Europe and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: a peculiar relationship. Abstract. Stefano Pilotto. No.

Transcription

1 Stefano Pilotto Europe and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: a peculiar relationship On the 9 th of December, 2011, the Council of Europe at Brussels sealed the renewed break between Great Britain and the rest of the European Union in relation to the definition of a new agreement on budgetary discipline by the governments of the member countries. The very recent visit to London by the Italian Premier Mario Monti voiced the intention, on the part of the Italian government, to mend the rupture of last 9 December, without, however, being quite successful. On the eve of new decisions soon to be made at the EU level, what is the real position of Great Britain in a continental context? How sustainable will be from a political perspective an eternal privilege linked to the opting out clause, concerning integration policies to be followed in the future, which are today expressly encouraged by the emergency triggered by the global economic crisis? Let us try to backtrack and follow the main stages in the historical relationship between London and Europe, in order to come to an understanding of the real nature of this peculiar relationship made of likes and dislikes, cooperation and obstacles, geographical propensity and genetic isolationism that exists between Great Britain and the rest of Europe. This reflexion seems appropriate in order to understand which direction the EU will have to take to normalize its future relations with Great Britain. The first question to be answered is assuredly the one asked by some observers little inclined to a cordial relationship with London, i.e.: Is Great Britain Europe, or is it not? If from a geographical standpoint the British Isles are not a part of the continental block, the history of British people has shown throughout the centuries the existence of a relationship and a destiny clearly shared with other European peoples. British policy, however, has always sought to emphasize the right to a profound diversity of ideas and administration, though it influenced considerably European thought through the impact of its philosophers, legal experts, and economists. Should one neglect the fact that modern political theory, constitutionalism, the science of the foundation of legitimate power, Common Law, liberalism, were born in England in the time of John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, and Adam Smith? But today the crucial issue is the real identification of British culture; of the components, that is, that the British themselves attribute to their European identity or to their British specificity. In other words how deep is that narrow sea strait that is today called The Channel? Throughout history, from Roman to modern times, the fate of the British people has been studded with struggles for autonomy and with internal conflicts that resulted in the consolidation of a modern monarchy, which under the Tudors and the Stuarts slowly led the country to basic stabilization and increasing imperial splendor. Even today British schools proudly recall that at the pinnacle of its colonial era two-fifths of the mainland belonged to British empire. After the centuries of Chaucer and Shakespeare, Cromwell and Nelson, the nineteenth century No. 94 JANUARY 2012 Abstract Undoubtedly, integrated Europe and the United Kingdom have a curious and strange relationship. Since the very beginning of the European integration process the UK showed skepticism and, often, annoyance. The reasons for such a feeling can be identified in the peculiar history of the British people: local conflicts led to stabilization, growth and imperial splendor. The end of the Second World War, nevertheless, introduced a new era of international dialogue, mutual respect and led almost inevitably to the decolonization process. The resistance to European integration process, both from outside and inside, may express the British wish to refuse to accept the today s world evolution, hoping that, beyond the possible concrete financial advantages, the solution of an integrated and partly protected European market would not compromise the traditional prestige of British world policy. London seems to reject the European spirit, the financial rules and the cultural background that come with it, which tend to privilege continental solidarity. Such a crucial approach might seriously compromise the future relations between the 26 EU countries and the UK in the next decades. Before the next EU summit in Brussels the EU countries are considering new proposals to reintroduce effectively the UK in the EU executive policy, but they need an indication of good will from London. Stefano Pilotto, teaches at MIB School of Management (Trieste) and is ISPI Visiting Professor. (*) The opinions expressed herein are strictly personal and do not necessarily reflect the position of ISPI.

