Intelligence Driven Intrusion Detection
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1 Intelligence Driven Intrusion Detection Matthias Wübbeling: Arnold Sykosch: Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn: Working Group IT Security Fraunhofer Institute for Communication, Information Processing and Ergonomics FKIE: Cyber Security Department
2 OVERVIEW Threat Intelligence in a Nutshell Exchange of TI Utilization of TI STIX2Suricata STIX2GRR 2
3 Threat Intelligence in a Nutshell What do you need TI for? Identify emerging threats before being targeted by an attacker. Share intelligence information of ongoing or finished attacks. Common sense: To survive, a gazelle must run faster than the slowest gazelle. 3 (image from Common sense is not so common (unknown source). How about this quote in the field of Internet attacks / APT?
4 Threat Intelligence in a Nutshell How about the hunters and the hunted in the Internet age? To survive: You have to be faster than the fastest attacker! 4
5 Threat Intelligence in a Nutshell How about the hunters and the hunted in the Internet age? To survive: You have to be faster than the fastest attacker! Common goal: Being faster than 85%-99% of the attackers. 5
6 Exchange of Threat Intelligence Common data exchange format: XML Existing standards for TI data: OpenIOC STIX/CybOX OpenIOC OpenIOC is an extensible XML schema for the description of technical characteristics that identify a known threat, an attacker s methodology, or other evidence of compromise. OpenIOC was created by MANDIANT ( STIX/CybOX Developed by MITRE. At least as expressively as OpenIOC. Therefore: => we use STIX/CybOX. How to get Threat Intelligence? Become part of a TI sharing community Buy TI feeds or get the free ones (e.g. from hailataxii.com) 6
7 Utilization of Threat Intelligence How to use Threat Intelligence to protect your infrastructure? Have an employee consuming TI the whole day extracting the relevant information? 7
8 Utilization of Threat Intelligence How to use Threat Intelligence to protect your infrastructure? Have an employee consuming TI the whole day extracting the relevant information? Better not! 8
9 Utilization of Threat Intelligence How to use Threat Intelligence to protect your infrastructure? Have an employee consuming TI the whole day extracting the relevant information? Better not! Enable your security equipment to understand STIX/CybOX? 9
10 Utilization of Threat Intelligence How to use Threat Intelligence to protect your infrastructure? Have an employee consuming TI the whole day extracting the relevant information? Better not! Enable your security equipment to understand STIX/CybOX? Not possible if you use security appliances. 10
11 Utilization of Threat Intelligence How to use Threat Intelligence to protect your infrastructure? Have an employee consuming TI the whole day extracting the relevant information? Better not! Enable your security equipment to understand STIX/CybOX? Not possible if you use security appliances. Beg the vendor or your appliance to implement STIX/CybOX? 11
12 Utilization of Threat Intelligence How to use Threat Intelligence to protect your infrastructure? Have an employee consuming TI the whole day extracting the relevant information? Better not! Enable your security equipment to understand STIX/CybOX? Not possible if you use security appliances. Beg the vendor or your appliance to implement STIX/CybOX? Sure you do! Will take a while. 12
13 Utilization of Threat Intelligence How to use Threat Intelligence to protect your infrastructure? Have an employee consuming TI the whole day extracting the relevant information? Better not! Enable your security equipment to understand STIX/CybOX? Not possible if you use security appliances. Beg the vendor or your appliance to implement STIX/CybOX? Sure you do! Will take a while. Map STIX/CybOX information to the applications /appliances configuration! 13
14 Utilization of Threat Intelligence How to use Threat Intelligence to protect your infrastructure? Have an employee consuming TI the whole day extracting the relevant information? Better not! Enable your security equipment to understand STIX/CybOX? Not possible if you use security appliances. Beg the vendor or your appliance to implement STIX/CybOX? Sure you do! Will take a while. Map STIX/CybOX information to the applications /appliances configuration! Might be a good chance to get it now! 14
15 Utilization of Threat Intelligence How to use Threat Intelligence to protect your infrastructure? Have an employee consuming TI the whole day extracting the relevant information? Better not! Enable your security equipment to understand STIX/CybOX? Not possible if you use security appliances. Beg the vendor or your appliance to implement STIX/CybOX? Sure you do! Will take a while. Map STIX/CybOX information to the applications /appliances configuration! Might be a good chance to get it now! We just started to map STIX to a Host and a Network IDS: Suricata (NIDS; same rule syntax as SNORT) GRR Rapid Response (HIDS; hunting for artifacts ) 15
