MARINE INSURANCE Review

Transcription

1 A quarterly review of marine insurance risks Issue 6: March 2012 In this issue - No unequivocal waiver of breach of warranty by insurer - New member of the Marine Insurance Team - Accession of the European Union to the Protocol of 2002 to the Athens Convention relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea, 1974, with the exception of Articles 10 and 11 thereof. - Grand Union Canal Regulations Welcome to the sixth edition of Greenwoods Marine Insurance Review. Greenwoods are pleased to announce the arrival of Gemma Pearce to the firm. Gemma brings with her over 10 years experience as a marine casualty specialist. In this bumper edition this month we look at waiver of breach of warranties, and the recent decision on materiality, due diligence and multiple occurrences. Gemma has provided a piece on the up and coming changes to The Athens Convention and we look at the Court's handling of a litigant in person in the pleasure craft case of Nigel Moore v British Waterways Board. If you would like further information about this new offering or on any of the cases or issues that feature below, please contact: Daniel Crockford on: or [email protected] or Gemma Pearce on: or [email protected] No unequivocal waiver of breach of warranty by insurer Bristol One Redcliff Street BS1 6NP T London Bedford Square 18 Bedford Square WC1B 3JA T London Market Office 77 Gracechurch Street EC3V 0AS T Manchester 57 Spring Gardens, M2 2BY T Milton Keynes 2 Eskan Court Campbell Park MK9 4AN T Southampton 3600 Parkway The Solent Centre, Solent Business Park, Fareham PO15 7AN T The background facts of Liberty Insurance Pte Ltd & Anor v Argo Systems FZE were that Argo Systems FZE ("Argo") purchased a floating casino ("Copa Casino") for scrap and wished to tow it from Mobile, Alabama to India in March Argo arranged insurance for the voyage under a voyage policy dated 11 March The policy was underwritten by Liberty Insurance Pte Ltd ("Liberty"). On 14 March 2003, during the voyage, the vessel developed a list which continually worsened until she sank in the Caribbean Sea on 16 March 2003 and was an actual total loss. Argo made a claim to Liberty but cover was declined on 18 July 2003 and proceedings were issued a year later in both the US and England. During the course of English proceedings an order was made for the trial of four preliminary issues that were heard by HHJ Mackie QC. The issues were: the construction of the Hold Harmless Warranty contained in the voyage policy; whether the insurer had waived their right to rely on the warranty; whether the insurer had affirmed the contract of insurance such that it was not entitled to avoid the policy for alleged misrepresentations; and if insurers had affirmed the contract, whether they could still claim damages for alleged misrepresentations pursuant to section 2(1) Misrepresentation Act Mackie J found that Argo were in breach of warranty, that Liberty had waived its right to rely on that breach, that Liberty had affirmed the contract and that Liberty were not able to claim for damages for misrepresentation pursuant to section 2(1) Misrepresentation Act Liberty appealed Mackie J's decisions on the second and fourth issues. The issues that the Appeal Judges stated they had to decide on were: was the Judge correct to conclude that Liberty had made an unequivocal representation to Argo that it would not rely on Argo's breach of the Hold Harmless Warranty; was the Judge correct to conclude that Argo had relied on that representation; and if the answers to those two questions was that the Judge was correct, then, as a matter of principle, could Liberty claim damages for pre-contractual misrepresentations by Argo, relying on section 2(1) Misrepresentation Act 1967? Lord Justice Atkins, in the leading judgment, discussed the doctrines of "waiver by election" and "waiver by estoppel". Atkins LJ stated that as in the event of a breach of warranty, an insurer need not make a positive action to discharge themselves from any further liability under the policy. It therefore followed that where it was alleged that an insurer had waived their right to rely on a breach of warranty then this logically would be by estoppel, rather than election. Both of the doctrines require the person who is alleged to have waived to have made an unequivocal representation, by words or conduct, that he does not, in the future, intend to enforce their legal right. In the case of "waiver of estoppel" it also has to be demonstrated that the other person relied upon that unequivocal representation in such a way that it would be inequitable for the representor to go back on his representation. The evidence put forward by Argo was that Liberty gave unequivocal representations on three separate occasions. Personal Injury l Property & Construction l Insurance l Commercial & Financial Risks l Fraud l Health & Safety l Motor Prosecutions