2 2 ISPI - Analysis marked England s further growth in the time of Queen Victoria. It was the time of imperialism, managed by the clever diplomacy of Palmerton, Gladstone and Disraeli; a time sustained by the inspiring writings of Rudyard Kipling and ennobled by the Romantic poetry of Lord Byron. This was the time of Splendid Isolation, when the steady political stance of England towards the rest of Europe became consolidated: as little involvement as possible in European affairs until a loss of balance on the Continent to the advantage of a given European power necessitated involvement on the part of London to favour the re-establishment of political balance. It must be noted, however, that within a framework of protection of British interests no European power could, or had to surpass English power, particularly as regards maritime supremacy. If in the early nineteenth century France under Napoleon Bonaparte had been a threat to European balance, in the early twentieth century Germany under Wilhelm II and eventually Hitler were to be in English eyes a new, intolerable threat, under which it was not only apposite, but even necessary and desirable, to let go of isolationism. In every such case the English intervened to re-establish political balance in Europe. They succeeded, overcoming at times serious difficulties. They did not achieve territorial expansion, but preserved their colonial influence in strategic areas both in the Mediterranean and in the Middle East. On the other hand, World War II was a crucial moment in the history of Great Britain, for it made it possible to London to consolidate her special relationship with the United States of America in view of their common victory. Such a privileged relationship with Washington was to characterize and condition, even today, British foreign policy throughout the period subsequent to World War II. In the reconstruction period, amidst the rubble still present in many cities of the Continent, the option for Western European integration began to take shape as a real and valuable solution, and it was precisely Winston Churchill who encouraged European reconstruction ( Let Europe arise! ), specifying that France and Germany should assume leadership of the new, post-world War II Europe, while Great Britain, Commonwealth, America and Soviet Russia should simply be friends and supporters ( sponsors ) of such a plan. Thus, from that very moment on, the English stance was not one of full participation in the European project. Certainly, Churchill s speech intervened on 19 September 1946, when the European Community was not yet in sight; there was, instead, the hypothesis of a Council of Europe to protect common concerns of the new Europe, not excluding a federal-political unification plan for the Continent. Churchill himself alluded to the United States of Europe, but it is generally thought that he did not intend to include Great Britain. Genesis of European integration and British hostility ( ) British foreign policy was in the 50s a prudent one, desirous to safeguard the prestige derived from victory in World War II and also to preserve the privileged relationship with Washington. Attlee s Labour government turned to Europe through the Bevin Plan for security reasons rather than for reasons of economic integration: the Dunkerque agreement with France in 1947, extended in 1948 to the three Benelux countries, set as its goal to assure a European alliance against Germany in order to prevent the resurgence of new expansionist aims in Germany. Great Britain was amazed at this development and resented the fact that Italy under De Gasperi had kindly declined the invitation to join the Bevin Plan, and neglected the sense of responsibility on the part of the Italian government that, before the elections on 18 April 1948, did not deem to be sufficiently legitimated to embark on an agreement for a new alliance after the experience of the Pact of Steel in But after the elections on 18 April 1948, Italy felt definitely free to discuss and vote on its own participation; not in the Bevin Plan, which Italy deemed no longer relevant given the evolution of the cold war (the new threat came from the Soviet Union, not from Western Germany), but in the Atlantic Pact, which was studied, negotiated, and signed in the time frame between summer 1948 and 4 April Certainly, the creation of the Atlantic Alliance motivated to a greater extent Great Britain first under Attlee, then under Churchill and Eden to uphold its importance and its authoritative character through a policy of close cooperation with the United States, which would have made possible to London also to acquire the instruments and knowledge necessary to have nuclear weapons in the early 50s. When the first European Community (CECA, the European Coal and Steel Community) was born in , London s position was characterized by expectation and reserve. Though explicitly invited through the Schuman Plan, Great Britain stepped discreetly aside, out of fear of losing some of her privileges if she had to share them with the other members of the fledgling integrated Europe. London did not countenance with unlimited pleasure the proposals made by the French, which involved in the forefront Western Germany under Adenauer, and left to the other European countries apparently subordinate roles. Nor was London exceedingly sorry when in 1954, after a nearly 4-year gestation, the second European plan for integration failed that Pleven Plan which would have made possible to the six CECA countries to achieve an integrated defence community. And such lack of sadness on London s part was even clearer when, a few months after the collapse of the CED, the Bevin Plan was taken up again and expanded to Italy and Western Germany for the purpose of establishing a Union of Western Europe (UEO) that would have remedied the CED failure and offered to its seven member countries a new form of cooperation and coordination in matters related to defence. But the European integration project did not stop with the CED failure; quite the opposite.

