How To Understand The Benefits Of The French Power Market Plan
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1 Why Did the US (Mostly) Go With LMP? Benefits of Flow Based Allocation Benjamin F. Hobbs EPRG, University of Cambridge, UK DoGEE, Johns Hopkins University, USA Market Surveillance Committee, California ISO, USA Karsten Neuhoff Climate Policy Initiative, German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin) The Role of Power Market Design or the Achievement of the 20% Renewable Target Workshop, 10 June 2010, Brussels Overview 1. Definition of LMP based markets 2. Benefits of LMP Categories Modeling the unit commitment & international redispatch benefits 3. Why the US chose LMP 4. Continuous improvement
2 1. Market Restructuring a la Amerique LMP: Settlement price = nodal λ from smart auction Time varying energy + congestion + loss components Calculated: Ex ante (dual variables) or Ex post (best supports dispatch) Most transactions bilateral; λ adds transparency, liquidity Also (FERC Wholesale Market Platform ): Multi settlement markets Guarantee min load & start up costs Local market power mitigation Financial transmission rights To Make LMP System Work Residual unit commitment : commit enough to meet forecast load Capacity or resource adequacy markets Possibility of merchant based transmission Overview 1. Definition of LMP based markets 2. Benefits of LMP Categories Modeling the unit commitment & international redispatch benefits 3. Why the US chose LMP 4. Continuous improvement
3 2. Short term benefits of LMP Within country dispatch Lower congestion costs Include losses in dispatch Avoid Inc dec game Income transfers from consumers Unit commitment **** **** Commitment based on full network $170M/yr benefits from PJM s westward expansion Mansur, E., & White, M., Market Organization and Market Efficiency in Electricity Markets, Yale School of Management Working Paper, June International redispatch Increased use of network Avoid over conservative definition of NTC Avoid inefficiencies of separate allocation of T & gen Increase market size, reduce local market power Demand response to local conditions Incentives for operation of network (FACTS devices) Increase security of network Feasible day ahead schedules Long run benefits from LMP Incent appropriate siting of gen, load Information for T investment Reduced need for T investment
4 Overview 1. Definition of LMP based markets 2. Benefits of LMP Categories Modeling the unit commitment & international redispatch benefits 3. Why the US chose LMP 4. Continuous improvement Modelling the Unit Commitment & International Redispatch Benefits of LMP Harry van der Weijde & Ben Hobbs, EPRG 3 models of commitment & dispatch costs LMP commit s.t. full network (best!) NTC IRD commit s.t. NTC, international redispatch NTC NoIRD commit s.t. NTC, adhere to day ahead intl MW Calculate LMP benefits Δ = Unit commitment benefits Quantified for two NTC cases: Optimal NTC (chosen to MIN C) Arbitrary (fixed) NTC Sensitivity to generator sizes, load characteristics Δ= UC + redispatc benefits
5 Model LMP Net load realised Day-ahead unit commitment & scheduling subject to full network constraints Redispatch Model NTC IRD Net load realised TSO sets NTC Day-ahead unit commitment subject to NTC Real-time international redispatch subject to network constraints
6 Model NTC NoIRD Net load realised TSO sets NTC Day-ahead unit commitment subject to NTC Real-time redispatch only within country (international MW flow fixed) Network Q C A B ~ ~ Export Area Import Area C D ~ ~ Q D Transmission assumptions: -Equal reactance -Line limits = 1000 MW -Hence: 1000 MW < NTC < 2000 MW
7 Results Base Case Note: LMP cost = $102,000/hr Cost increase relative to LMP ($/hr) Savings if NTC = 80% Line Capacity No-IRD Intl. RD. Optimal NTC Conclusions Unit commitment & redispatch benefits of LMP ~ 0.1 5% of production costs But depends on exact load & gen parameters! If optimize NTC: 0 1.7% with intl real time redispatch 0 2.7% without If set NTC = 80% of line capacity: 0 5.3% with intl real time redispatch 0 9.5% without Cf. other studies 0.1% Unit commitment benefits in EU (R. Barth et al.,load Flow Based Market Coupling with Large Scale Wind Power in Europe. 8 th Workshop on Large Scale Integration of Wind Power in Power Systems, 2009) 0.38 /MWh Intl. redispatch benefits in F Be NL G example (Oggioni & Smeers, Degrees of Coordination in Market Coupling and Counter Trading, UCL, 2009)
8 Work in Progress Model Comparison: Renewables Network Integration, Benefits of Flow Based vs. NTC Based Allocation DIW / CPI Berlin Ecofys University of Duisburg Essen Nodal Prices: Voltage Levels >= 220kV - Max wind TU Dresden Universidad Pontificia Comillas University of Durham 50 N 40 N Maxwind 10 W 0 Making 10 networks fit for renewables E E 30 E Ecofys Overview 1. Definition of LMP based markets 2. Benefits of LMP Categories Modeling the unit commitment & international redispatch benefits 3. Why the US chose LMP 4. Continuous improvement
9 Answer: Zonal Pricing Failed: Learning the Hard Way California 2004 PJM 1997 New England 1998 Better to recognize spatial & intemporal constraints by pricing them than to make believe they don t exist
