The Security Development Lifecycle. Steven B. Lipner, CISSP Senior Director Security Engineering Strategy Microsoft Corp.
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1 The Security Development Lifecycle Steven B. Lipner, CISSP Senior Director Security Engineering Strategy Microsoft Corp.
2 2 Overview Introduction A look back Trustworthy Computing and security pushes The Security Development Lifecycle Training Tools Results What next?
3 3 Introduction Microsoft employee for 6+ years 35+ years in security Mathematical models A1 systems Firewalls Patents in system and network security Learned from my (and industry s s mistakes)
4 4 A Look Back Security integrated into Windows NT Microsoft Security Response Team Secure Windows Initiative (SWI) team Each OS release placed more emphasis on security And then there was 2001 Code Red Nimda UPNP
5 5 Trustworthy Computing Deliver products and services that customers can rely on Integrate trust into Microsoft culture
6 6 urity ushes Sec P Make significant security improvement Jumpstart Trustworthy Computing Apply (then) current understanding of security best practices.net Framework Windows Server 2003 Office 2003 SQL Server 2000 SP3 Exchange 2000 SP3
7 7 Building a Process Security Audit introduced with Windows Server 2003 How good a job did we do? Through 2003, SWI team Provided training Supported security pushes Conducted audits By late 2003, time to formalize
8 8 The Security Development Lifecycle
9 9 Security Engineering Framework SD 3 + Communications Secure by Design Secure by Default Secure in Deployment Communications Threat Modeling Code Inspection Security Testing Reduce attack surface area Unused features off by default Least privilege Prescriptive Guidance Security Tools Enterprise Management Clear security commitment Full member of the security community Microsoft Security Response Center
10 10 Security Development Lifecycle Tasks and Processes Security Kickoff & Register with SWI Security Training Security Design Best Practices Security Arch & Attack Surface Review Threat Modeling Use Security Development Tools & Security Best Dev & Test Practices Create Security Docs and Tools For Product Prepare Security Response Plan Security Push Pen Testing Final Security Review Security Servicing & Response Execution Requirements Design Implementation Verification Release Support & Servicing
11 11 Key Components of the SDL Threat modeling Enumerate external entities, processes, stores, flows Identify threats STRIDE Determine risks Plan mitigations security features and code quality Development best practices Banned APIs Static analysis SAL Annotation
12 12 Key Components of the SDL Fuzz testing Supply well-formed random input; investigate failures Applies to file parsers, RPC, ActiveX controls Tools Static analysis and fuzz testing must be automated Other tools developed as needed some weapons grade Improves efficiency and consistency
13 13 Final Security Review (FSR) Successor to audit From a security viewpoint, is this software ready to deliver to customers? Did the team meet the SDL requirements? How secure is this software? NOT penetrate and patch If FSR finds a pattern of vulnerabilities, revisit earlier phases and address root causes (e.g., improve training, enhance tools) don t t just fix the bugs and ship!
14 14 Maintaining the SDL SDL is NOT static! Respond to new threats Exploit new tools, techniques, processes SDL updated on a six-month cycle Proposal (with costs and benefits) Beta Final review and release Proposed updates reviewed broadly by Microsoft security and engineering teams
15 15 SDL: Education and Training Knowledge of security is not the norm among developers/college graduates Microsoft operates its own training program Basics of Secure Software Design, Development, and Test Introduction to Fuzz Testing Threat Modeling Security Design and Architecture - Time Tested Design Principles Implementing Threat Mitigations Introduction to SDL and the FSR Process Security Tools Overview Security Code Reviews Network Fuzz Testing Security for Upper Management Vista Security Features Classes of Security Defects Defects in Detail Attack Surface Analysis and Reduction Exploit Development Defect Estimation and Management Introduction to Cryptography Security Response
16 16 SDL Tools Visual Studio 2005 Native code static analysis (/analyze aka PREfast) Safe CRT libraries Managed code static analysis (FXCop) Code Access Security/Least Privilege (.Net) /GS improvements Testing tools (AppVerifier) Unit/Stress testing framework Full integrated solutions in VS Team System Stand alone versions available shortly More info: us/dnvs05/html/vs05security.asp
17 17 Results Service Pack Bulletins in Bulletins since period prior TwC release to release SQL Server 2000 SP3 released 1/17/ Released 11/29/ Days After Product Release * As of May 9, 2006 Released 09/28/2003 Released Released 05/31/ /17/2003 Bulletins 904 Days After Product Release
18 Results 18 We actually consider Microsoft to be leading the software [industry] now in improvements in their security development life cycle [SDL]. John Pescatore Vice President and Distinguished Analyst Gartner, Inc (From CRN, Feb 13 th 2006)
19 19 What Next? Making the SDL available to the community Howard/Lipner book a first step Additional tools, training, partners to follow Continuing to improve the SDL Process improvements More and better tools Blocking new classes of vulnerabilities and exploits Working to improve the Common Criteria security evaluation scheme
20 20 Summary SDL has proven effective at improving software security Key success factors Executive commitment Education and training Continuous improvement Process is widely applicable to software development teams
21 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. This presentation is for informational purposes only. MICROSOFT MAKES NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, IN THIS SUMMARY.
22 22 Emulating the SDL Get management support Build a core security team Including a security response center) Define your SDL process Select your initial tools Train your people Learn from your mistakes Update your products and your processes
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