3 ISPI - Analysis 3 With a new proposal promoted by Italy at Taormina in 1955 came the great success of the Rome Treaties in 1957 and the further achievement of communitarian integration through the expansion of the Common Market to all goods and services, including nuclear energy. The new, conservative Macmillan government first reacted with a certain disappointment to that communitarian success and favoured the alternative and competitive creation of the European Free Trade Association, involving nearly all other countries in Western Europe. Great Britain under Macmillan reasserted what was to become a constant element of English economic diplomacy, to wit support for liberalism against any form of protectionism, in order to meet, among other things, demands linked to trade relations with other countries worldwide, particularly those of the Commonwealth and the United States. But early in the 60s Macmillan s position changed. Great Britain s rapprochement to the three European Communities and de Gaulle s resistance When the Macmillan government became aware that the benefits deriving from the creation of the European Free Trade Association were inferior to the benefits to be derived from the possible participation of London in the three European Communities, British government drew closer to communitarian Europe. That was the time when the many tensions felt in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland moved the government to petition for participation in the three European communities. Which tensions? They were at least three: the decolonisation process with the decline of the imperial vision; economic development; internal centrifugal forces. As regards the decolonization process and the decline of imperial vision, London suffered all the consequences related to the new principles sealed by the Charter of the United Nations, and with these the renewed affirmation of the right of peoples to self-determination. Between 1947 and 1961 several countries that had belonged to the British Empire obtained their independence and the Suez crisis in 1956 signalled the decline of prestige and colonial or postcolonial influence of France and Great Britain. Next, economic development, often threatened by strikes and social conflicts, demanded that close trade relations be maintained with the three most important European countries, i.e. France, Western Germany, and Italy. Furthermore, internal centrifugal forces from Scotland to Northern Ireland, set London before the prospect of releasing internal tension through a rapprochement to a super-national community that would have reduced the weight of national boundaries and weakened independentist elements. But the rapprochement of Great Britain to the three European communities was blocked by the French policy of de Gaulle who, having returned to power in 1958 subsequent to the Algerian crisis, had consolidated his own internal authority by adopting the Constitution of the Fifth French Republic. De Gaulle could not remain insensitive to the support he had received, precisely from the English, at a time most dramatic for France during World War II. But de Gaulle was also the expression of a conservative French nationalism that aimed at endowing one s own country with a clear European prestige. De Gaulle also wanted nuclear arms for France, and he obtained them early in the 1960s without, however, the British help he had hoped for. Yet, at the root of the repeated veto by de Gaulle concerning the participation of Great Britain in the European communities, there was the awareness of the failed moral participation on London s part in the European project launched by the founding fathers. In fact, the attitude of the British government was quite ambiguous in French eyes, and never reassuring as to goals and objectives. The Elysée thought that London wanted to enter the three European communities not because it shared in the spirit of a Europe united by culture, history, and traditions, but for a mere question linked to interests generated by the capitalist model: a marriage of convenience, then, not one of the heart. In addition there was, on the part of de Gaulle, the desire to further draw London into a European context also in the area of defence, thus weakening the privileged relationship between Great Britain and the United States. Moreover, in the negotiations for participation the British government tried to modify the working mechanism of the Common Agricultural Policy, that is to say of the substantial financial and administrative support that had been established, beginning in the early 60s, in order to arrest the decline of the agricultural sector in Europe. Since it did not have an important agricultural sector, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland never shared in the efforts made to protect the agricultural sector and was inclined to reconsider the general financial issues, in order to re-establish the balance of agricultural ties existing between Great Britain and the Commonwealth countries. After as many as two French vetoes, in 1963 and 1967, against the participation of London in the Rome Treaties, Great Britain was not to succeed in entering the European Community until the demise of de Gaulle. Great Britain in the European communities from 1973 to the present time: Euro-scepticism as a factor preventing the development of integration Great Britain, along with Denmark and Ireland, became a member of the three European communities only in 1973: negotiations for participation were slow and hindered by the British desire to modify the rules for a common European agricultural policy and the general financial sharing (British contribution to the European Economic Community), as well as by London s reluctance to consider a reform of the role played by the British pound on the global currency market. But with the entrance of the United Kingdom of Great Britain in the three European

