STATE'S RESPONSE BRIEF

Transcription

1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT RANDY ERIC WORSHAM, APPELLANT NO CR V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE APPEALED FROM CAUSE NUMBER F IN THE CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NUMBER 2 OF DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS; THE HONORABLE DON ADAMS, JUDGE PRESIDING. STATE'S RESPONSE BRIEF CRAIG WATKINS Criminal District Attorney Dallas County, Texas MICHAEL R. CASILLAS, Assistant Criminal District Attorney, Chief Prosecutor - Appellate Division, Oral Argument is requested, 133 N. Riverfront Blvd., LB 19 but only if Appellant is Dallas, TX also requesting argument. (214) / FAX (214) State Bar No

2 TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES...ii SUMMARY OF THE CASE...1 STATEMENT OF FACTS...1 SUMMARY OF STATE'S RESPONSIVE ARGUMENTS...2 STATE S REPLY TO APPELLANT S SOLE POINT OF ERROR...2 The trial court s judgment should be modified or reformed to accurately reflect the name of the State s counsel. LEGAL AUTHORITY...2 APPLICATION...3 CONCLUSION AND PRAYER...4 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE...5 i

3 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES PAGES Abron v. State, 997 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. App. Dallas 1998, pet. ref d).....2,3,4 Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. App. Dallas 1991, pet. ref d)...3,4 Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).... 2,4 Nolan v. State, 39 S.W.3d 697 (Tex. App. Houston [1 st Dist.] 2001, no pet.)....3,4 ARTICLES, CODES and CONSTITUTIONS: Tex. R. App. P. 38.2(a)(1)(B)...1 Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b)... 2,4 ii

4 TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS: The instant brief in response to the brief of Appellant, Randy Eric Worsham, is filed on behalf of Craig Watkins, the Criminal District Attorney of Dallas County, Texas. SUMMARY OF THE CASE Appellant was charged with aggravated robbery. (CR: 2). Appellant s indictment contained two enhancement paragraphs that, taken together, alleged that Appellant was an habitual felony offender. (CR: 2). Without the benefit of a plea bargain agreement, Appellant pled guilty to the charge of aggravated robbery and admitted that he was an habitual felony offender as charged in the indictment. (RR-2: 5-8). The trial court eventually placed Appellant on deferred adjudication probation for a period of 10 years, but later granted the State s motion to revoke and sentenced Appellant to incarceration for a period of 40 years. (RR-3: 10; RR-4: 24-25). STATEMENT OF FACTS Appellant s statement of facts admits that Appellant pled guilty to the offense charged, was placed on deferred adjudication probation, and ultimately had his probation revoked after Appellant had pled true to the State s revocation allegations. (Appellant s Brief at p. 5). Since the State has no dissatisfaction with the facts has stated in Appellant s Brief, the State s Response Brief contains no further discussion of the historical facts of the underlying crime and/or Appellant s criminal history. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.2(a)(1)(B). 1

5 SUMMARY OF STATE'S RESPONSIVE ARGUMENTS State's Reply to Appellant's Sole Point of Error: The trial court s judgment should be modified or reformed to accurately reflect the name of the State s counsel. STATE'S REPLY TO APPELLANT S SOLE POINT OF ERROR: Appellant s contentions: In his sole point of error, Appellant contends that the trial court s judgment must be reformed because the judgment fail to accurately reflect the name of the Assistant District Attorneys who represented the State in connection with the trial court s rendition of its judgment. (Appellant s Brief at pp. ii, 4, 6-8). State s responses: The trial court s judgment should be modified or reformed to accurately reflect the name of the State s counsel. LEGAL AUTHORITY When the record of the proceedings in the trial court contains the information necessary to ascertain that the trial court s judgment is incorrect as well as that necessary to permit an accurate correction to be made to the trial court s judgment, the intermediate appellate court has the authority to order that the trial court s judgment be reformed. Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Abron v. 2

6 State, 997 S.W.2d 281, 282 (Tex. App. Dallas 1998, pet. ref d). In short, An appellate court has the power to correct and reform a trial court judgment to make the record speak the truth when it has the necessary data and information to do so, or make any appropriate order as the law and nature of the case may require. Nolan v. State, 39 S.W.3d 697, 698 (Tex. App. Houston [1 st Dist.] 2001, no pet.), quoting Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. App. Dallas 1991, pet. ref d). APPLICATION Appellant s sole point of error contends that the trial court s judgment must be reformed because it fails to accurately reflect the name of the Assistant District Attorney who represented the State in connection with the trial court s rendition of its judgment. (Appellant s Brief at pp. ii, 4, 6-8). Consultation of the trial court s judgment reveals that the name Lindy Anagnostis appears beside the heading Attorney for State. (CR: 29). However, the relevant volume of the Reporter s Record reveals that the State was represented by MS. LAUREN HUDGEONS. (RR-4: 2). Additionally, the same volume of the Reporter s Record reveals that the Assistant District Attorney who moved to enter Appellant s written, signed stipulation into evidence was referred to as MS. HUDGEONS. (RR-4: 7). In light of all the aforementioned undisputed facts reflected in the appellate record, Appellant is correct in his assertion that the trial court s judgment in his case incorrectly reflects the name of the State s counsel as Lindy Anagnostis. (CR: 29). Likewise, Appellant is correct in his assertion that an accurate version of the trial court s judgment 3

7 would reflect Lauren Hudgeons as the correct name of the Assistant District Attorney who represented the State of Texas in connection with the proceedings that led to the trial court s rendition of its judgment. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b); Bigley, 865 S.W.2d at 27; Abron, 997 S.W.2d at 282. In short, the trial court s judgment should be reformed to reflect the truth regarding the actual name of the Assistant District Attorney who represented the State of Texas in connection with securing the trial court s entry of its judgment in Appellant s case. See Nolan, 39 S.W.3d at 698; Asberry, 813 S.W.2d at 529. For all the aforementioned reasons, Appellant should be accorded the relief he requests in his sole point of error. CONCLUSION AND PRAYER Appellant suffered no reversible error. While the State prays that this Court reform the trial court s judgment to reflect the name of the Assistant District Attorney who actually represented the State of Texas, the State disagrees with Appellant s alternative prayers that this Court should reverse the conviction, should order an acquittal, or should remand [the case] for a new trial or punishment hearing. (Appellant s Brief at p. 8). Accordingly, the State prays for the reformation/modification of the trial court s judgment only in the manner requested by Appellant, but also prays that the trial court s judgment, as modified or reformed, otherwise be affirmed in all respects. Respectfully submitted, CRAIG WATKINS 4

8 Criminal District Attorney Dallas County, Texas MICHAEL R. CASILLAS, Assistant Criminal District Attorney, Chief Prosecutor - Appellate Division 133 N. Riverfront Blvd., LB 19 Dallas, Texas (214) / FAX (214) State Bar No CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE True copies of the State's brief have been served on opposing counsel, the Hon. Deborah Ellison Farris, 4136 High Summit Drive, Dallas, Texas 75244, by depositing said copies with the United States Postal Service, postage pre-paid, no later than the 4 th day of February, MICHAEL R. CASILLAS 5