DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Working Group. draft-ietf-dots-use-cases-00
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1 DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Working Group draft-ietf-dots-use-cases-00 Roland Dobbins Arbor Networks Stefan Fouant Corero Network Security Daniel Migault Ericsson Robert Moskowitz HTT ConsulAng Nik Teague Verisign Liang Frank Xia Huawei
2 IntroducAon & Context 2
3 draft-ietf-dots-use-cases-00 Summary Provides example use-cases for DOTS (actually, categories). All examples can be CE/PE or PE/PE. Room for wide variation within each category (see 4.1.1). All DOTS communications in each example can be directly between DOTS servers and DOTS clients, or mediated by DOTS relays. DOTS relays can forward messages between DOTS clients and servers using either stateless transport, stateful transport, or a combination of the two. DOTS relays can aggregate service requests, status messages, and responses. DOTS relays can filter service requests, status messages, and responses 3
4 draft-ietf-dots-use-cases-00 Summary (cont.) Use-cases in -00 are not exhaustive, are illustrative. Use-cases in -00 focus on DDoS mitigation using dedicated mitigation devices. S/RTBH, flowspec, OpenFlow, etc. can also be used to leverage network infrastructure for DDoS mitigation use-case in this presentation illustrates full DOTS communications cycle, variants. Other use-cases in this presentation are summarized diffs illustrating DOTS communications model in widely varying circumstances. Use-cases in this presentation focus on protecting servers under DDoS attack on destination networks. DOTS can also be used to suppress attack traffic on origin networks or as it traverses intermediary networks. 4
5 4.1 - Primary Use Cases 5
6 ReflecAon/AmplificaAon CPE or PE MiAgators Request Upstream DDoS MiAgaAon DDoS AYacks 6
7 7
8 8
9 9
10 10
11 DDoS a&ack ini+ated. 11
12 A&ack mi+gated on- prem. 12
13 On- prem mi+ga+on capacity exceeded. 13
14 On- prem mi+ga+on capacity exceeded. 14
15 DOTS client signals for upstream mi+ga+on. 15
16 DOTS server acknowledges mi+ga+on request, mi+ga+on ini+ated. 16
17 Mi+ga+on in progress. 17
18 Status messages exhanged during mi+ga+on efficacy, mi+ga+on status, etc. 18
19 A&ack terminated. 19
20 Mi+ga+on status change message transmi&ed. 20
21 Mi+ga+on termina+on service request. 21
22 Mi+ga+on termina+on service acknowledgement. 22
23 Mi+ga+on terminated, return to status quo ante. 23
24 DOTS communica+on rela+onships. 24
25 ReflecAon/AmplificaAon VariaAon with DOTS Relay MediaAng CommunicaAons DDoS AYacks 25
26 26
27 27
28 Mi+ga+on in progress. 28
29 Mi+ga+on in progress. 29
30 DOTS communica+on rela+onships. 30
31 ReflecAon/AmplificaAon VariaAon with Overlay DDoS MiAgaAon Service Provider DDoS AYacks 31
32 32
33 Mi+ga+on in progress. 33
34 DOTS communica+on rela+onships. 34
35 ReflecAon/AmplificaAon VariaAon with MulAple Upstream DDoS MiAgaAon Providers DDoS AYacks 35
36 36
37 Mi+ga+on in progress. 37
38 Mi+ga+on status messaging between providers. 38
39 DOTS communica+on rela+onships. 39
40 4.1.2 Network Infrastructure ReflecAon/AmplificaAon Device Requests Upstream DDoS DDoS AYacks MiAgaAon 40
41 41
42 Mi+ga+on in progress. 42
43 DOTS communica+on rela+onships. 43
44 ReflecAon/AmplificaAon AYack Telemetry DetecAon/ ClassificaAon System Requests Upstream DDoS AYacks DDoS MiAgaAon 44
45 45
46 Mi+ga+on in progress. 46
47 DOTS communica+on rela+onships. 47
48 ReflecAon/AmplificaAon Targeted Service/ApplicaAon DDoS AYacks Requests Upstream DDoS MiAgaAon 48
49 49
50 Mi+ga+on in progress. 50
51 DOTS communica+on rela+onships. 51
52 ReflecAon/AmplificaAon Manual Web Portal Request to Upstream MiAgator DDoS AYacks 52
53 53