4 4 ISPI - Analysis communities, the British people had to accept the unavoidable modification of their country s role and prestige: participation in the European Economic Community, in particular, involved the acceptance of a partial loss of sovereignty and its transfer to a supranational organization, managed at the time by nine countries. A sizable part of the Conservative Party and a minority of the Labour Party (356 favourable, 244 contrary) contributed to the approval of Great Britain s entrance into the three European communities; the voters were attracted by the prospects of economic development at a continental level rather than by the failed preservation of the imperial heritage. The awareness reached by British society on the historical evolution in the latter half of the twentieth century was at the root of an important diplomatic step such as that taken by joining communitarian Europe. If, on the one hand, the conservatives had been at the root of such a policy, on the other hand the labourists had not given up serious consideration of such a proposal, offering their contribution at the appropriate time. In this respect, one of the most interesting moments came on the occasion of the test of strength between the United States and the EU on matters concerning liberalization of world trade in the autumn 1992, after the sanctions decided by Washington against the subsidy of European products under the Common Agricultural Policy. In order to negotiate solutions acceptable to the United States, the EU entrusted the matter to Leon Brittan (UK), Commissary for External Affairs, who protected the affairs of the EU against the measures proposed under the administration of George Bush Sr. and dialogued with the US representative Mickey Kantor in view of the Blair House Agreement. Such agreement did not satisfy the majority of public opinion in the EU, but Europe had confided in Great Britain to obtain something from the United States, supporting London s aim to play a special and privileged role in the dialogue with Washington. Several decisions made by the United Kingdom, however, were telltale of a clear scepticism as regards the European integration process; it will be well to recall among these, prior to the present grand refusal of the agreement proposed on 9 December 2011: opposition to the European Monetary System, opposition to Common Agricultural Policy with demands for refunds, opposition to the Schengen Convention, opposition to the Economic and Monetary Union (i.e. to the euro, the common currency). No to the European Monetary System In the intervening years, however, European solidarity was tried more than once by British choices and stances often contrasting with the desired progress towards integration and consolidation of the institutions. The difficulties of the 70s, caused by the end of the Bretton Woods System (stability of the dollar), by the Middle East crisis, by an increase in prices of raw materials, by inflation, and by economic recession, in 1979 moved European countries to create an European monetary system in order to contain the de- and re-evaluation of communitarian currencies. London did not deem appropriate to participate in such a system, in order to safeguard its own freedom of action in regard to its own currency, according to interests determined, among other things, by the balance between internal production and external demand on the world market, first and foremost that offered by trade relations with the United States and the countries that formerly belonged to the British Empire. Many European observers saw in such decision the desire on the part of Downing Street to preserve the British pound s supremacy and prestige. Great Britain was to enter the European Monetary System only in 1990 and to leave it definitely in 1992, on the occasion of the strong de-evaluation of the British currency. No to the Common Agricultural Policy without an exclusive and privileged refund (British Rebate). During eleven years of conservative government under Margaret Thatcher, Great Britain became involved on several parallel fronts: industrial crisis and the declining importance of coal, conflict in Northern Ireland, Falklands War, strikes, tension within the European Community, particularly in the Economic European Community. With strength and determination the British Prime Minister confronted all obstacles and faced communitarian Europe with a mixture of cynicism and pragmatism: according to London, suffering was caused by agricultural and financial issues. Great Britain was a net contributor to the Economic European Community inasmuch as the funds transferred by the British government to the Commission were far superior to those that the Commission transferred to the government or the citizens of the United Kingdom. Since over 50% of the resources of the European Community went to the Common Agricultural Policy, and since Great Britain did not possess an important agricultural sector such as that of France or Italy or Germany, the English government