2 Page 2 of 6 The first was that the breach of warranty point was not raised in the declinature letter dated 18 July 2003, the second was that the breach was not pleaded in the US proceedings and the third was that nothing was said by Liberty about the breach until Liberty's defence in the English proceedings in May The declinature letter did not refer to the breach of warranty, yet Liberty's US lawyers had concluded the letter with the sentence "the foregoing is without prejudice to all the remaining terms and conditions of the policy". Atkins LJ held that the insurers had reserved their right to rely on other terms of the policy in support of its denial of coverage and had not unequivocally made any representation that they would not rely on any breach of warranty. Atkins LJ also held that Liberty's pleadings in the US dealt with jurisdictional issues and general defence terms, so again there was no unequivocal representation. Finally, Atkins LJ discussed Mackie's findings on the reference to the breach of warranty in Liberty's defence in the English proceedings some seven years after the original declinature letter. Mackie J found that the seven year gap was a "powerful factor" supporting that an unequivocal representation had been made by Liberty, but Atkins LJ was of the view that saying nothing was actually an equivocal action. Atkins, therefore, held that Mackie J had erred in his judgment and there had not been an unequivocal representation to Argo that Liberty would not rely on any breach of warranty argument. This meant that the Court did not have to decide on the issue as to whether Argo relied on the representation or not. Also Liberty agreed that they would not pursue the Misrepresentation Act appeal if they were successful in their appeal over the waiver of breach of warranty. Comment This is a helpful judgment for insurers, and although Atkins LJ made it clear in his judgment that in the case of deciding whether there has been an unequivocal representation or not turned on the facts of the matter, it does allow insurers some breathing space when deciding which points to rely on when declining cover if there are others in existence. The judgment does also highlight the importance of clear wording in declinature letters confirming that insurers will rely on other terms of the policy to support the declinature if needs be or if new evidence comes to light. New Member of the Marine Insurance Team Gemma qualified as a Barrister in 2001 and joined Eversheds LLP the same year, cross qualifying in She is currently employed as a Senior Solicitor at Greenwoods working in the Bristol Office Gemma is part of the Marine Team. Gemma specialises in dealing with all aspects of claims arising from any accident, minor or major on land or at sea. Her involvement begins at the scene of an accident and continues through to trial. Being a health and safety specialist, Gemma offers proactive advice and training to clients on their responsibilities. She also drafts/advises on health and safety procedures, policies, documentation and risk management, drafts the necessary documents and trains management and personnel. She lectures widely and runs practical workshops on all aspects of personal injury and accident investigation. In the maritime sector, Gemma s clients include owners of all types of ships and their P&I insurers. She regularly advises ship owners in respect of their liabilities and has particular expertise on the Athens Convention and Hague/Hague Visby Rules and other ship/ferry issues. She has drafted brochure and ticket terms and conditions and contractual indemnities and acts for a number of ship operators. Gemma specialises in all aspects of marine casualty work but has a national reputation in the area of shipping/transport related personal injury and fatal accident cases. Her experience in this field is extensive covering accidents involving cargo ships, passenger ships and port/terminal operations. Gemma regularly carries out on site investigations in order to protect her clients' interests by preserving evidence and working effectively with the appropriate authorities. Gemma Pearce or [email protected] Materiality, Due Diligence and Multiple Occurrences In the recent decision of (1) Sealion Shipping (2) Toisa Horizon Inc v Valiant Insurance Co, Mr Justice Blair looked at the materiality of the non disclosure of a previous hull claim and the definition of "due diligence" in a Inchmaree clause. The facts of the claim were that in 2004 the Claimants' vessel "Toisa Pisces" suffered starboard motor failure due to a loose stator. During repairs the vessel of offhire for 10 days. In 2005 there were vibration problems with the port motor, and a loose stator was thought to be the cause, although on inspection a rotator was found to be the problem. The Claimant claimed for losses suffered from both the 2004 and 2005 incidents off their hull insurers. In 2008 the Claimants entered into a hire insurance agreement with the Defendant and the Claimant's brokers stated in their presentation that the vessel had an excellent hull record and no major business interruption claims. The policy noted that there had been an hull claim in 2005, that the vessel had not experienced any significant off-hire period and included a defence for insurers if breakdown is caused by the Claimant's want of due diligence. Furthermore, loss of hire was limited to 30 days per occurrence, plus there was an excess of 21 days for machinery claims. In 2009 "Toisa Pisces" suffered a port motor breakdown. The motor was replaced by the old starboard motor but there were two further failures and the vessel was off-hire for around three months. The fault was subsequently found to be a loose stator. A claim was made to the Defendant insurer for 30 days loss of hire. The Defendant refused indemnity on the grounds that the representation that there had only been one hull claim and no major business interruption constituted a material non-disclosure and/or misrepresentation. The Defendant's secondary position was that the breakdown in 2009 was due to a lack of due diligence for failing to properly inspect the starboard motor in 2004.