54 Mi+ga+on in progress. HTTP/S between Web browser & DOTS client on Web portal. 54
55 Mi+ga+on in progress. HTTP/S between Web browser & DOTS client on Web portal. 55
56 Communica+on rela+onships. DOTS on upstream mi+ga+on network only. 56
57 ReflecAon/AmplificaAon Manual Mobile Device ApplicaAon Request to Upstream DDoS AYacks MiAgator 57
58 58
59 Mi+ga+on in progress. 59
60 DOTS communica+on rela+onships. 60
61 s Unsuccessful CPE or PE ReflecAon/AmplificaAon MiAgator Request for Upstream DDoS AYacks DDoS MiAgaAon 61
62 62
63 Mi+ga+on in progress. 63
64 Another a&ack ini+ated, different target. 64
65 Mi+ga+on service request refused due to mi+ga+on capacity constraints. 65
66 DOTS communica+on rela+onships. 66
67 4.2 - Ancillary Use Cases 67
68 4.2.1 Auto-Registration Beyond attack mitigation requests, responses, and status messages, DOTS can also be useful for administrative tasks. Administrative tasks are a significant barrier to effective DDoS mitigation. DOTS clients with appropriate credentials can auto-register with DOTS servers on upstream mitigation networks. This helps with DDoS mitigation service on-boarding, moves/adds/changes. 68
69 4.2.2 Automatic Provisioning of DDoS Countermeasures DDoS countermeasure provisioning today is a largely manual process, errors and inefficiency can be problematic. This can lead to inadequately-provisioned DDoS mitigation services which often are not optimized for the assets under DDoS protection. Mitigation rapidity, efficacy suffers. On-boarding organizations during an attack an all-toocommon situation can be very challenging. The self-descriptive nature of DOTS registration and mitigation status requests can be leveraged to automate the countermeasure selection, provisioning, and tuning process. Mitigation efficacy feedback from DOTS clients to DOTS servers during an attack can be leveraged for real-time mitigation tuning and optimization. 69
70 4.2.3 Informational DDoS Attack Notification to Third Parties In addition to service requests from organizations under attack to upstream mitigators, DOTS can be used to send DDoS attack notification and status messages to interested and authorized third parties. It may be beneficial in some circumstances to automatically provide attack notifications and status messages econdary or tertiary backup mitigation providers, security researchers, vendors, law enforcement agencies, regulatory agencies, etc. Any such sharing of information with third parties should only take place in accordance with all relevant laws, regulations, contractual obligations, privacy and confidentiality agreements. 70
71 s Next ReflecAon/AmplificaAon Steps for Use- Cases DDoS Drac AYacks 71
72 To-Do List for draft-dots-ietf-use-cases-01 Fix typos (doh!). Remove duplicative verbiage. Wordsmith phrasing for clarity. Present use-cases via diffs i.e., refer to commonalities with other use-cases, emphasize specific factors unique to each use-case. Reconcile definitions of terminology with dots-ietfrequirements draft. Add use-cases illustrating suppression of DDoS attack traffic on origin networks, filtering on intermediate networks. Add use-cases illustrating specific PE-PE scenarios (e.g., overflow requests for additional DDoS mitigation capacity, etc.). 72
73 Request for Feedback from WG Participants What should we add? What should we remove? What should we change? Should we include variations (via diffs ) on each use-case similar to what was done with in this presentation? Other input? 73
74 This Presentation
75 DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Working Group Thank you! Roland Dobbins Arbor Networks Stefan Fouant Corero Network Security Daniel Migault Ericsson Robert Moskowitz HTT ConsulAng Nik Teague Verisign Liang Frank Xia Huawei
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