demanded through Prime Minister Thatcher s outburst ( I want my money back! ) a form of reimbursement, the so-called British Rebate. Based on the 1984 agreement, Great Britain was to receive a reimbursement equal to two-thirds of the difference between the money received from the Economic European Community and the money disbursed to the latter. It was a success for Margaret Thatcher. Between 1997 and 2007 Great Britain under Tony Blair continued to uphold the legitimacy of the British rebate, though it was obliged to accept a reduction of the latter by about 20% for the years Thus, from 1984 and definitely until 2013, Great Britain has obtained and shall obtain from Brussels a special rebate, the equivalent of several billions British pounds. Now Great Britain receives a rebate in the amount of about 3 billion pounds (3,5 billion Euros) yearly from the European Union and

5 ISPI - Analysis 5 contributes to the Union budget with a percentage equal to 14,82% of the total. In 2011 the EU budget reached about 143 billion Euros. Thus, Great Britain still is a net contributor who offers more than it receives, and this fact does not breed love for the EU on the part of a significant percentage of British people. No to the Schengen Convention From 1985 on the ideal of Europe as a space open to free circulation of citizens took hold and found its embodiment in the adoption of the Schengen Convention (1990), whereby member countries were to progressively eliminate any control of documents at the common borders, and to increase control at the outer borders of the Schengen area. Once again, Great Britain decided not to participate, deeming that both her own security and her relations with other Anglo-Saxon countries required the exclusive protection of the British Parliament. But such decision would impair the ideal of social Europe that the new Labour government of Tony Blair was to seek and pursue with renewed attention in the intervening years. On the other hand, the Schengen Convention would also entail cooperation among participating states by police and intelligence systems, thus initiating another form of cooperation among member states. Furthermore, it is undeniable that failed participation in the Schengen Convention would have a negative effect on the volume of European tourism to Great Britain, as well as on trade agreements directed towards the island. No to the Single European Currency In the era that saw the fall of the Berlin Wall, the political and economic transition of central and eastern European countries towards democracy and a market economy, the dissolution of Yugoslavia, of the Soviet Union and of Czechoslovakia, communitarian Europe made an important decision to further implement integration and to solve the legal problems related to risks in currency exchange, to the free export of capitals, and to the reform of national monetary policies. Indeed, while waiting for the new expansion stage to include central and eastern European countries, the Maastricht Treaty (1992) offered the possibility of outlining the contours of the path towards the adoption of a single currency within the EU: the euro, which was to mark a further step towards fuller integration. But on that occasion, too, the United Kingdom under the leadership of John Major kindly declined the invitation and, through the opting out clause, obtained to adopt neither the new single European currency nor the new worker-related disciplines. That was a further step in a direction opposite to the one chosen by the majority of European countries. Nor could Great Britain under the Labour Blair ( ) modify substantially London s position, notwithstanding the intentions of the new Prime Minister, who had given the impression that he wanted to uphold an European policy, highly sensitive to the social dimension and open to the evaluation of the possible adoption of the single currency. But these political ideals slowly died out, knowing that the majority of British public opinion would not support such an option. Moreover, Blair s foreign policy choices in the years subsequent to 2001 led London to recognize the special relationship with the United States through support of the war in Iraq and fight against international terrorism: in fact, every propension towards a privileged relationship on the other side of the Atlantic always results in the cooling down of any warmth in the relationship with Europe. Finally, Great Britain under Gordon Brown, overpowered by the global economic crisis, did not make a possible rapprochement towards the euro one of her priorities, before giving way to the new conservative government of David Cameron. Conclusions The British move on 9 December 2011 continues to raise questions and perplexities on both sides of the Channel. At a time when the seriousness of the financial and economic crisis moves European countries to draft a new treaty to regulate budgetary discipline through new systems for control of financial management and new taxation systems of financial transactions, the government in London chooses the hard way of separation and isolation from the other 26 European countries in order not to compromise the interests of British financial institutions. If, on the one hand, it is possible to understand the reasons of some financial operators in the City, on the other it is necessary to develop different considerations on the topic. In the first place, Great Britain fears regulations tighter than the present ones and thinks that a greater control by the EU may compromise not only the volume of its own financial transactions, but also the very freedom of operators, often indulgent towards a too liberal, and perhaps scarcely moral, interpretation of modern capitalism. With this gesture, however, the British government and the majority of the people behind it, clearly show a propension to individualism with a materialistic background, to the detriment of a communion of intent and shared principles with the other countries on the Continent. In the second place, the measures envisioned at Brussels on the last 9 th of December still respond to the necessity of reacting to the crisis that has befallen the Western world in particular, and continues to strike the economy of the European countries. The idea of discipline joins that of