3 Page 3 of 6 The Defendant also argued that there were three separate breakdowns rather than one which had a significant effect on the excess periods applied. Mr Justice Blair in his judgment did criticise the brokers stating that disclosure of the hull claim would have been good broking practice but it did not automatically mean that the failure to disclose was material. To decide whether the non-disclosure was material in this instance Blair J stated that the hull claims had to be seen in light of the extent to which they caused periods of off-hire. Blair J's view was that a 10 day off period in 2004 was not material when compared to a 21 day excess in the current policy. Commercially this also made sense as it was not a particularly long period, was four years before this policy, there was no claim and it was not close to the excess period. Blair J also commented that the statements made by the broker that there had been no major business interruption periods and that the vessel had an excellent hull record were statements of opinion and made in good faith by the broker. With regards to the Defendant's second position, namely that the damage was due to the Claimant's lack of due diligence, Blair J provided a helpful clarification of the law on this issue. The standard of care required by the Claimant was one of negligence and "want of due diligence" meant lack of reasonable care. The stator had been inspected following the earlier incident and there was no reason to doubt that the inspection had not been adequate. Therefore there was no negligence on behalf of the Claimant. Finally the Defendant raised the argument that there had been three occurrences rather than one insured loss meaning that the excess period should be applied to all three occurrences substantially reducing the off hire claim. It was accepted by the Court that the failure of the port motor in February 2009 did lead to other incidents. The Claimants tried, reasonably in the view of Blair J, to deal with the issue by substituting the starboard motor. However there was a hydraulics failure which frustrated that attempt and then once the hydraulics issue was remedied, the starboard motor failed after only 2 days at sea. The parties arguments surrounding this was not supported by simple causation arguments. The Defendant's argument was that "but for" the hydraulics' failure the vessel would have been back on hire within the excess period, therefore there would have been no claim. The Claimant, on the other hand, stated that they could have not done anything differently, that they acted reasonably in getting the vessel repaired, reinstalled and sea-tested. Blair J accepted the Claimant's position and stated that this situation required a "practical approach" and accepted that the Claimant acted reasonably through their attempts to substitute the starboard motor and, as such, the entire off hire period should be accepted, rather than seeing them as three separate incidents. There were also some obiter comments from Blair J regarding an alternative position that the Defendants put forward as to the Claimants using the period whilst repairs were being undertaken to the port motor to undertake other general repairs and maintenance that were due later in the year. Blair J reiterated the position in The Ferdinand Retzlaff where ship owners had brought forward general maintenance at the same time as repairs were being undertaken following a collision. The Defendants in this matter were not able to claim any credit for these repairs being brought forward as it did not increase the cost of the collision repairs thus the wrongdoer should not benefit. Blair J agreed with the Claimants that the Defendant should not benefit from the Claimant's decision to take this sensible approach whilst the vessel was dry docked. Comment Blair J provides a clear judgment and clarification of some aspects of insurance law, and in particular, on materiality of non-disclosure that even where a broker is open to criticism for failure to disclose a past claim, that does not automatically mean that the nondisclosure is material. Blair J also reviews and reminds us that the standard of care when looking at "want of due diligence" is negligence. The theme of the judgment is practical commerciality and he is keen to give the Claimant the benefit of the doubt on this issue and also has to the number of insured occurrences took place. Accession of the European Union to the Protocol of 2002 to the Athens Convention relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea, 1974, with the exception of Articles 10 and 11 thereof. Introduction Following the adoption by the European Parliament and the Council decision on the EU s accession to the 2002 Athens Protocol on the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea, the European Union adhered to this Protocol on 15 December This EU accession does not take away the need for individual EU Member States to ratify or adhere to the 2002 Athens Protocol. In this respect it should be noted that since none of the EU Member States had ratified or acceded to the Athens Protocol by 31 December 2011, carriers of passenger ships flying a Member States flag