: The court held that Sections 481.112 and 482.002 are in pari materia, that when statutes are in pari materia, the state should charge the accused under the more specific statute if it proscribes the particular conduct in which the accused engages, and that under the facts of the case the appellant could not be prosecuted under Section 481.112, but instead had to be prosecuted under Section 482.002, the specific statute. GONZALEZ v. STATE, 915 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 1996, no pet.). Statutes found in conflict: The enhancement provisions of Section 12.42(d), Penal Code, relating to any felony conviction, and the requirement of Section 15(a), Article 42.12, Code of Criminal Procedure, related to the suspension of the sentence of a person convicted of a state jail felony, as those sections existed before amendment in 1995. Holding: The court examined the legislative history of Senate Bill 1067, which created state jail felonies, as well as the subsequent amendments to Section 12.42(d) and Section 15, Article 42.12, and held that Section 12.42(d), Penal Code, does not apply to a person convicted of a state jail felony. SIMMONS v. STATE, 944 S.W.2d 11 (Tex. App.--Tyler 1996, pet. ref'd); PHUONG THAI THAN v. STATE, 918 S.W.2d 106 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1996, no pet.). Statutes found in conflict: Section 311.031(b), Government Code, the "saving provisions" clause 10

of the Code Construction Act, and the "'saving provisions' clauses" in Senate Bill 1067, 73rd Legislature, Regular Session, 1993. Holding: In SIMMONS, at the time of the offense for which the appellant was convicted, Section 481.112(b), Health and Safety Code, provided that delivery of less than 28 grams of a controlled substance (crack cocaine) was a first degree felony, punishable by imprisonment for life or for 5 to 99 years and a fine not to exceed $20,000. Effective September 1, 1994, Senate Bill 1067 amended the Health and Safety Code to make delivery of less than one gram of a controlled substance a state jail felony, punishable by a term of 180 days to two years and a fine not to exceed $10,000. In PHUONG THAI THAN, at the time of the offense for which the appellant was convicted and placed on probation, Section 30.04, Penal Code, provided that burglary of a motor vehicle was a third degree felony, punishable by imprisonment for 2 to 10 years and a fine not to exceed $10,000. Effective September 1, 1994, Senate Bill 1067 amended the Penal Code to make burglary of a motor vehicle a Class A misdemeanor, punishable by a fine not to exceed $4,000, confinement for a term not to exceed one year, or both. After September 1, 1994, appellant's probation was revoked and appellant sentenced as a third degree felon. On appeal, appellant claimed that he should have been sentenced as a Class A misdemeanor. In both SIMMONS and PHUONG THAI THAN, the court held that in including the specific "'saving provisions' clauses" in Senate Bill 1067, the legislature expressed a clear intention that the law in effect at the time the offense was committed would govern the disposition of cases involving offenses committed before 1994, and furthermore, because Section 311.026(b), Government Code, (Code Construction Act), provides that when two statutes conflict, the specific controls over the general, particularly when the specific provision is the later enactment, that Section 311.031(b), Government Code, does not apply to the 1994 amendments to the Health and Safety Code and to the Penal Code, and the "'saving provisions' clauses" in Senate Bill 1067 prevail. AVERY v. STATE, 963 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no writ). Statutes found in conflict: Section 54.697, Government Code, a special Harris County juvenile law master statute, and Section 201.005, Family Code, the general family law associate judge statute. Holding: After reviewing both statutes, it is clear that a master or associate judge cannot preside under both the general family law associate judge statute and the Harris County juvenile law master statute. Section 54.697 prevails over Section 201.005 for two reasons: it is a special provision and it was originally enacted later in time. Section 311.026(b), Government Code (Code Construction Act). 11

IN RE HATHCOX, 981 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1998, no pet.). Statutes found in conflict: Section 157.062(d), Family Code, and Rules 2 and 247, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Holding: Section 157.062(d), Family Code, provides that if a motion for enforcement of child support is joined with another claim, "(1) the hearing may not be held before 10 a.m. on the first Monday after the 20th day after the date of service; and (2) the provisions of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure applicable to the filing of an original lawsuit apply." Rule 2, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, provides "[t]hese rules shall govern the procedure in the justice, county, and district courts of the State of Texas in all actions of a civil nature, with such exceptions as may be hereinafter stated." Rule 247 provides that "[e]very suit shall be tried when it is called, unless continued or postponed to a future day or placed at the end of the docket to be called again for trial in its regular order" and that "[n]o cause which has been set upon the trial docket of the court shall be taken from the trial docket for the date set except by agreement of the parties or for good cause upon motion and notice to the opposing party." Section 157.062(d), Family Code, not Rules of Civil Procedure, governs notice and hearing requirements for an amended motion for enforcement of child support, which is joined with another claim. A hearing on the motion may not be held earlier than the first Monday after the 20th day following service. RENT v. STATE, 949 S.W.2d 418 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1997), aff'd, 982 S.W.2d 382, (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Statutes found in conflict: Defendant was convicted of the misdemeanor offense of unwarranted mental health commitment under Section 571.020(a), Health and Safety Code. In 1993 the legislature nonsubstantively codified Section 571.020 and repealed its predecessor statute, Article 5547-19, Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes. Both Article 5547-19 and Section 571.020 provided that the offense of unwarranted mental health commitment was punishable by a fine not to exceed $5,000 or by imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed two years. Also in 1993, the legislature amended Article 5547-19 to change the maximum term of confinement for a violation from two years to one year. The court stated that "[a]s the code and amendment to the statute conflict, the amended statute controls." 1 1 The appeals court appears to have reached the correct conclusion, but on an incorrect reading of the Code Construction Act. The court recognized that Section 311.031, Government Code, governs the effect to be given to a code provision and an amended statute: "Section 311.031(c) provides that (1) the repeal of a statute by a code does not affect an amendment, revision or reenactment of the statute by the same legislature that enacted the code and (2) the amendment, revision, or reenactment is preserved and given effect as part of the code provision that revised the statute so amended, revised, or reenacted." Having said this, the court continued: "In addition, section 311.031(d) provides that if any provision of a code conflicts with a statute enacted by the same legislature that enacted the code, the statute controls (emphasis added).... Therefore, article 5547-19, as amended, is to be given effect as part of section 571.020 12