6 6 ISPI - Analysis ethics and becomes joined to the reality of that European spirit that has been evoked many times to motivate the genesis of future proposals. That European spirit is directly linked to European culture the culture whose representation was attempted in the preamble to the European constitution, made to sink in The basic concept of continental solidarity is present in European culture, in spite of countless conflicts that have torn European peoples: a solidarity that emerges in the most difficult moments and becomes joined to moral uprightness, to the integrity of governments and operators beyond any specific material interest. Closing the door to the treaty on budgetary discipline, Cameron has perhaps fulfilled the hopes of London s City, but has certainly frustrated the expectations of several hundred millions Europeans who await common answers, commensurate to the difficulties that their respective societies must face. Furthermore, the British government has caused three very serious effects. On the one hand, many Europeans have the impression that the Channel has grown even deeper, that the bridge thrown with the French-British tunnel in the 80s is deceptive and that it is not possible to trust English friendship, inasmuch as their presence in Europe seems justified only by the gratification of interests tied to money. These are the Europeans who, at this time, also unearth colourful expressions from the past (perfidious Albion, may God curse the English again and again...) and may counteract the sentiments of respect, affection, and admiration that many other Europeans feel towards the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. On the other hand, many political and economic operators take advantage of this small but revealing crisis between the EU and Great Britain in order to hinder the renewal of the British rebate in view of the negotiations linked to the communitarian budget for the next seven years ( ). Finally, internal cohesion in the United Kingdom seems to be further compromised by disagreements within the alliance of liberals and conservatives (the liberals took exception to Cameron s position on past 9 December), as well as by the independence movements in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, which take advantage of the consequences of Cameron s behaviour in Brussels to promote once more their own claims to independence. In the proximity of the next summit meetings at Brussels scheduled in the next weeks, member countries, besides continuing to define the new agreement on budgetary discipline, will have to think of ways to recover the active presence of the United Kingdom within the EU, and also of measures likely to increase the attachment of the English people to Europe; measures useful to them not only to identify the best sites where to spend their vacations, but also to help them understand that ambitions of a post-imperial nature cannot be the same as in centuries gone by, and that the present challenges require that close cooperation which nature itself assigned to mankind; unless the insular idea really cannot be uprooted in the United Kingdom and the proverbial British stubbornness moves the country to objectively self-defeating choices. In this sense, a proposal that the EU could make to London is one linked to an interesting reversal of trend, which could La ricerca ISPI analizza le dinamiche politiche, strategiche ed economiche del sistema internazionale con il duplice obiettivo di informare e di orientare le scelte di policy. I risultati della ricerca vengono divulgati attraverso pubblicazioni ed eventi, focalizzati su tematiche di particolare interesse per l Italia e le sue relazioni internazionali e articolati in: Programma Africa Programma Caucaso e Asia Centrale Programma Europa Programma Mediterraneo e Medio Oriente Programma Russia e Vicini Orientali Programma Sicurezza e Studi Strategici Progetto Argentina Progetto Asia Meridionale Progetto Cina e Asia Orientale Progetto Diritti Umani Progetto Disarmo Progetto Internazionalizzazione della Pubblica Amministrazione Le pubblicazioni online dell ISPI sono realizzate anche grazie al sostegno della Fondazione Cariplo. SPI Palazzo Clerici Via Clerici, 5 I Milano ISPI 2012 prelude to a positive, not a negative attitude, as compared to what happened in the past. Instead of offering the usual opting out clause, the 26 European countries could offer to London the opting in clause, thus allowing the United Kingdom ample time to make an unpressured decision and leaving the door open to future British participation in the new agreement. Recovery is a necessity and Westminster must not sink into the Thames.