16 STIX2Suricata Goal: Generate Suricata rules based on STIX/CybOX TI. 1 st Step: Identify relevant data fields in STIX/CybOX. 2 nd Step: Mapping identified fields to Suricata rule elements. 3 rd Step: Implement tool for automated rule generation. STIX/CybOX elements relevant for network intrustion detection systems: Address, NetworkConnection, Packet, Port, Socket ArchiveFile, DNSQuery, DNSRecord, DomainName, Message, File, Hostname, HTTPSession, Link, NetFlow, URI, X509Certificate 16
17 STIX2Suricata Suricata rule syntax: <Action> <Header> <Options> 17
18 STIX2Suricata Suricata rule syntax: <Action> <Header> <Options> <Action> Pass Drop Reject Alert 18
19 STIX2Suricata Suricata rule syntax: <Action> <Header> <Options> <Action> Pass Drop Reject Alert <Header> Protocol: (IP/UDP/TCP + some application layer protocols) Source IP-Address Source TCP/UDP-Port Direction of traffic Destination IP-Address Destination TCP/UDP-Port STIX2Suricata mapping for <Header> elements: Address, NetworkConnection, Packet, Port, Socket 19
20 STIX2Suricata <Header> mapping example: STIX/Cybox data: <indicator:observable id="example:observable-1c a4cd-434d-a d6980c459"> <cybox:object id="example:object-1980ce43-8e03-490b-863a-ea404d12242e"> <cybox:properties xsi:type="addressobject:addressobjecttype" category="ipv4-addr"> <AddressObject:Address_Value condition="equals" apply_condition="any"> ##comma## ##comma## </AddressObject:Address_Value> </cybox:properties> </cybox:object> </indicator:observable> 20 Resulting Suricata rule: alert ip [ , , ] any <> any any (<Options>)
21 STIX2Suricata Suricata rule syntax: <Action> <Header> <Options> <Options> msg sid rev gid classtype reference priority metadata content STIX2Suricata mapping for <Options> elements: ArchiveFile, DNSQuery, DNSRecord, DomainName, Message, File, Hostname, HTTPSession, Link, NetFlow, URI, X509Certificate 21
22 STIX2Suricata <Options> mapping example: STIX/Cybox data: < MessageObj:Header> < MessageObj:From category=" "> <AddressObj:Address_Value condition="startswith"> </AddressObj:Address_Value> </ MessageObj:From> </ MessageObj:Header> <cybox:related_objects> <cybox:related_object> <cybox:properties xsi:type="fileobj:fileobjecttype"> <FileObj:File_Extension>pdf</FileObj:File_Extension> <FileObj:Size_In_Bytes>87022</FileObj:Size_In_Bytes> </cybox:properties> </cybox:related_object> </cybox:related_objects> 22 Resulting Suricata rule: alert tcp any any <> any any (msg:"stix2suricata: Malicious "; flow:established; content:from: nocase; fileext:"pdf"; sid:513000; )
23 STIX2Suricata Current development status: Python prototype maps data relevant for NIDS to Suricata rules. Integration into [large company name here] Threat Intelligence tool. 23
24 STIX2GRR GRR Rapid Response (GRR) GRR is forensic framework focused on scalability enabling powerful analysis. ( A forensic framework is not a Host IDS!!!11? But: It is possible to use GRR to remotely get the state of host systems. Why GRR and not OSSEC or similar? GRR is state based as STIX/CybOX data is 24 GRR is hunt based Define artifact to look for. Select target hosts. Start hunt. Wait for rapid responses.
25 STIX2GRR GRR Rapid Response (GRR) GRR is highly extensible and written in python. 25 Image from:
26 STIX2GRR Mapable STIX/CybOX data fields: WindowsDriver, ArchiveFile, File, ImageFile, PDFFile, UnixFile, WindowsExecutableFile, WindowsFile, Mutex, Address, DomainName, DNSQuery, Message, HTTPSession, NetworkConnection, SocketAddress, URI, Process, UnixProcess, WindowsProcess, WindowsRegistryKey Goal: Generate hunts for given STIX/CybOX TI data: 1 st Step: Identify relevant data fields in STIX/CybOX. 2 nd Step: Mapping identified fields to artifacts. 3 rd Step: Implement tool for automated hunt generation (+ artifact support). 26
27 STIX2GRR Current development status: Python prototype maps data relevant for HIDS and creates hunts directly in GRR server system. Integration into [large company name here] Threat Intelligence tool. 27
28 Conclusion Identified relevant Objects in STIX/CybOX. Created mapping for STIX/CybOX => (N H)IDS. Implemented prototype as proof-of-concept. Integrated it into a TI management framework. 28
29 Questions? Thank you very much for your attention 29 Credits: Image Lion and Gazelle from quoteinvestigator.com. Image GRR hunt from github.com/google/grr Other images from pixabay.com (CC License)
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