10 The DEC Game in Zonal Markets Clear zonal market day ahead (DA): One supply curve from all gen bids Clear against zonal load Accepted bids paid DA price Intrazonal congestion arises in real time & must be eliminated INC needed gen that wasn t taken DA Pay them > DA price DEC unneeded gen that can t be used Allow generator to pay back < DA price Problems arising from DEC Games 1: Congestion worsens Gen you want won t enter DA But gen you don t want will! E.g., PJM : DEC game is a money machine Gen pocket generators bid cheaply, knowing they can buy back at lower price E.g., P DA = $70, P DEC = $30 Make $40 for doing nothing E.g., California 2004
11 Problems arising from DEC Games 3: Short Run Inefficiencies If DEC ed gen started up & then shut down If INC ed gen needed at short notice 4: Long run siting inefficiencies Complex rules required to correct perverse incentives E.g., New England 1998, UK late 1990s Example 1: Cost of DEC Game in California Three zones in 1995 market design Cost of Interzonal Congestion Management: E.g., $56M (2004)
12 Intrazonal Congestion in California (Real Time Only) $426M (2004) Mostly transmission in load pockets Managed by: Dispatching Reliability Must Run and minimum load units INC s and DEC s Mean INC price = $67.33/MWh Mean DEC price = $39.20/MWh Miguel Substation Congestion 1070 MW new gen in Mexico In SoCal zone Miguel substation congestion limits imports to SoCal So INC San Diego units DEC Mexican or Palo Verde imports Mexican generation submit very low DEC bids In anticipation, CAISO Amendment 50 (March 2003) mitigated DEC bids Nonetheless, until Miguel upgraded (2005), congestion management costs ~ $3 $4M/month even when mitigated Value to Mex gen: ~$5/MW/hr
13 Example 2: PJM Zonal Collapse New 1997 PJM market: zonal DA prices Congestion to be cleared by RT INC s and DEC s Generators had two options: Bid into zonal market Bilaterals (sign contract with load, submit fixed schedule) HUGE number of infeasible bilaterals with cheap western gen PJM emergency restrictions June 1997 PJM requested FERC permission for LMP, operational in April 1978 (Source: W. Hogan, Restructuring the Electricity Market: Institutions for Network Systems, April 1999) Example 3: Perverse Siting Incentives in New England Before restructuring, 1 zonal price After market opened in late 1990s, ~30 GW new plant announced (doubled capacity) To correct perverse siting incentives, NEPOOL proposed complex rules extensive studies of system impacts expensive investments in the transmission system. Rules delayed & increased entry costs, protecting existing gen from competition 1998, FERC struck down rules as discriminatory and anticompetitive responses to defective congestion management ISO NE submitted a LMP proposal in 1999 which was accepted (See W. Hogan, ibid. )
14 Overview 1. Definition of LMP based markets 2. Benefits of LMP Categories Modeling the unit commitment & international redispatch benefits 3. Why the US chose LMP 4. Continuous improvement 4. Implementing LMP: Ongoing Improvement Basic principles of Wholesale Market Platform work well Price all constraints Facilitate trade between markets Forward contracting Stakeholders want it to work even better 24 hrs several days Better security: zonal operating reserves, contingencies AC load flow Deal with seams barriers between LMP markets More temporal variation to reward flexible investment Scarcity pricing and resource adequacy to incent investment at right time & place Minimize distortion from exclusion of constraints, operator decisions
15 Conclusion You don t always get it right the first time. Now you have experience-- try FERC s WMP! Thanks to Dick O Neill, FERC Readings on LMP General: R. Baldick, U. Helman, B.F. Hobbs, and R.P. O Neill, Design of Efficient Generation Markets, Proceedings of the IEEE, 93(11), Nov. 2005, R.P. O'Neill, U. Helman, and B.F. Hobbs, " The Design of U.S. Wholesale Energy and Ancillary Service Auction markets: Theory and Practice," Ch. 5, in F.P. Sioshansi, Competitive Electricity Markets: Design, Implementation, Performance, Elsevier, R.P. O Neill, U. Helman, B.F. Hobbs, and R. Baldick, Independent system operators in the United States: History, lessons learned, and prospects, Ch. 14, in F. Sioshansi and W. Pfaffenberger, Electricity Market Reform: An International Perspective, Elsevier, 2006, Presentation References: R. Barth et al.,load-flow Based Market Coupling with Large Scale Wind Power in Europe. 8th Workshop on Large-Scale Integration of Wind Power in Power Systems, Duisberg-Essen University, 2009 W. Hogan, Restructuring the Electricity Market: Institutions for Network Systems, April 1999 (available Harvard Electricity Policy Group HEPG Website) G. Oggioni & Y. Smeers, Degrees of Coordination in Market Coupling and Counter-Trading, Universite Catholique Louvain-la-Neuve, 2009 ISO LMP Training Materials CAISO MRTU training Locational Marginal Pricing (LMP) 101 Course Overview of Locational Marginal Pricing slides only New England PJM Training Curriculum with audio accompaniment
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