ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT Q

Transcription

1 The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT Q.1 11 Jan 1st Mar 1st 11 ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report. -Not for copy or sale- SUMY & ASSESSMENT A acks against NGOs by armed opposi on have remained stable and low throughout the Q1 (p.), although the overall level of incidents, including criminal acts, has grown by %. The criminal sector saw an increase of % (p.) with a acks by AOG increasing by a lower rate of 9% (or just four actual a acks). A total of seven persons have been killed, comparable to eight at Q1, all by small arms fire either as a result of deliberate intent (mostly criminal), a personal dispute or collaterally in a acks on other targets (p.). The percentage of total a acks occurring in the North East has jumped from 1% in to % this year with a spike of incidents (mostly criminal) recently in Badakhshan; notably one of the provinces slated for early transi on. The number of a acks occurring in the East has similarly jumped from % to %, mostly as a result of a sharply deteriora ng Nangarhar province. Kine c a acks against NGOs have included improvised explosive devices (), rocket strikes (1), small arms fire () and armed robberies (). In addi on there have been four cases of abduc on, involving seven actual persons, all but one of which have been resolved to date. Abduc on rates also remain consistent with, which, coincidentally, also saw eight in the Q1. The data at this stage con nues to support the conclusion that, despite an over all increase in the conflict rate (p.), NGOs are not rou nely targeted by the Taliban as a ma er of policy but are being impacted, as a sta s cal inevitability, by an increase in ambient violence. ANSO currently ranks collateral damage and an accidental strike with an IED as the highest risk factors facing the NGO community (p.). Mi ga on strategies for these specific risks would include reduced proximity to likely targets, adop on of a low visibility movement profile and where possible, direct access nego a ons with opposi on forces to respect neutrality. There have been no substan al changes in the strategic environment since the last report period. The IMF remain engaged in establishing the condi ons for their exit, with data sugges ng that their regular force interven ons have not significantly impacted AOG figh ng capacity at a strategic level. AOG a acks in Helmand province have increased by 7% over the Q1 of (p.9). As an cipated, irregular armed forces con- nue to develop (under the VSO/ALP rubric) well beyond the planned footprint (p.11) establishing poten al obstacles to poli cal cohesion and state stability. Preliminary transi on areas have been announced, although it remains too early to judge the impact of this in the Q1 data period. Countrywide, the number of a acks by armed opposi on has already grown by 1% (p.) on, sugges ng that AOG capacity was not significantly effected by last years IMF opera ons. We an cipate that 11 will be the most violent year since we have been keeping records. Nic Lee, ANSO Director, Kabul, April 11 The views expressed in this report remain the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of ANSO donors or partners.

2 Page Part 1. NGO TRENDS

3 Page 1.1 AOG Attacks Against NGOs ANSO: NGO security incidents attributed to AOG per month, - 11 (Includes all types of event such as kinetic, non kinetic, threats and abductions) AOG a acks against NGOs remain within normally low ranges, seeing a moderate rise over the Q1 period of (up from 1 to 1, see below right). Just % of the total are assessed as being deliberately intended to cause harm or loss, although this count also includes many incidents which look more like AOGs se ling personal scores than airing a grudge against the NGO. Accidents, most commonly with IED or RPG strikes, and informa on gathering exercises, most commonly through temporary deten ons, con- nue to make up a large part of AOG interac on with NGOs. The data con nues to provide no evidence of systema c or rou ne targe ng of NGOs by the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA). ANSO: Assessed cause/purpose of AOG attacks on NGOs, Q 1 11 ANSO: AOG attacks against NGOs, Q1 only, -11 Influencing Populations 1% Deliberate & Hostile % Accidental % 17 1 Info Gathering % 1 1 Q1- Q1-9 Q1- Q1-11

4 Page 1. General NGO Trends Criminal Attacks ANSO: NGO security incidents attributed to criminals per month, -11 (Includes all types of event kinetic and non kinetic) While s ll low in absolute terms, there has been a slight rela ve increase in the number of crimes against the NGO community, rising from to 1 over the Q1 (below right). The rate does not exceed longer term norms however (above) and overall NGO exposure to crime appears to be dropping. The majority of recent a acks have been armed robberies, both at the office and at home, with vehicles, cash and valuable electronics being stolen. That the majority of crimes (7%) occur in the North and North Eastern regions is certainly reflec ve of NGO density there, but it could also suggest a general growth in criminality invoked by the widespread forma on of irregular mili as. It is in these regions par cularly that locals have claimed irregular forces to be nothing more than sanc oned criminals. ANSO: Types of crimes against NGO/NGO staff, Q1 11 only ANSO: Criminal attacks against NGOs, Q1 only, -11 Murder Unarmed Robbery Abduction for Ransom (Persons) Non-Fatal Assault Intimidation by IED Armed Robbery Q1- Q1-9 Q1- Q1-11