and/or operating in EU waters will be bound by the EU legislation as from 1 January 2013, notably by Regulation 392/2009 of 23 April 2009 on the liability of carriers of passengers by sea in the event of accidents. What does this mean for the shipowner? Regulation 392/2009 Regulation 392/2009 aims at introducing a Community regime of liability and insurance for the carriage of passengers by sea in order to improve compensation for passengers who suffer damages and to improve the safety of maritime transport. This Regulation lays down a harmonised regime of liability and insurance for the carriage of passengers by sea, based on: Athens Convention relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea 1974, as amended by the Protocol of 2002 on the carriage of passengers; and International Maritime Organization (IMO) guidelines for implementation of the Athens Convention, adopted in Scope This Regulation applies to all international carriage and carriage by sea within a single Member State on board ships of Classes A and B pursuant to Directive 98/18/EC when: the ship is flying the flag of or is registered in a Member State; the contract of carriage has been signed in a Member State; the place of departure or of destination as laid down in the contract of carriage is situated within a Member State. Member States are free to extend the scope of this regulation to all domestic sea-going voyages.

4 Page 4 of 6 Liability and insurance According to the new liability regime established by the Regulation and taken from the Athens Convention, for damages related to navigation. accidents victims shall be covered by an ipso jure liability regime but must prove a fault on the part of the carrier in order to be compensated for damages. The limitations of liability to which carriers are entitled under the Athens Convention and the 2002 Protocol are also included and the overall limitations of liability established in application of the 1976 Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, as amended by the Protocol of 1996, are not affected. Carriers must all maintain insurance and victims shall be entitled to make claims directly against the insurer. If mobility equipment or any other equipment used by a passenger with reduced mobility is lost or damaged, the carrier shall be liable if the loss arising is the result of a fault or neglect on their part. Advance payment In the event of death or personal injury to a passenger caused by a shipping incident, the carrier responsible for all or part of the carriage shall make an advance payment proportionate to the damages suffered. However, this advance payment shall not constitute recognition of liability. Information to passengers The carrier or performing carrier shall ensure that passengers are informed clearly and precisely of their rights under this Regulation. The information shall be provided in the most appropriate format: at all points of sale, including by telephone and via the Internet where the contract of carriage is signed in a Member State; prior to departure where the place of departure is in a Member State; upon departure in all other cases. Entry into force This Regulation shall apply from the date of the entry into force of the Athens Convention for the Community, and in any case from no later than 31 December Conclusion The effect of this legislation coming into force on 31 December 2012 will mean that whilst the carriers limit of liability has not altered, they will be required to undertake the following: 1. Compulsory liability insurance; 2. In the event of death or personal injury to a passenger caused by a shipping incident make an advance payment; 3. If mobility equipment or any other equipment used by a passenger with reduced mobility is lost or damaged, the carrier shall be liable if the loss arising is the result of a fault or neglect on their part; 4. The carrier or performing carrier shall ensure that passengers are informed clearly and precisely of their rights under this Regulation. Protocol of 2002 to the Athens Convention relating to the carriage of passengers and their luggage by sea What does this mean for the shipowner? Articles numbered 1, 3, 4, 7, 8 and 16 are amended. Article 3 of the Convention is replaced by the following text:: Article 3 - Liability of the carrier 1. For the loss suffered as a result of the death of or personal injury to a passenger caused by a shipping incident, the carrier shall be liable to the extent that such loss in respect of that passenger on each distinct occasion does not exceed 250,000 units of account, unless the carrier proves that the incident: (a) (b) resulted from an act of war, hostilities, civil war, insurrection or a natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable and irresistible character; or was wholly caused by an act or omission done with the intent to cause the incident by a third party. If and to the extent that the loss exceeds the above limit, the carrier shall be further liable unless the carrier proves that the incident which caused the loss occurred without the fault or neglect of the carrier. 