WILSON v. STATE, 944 S.W.2d 444 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1997), aff'd, 977 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Statutes found in conflict: Section 311.031(b), Government Code, the "saving provisions" clause of the Code Construction Act, which provides that when two statutes conflict the specific controls, and the "'saving provisions' clauses" in Senate Bill 1067, 73rd Legislature, Regular Session, 1993. Holding: At the time of the offense for which appellant was convicted, Section 481.115(b), Health and Safety Code, provided that possession of less than 28 grams of a controlled substance (cocaine) was a second degree felony punishable by a term of 2 to 20 years' confinement and a fine not to exceed $10,000, and Section 12.42(d), Penal Code, increased the range of punishment to 25 years to life because appellant had two prior felony convictions. Effective September 1, 1994, Senate Bill 1067 amended the Health and Safety Code and the Penal Code to make possession of less than one gram of cocaine a state jail felony punishable by a term of 180 days to two years and a fine not to exceed $10,000. Held that in including the specific "'saving provisions' clauses" in Senate Bill 1067, the legislature expressed a clear intention that the law in effect at the time the offense was committed would govern the disposition of cases involving offenses committed before 1994, and furthermore, because Section 311.026(b), Government Code (Code Construction Act), provides that when two statutes conflict, the specific controls over the general, particularly when the specific provision is the later enactment, Section 311.031(b), Government Code, does not apply to the 1994 amendments to the Health and Safety Code and the Penal Code, and the "'saving provisions' clauses" in Senate Bill 1067 prevail. BURD v. ARMISTEAD, 982 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied). Statutes found in conflict: At the time the case was decided and before amendment in 1999, the definition of "costs" in Section 34.21(e)(2), Tax Code, and the definition of "costs" in Section 34.21(i), Tax Code. Holding: Because the legislature enacted Section 34.21(e)(2) three days after it enacted Section 34.21(i), the court held that the definition in Section 34.21(e)(2) is the intended definition. MEDNICK v. TEXAS STATE BOARD OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTANCY, 933 S.W.2d 336 unless there is a conflict in which event article 5547-19 controls." The court's reference to and reliance on Section 311.031(d) was not necessary. 13

(Tex. App.--Austin 1996, writ denied). Statutes found in conflict: Section 22(f), Texas Public Accountancy Act (Article 41a, Vernon s Texas Civil Statutes), as that law existed before codification in 1999 as Chapter 901, Occupations Code, which provided that an accountant's motion for rehearing to the Texas State Board of Public Accountancy must be filed within 15 days of the rendition of the order, ruling, or decision complained of, and Section 2001.146(a), Government Code (Administrative Procedure Act), which required that, in order to preserve the right to appeal the board's decision to district court, a party must file a motion for rehearing not later than the 20th day after the date on which the party was notified of the adverse action. Holding: Because the Public Accountancy Act fully incorporated the Administrative Procedure Act, which provides the minimum standards for judicial review of agency decisions, the court held that the Administrative Procedure Act's 20-day period controlled over the Public Accountancy Act's 15-day period. SIMMONS v. TEXAS STATE BOARD OF DENTAL EXAMINERS, 925 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. 1996). Statutes found in conflict: Section 3(a), Dental Practice Act (Article 4548h, Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes), as that law existed before amendment in 1997, which provided that a dentist has 30 days from the date of a license revocation to seek judicial review in district court, and Section 2001.145(a), Government Code (Administrative Procedure Act), which required an aggrieved person to file a timely motion for rehearing before the board of dental examiners before filing an appeal to district court. Holding: A dentist could not be required to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act by waiting for the board of dental examiners to overrule a motion for hearing because the dentist may not be assured of a timely appeal to district court. A petition for judicial review in district court filed within the 30- day period provided by the Dental Practice Act was sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the district court. SMITH v. TARRANT COUNTY BAIL BOND BOARD, 997 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1999, rev. denied). Statutes found in conflict: Article 2372p-3, Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes, relating to the licensing and regulation of bail bondsmen (nonsubstantively revised in 1999 as Chapter 1704, Occupations Code), and Articles 6252-13c and 6252-13d, Vernon s Texas Civil Statutes, relating respectively to the eligibility of persons with criminal backgrounds for certain occupations, professions, and licenses and to the suspension, revocation, or denial of licenses to persons with criminal backgrounds (in pertinent parts, nonsubstantively revised in 1999 as Subchapters A and B, Chapter 53, Occupations Code). 14