5 Page 1. NGO Incident Mapping Q1 11 ANSO: Province of serious NGO Incidents, Jan-Mar 11 BADAKSHAN JAWZ BALKH KUNDUZ TAKHAR FARYAB SAMANGAN BAGHLAN SAR E PUL HERAT BADGHIS GHOR DAYKUNDI BAMYAN PARWAN KAPISA LAGHMAN KABUL WARDAK NANGAHAR GHAZNI KHOST URUZGAN FARAH NIMROZ HELMAND KANDAHAR ZABUL PAKTIKA IED Rocket Small Arms Fire Abduction Armed Robbery As usual, serious a acks have occurred in provinces assessed both as calm as well as insecure with no specific geographic concentra on. That IED strikes have not, so far, occurred in the South, reflects the lack of road movement in those areas. A larger propor on of incidents occurred in the East as a result of a growing instability in Nangarhar, this will definitely be a province to watch in 11. Of the seven NGO deaths occurring so far this year, five have been as a result of the small arms fire incidents, a change from last year when most were from IEDs. Most of these deaths have been assessed as being criminally (or personally) mo vated. The percentage of all incidents occurring in the North and North East has risen from to %. ANSO: Regional distribution of NGO attacks, Q1 11 West South Central East North North East % 9% % 1% % %

6 Page 1. Security Risk Assessment Matrix (SRAM) Impact RISK ANALYSIS MATRIX (Likelihood x Risk Rating Impact=Risk) Very Low Low Moderate High Very High Very Low Negligible Risk Low 1 Mild Risk Moderate Moderate Risk High Serious Risk Very High Unacceptably High Risk Likelihood The Security Risk Assessment Matrix is a common tool to assist NGOs in visualizing and ranking risk. The below presents our current ranking of the primary risks to NGOs, per ANSO opera onal area, along with the recommended mi ga on tac c. We currently consider collateral damage and accidental IED strikes to be the highest ranked risks to NGOs countrywide. NGOs might use the charts to further develop regionally specific mi ga on. COUNTRY WIDE Type of Incident Likelihood Impact ANSO Risk Rating Proposed Primary Mitigation Measure Collateral Damage Moderate High Avoiding proximity to targets & hardening of facilities (protection) Accidental IED Moderate High Use a low profile vehilce (unless your logo is recognized) & travel off peak Abduction for Interrogation High Low Establish community legitimacy & deploy staff from local area only Armed Robbery Moderate Moderate Restrict information on travel plans & never establish routines EASTERN REGION Type of Incident Likelihood Impact ANSO Risk Rating Proposed Primary Mitigation Measure Collateral Damage Low High Avoiding proximity to targets Accidental IED Low V. High Use a low profile vehilce & travel 'off peak' Deliberate IED V. Low V.High Outreach to AOG to promote acceptance Armed Robbery on Road Moderate Moderate Restrict information on travel plans & never establish routines Deliberate AOG targeting V. Low V. High Outreach to AOG to promote acceptance NORTHERN & NORTH EAST REGIONS Type of Incident Likelihood Impact ANSO Risk Rating Proposed Primary Mitigation Measure Abduction at Illegal Checkpoint Low Moderate Do not carry items linking you to an NGO (sanitized) Direct Attack on Vehicle/Compound Low V. High Outreach to AOG to promote acceptance Accidental IED Low V. High Low profile vehilce, travel 'off peak' Collateral Damage Low High Avoiding proximity to targets Armed Robbery on Road Low Moderate Restrict information on travel plans & never establish routines WESTERN REGION Type of Incident Likelihood Impact ANSO Risk Rating Proposed Primary Mitigation Measure Targeted Abduction Low Moderate Deploy staff from the local area only and establish community support Armed Robbery on Road Low Moderate Restrict information on travel plans & never establish routines Collateral Damage Low High Avoiding proximity to targets Accidental IED Low V. High Low profile vehilce, travel 'off peak' Deliberate AOG targeting Low V. High Outreach to AOG to promote acceptance SOUTHERN REGION Type of Incident Likelihood Impact ANSO Risk Rating Proposed Primary Mitigation Measure Accidental IED High V.High Reduce road movements, travel low profile & "off peak" Collateral Damage High V.High Avoiding proximity to targets Deliberate AOG targeting Low V.High Avoid association to IMF/GIRoA, maintain neutrality in projects Deliberate IED Low V.High Remain neutral & outreach to AOG to promote acceptance CENTRAL REGION Type of Incident Likelihood Impact ANSO Risk Rating Proposed Primary Mitigation Measure Accidental IED Very Low V.High Low profile vehilce, travel 'off peak' Accidental IDF strike Low Moderate Avoiding proximity to targets Collateral Damage Moderate V. High Avoiding proximity to targets Armed Robbery on Road Moderate Moderate Restrict information on travel plans & never establish routines Home/Office Break In High Low Guards, perimeter fence & lighting