2. For the loss suffered as a result of the death of or personal injury to a passenger not caused by a shipping incident, the carrier shall be liable if the incident which caused the loss was due to the fault or neglect of the carrier. The burden of proving fault or neglect shall lie with the claimant. 3. For the loss suffered as a result of the loss of or damage to cabin luggage, the carrier shall be liable if the incident which caused the loss was due to the fault or neglect of the carrier. The fault or neglect of the carrier shall be presumed for loss caused by a shipping incident. 4. For the loss suffered as a result of the loss of or damage to luggage other than cabin luggage, the carrier shall be liable unless the carrier proves that the incident which caused the loss occurred without the fault or neglect of the carrier. 5. For the purposes of this Article: (a) (b) (c) (d) shipping incident means shipwreck, capsizing, collision or stranding of the ship, explosion or fire in the ship, or defect in the ship; fault or neglect of the carrier includes the fault or neglect of the servants of the carrier, acting within the scope of their employment; defect in the ship means any malfunction, failure or non-compliance with applicable safety regulations in respect of any part of the ship or its equipment when used for the escape, evacuation, embarkation and disembarkation of passengers; or when used for the propulsion, steering, safe navigation, mooring, anchoring, arriving at or leaving berth or anchorage, or damage control after flooding; or when used for the launching of life saving appliances; and loss shall not include punitive or exemplary damages. 6. The liability of the carrier under this Article only relates to loss arising from incidents that occurred in the course of the carriage. The burden of proving that the incident which caused the loss occurred in the course of the carriage, and the extent of the loss, shall lie with the claimant. 7. Nothing in this Convention shall prejudice any right of recourse of the carrier against any third party, or the defence of contributory negligence under Article 6 of this Convention. Nothing in this Article shall prejudice any right of limitation under Articles 7 or 8 of this Convention. 8. Presumptions of fault or neglect of a party or the allocation of the burden of proof to a party shall not prevent evidence in favour of that party from being considered.. The following text is added as Article 4bis of the Convention: Article 4bis - Compulsory insurance 1. When passengers are carried on board a ship registered in a State Party that is licensed to carry more than twelve passengers, and this Convention applies, any carrier who actually performs the whole or a part of the carriage shall maintain insurance or other financial security, such as the guarantee of a bank or similar financial institution, to cover liability under this

5 Page 5 of 6 Convention in respect of the death of and personal injury to passengers. The limit of the compulsory insurance or other financial security shall not be less than 250,000 units of account per passenger on each distinct occasion. Article 7 of the Convention is replaced by the following text: Article 7 - Limit of liability for death and personal injury 1. The liability of the carrier for the death of or personal injury to a passenger under Article 3 shall in no case exceed 400,000 units of account per passenger on each distinct occasion. Where, in accordance with the law of the court seized of the case, damages are awarded in the form of periodical income payments, the equivalent capital value of those payments shall not exceed the said limit. 2. A State Party may regulate by specific provisions of national law the limit of liability prescribed in paragraph 1, provided that the national limit of liability, if any, is not lower than that prescribed in paragraph 1. A State Party, which makes use of the option provided for in this paragraph, shall inform the Secretary-General of the limit of liability adopted or of the fact that there is none.. Article 8 of the Convention is replaced by the following text: Article 8 - Limit of liability for loss of or damage to luggage and vehicles 1. The liability of the carrier for the loss of or damage to cabin luggage shall in no case exceed 2,250 units of account per passenger, per carriage. 2. The liability of the carrier for the loss of or damage to vehicles including all luggage carried in or on the vehicle shall in no case exceed 12,700 units of account per vehicle, per carriage. 3. The liability of the carrier for the loss of or damage to luggage other than that mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall in no case exceed 3,375 units of account per passenger, per carriage. 