7 Page 7 Part. State of the Conflict

8 Page.1 AOG Initiated Attacks Countrywide ANSO: Total AOG initiated attacks per month, 11 (Note: This is a clean count of AOG initiated kinetic attaks only, it does not include any criminal activity, kinetic or otherwise) AOG ini ated a acks have soared this quarter, up by 1% from last year. This gain rate is also larger than the % seen between the Q1 of 9-. March 11 saw 1, a acks, an average of per day, surpassing even the August 9 summer peak during Presiden al elec ons. The data suggests that the deep winter down turn (noted at Q ) was simply an ordinary opera onal pause, and was not reflec- ve of a permanently degraded capacity as some had suggested at the me. Considering the variety of IMF tac cs and strengths that have been brought to ANSO: Total AOG attacks at Q1 stage only, 7-11 bear against the opposi on at different periods throughout the. years recorded here, it is remarkable how consistent the growth rate has been 7 and suggests that we need to think beyond the linear logic that a stronger IMF equals a weaker AOG, as 1791 this is clearly not the case. Instead, it is likely that a 1 1 more complex co-evolu onary rela onship exists within which the counter-insurgency actually 77 strengthens and exacerbates the insurgency, through forced adapta on, rather than defea ng it. The end result appears to be a perpetually escala ng stalemate which could sustain itself indefi- Q1-7 Q1- Q1-9 Q1- Q1-11 nitely, or un l one side, or the other, transi ons out.

9 Page 9. AOG Initiated Attacks Per Province This table provides a comparison of raw AOG a ack rate data, per province, for the Q1 periods of and 11. It shows the percentage change and the absolute figure. When using for independent analysis readers are reminded that a low a ack volume can indicate AOG dominance and that a small absolute change can be large when stated as a percentage. The average referred to is the 1% country rate. (p) PROVINCE AOG Attacks Q1 AOG Attacks Q1 11 % Change Absolute Change PAKTYA 1 9% 1 NURISTAN 1 % 17 JAWZ 1 17% 1 BADAKHSHAN 11 17% 7 FARAH 1% PARWAN 1 1% 9 KHOST 17 1% 179 BALKH % 17 HERAT 7 11% 1 GHAZNI % 1 URUZGAN 9 9 9% HELMAND 1 7 7% 91 NANGARHAR 7 1 % BADGHIS 97 9% FARYAB % 17 LAGHMAN % WARDAK 1% PAKTIKA 1% KANDAHAR 9 9% 1 KUNAR 1 % ZABUL % SAMANGAN % LOGAR % GHOR % KABUL -% - SAR-E PUL % - DAYKUNDI 7-1% -1 NIMROZ 1 1 -% -7 KUNDUZ 79 -% - KAPISA % -1 BAGHLAN 1 -% -19 TAKHAR 19-7% -1 BAMYAN 1 -% -1 NEGATIVE GROWTH BELOW AVERAGE GROWTH ABOVE AVERAGE GROWTH

10 Page. AOG Initiated Attacks Insecurity Rating ANSO: Provincial Insecurity Rating, at Q1 11 (Rating based on analytical assessment and not just incident rate. Total AOG attacks for 11 indicated in map. A lack of AOG attacks can indicate uncontested AOG presence) HERAT FARAH NIMROZ 1 BADGHIS 97 RC North RC West GHOR HELMAND 7 RC South West FARYAB JAWZ SAR E PUL 19 URUZGAN 9 KANDAHAR 9 DAYKUNDI 7 BALKH 1 RC East BAMYAN ZABUL GHAZNI 1 KUNDUZ SAMANGAN BAGHLAN 1 PAKTIKA TAKHAR KHOST BADAKSHAN 11 PARWAN KAPISA 1 19 LAGHMAN KABUL WARDAK RC Capital NANGAHAR 1 RC South Extremely Insecure Highly Insecure Moderately Insecure Deteriorating Low Insecurity The most vola le area, again, has been Loya Paktya (PK) plus Ghazni - which corresponds to some of ISAF RC-EAST and AOG Miramshah Shura - which has seen an averaged growth rate of 7% per province. All four provinces in this area are ranked as extremely insecure and are likely to remain so throughout 11. The northern half of ISAF RC-EAST (Nuristan, Kunar) remains ranked as extremely insecure, with at least one district (Waygal) en rely under AOG command. In the south, Uruzgan and Helmand are seeing above average growth rates, as AOG counter ISAF offensives, while Kandahar and Zabul remain steady and Nimroz sees decline. We con nue to rank four of the five as highly insecure or above, with just Nimroz being slightly more accessible. The four provinces of the west have seen an averaged growth rate of % and we rank Herat as deteriora ng as it is slated for early transi on while seeing a 11% increase in a acks. In the north west, Faryab is ranked as moderate having the regional highest a ack rate in absolute terms. Jawzjan and Balkh rank as deteriora ng due to them having the regions highest percentage growth rates (17% & 11% respec vely). Sar-i-Pul s Sayyad district causes it to also be ranked as deteriora ng. In the north east all provinces but Badakhshan have seen lower a ack rates than Q1 last year but con nue to be ranked as moderate and deteriora ng due to the very high likelihood of a fresh AOG campaign in Q.

11 Page 11. Irregular Armed Forces (IAF) Irregular armed forces con nue to be developed, as a component of the IMF exit strategy. To deflect cri cism, all such forces are supposed to become enrolled in the MOI Afghan Local Police (ALP) program. However, as the mapping exercise below shows, irregular armed forces are in fact mobilizing and opera ng well beyond the reach of that program, mostly at the ini a ve of local poli cal and ethnic leaders and generally with tacit knowledge and approval from IMF (US). The phenomenon presents only minor immediate threats to NGOs, but may lead to sub-na onal conflicts as transi on progresses. ANSO: Official ALP sites, North East, 11 Darwaz Khwahan Chah Ab Shahri Buzur Ragh Shighnan Qalay I Zal Chahar Dara Baghlani Jadid Imam Sahib Baghlan Ali Abad Archi Kunduz Khan Abad Khwaja Ghar Taluqan Bangi Ishkamish Burka Chal Rustaq Kalafgan Farkhar Warsaj Kishim Fayz Abad Jurm Baharak Zebak Ishkashim Wakhan Dahana I Ghori Tala Wa Barf Dushi Nahrin Khinjan Andarab Khost Wa Fir Kuran Wa Mun 1. OFFICIALLY APPROVED AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE (ALP) DISTRICTS in NORTHEAST as of 11 ANSO: Irregular force activity, North East, 11 Darwaz Khwahan Chah Ab Shahri Buzur Ragh Shighnan Qalay I Zal Chahar Dara Baghlani Jad Imam Sahib Baghlan Ali Abad Archi Kunduz Khan Abad Khwaja Ghar Taluqan Bangi Ishkamish Burka Chal Rustaq Kalafgan Farkhar Warsaj Kishim Fayz Abad Jurm Baharak Zebak Ishkashim Wakhan Dahana I Ghori Tala Wa Barf Dushi Nahrin Khinjan Andarab Khost Wa Fir Kuran Wa Munjan. REPORTED ACTUAL PRESENCE of IRREGULAR ARMED FORCES in NORTHEAST as of 11

12 Page 1 Acronyms: IEA - Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Taliban) AOG- Armed Opposition Groups (specifically Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Taliban); Haqqani Network and Hezb-i-Islami Hekmatyar (HiH) IMF - International Military Forces (specifically ISAF, USFOR-A, PRTs and SOF) ANSF - Afghan National Security Forces (mostly Police & Army) IED - Improvised Explosive Device (home made bomb) IDF Indirect Fire (rockets, mortars) CAS - Close Air Support (airstrike) EOF - Escalation of Force (shooting a vehicle at a check post that fails to stop) SAF - Small Arms Fire (from a machine gun such as AK7) REPORT ENDS For further information director@afgnso.org ANSO, January 11 This document will be stored in the public domain at It may be reproduced, stored or transmitted without permission for non-commercial purposes only and with written credit to ANSO. Where it is transmitted electronically a link should be provided to ANSO website