4. The carrier and the passenger may agree that the liability of the carrier shall be subject to a deductible not exceeding 330 units of account in the case of damage to a vehicle and not exceeding 149 units of account per passenger in the case of loss of or damage to other luggage, such sum to be deducted from the loss or damage.. Conclusion The effect of the legislation coming into force on 1 January 2013 will mean increased limits on a carrier's liability (Articles 6 & 7), an extension of limitation periods (Article 9), and the introduction of compulsory insurance (Article 4bis). Grand Union Canal Regulations In Nigel Peter Moore v British Waterways Board the Court reviewed the powers that the British Waterways Board had over the Grand Union Canal. The Claimant lived on a boat along a tidal stretch of the Grand Union Canal. He also moored five other boats on the canal. The British Waterways Board ("BWB") served notices further to section 8 British Waterways Act 1983 ("1983 Act") on the Claimant to remove the boats moored on the canal for not having the necessary mooring licences. The Claimant argued that his riparian rights and that under the Grand Junction Canal Act 1793 ("1793 Act") there was a right to "full, free and uninterrupted use and enjoyment" of the area where his boats were moored, and because of his riparian rights, so the notices were invalid because BWB had served them on the misconceived premises that licences were required. Mr Justice Hildyard, mindful that he was dealing with a litigant in person, gave a full and comprehensive judgment over 50 pages, dealing with the relevant legislation that applied to this case. In brief he found that: the 1793 Act did not make unlicensed use of the canal lawful, other than navigation of tidal stretches, and the public right of passage did not include mooring. the right to the use and enjoyment of the wharf did not include the right to moor (Booth v Ratte (1890)). with regards to the powers available to BWB to issue notices on the Claimant, BWB had the power, on proper notice and subject to observance of proper process, to remove vessels moored without any mooring rights, including the Claimant's. it was accepted by the BWB that their section 8 powers were draconian and that public authorities must exercise such powers mindful of the legitimate expectation as to the manner in which they were exercised. By failing to issue a warning letter before exercising their section 8 powers BWB had breached the Claimant's legitimate expectation that it would follow its own procedures. as the Claimant was living on one of the boats, BWB had infringed his article 8 rights under the European Convention of Human Rights for using the section 8 power without first issuing a warning letter. Hildyard J urged BWB to bring forward clearer consolidated legislation to clarify their existing "disparate and complex" powers. Comment The Court (and Defendant solicitors) do have to tread carefully with litigants in person, and justice has to be seen to be done. This very full judgment insures that the Claimant is given every detail of the Court's findings and every argument is dealt with in full by Hildyard J. This matter relates to a long running claim where there are 2 other reported judgments ([2010] EWCA Civ 42 and Ch D (Martin Mann QC) 12/03/2009). From a practical point of view, this matter also illustrates that claims involving litigants in person often have a certain longevity which means significant costs building up that the Defendant is unlikely ever to recover. Although not always possible, when dealing with litigants in person, commercially it can be advisable to push for an early conclusion of the claim.

6 Page 6 of 6 further information If you would like further information about Greenwoods marine offering or to discuss any of the cases or issues featured in this Review, please contact Daniel Crockford on T or [email protected] To subscribe or unsubscribe from this newsletter, please [email protected] Seminars Greenwoods holds a series of training events for both our lawyers and interested clients. Below are the next three events being held. If you would like to attend any of the seminars please [email protected], indicating which you are interested in attending. PI UPDATE for Q1: ThE KEy CASES AND PROCEDURAL DEvELOPMENTS Date Time Location Speaker(s) 14 March Bedford Square Geoff Owen London WC1B 3JA Greenwoods SUBROGATION & PURSUING ACTIONS; PARTIES TO A RECOvERy ACTION Date Time Location Speaker(s) 29 March Gracechurch Street Jack Holborn London EC3V 0AS 39 Essex Street PRE-ACTION PROTOCOL, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE; WITNESS SUMMARIES & JURISDICTION Date Time Location Speaker(s) 19 April Gracechurch Street Emily Formby London EC3V 0AS 39 Essex Street Other Greenwoods publications Greenwoods produces a number of regular publications on various topics, namely: PERSONAL INJURY ALERT (Weekly) PROPERTY, CONSTRUCTION & INSURANCE REVIEW (Monthly) MOTOR CRIME FOCUS (Quarterly) FRAUD REVIEW (Quarterly) H&S REVIEW (Quarterly) If you would like to subscribe to any of the above publications, please [email protected], indicating which you would like to receive. The information and opinions contained in this document are not intended to be a comprehensive study, nor to provide legal advice, and should not be relied on or treated as a substitute for specific advice concerning individual situations. This document speaks as of its date and does not reflect any changes in law or practice after that date. Greenwoods is a firm of solicitors regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority in England and Wales. You can access the rules which regulate our professional conduct at: Greenwoods Solicitors 2011